Le résumé des témoignages par le juge à l'attention du jury

Boucher c. R., 2006 QCCA 668 (CanLII)

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[160]      Comme c'est l'usage, surtout après une longue instruction, le juge a voulu résumer les témoignages.

[161]      Il est relativement facile de faire un résumé d'un interrogatoire principal.  Il est beaucoup plus difficile de faire voir qu'une réponse donnée en contre-interrogatoire constitue une contradiction avec une autre réponse du témoin ou avec la version d'un autre témoin; ou de faire voir une incohérence ou quelque chose non plausible.  Souvent une telle réponse peut être une incohérence, une contradiction, une chose non plausible, une exagération ou une imprécision pour un avocat alors qu'elle ne le sera pas pour son adversaire ou pour le juge.

[162]      C'est pourquoi, en résumant les témoignages, un juge n'a pas l'obligation de faire une analyse en détail de chaque incohérence, contradiction ou chose non plausible en rappelant l'argumentation pour ou contre des parties sur chaque élément.  À cet égard on peut se référer aux arrêts suivants : Devillers c. R., 2005 QCCA 660 (CanLII), J.E. 2005-1406 (C.A.); Savard c. R., J.E. 2005-1729 (C.A.); Binette c. R., J.E 2005-97 (C.A.); R. c. Rochon (2002), 2002 CanLII 23616 (QC CA), 167 C.C.C. (3^e) 257 (C.A.Q.); R. c. Laflamme, [2002] J.Q. n° 26 (C.A.).

La pertinence des questions posées en contre-interrogatoire doit s’apprécier sous l'éclairage de la procédure (requête ou contre-interrogatoire au fond)

Boucher c. R., 2006 QCCA 668 (CanLII)

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[135]      L’appelant plaide que le juge a erré en limitant indûment l’interrogatoire de certains témoins par la défense au cours du voir-dire dont il est question dans notre étude du 11^e moyen.

[136]      L’appelant ne démontre pas en quoi le juge aurait limité son droit à l’interrogatoire.

[137]      C’est dans le contexte d’une requête bien précise que ces interrogatoires ont été conduits.  La pertinence de certaines questions doit donc s’apprécier sous l'éclairage des objectifs de cette requête.  Or, le juge a largement permis à l’avocat de l’appelant d’interroger les témoins même si, à première vue, la pertinence de certaines questions paraissait ténue.

[138]      Par ailleurs, le droit en cause est celui d’interroger les témoins et non de les contre-interroger.  Même si les règles de l’interrogatoire peuvent parfois être partiellement relâchées compte tenu de la qualité des témoins en cause ou de la nature de la procédure dans laquelle l’interrogatoire s’inscrit, il est nécessaire de noter la distinction lorsqu'on apprécie les décisions qui ont limité les interrogatoires.

Consentir un privilège ou un avantage à un témoin collaborateur de justice est acceptable

Boucher c. R., 2006 QCCA 668 (CanLII)

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[106]      Bien sûr, toute personne citée comme témoin doit déposer et dire la vérité.  Mais le délateur, qui a bien souvent participé aux activités criminelles qui sont reprochées à l’accusé, est dans une situation fort différente du témoin ordinaire.

[107]      En conséquence, on ne peut permettre qu'un délateur témoigne sans protection.  Comme cette protection ne peut être assurée par un privilège protégeant son identité, l’État doit recourir à d'autres mesures comme l'octroi d'une nouvelle identité, le relogement, etc.

[108]      Dans R. c. Thresh, [2003] J.Q. n° 11326 (C.A.), la Cour, sous la plume du juge Proulx, approuve le dépôt en preuve d’une telle entente afin, notamment, que le tribunal puisse veiller à la bonne administration de la justice dans le cadre d’un exercice qui doit être transparent :

[28] Appliquant ce principe au cas à l’étude, j’estime que c’est fondamentalement une question de transparence dans le traitement des témoins-délateurs qui légitime la preuve du contrat de délation en interrogatoire principal.  Il n’y a pas si longtemps, les conditions de l’entente entre l’État et le délateur étaient gardées secrètes, si bien que toutes les spéculations sur l’intérêt du témoin étaient possibles.  Pourtant, comme l’avait souligné le juge McIntyre dans l’arrêt Palmer c. La Reine 1979 CanLII 8 (CSC), [1980] 1 R.C.S. 759, p. 779, il est de la responsabilité des tribunaux de s’assurer qu’en accordant une protection à ce type de témoin, on ne fera rien qui puisse influencer les témoins à charge, nuire de quelque façon au procès ou entraîner un déni de justice.  Pour ma part, je crois qu’il serait assez paradoxal d’exiger du ministère public une totale transparence dans ses ententes avec les délateurs et de ne pas lui permettre de mettre cartes sur table si ce délateur témoigne.  Le contraire laisserait croire au juge des faits, si seule la défense pouvait y référer, que la transparence est à sens unique.

