Fontaine c. R., 2008 QCCS 6437 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[11] La règle du privilège des indicateurs de police s’avère cruciale pour le bon fonctionnement de notre système de justice criminelle. Elle encourage la dénonciation des crimes et garantit la sécurité des individus qui, parfois au péril de leur vie, fournissent des renseignements aux autorités policières. L’unique exception à cette règle, qualifiée d’absolue, est « la démonstration de l’innocence de l’accusé. »
[12] Dans l'arrêt Leipert, la Cour suprême du Canada indique la procédure à suivre lorsque l’accusé demande la divulgation de l’identité de l’informateur et invoque, pour ce faire, l'exception de la démonstration de son innocence :
« Premièrement, l'accusé doit montrer qu'il existe un motif de conclure que, sans la divulgation demandée, son innocence sera en jeu. Si l'existence d'un tel motif est établie, le tribunal pourra alors examiner l'information en cause pour déterminer si elle est effectivement nécessaire pour prouver l'innocence de l'accusé. »
[13] Dans un premier temps, il est nécessaire de démontrer que l'innocence de l'accusé est en jeu pour lever ce privilège. Dans un deuxième temps, la preuve doit révéler l'existence d'un motif pour conclure que la divulgation de l'identité de l'indicateur est nécessaire afin de démontrer cette innocence.
[14] Dix ans plus tard, la Cour suprême actualisera ces critères dans l'affaire Personne désignée c. Vancouver Sun. Sous la plume du juge Bastarache, on y précise que :
- Les simples conjectures ne suffisent pas pour prouver que la connaissance de l'identité de l'indicateur est nécessaire à la démonstration de l'innocence de l'accusé. Des preuves doivent étayer cette conclusion (paragr. 27);
- L'exception trouvera application seulement si la divulgation de l'identité est l'unique moyen pour l'accusé de faire la preuve de son innocence (paragr. 27);
- Le droit à une défense pleine et entière n'est pas opposable à la confidentialité de l'identité de l'indicateur (paragr. 28);
- Le droit à la communication de la preuve n'est pas opposable au privilège relatif aux indicateurs de police (paragr. 28).
[15] L’exception de la démonstration de l’innocence demeure donc très circonscrite et ne saurait être assimilée au droit générique à une défense pleine et entière.
[16] Il n'est également pas suffisant de simplement alléguer que la divulgation de l'identité de l'indicateur permettrait de préparer une défense plus complète. Dans le contexte apparenté du privilège du secret professionnel d'un avocat, le juge Major, au nom de la Cour, précisait que :
« Par exemple, si l’accusé était en mesure de susciter un doute raisonnable à son procès relativement à la question de la mens rea en accédant au dossier protégé par le secret professionnel de l’avocat, mais également en invoquant l’alibi ou l’identification, ou les deux à la fois, comme moyen de défense, il ne serait pas nécessaire alors d’utiliser le dossier protégé par le secret professionnel de l’avocat. L’innocence de l’accusé ne serait pas en jeu, mais ce serait sa volonté de préparer une défense plus complète qui serait contrariée. De prime abord, il peut paraître dur de refuser l’accès alors que l’élément de preuve privilégié en question pourrait susciter un doute raisonnable; toutefois, les raisons de politique générale qui militent faveur du maintien de la confidentialité des communications entre un avocat et son client doivent l’emporter sauf s’il y a un risque véritable qu’une déclaration de culpabilité injustifiée soit prononcée. »
[17] La possibilité d’attaquer la crédibilité d’un témoin de la poursuite ne fait pas partie des situations justifiant la divulgation de l’identité d’un informateur. Dans le contexte du privilège du secret professionnel de l'avocat, la Cour suprême notait à ce sujet que :
« Le simple fait de présenter des éléments de preuve qui favorisent des attaques incidentes contre la preuve du ministère public (comme, par exemple, le fait d'attaquer la crédibilité d'un témoin à charge ou de présenter une preuve qui indique que certains éléments de preuve du ministère public ont été obtenus inconstitutionnellement) sera très rarement suffisant… »
[18] Plus encore, quant au privilège de l'indicateur de police, la Cour suprême du Canada énonce dans l'arrêt R. c. Chiarantano qu'il ne suffit pas d'alléguer la contradiction possible d'un témoin de la poursuite avec une déclaration antérieure incompatible provenant d'un informateur pour justifier de dévoiler l'identité de ce dernier. Le juge Major commentait cette décision dans l'arrêt Leipert en ces termes :
