Le droit à la communication de la preuve & le privilège de l'informateur

R v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524 (CanLII)

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[77]      An accused’s right to make full answer and defence, a principle of fundamental justice constitutionally protected under s. 7 of the Charter, includes the right to full and timely disclosure, the right to know the case to meet, the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence proffered for admission by the Crown, and the right to cross-examination: Crevier, at para. 52. 

[78]      On the other hand, neither the right to make full answer and defence nor the right to disclosure is absolute.  For example, however fundamental, the right to make full answer and defence does not reach so far that it issues a blank cheque to an accused to pursue any and every conceivable tactic and line of inquiry in service of defending him or herself against an allegation of crime: Crevier, at para. 53; R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 64.  Context and the presence and influence of other competing interests are of importance in establishing the outer boundaries of the right: Crevier, at para. 53. 

[79]      Nor is an accused’s right to disclosure absolute.  It is subject to the discretion of the Crown, a discretion which extends to the enforcement of CI privilege: R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at pp. 335-36 and 339.

[80]      Confidential informant privilege is a class privilege.  The rule is of fundamental importance to the workings of our criminal justice system: Bisaillon v. Keable, 1983 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60, at p. 105; R. v. Leipert, 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 10.

[81]      Informer privilege is of such importance that, once established, a court is not entitled to balance the benefit that enures from the privilege against countervailing considerations: Leipert, at paras. 12 and 14.  The only exception to the rule is innocence at stake.  No exception exists for the right to make full answer and defence: Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 43(CanLII), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, at para. 28.

[82]      Preservation of the near absolute nature of CI privilege has significant implications for the redaction process as well as for requests for further disclosure about the informant’s sources of knowledge or the nature of the information provided.  It is virtually impossible for a court to know what details may reveal the identity of a CI: Leipert, at para. 28; World Bank Group v. Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 (CanLII), 395 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 129.

[83]      An absolute CI privilege rule, subject only to the innocence at stake exception, is consistent with the protection the Charteraccords to the right to a fair trial: Leipert, at para. 24; Vancouver Sun, at para. 28.