[29] Au Québec, il semble que le dépôt en preuve de ce contrat par le ministère public est une pratique courante.  L’article 9 de la directive TEM-3 du 9 octobre 1991 oblige même les substituts du Procureur général à le faire; l’article 2 de la même directive indique que le substitut ne peut recourir au témoignage d’un témoin repenti que s’il existe une entente écrite conclue entre ce témoin et le comité de contrôle.  […]

[31] Pour conclure sur ce premier volet de la discussion, j’estime que le dépôt en preuve du contrat de délation lors de l’interrogatoire principal ne visait qu’indirectement à rehausser la crédibilité du délateur Bastien et se justifiait par d’autres objectifs légaux : 1) faire la preuve de transparence à l’égard des ententes prises avec le témoin, 2) anticiper toute question en contre-interrogatoire de nature à mettre en doute cette transparence, 3) éviter de présenter au jury une image déformée du témoin.

[109]      L’entente en cause prévoit par ailleurs des obligations qui ne visent pas spécifiquement la protection de Gagné, singulièrement l’engagement du procureur général d’ordonner l'arrêt de la procédure concernant une accusation de meurtre et de  faire au tribunal certaines observations en faveur de Gagné.  Il ne s'agit pas d'obligations qui visent à assurer la protection du témoin; elles visent plutôt à assurer sa collaboration.

[110]      De tels engagements ne sont pas pour autant illégaux et de nature à ternir l'administration de la justice.  La protection de la société requiert que le ministère public fasse des choix pour le bien commun.  Les tribunaux doivent évidemment demeurer vigilants afin de détecter toute tentative par la poursuite d’influencer un témoignage.  (R. c. Palmer, précité)

[111]      Dans R. c. Heng, [1995] A.Q. n° 427 (C.A.), le juge Rothman écrit :

[29] It is clear that Turcotte received very favourable treatment for his cooperation with the police and for the evidence he was to give at appellant’s trial.  Tacitly at least, the police accepted his refusal to identify the 3 men who hired him.  And in the end, after giving his evidence at appellant’s trial, Turcotte himself received a suspended sentence.

[30] There is no doubt that, in certain cases, the Crown must rely on informers and co-conspirators to provide evidence implicating an accused person in the commission of a crime.  Sometimes this involves an agreement of favourable treatment for a witness; it may also involve arrangements for the protection of the witness and his or her family.  The courts must, however, be vigilant to assure that these arrangements do not influence the evidence of witnesses or undermine the integrity of the trial.

[112]      Consentir un privilège ou un avantage à un témoin est donc acceptable mais les tribunaux doivent veiller à ce que ces avantages ne constituent pas une incitation directe au parjure comme, notamment, la promesse d’une rémunération à la condition que le témoignage entraîne une condamnation.  (R. c. Xénos, [1991] A.Q. n° 2200, (C.A.))

Il ne faudrait pas attribuer aux questions énoncées dans W. (D.) un caractère sacré ou un degré de perfection immuable

R. c. J.H.S., [2008] 2 RCS 152, 2008 CSC 30 (CanLII)

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[13]                          Bref, il ne faudrait pas attribuer aux questions énoncées dans W. (D.) un caractère sacré ou un degré de perfection immuable que leur auteur n’a jamais revendiqué pour elles.  Le message transmis par W. (D.) — soit que le jury doit être informé de manière limpide que le ministère public n’est jamais libéré du fardeau de prouver tous les éléments de l’infraction hors de tout doute raisonnable — est d’une importance capitale; son application ne devrait toutefois pas laisser la forme l’emporter sur le fond.  Dans R. c. S. (W.D.), 1994 CanLII 76 (CSC), [1994] 3 R.C.S. 521, le juge Cory a réitéré que les directives énoncées dans W. (D.) n’ont pas à être récitées « mot à mot comme une incantation » (p. 533).  Dans R. c. Avetysan, [2000] 2 R.C.S. 745, 2000 CSC 56 (CanLII), le juge Major qui s’exprimait au nom des juges de la majorité a souligné que, dans toutes les causes où la question de la crédibilité revêt de l’importance, « [c]e qu’il importe vraiment de déterminer, c’est essentiellement si les directives du juge du procès ont donné au jury l’impression qu’il devait choisir entre les deux versions des événements » (par. 19).  L’essentiel c’est que le manque de crédibilité de l’accusé n’équivaut pas à une preuve de sa culpabilité hors de tout doute raisonnable.