« Dans l’affaire, Chiarantano, on a jugé que la possibilité de conflit entre le témoignage de l’accusé et les renseignements fournis par un indicateur au sujet de l’arrivée, dans une résidence, de drogues subséquemment trouvées en la possession de l’accusé ne justifiait pas la divulgation conformément à l’exception concernant la démonstration de l’innocence de l’accusé. La cour a statué que l’utilité des renseignements était hypothétique et que la simple supposition qu’ils pourraient être utiles à la défense était insuffisante. Si des conjectures suffisaient à faire tomber le privilège, la protection que celui-ci est censé accorder s’en trouverait pratiquement sinon totalement anéantie. »
mercredi 25 avril 2012
mardi 24 avril 2012
L'infraction de voies de fait armés n'est pas nécessairement moindre et incluse à l'infraction de voies de fait graves
R. v. St. Clair, 1994 CanLII 8719 (ON CA)
Lien vers la décision
[13] The Crown conceded in oral argument that the offence created by s. 267 is not an included offence and that the trial judge erred in leaving the offence of assault with a weapon (s. 267(1)(a)) with the jury as a possible verdict. The offence alleged in the indictment was that the appellant committed aggravated assault by wounding. Section 268 provides:
[14] The trial judge, with the apparent consent of both Crown and defence counsel at trial, directed the jury that “assault with a weapon” as set out in s. 267(1)(a), was an included offence and thus a possible verdict. Section 267(1)(a) provides:
[15] The indictment did not set out the means by which the assault was alleged to have been committed. Neither the indictment, nor s. 268 of the Criminal Code (aggravated assault by wounding) makes the offence set out in s. 267 an included offence: see Luckett v. The Queen 1980 CanLII 185 (SCC), (1980), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 489, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1140, 20 C.R. (3d) 393 (S.C.C.); R. v. Simpson (No. 2) reflex, (1981), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 122, 20 C.R. (3d) 36, 5 W.C.B. 455 (Ont. C.A.). Thus the trial judge erred in leaving the offence set out in s. 267(1)(a) with the jury as an included offence.
Lien vers la décision
[13] The Crown conceded in oral argument that the offence created by s. 267 is not an included offence and that the trial judge erred in leaving the offence of assault with a weapon (s. 267(1)(a)) with the jury as a possible verdict. The offence alleged in the indictment was that the appellant committed aggravated assault by wounding. Section 268 provides:
[14] The trial judge, with the apparent consent of both Crown and defence counsel at trial, directed the jury that “assault with a weapon” as set out in s. 267(1)(a), was an included offence and thus a possible verdict. Section 267(1)(a) provides:
[15] The indictment did not set out the means by which the assault was alleged to have been committed. Neither the indictment, nor s. 268 of the Criminal Code (aggravated assault by wounding) makes the offence set out in s. 267 an included offence: see Luckett v. The Queen 1980 CanLII 185 (SCC), (1980), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 489, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1140, 20 C.R. (3d) 393 (S.C.C.); R. v. Simpson (No. 2) reflex, (1981), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 122, 20 C.R. (3d) 36, 5 W.C.B. 455 (Ont. C.A.). Thus the trial judge erred in leaving the offence set out in s. 267(1)(a) with the jury as an included offence.
vendredi 20 avril 2012
Le privilège des négociations dans le contexte du droit criminel
R. v. Griffin, 2009 ABQB 696 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[55] It is common ground between the parties that settlement negotiation privilege also applies in negotiations between criminal defence counsel and the Crown. The applicability of this privilege to criminal cases was discussed by Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (3rd ed.) (Markham: LexisNexis, 2009) at para. 14.314:
With respect to persons facing criminal charges, there is a public interest in preserving the confidentiality of plea negotiations between such accused and their counsel, and the Crown. A privilege is necessary to encourage full and frank discussions with a view to coming to a resolution of the matter. There is a substantial saving by the public and a resulting benefit to the administration of justice ‑ including victims and witnesses ‑ in resolving such cases on a just basis.