La définition de la séquestration

Grey c. R., 2010 QCCA 1776 (CanLII)

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[64]           Selon la jurisprudence, si pendant un laps de temps assez long une personne est soumise à la contrainte physique ou forcée d’agir contre sa volonté de sorte qu’elle n’est pas libre de ses mouvements, il s’agit d’une séquestration au sens de l’article 279(2) C.cr.

La définition du doute raisonnable

R. c. Lifchus, [1997] 3 RCS 320, 1997 CanLII 319 (CSC)

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36                     Il serait peut‑être utile de résumer ce que la définition devrait et ne devrait pas contenir.  Les explications suivantes devraient être données:

∙     la norme de la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable est inextricablement liée au principe fondamental de tous les procès pénaux, c’est‑à‑dire la présomption d’innocence;

∙     le fardeau de la preuve incombe à la poursuite tout au long du procès et ne se déplace jamais sur les épaules de l’accusé;

∙     un doute raisonnable ne peut être fondé sur la sympathie ou sur un préjugé;

∙     il repose plutôt sur la raison et le bon sens;

∙     il a un lien logique avec la preuve ou l’absence de preuve;

∙     la norme n’exige pas une preuve correspondant à la certitude absolue; il ne s’agit pas d’une preuve au-delà de n’importe quel doute; il ne peut s’agir non plus d’un doute imaginaire ou frivole;

∙     il faut davantage que la preuve que l’accusé est probablement coupable — le jury qui conclut seulement que l’accusé est probablement coupable doit acquitter l’accusé.

37                           Par contre, certaines mentions concernant la norme de preuve requise doivent être évitées.  Par exemple:

∙     le fait de décrire l’expression «doute raisonnable» comme étant une expression ordinaire, qui n’a pas de sens spécial dans le contexte du droit pénal;

∙     le fait d’inviter les jurés à appliquer la même norme de preuve que celle qu’ils utilisent, dans leur propre vie, pour prendre des décisions importantes, voire les plus importantes de ces décisions;

∙     le fait d’assimiler preuve «hors de tout doute raisonnable» à une preuve correspondant à la «certitude morale»;

∙     le fait de qualifier le mot «doute» par d’autres adjectifs que «raisonnable», par exemple «sérieux», «substantiel» ou «obsédant», qui peuvent induire le jury en erreur;

∙     le fait de dire aux jurés qu’ils peuvent déclarer l’accusé coupable s’ils sont «sûrs» de sa culpabilité, avant de leur avoir donné une définition appropriée du sens des mots «hors de tout doute raisonnable».

La 6e étape de Garofoli

R v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524 (CanLII)

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[84]      In Garofoli, which involved a challenge to a conventional authorization under what is now Part VI of the Criminal Code, Sopinka J. set out a procedure to be followed when the Crown objects to disclosing part of the affidavit filed in support of an application for authorization: see Garofoli, at p. 1461.  The same procedure applies to an ITO relied upon to support issuance of a search warrant: R. v. Blake, 2010 ONCA 1 (CanLII), 251 C.C.C. (3d) 4, at para. 15; R. v. Rocha, 2012 ONCA 707 (CanLII), 112 O.R. (3d) 742, at para. 56.

[85]      Step six of Garofoli may be invoked when the editing of the supportive affidavit or ITO to ensure compliance with the CI privilege rule renders the affidavit or ITO incapable of satisfying the conditions precedent for issuance of the warrant or authorization.  Step six is in these terms, at p. 1461:

6.    If, however, the editing renders the authorization insupportable, then the Crown may apply to have the trial judge consider so much of the excised material as is necessary to support the authorization.  The trial judge should accede to such a request only if satisfied that the accused is sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence.  In this regard, a judicial summary of the excised material should be provided if it will fulfill that function.  It goes without saying that if the Crown is dissatisfied with the extent of disclosure and is of the view that the public interest will be prejudiced, it can withdraw tender of the wiretap evidence.

The step six procedure attempts to balance conflicting interests.  On the one hand, the interests of law enforcement, including the duty to ensure the protection of informers and preserve the near-absolute sanctity of CI privilege.  On the other hand, the right of every person charged with a crime to make full answer and defence: see Garofoli, at p. 1458.  The balancing is not a weighing of absolutes for, as we have already seen, neither the right to make full answer and defence nor CI privilege is absolute.

[86]      Step six adopts a quid pro quo approach to this balancing process. This involves, on the one hand, permitting the Crown to rely upon the unredacted ITO, which has not been disclosed to the defence, to support the issuance of the warrant.  And on the other hand, permitting the defence to challenge the issuance of the warrant, and thus the reasonableness of the search, on the basis of the redacted ITO and a judicial summary of the nature of the redacted material.  The Crown may only invoke step six, however, where the summary makes the accused sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence: Crevier, at para. 43; Garofoli, at p. 1461.  A summary that fails to meet this standard disentitles the Crown to rely on the unredacted ITO to sustain the issuance of the warrant as the enabling search authority. 

[87]      Three points about the judicial summary are worthy of reminder.

[88]      First, what is provided is a summary.  By its very nature, a summary is general, not detailed.  Its predominant characteristics are conciseness and brevity.  A summary eschews detail.  Indeed, were a summary to contain the last detail, it would not only exceed what is required by step six but also, in all likelihood, breach CI privilege.

[89]      Second, and despite its general nature, the summary must provide an accused with a meaningful basis on which to challenge whether the author of the ITO made full and frank disclosure of the Debot factors relating to the CI: Crevier, at para. 83. 

[90]      Third, the summary need only make the accused aware of the nature of the redacted material, not its substance and not its details.  The summary must be sufficient to allow the accused to mount a challenge to the redacted material by argument or evidence.  But recall that the judicial summary is not the only means available to an accused to challenge the issuance of the warrant.  An accused may seek leave to cross-examine the author of the ITO, may rely on other information that has been the subject of Crown disclosure, or may adduce other evidence: Crevier, at paras. 72, 77 and 83. 

Le droit à la communication de la preuve & le privilège de l'informateur

R v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524 (CanLII)

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[77]      An accused’s right to make full answer and defence, a principle of fundamental justice constitutionally protected under s. 7 of the Charter, includes the right to full and timely disclosure, the right to know the case to meet, the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence proffered for admission by the Crown, and the right to cross-examination: Crevier, at para. 52. 

[78]      On the other hand, neither the right to make full answer and defence nor the right to disclosure is absolute.  For example, however fundamental, the right to make full answer and defence does not reach so far that it issues a blank cheque to an accused to pursue any and every conceivable tactic and line of inquiry in service of defending him or herself against an allegation of crime: Crevier, at para. 53; R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 64.  Context and the presence and influence of other competing interests are of importance in establishing the outer boundaries of the right: Crevier, at para. 53. 

[79]      Nor is an accused’s right to disclosure absolute.  It is subject to the discretion of the Crown, a discretion which extends to the enforcement of CI privilege: R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at pp. 335-36 and 339.

[80]      Confidential informant privilege is a class privilege.  The rule is of fundamental importance to the workings of our criminal justice system: Bisaillon v. Keable, 1983 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60, at p. 105; R. v. Leipert, 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 10.

[81]      Informer privilege is of such importance that, once established, a court is not entitled to balance the benefit that enures from the privilege against countervailing considerations: Leipert, at paras. 12 and 14.  The only exception to the rule is innocence at stake.  No exception exists for the right to make full answer and defence: Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 43(CanLII), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, at para. 28.

[82]      Preservation of the near absolute nature of CI privilege has significant implications for the redaction process as well as for requests for further disclosure about the informant’s sources of knowledge or the nature of the information provided.  It is virtually impossible for a court to know what details may reveal the identity of a CI: Leipert, at para. 28; World Bank Group v. Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 (CanLII), 395 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 129.

[83]      An absolute CI privilege rule, subject only to the innocence at stake exception, is consistent with the protection the Charteraccords to the right to a fair trial: Leipert, at para. 24; Vancouver Sun, at para. 28.