[56] There is also strong support in Canadian case law for the application of settlement negotiation privilege to the criminal law. The policy rationale for criminal settlement negotiation privilege was discussed by Lesage A.C.J. (as he then was) in R. v. Bernardo, [1994] O.J. No. 1718 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). Counsel for the accused sought disclosure of information relating to the negotiations between the Crown and Ms. Homolka with respect to her plea agreement to testify against Mr. Bernardo. The Crown took the position that such plea negotiations were privileged. Lesage A.C.J.(at para. 16) accepted that plea negotiation privilege exists:
I agree with the Crown’s submissions that there should be a recognized privilege surrounding plea discussions vis‑a‑vis the accused and the Crown. There are many reasons in the nature of public policy that would suggest that such a privilege does exist or ought to exist in order to encourage Crown and defence to have full, frank and private negotiations in criminal cases. I believe, as in civil cases, settlement negotiation privilege ought to exist. The rules or [sic] this Court concerning pre‑hearing conferences in criminal matters contemplate that those negotiations will normally occur in private and that they will remain confidential, unless a resolution is achieved in which case the discussions would normally be disclosed in court. I am of the view that the public interest is well served by encouraging such frank and full discussions between counsel for the accused and counsel for the Crown. The saving to the public and the resulting benefit to the administration of justice in resolving cases that ought to be resolved is substantial. Although there may be exceptions to that confidentiality or privilege such as obstruction of justice, or other issues, I am of the view that public policy would dictate that there be a confidentiality concerning such negotiations. That privilege applies in the sense that the information disclosed will not be used against that person.
[57] Lesage A.C.J. ultimately ruled that this privilege should not extend to negotiations that result in agreements where an individual agrees to testify against a co‑accused for the Crown, because the records of the negotiations were not being sought for use against Ms. Homolka, but for the defence of another person.
[58] In R. v. Lake, [1997] O.J. No. 5447 (C.J.), the Crown took the position that if defence counsel in resolution discussions attributed a statement to his or her client, that statement and the discussions that led to that statement are no longer covered by solicitor‑client privilege. The Crown argued that although there is a public interest in the promotion of resolution discussions, negotiation privilege must yield to the stronger public interest in the search for the truth. McCombs J. restricted Bernardo to its particular facts, where the co‑accused Homolka no longer faced any risk of having the plea negotiations used against her, and where Bernardo had a s. 7 right to make full answer and defence. In a case where such considerations are absent, the privilege remains much stronger (at para. 51):
In my view, a ruling favourable to the Crown in the circumstances of a case such as this would have a profound chilling effect upon resolution discussions, an essential component of the administration of justice, and would do irreparable damage to the public interest in the proper administration of justice. This public interest is of such importance that it must outweigh all other considerations.
[59] Likewise, in R. v. T.J.C., [1997] N.W.T.J. No. 141 (S.C.), Vertes J. strongly endorsed settlement negotiation privilege in criminal negotiations. Defence counsel had written a “without prejudice” letter to the Crown which included the accused’s recollection of certain facts of the alleged offence, and set out a proposal for a joint submission on sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. Police attended the accused’s cell and, in the course of interrogating the accused, referred to the letter sent by counsel for the accused. Several months later, in response to another letter from defence counsel offering a plea deal, Crown counsel wrote a letter that rejected the plea offer. This letter from the Crown also warned:
[S]tatements made to you by Mr. C. may become part of the Crown’s case, should this matter proceed to trial. Unless we can tender evidence of Mr. C.’s statements by agreement, you may be required as a Crown witness.