Comment apprécier la légalité et la raisonnabilité d'une fouille sans mandat

R. v. Amare, 2014 ONSC 4119 (CanLII)

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[85]          As to the police authority to search a vehicle without a search warrant, the following principles apply:

(1)         warrantless searches are an exception in Canadian law and are presumptively unreasonable unless justified by the Crown on a balance of probabilities: R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at para. 21; R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 (CanLII), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 84

(2)         however, “[a] warrantless search…may be justified at common law if it is a search incident to arrest”: R. v. Valentine, 2014 ONCA 147 (CanLII), at para. 43 (appln for leave to appeal filed [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 183)

(3)         if the arrest itself is not lawful or valid, then the search incident to such an arrest is itself unlawful and therefore unreasonable and violative of s. 8 of the Charter: Chehil, at para. 55; R. v. Caslake, 1998 CanLII 838 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 13; R. v. Day, 2014 NLCA 14 (CanLII), at para. 60 (appeal as of right filed [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 136)

(4)         a search incident to arrest is constrained by these limits:

In Cloutier [v. Langlois, 1990 CanLII 122 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158], L'Heureux-Dubé J. also recognized the potential breadth of this police power. She held that the court must balance the state's interests in law enforcement and the protection of the police against the arrested person's interest in privacy in order to determine whether a search was a reasonable and justifiable use of the police power. She then set out three important limits on the power to search incident to arrest (at p. 186):

1. This power does not impose a duty. The police have some discretion in conducting the search. Where they are satisfied that the law can be effectively and safely applied without a search, the police may see fit not to conduct a search. They must be in a position to assess the circumstances of each case so as to determine whether a search meets the underlying objectives.

2. The search must be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, such as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against the accused. The purpose of the search must not be unrelated to the objectives of the proper administration of justice, which would be the case for example if the purpose of the search was to intimidate, ridicule or pressure the accused in order to obtain admissions.

3. The search must not be conducted in an abusive fashion and in particular, the use of physical or psychological constraint should be proportionate to the objectives sought and the other circumstances of the situation.

If all three of these conditions are met, and the arrest itself is lawful, the search will be "authorized by law" for the purposes of s. 8 of the Charter. In the case at bar there is no allegation that the arrest was unlawful or that the search was abusive. Rather, the problem in this case is that the objective and scope of the search exceeded its permissible limits.

(Caslake, at para. 14)

(5)         in appropriate cases, a search incident to arrest may be executed upon a motor vehicle: Caslake; Day.

[86]          To be reasonable, any search must be executed in a reasonable manner:

(1)         it must be borne in mind that when the police work in a close encounter with someone who may have committed a criminal offence, they must have reasonable resort to measures to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, harm to themselves: R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52 (CanLII), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 43; R. v. Mellenthin, 1992 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at p. 623

(2)         when the police execute extraordinary measures as an aspect of arrest or search, consideration of whether their actions are based upon reasonably based and genuinely held beliefs, depends not only the factual circumstances of a particular case, but also the experience of the officers in similar situations, and their related training - “Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions”: Florida v. J.L., at p. 272 - the courts should exercise some caution before attempting “to micromanage the police’s choice of equipment”: R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31 (CanLII), [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, at para. 31

(3)         indeed, the courts have recognized the real potential for the presence of firearms in the immediate vicinity of significant quantities of illicit drugs as the trafficker seeks to protect his or her valuable commodity: United States v. Garcia, U.S.C.A. 10th Cir. (May 12, 2014; No. 13-2155), at pp. 12-3, 16; United States v. Beltram, U.S.C.A. 7th Cir. (May 15, 2014; No. 12-2990), at p. 9.

Le cadre juridique applicable à l'examen de la légalité d'une arrestation (incluant quand les motifs raisonnables proviennent d'un informateur)

R. v. Amare, 2014 ONSC 4119 (CanLII)

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[83]          In assessing whether the police breached s. 9 of the Charter in arresting a person, the following considerations apply:

(1)         an arbitrary arrest includes an unlawful arrest: R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at paras. 55, 57

(2)         an arrest will be unlawful, and arbitrary, if the arresting officer does not have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the subject has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offence: Criminal Code, s. 495(1)

(3)         although it has been observed that “the onus is on the Crown to show that the objective facts” rise to the level supporting a lawful detention (R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 (CanLII), [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220, at para. 45), it has generally been recognized that the onus is on the accused to demonstrate that his detention was unlawful: R. v. Nartey, 2013 ONCA 215 (CanLII), at para. 14