[60] Defence counsel subsequently was issued a subpoena. At trial, the new Crown counsel stated the Crown would not be calling defence counsel as a witness. Defence counsel brought a motion for a stay of proceedings on the basis of these and other incidents. In reference to the “without prejudice” letter, Vertes J. stated (at para. 32):
I know of no reason why [settlement negotiation] privilege does not apply as well to criminal cases. Indeed, I think there is a stronger case to be made that the privilege applies in criminal cases because of the liberty interests and constitutional rights at stake. I note in passing only that such a privilege had been extended to plea bargaining communications in United States criminal law. Perhaps the reason why there is no obvious Canadian case on this point is that the point is obvious.
[Emphasis added.]
[61] In R. v. Larocque reflex, (1988), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 564 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), the Crown wrote to counsel for the accused with an offer of a joint submission in exchange for a guilty plea. Counsel for the accused responded with a letter stating that the accused accepted the offer and would plead guilty. The accused reneged, and did not plead guilty as planned. The matter proceeded to trial and the Crown took the position that the letter from counsel for the accused was admissible to prove the accused’s guilt. The trial judge, citing Bernardo and Lake, concluded that the communications were privileged and inadmissible and the privilege remained in effect even though the accused reneged on the offer to plead guilty. The court distinguished the situation from the civil context, where a settlement itself is not covered by settlement negotiation privilege, because in a criminal context a plea agreement is not enforceable against the accused.
[62] Settlement negotiation privilege applies equally to communications made by Crown counsel in the course of settlement negotiations. For example, in R. v. Hainnu, [1997] N.W.T.J. No. 76 (S.C.) (QL), counsel for the accused attempted to use a comment made by a Crown prosecutor at a pre‑trial conference as the basis for an abuse of process application, but the comment was deemed to be protected by privilege. Similarly, an attempt by the accused to refer to a pre‑trial resolution offer by the Crown during sentencing submissions was rejected as a violation of settlement negotiation privilege in R. v. Roberts, 2001 ABQB 520 (CanLII), 2001 ABQB 520, 289 A.R. 127 at paras. 59‑62 (cited with approval in R. v. Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 (CanLII), 2001 ABCA 243, 159 C.C.C. (3d) 434)).
[63] In R. v. Bernard, 2002 ABQB 747 (CanLII), 2002 ABQB 747, 392 A.R, 204, Veit J. also emphasized (at para. 43) that settlement negotiation privilege exists even in the absence of criminal practice rules against the production of without prejudice communications, such as existed in Bernardo.
[64] Most recently, in R. v. Delorme, 2005 NWTSC 34 at paras. 9-32, 198 C.C.C. (3d) 431, Vertes J. revisited the issue of criminal settlement negotiation privilege and summarized the Canadian authorities on the matter. He found (at para. 33) that “[t]he common theme in those cases where the plea negotiation privilege has been set aside is that of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence,” and concluded that rather than applying an “innocence at stake” test to determine whether the privilege should be overcome, an O’Connor‑like “likely relevance” test was more appropriate (para. 45).
[65] Based on these authorities, I conclude that criminal plea bargain privilege is a recognized form of privilege and should be sedulously protected in the interests of encouraging fair, reasonable, and efficient disposition of criminal cases, in the interests of the public, victims, witnesses, and accused persons.
Lien vers la décision
[55] It is common ground between the parties that settlement negotiation privilege also applies in negotiations between criminal defence counsel and the Crown. The applicability of this privilege to criminal cases was discussed by Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (3rd ed.) (Markham: LexisNexis, 2009) at para. 14.314:
With respect to persons facing criminal charges, there is a public interest in preserving the confidentiality of plea negotiations between such accused and their counsel, and the Crown. A privilege is necessary to encourage full and frank discussions with a view to coming to a resolution of the matter. There is a substantial saving by the public and a resulting benefit to the administration of justice ‑ including victims and witnesses ‑ in resolving such cases on a just basis.
[56] There is also strong support in Canadian case law for the application of settlement negotiation privilege to the criminal law. The policy rationale for criminal settlement negotiation privilege was discussed by Lesage A.C.J. (as he then was) in R. v. Bernardo, [1994] O.J. No. 1718 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). Counsel for the accused sought disclosure of information relating to the negotiations between the Crown and Ms. Homolka with respect to her plea agreement to testify against Mr. Bernardo. The Crown took the position that such plea negotiations were privileged. Lesage A.C.J.(at para. 16) accepted that plea negotiation privilege exists:
I agree with the Crown’s submissions that there should be a recognized privilege surrounding plea discussions vis‑a‑vis the accused and the Crown. There are many reasons in the nature of public policy that would suggest that such a privilege does exist or ought to exist in order to encourage Crown and defence to have full, frank and private negotiations in criminal cases. I believe, as in civil cases, settlement negotiation privilege ought to exist. The rules or [sic] this Court concerning pre‑hearing conferences in criminal matters contemplate that those negotiations will normally occur in private and that they will remain confidential, unless a resolution is achieved in which case the discussions would normally be disclosed in court. I am of the view that the public interest is well served by encouraging such frank and full discussions between counsel for the accused and counsel for the Crown. The saving to the public and the resulting benefit to the administration of justice in resolving cases that ought to be resolved is substantial. Although there may be exceptions to that confidentiality or privilege such as obstruction of justice, or other issues, I am of the view that public policy would dictate that there be a confidentiality concerning such negotiations. That privilege applies in the sense that the information disclosed will not be used against that person.
[57] Lesage A.C.J. ultimately ruled that this privilege should not extend to negotiations that result in agreements where an individual agrees to testify against a co‑accused for the Crown, because the records of the negotiations were not being sought for use against Ms. Homolka, but for the defence of another person.
[58] In R. v. Lake, [1997] O.J. No. 5447 (C.J.), the Crown took the position that if defence counsel in resolution discussions attributed a statement to his or her client, that statement and the discussions that led to that statement are no longer covered by solicitor‑client privilege. The Crown argued that although there is a public interest in the promotion of resolution discussions, negotiation privilege must yield to the stronger public interest in the search for the truth. McCombs J. restricted Bernardo to its particular facts, where the co‑accused Homolka no longer faced any risk of having the plea negotiations used against her, and where Bernardo had a s. 7 right to make full answer and defence. In a case where such considerations are absent, the privilege remains much stronger (at para. 51):
In my view, a ruling favourable to the Crown in the circumstances of a case such as this would have a profound chilling effect upon resolution discussions, an essential component of the administration of justice, and would do irreparable damage to the public interest in the proper administration of justice. This public interest is of such importance that it must outweigh all other considerations.
[59] Likewise, in R. v. T.J.C., [1997] N.W.T.J. No. 141 (S.C.), Vertes J. strongly endorsed settlement negotiation privilege in criminal negotiations. Defence counsel had written a “without prejudice” letter to the Crown which included the accused’s recollection of certain facts of the alleged offence, and set out a proposal for a joint submission on sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. Police attended the accused’s cell and, in the course of interrogating the accused, referred to the letter sent by counsel for the accused. Several months later, in response to another letter from defence counsel offering a plea deal, Crown counsel wrote a letter that rejected the plea offer. This letter from the Crown also warned:
[S]tatements made to you by Mr. C. may become part of the Crown’s case, should this matter proceed to trial. Unless we can tender evidence of Mr. C.’s statements by agreement, you may be required as a Crown witness.
[60] Defence counsel subsequently was issued a subpoena. At trial, the new Crown counsel stated the Crown would not be calling defence counsel as a witness. Defence counsel brought a motion for a stay of proceedings on the basis of these and other incidents. In reference to the “without prejudice” letter, Vertes J. stated (at para. 32):
I know of no reason why [settlement negotiation] privilege does not apply as well to criminal cases. Indeed, I think there is a stronger case to be made that the privilege applies in criminal cases because of the liberty interests and constitutional rights at stake. I note in passing only that such a privilege had been extended to plea bargaining communications in United States criminal law. Perhaps the reason why there is no obvious Canadian case on this point is that the point is obvious.