(4)         not only must the police officer have reasonable grounds in the subjective sense of a personal, honestly-held belief, but also the asserted grounds must be justified upon an objective measure of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the officer: R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 (CanLII), [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250, at paras. 62-3, 83; R. v. Storrey, 1990 CanLII 125 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at pp. 250-1

(5)         in other words, the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard “consists of compelling and credible information that provides an objective basis”, objectively discernible facts, for drawing inferences as to the existence of factual circumstances: Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at para. 117

(6)         the fact “that an experienced constable has an honest subjective belief, while not conclusive, is itself some evidence that the belief is objectively reasonable”: R. v. Biccum, 2012 ABCA 80 (CanLII), at para. 21; see also R. v. Luong, 2010 BCCA 158 (CanLII), at para. 19; Chehil, at para. 47

(7)         reasonable and probable grounds does not involve a mathematical assessment of facts and circumstances but rather a common-sense, non-technical approach – it is necessarily a qualitative standard upon which reasonable people can differ in some cases: R. v. Campbell (2010), 2010 ONCA 588 (CanLII), 261 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 52-4 (affd 2011 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 549); Chehil, at paras. 29, 62, 69; MacKenzie, at para. 71; R. v. Ward, 2012 ONCA 660 (CanLII), at para. 116

(8)         that said, reasonable grounds is about “probabilities” (Chehil, at paras. 27-8; MacKenzie, at para. 74), not confidence at the level of no reasonable doubt (R. v. Debot (1986), 1986 CanLII 113 (ON CA), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 219 (affd (1989), 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.), at pp. 198, 213), nor at the low threshold of mere suspicion or possibility (R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 37; R. v. Baron (1993), 1993 CanLII 154 (SCC), 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510 (S.C.C.), at paras. 43, 47

(9)         the standard of reasonable probability applied to the totality of the circumstances, considering the relevant facts cumulatively, where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion and possibility, does not demand that police officers “always be correct, but that they always be reasonable” United States v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2012)

(10)      reasonable probability does not require that the level of confidence of the officer rise to the equivalent of, or beyond, a balance of probabilities: Mugesera, at para. 14; R. v. Spence, 2011 BCCA 280 (CanLII), at para. 31; R. v. Loewen (2010), 2010 ABCA 255 (CanLII), 260 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 18 (affd 2011 SCC 21 (CanLII), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 167); R. v. Jacobson (2006), 2006 CanLII 12292 (ON CA), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 270 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 22; Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1052 (2013)

(11)      in assessing whether she or he has reasonable grounds, a police officer must take into account all available information disregarding only such information as she or he has good reason to believe is unreliable: R. v. Golub (1997), 1997 CanLII 6316 (ON CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 203 – the officer is not required “to undertake further investigation to seek out exculpatory factors or rule out possible innocent explanations”: Chehil, at paras. 34, 67

(12)      an officer’s training and experience may provide “an objective experiential…basis” for grounds of belief: Chehil, at para. 47; MacKenzie, at paras. 62-4, 73

(13)      a court reviewing the existence of reasonable grounds concerns itself “only with the circumstances known to the officers”: R. v. Wong, 2011 BCCA 13 (CanLII), at para. 19 (leave to appeal denied [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 90) (emphasis in original)

(14)      provided that the officer who directs that an arrest take place has reasonable and probable grounds, officers acting under his or her direction are deemed to be acting on those grounds: Debot (S.C.C.), at pp. 206, 214.

[84]          Not infrequently, the police act upon hearsay information received from a confidential informant. Within limits, they are entitled to do so:

(1)         general principles can be derived from these authorities:

Consequently, a mere statement by the informant that he or she was told by a reliable informer that a certain person is carrying on a criminal activity or that drugs would be found at a certain place would be an insufficient basis for the granting of the warrant. The underlying circumstances disclosed by the informer for his or her conclusion must be set out, thus enabling the justice to satisfy himself or herself that there are reasonable grounds for believing what is alleged. I am of the view that such a mere conclusory statement made by an informer to a police officer would not constitute reasonable grounds for conducting a warrantless search or for making an arrest without warrant. Highly relevant to whether information supplied by an informer constitutes reasonable grounds to justify a warrantless search or an arrest without warrant are whether the informer's "tip" contains sufficient detail to ensure it is based on more than mere rumour or gossip, whether the informer discloses his or her source or means of knowledge and whether there are any indicia of his or her reliability, such as the supplying of reliable information in the past or confirmation of part of his or her story by police surveillance. I do not intend to imply that each of these relevant criteria must be present in every case, provided that the totality of the circumstances meets the standard of the necessary reasonable grounds for relief.

(Debot (OCA), at pp. 218-9)

…

In my view, there are at least three concerns to be addressed in weighing evidence relied on by the police to justify a warrantless search. First, was the information predicting the commission of a criminal offence compelling? Secondly, where that information was based on a "tip" originating from a source outside the police, was that source credible? Finally, was the information corroborated by police investigation prior to making the decision to conduct the search? I do not suggest that each of these factors forms a separate test. Rather, I concur with Martin J.A.'s view that the "totality of the circumstances" must meet the standard of reasonableness. Weaknesses in one area may, to some extent, be compensated by strengths in the other two.

...

In my opinion, it should not be necessary for the police to confirm each detail in an informant's tip so long as the sequence of events actually observed conforms sufficiently to the anticipated pattern to remove the possibility of innocent coincidence. As I noted earlier, however, the level of verification required may be higher where the police rely on an informant whose credibility cannot be assessed or where fewer details are provided and the risk of innocent coincidence is greater.

(Debot (SCC), at pp. 215, 218)

…

I conclude that the following propositions can be regarded as having been accepted by this court in Debot and Greffe [(1990), 1990 CanLII 143 (SCC), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.)].

(i)    Hearsay statements of an informant can provide reasonable and probable grounds to justify a search. However, evidence of a tip from an informer, by itself, is insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

(ii)   The reliability of the tip is to be assessed by recourse to "the totality of the circumstances". There is no formulaic test as to what this entails. Rather, the court must look to a variety of factors including:

(a)   the degree of detail of the "tip";

(b)   the informer's source of knowledge;

(c)   indicia of the informer's reliability such as past performance or confirmation from other investigative sources.

(R. v. Garofoli (1990), 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.), at p. 191)

(2)         in considering whether informant information is compelling, a number of factors are considered including the degree of specificity or detail in the tipster’s account, the currency of the information, whether the informant has first-hand or direct knowledge of the relevant facts, etc:

First, as to the detail or particularity of the informer's information, the fewer the details the greater the risk of innocent coincidence or a false tip: Regina v. Lewis (1998), 1998 CanLII 7116 (ON CA), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) at 490; Regina v. Sutherland (2001), 2000 CanLII 17034 (ON CA), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 231 (Ont. C.A.) at 239; Regina v. Haskell, 2004 ABQB 474 (CanLII), [2004] A.J. No. 804 (Q.B.) at para. 90. A lack of detail plunges the tip into the range of rumour, gossip and speculation: Regina v. Zammit (1993), 1993 CanLII 3424 (ON CA), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 112 (Ont. C.A.) at pp. 120-1; Regina v. Woodworth and Woodworth, [2006] N.S.J. No. 26 (S.C.) at para. 57, 63. Greater precision enhances reliability: Regina v. Wiley (1993), 1993 CanLII 69 (SCC), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.) at 170; Lewis, at p. 489; Regina v. Shoghi-Baloo, [1999] O.J. No. 325 (C.A.) at para. 3 (leave to appeal refused [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 297). A tip can be compelling even if it contains some inaccuracies: Regina v. Kesselring (2000), 2000 CanLII 2457 (ON CA), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 119 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 123.

…

Second, dealing with the informer's source or means of knowledge, the reliability of an informer's information is diminished by an absence of any sense as to how the tipster acquired his or her information: Zammit, supra at 120-1; Regina v. Traverse(2003), 2003 NLCA 18 (CanLII), 175 C.C.C. (3d) 537 (Nfld. & Lab. C.A.) at para. 2-6, 20; Regina v. Deol (2006), 2006 MBCA 39 (CanLII), 208 C.C.C. (3d) 167 (Man. C.A.) at para. 16; Woodworth, at para. 57, 63; Regina v. MacDonald, [2005] O.J. No. 551 (S.C.J.) at para. 18.

(R. v. Baldwin (2007), 2007 CanLII 41427 (ON SC), 52 C.R. (6th) 13 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 49-50)

(3)         in assessing the reliability of the tip, the credibility of the informant is important including consideration as to whether he or she is an untested source or has a track record of providing accurate information to the police in the past (R. v. Markiewicz, 2014 ONCA 455 (CanLII), at para. 2; R. v. Soto, 2011 ONCA 828 (CanLII), at paras. 8-9), the tipster’s own criminal antecedents, whether any benefit was sought or promised or actually given in exchange for the information, and, whether the informant is anonymous or identified to the police as in the latter case the source is exposed to the jeopardy of being charged with public mischief or obstruction of justice for deliberately misleading the police: R. v. Noorali, 2010 ONSC 2558 (CanLII), at para. 40 (affd 2012 ONCA 589 (CanLII)); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274-5 (2000)

(4)         while effective corroboration of a confidential informant’s information need not confirm all details of his or her account, and need not confirm the commission of the alleged crime itself (R. v. Caissey, 2007 ABCA 380 (CanLII), [2007] A.J. No. 1342 (C.A.), at para. 23 (affd 2008 SCC 65 (CanLII), 2008 S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 2)), there should be confirmation of something(s) material within the communicated information as opposed to routine or commonly available facts

(5)         in order to protect a confidential informer’s identity, the police are not required to disclose the informer’s identity or information that might tend to disclose his or her identity: Leipert v. The Queen (1997), 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.), at p. 397; Farinacci et al. v. The Queen (1994), 1994 CanLII 123 (SCC), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), at pp. 53-9; Regina v. Scott (1991), 1990 CanLII 27 (SCC), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 300 (S.C.C.), at pp. 312-5; Regina v. Hosie (1996), 1996 CanLII 450 (ON CA), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 399-400

(6)         accordingly, in criminal proceedings, the state may provide to the court and the accused only redacted information from a confidential informant in an effort to protect his or her identity – in these circumstances, while that may be the limit of what is available by way of disclosure, and recognizing that such measures as a judicial summary of the redacted material may be impossible without compromising the informant’s identity (R. v. Beckford, 2014 ONCA 66 (CanLII), at para. 4), there may nevertheless be options in some cases:

The police and the Crown were under a legal obligation to protect the identity of confidential informants: R. v. Leipert, 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 15. Defence counsel did not suggest at trial that he could bring his case within the innocence at stake exception to the confidential informant privilege, thereby entitling him to access to the informant's identity. This is the only recognized exception to that privilege: R. v. Leipert, at paras. 20-22. Nor did trial counsel challenge the legitimacy of the confidential-informant claim advanced by the Crown. Counsel did not contend that any of the editing was unnecessary or otherwise improper. He did not ask the trial judge to examine the unredacted information, review the editing process and perhaps order further disclosure or provide judicial summaries of the redacted contents: see R. v. Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at pp. 1460-61.

Crown counsel at trial also did not ask the trial judge to consider the unredacted version of the information before determining the merits of the appellant's s. 8 claim. Crown counsel was content to have the validity of the warrant and, hence, the reasonableness of the search determined on the contents of the redacted information. As observed in Leipert, at para. 38:

The issue before the trial judge was whether there were reasonable grounds for the issuance of the warrant. If the Crown wished to limit its defence of the reasonableness of the warrant and subsequent search to particular grounds, it was entitled to do so. At the end of the day the task of the judge was to make a ruling on reasonableness on the basis of the information relied on by the Crown. [Emphasis added.]

In summary, the Crown was content to have the reasonableness of the search determined exclusively on the basis of the redacted information. The defence did not challenge the validity of the confidential informant claims, seek access to the identity of those informants nor challenge the editing done by the Crown to protect the identity of those informants. In my view, these positions taken on the voir dire have significance in the s. 24(2) analysis.

(R. v. Blake (2010), 2010 ONCA 1 (CanLII), 251 C.C.C. (3d) 4 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 15-7)

(7)         where the Crown proceeds in its argument on the basis of the redacted information alone to support the existence of reasonable grounds, it cannot purport to rely upon a submission that the police in fact had more grounds in the undisclosed material: Blake, at para. 29; R. v. Dhillon (2010), 2010 ONCA 582 (CanLII), 260 C.C.C. (3d) 53 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 63

(8)         in any event, determining whether or not, on the totality of circumstances, the police had reasonable grounds based on a confidential informant’s tip is largely a fact-driven exercise with case-to-case comparisons of modest assistance at best – that said, the facts of the present case do not align with the authority relied upon by the defence (R. v. Daley, 2014 ONSC 1079 (CanLII) – no vehicle licence plate number provided (para. 18), no belief in informer’s past reliability (para. 25), no corroboration (para. 26)), falling more so into the range of circumstances identified in other cases: Noorali; R. v. Caravaggio, 2012 ONCA 248 (CanLII), at para. 4.