[Emphasis added.]
[61] In R. v. Larocque reflex, (1988), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 564 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), the Crown wrote to counsel for the accused with an offer of a joint submission in exchange for a guilty plea. Counsel for the accused responded with a letter stating that the accused accepted the offer and would plead guilty. The accused reneged, and did not plead guilty as planned. The matter proceeded to trial and the Crown took the position that the letter from counsel for the accused was admissible to prove the accused’s guilt. The trial judge, citing Bernardo and Lake, concluded that the communications were privileged and inadmissible and the privilege remained in effect even though the accused reneged on the offer to plead guilty. The court distinguished the situation from the civil context, where a settlement itself is not covered by settlement negotiation privilege, because in a criminal context a plea agreement is not enforceable against the accused.
[62] Settlement negotiation privilege applies equally to communications made by Crown counsel in the course of settlement negotiations. For example, in R. v. Hainnu, [1997] N.W.T.J. No. 76 (S.C.) (QL), counsel for the accused attempted to use a comment made by a Crown prosecutor at a pre‑trial conference as the basis for an abuse of process application, but the comment was deemed to be protected by privilege. Similarly, an attempt by the accused to refer to a pre‑trial resolution offer by the Crown during sentencing submissions was rejected as a violation of settlement negotiation privilege in R. v. Roberts, 2001 ABQB 520 (CanLII), 2001 ABQB 520, 289 A.R. 127 at paras. 59‑62 (cited with approval in R. v. Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 (CanLII), 2001 ABCA 243, 159 C.C.C. (3d) 434)).
[63] In R. v. Bernard, 2002 ABQB 747 (CanLII), 2002 ABQB 747, 392 A.R, 204, Veit J. also emphasized (at para. 43) that settlement negotiation privilege exists even in the absence of criminal practice rules against the production of without prejudice communications, such as existed in Bernardo.
[64] Most recently, in R. v. Delorme, 2005 NWTSC 34 at paras. 9-32, 198 C.C.C. (3d) 431, Vertes J. revisited the issue of criminal settlement negotiation privilege and summarized the Canadian authorities on the matter. He found (at para. 33) that “[t]he common theme in those cases where the plea negotiation privilege has been set aside is that of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence,” and concluded that rather than applying an “innocence at stake” test to determine whether the privilege should be overcome, an O’Connor‑like “likely relevance” test was more appropriate (para. 45).
[65] Based on these authorities, I conclude that criminal plea bargain privilege is a recognized form of privilege and should be sedulously protected in the interests of encouraging fair, reasonable, and efficient disposition of criminal cases, in the interests of the public, victims, witnesses, and accused persons.
Il est inapproprié pour un avocat d'informer le tribunal de la teneur de discussion ayant cours entre les parties
R. v. Roberts, 2001 ABQB 520 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[60] As I advised counsel at the sentencing hearing, I think it was improper to disclose those discussions to the court. The same issue was considered in R. v. Bernardo, [1994] O.J. No. 1718 (C.J. Gen. Div.); R. v. Lake, [1997] O.J. No. 5447 (C.J. Gen. Div.); and R. v. L.(N.) reflex, (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 564 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). In each case, the court agreed that public policy dictates confidentiality concerning such negotiations, and that privilege applies, in the sense that the information disclosed during pre‑trial negotiations should not be used against either party. I agree.
Lien vers la décision
[60] As I advised counsel at the sentencing hearing, I think it was improper to disclose those discussions to the court. The same issue was considered in R. v. Bernardo, [1994] O.J. No. 1718 (C.J. Gen. Div.); R. v. Lake, [1997] O.J. No. 5447 (C.J. Gen. Div.); and R. v. L.(N.) reflex, (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 564 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). In each case, the court agreed that public policy dictates confidentiality concerning such negotiations, and that privilege applies, in the sense that the information disclosed during pre‑trial negotiations should not be used against either party. I agree.
Les discussions entre avocats doivent demeurer confidentielles
R. v. Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[33] As to the obligations of counsel wishing to resolve a case by way of guilty plea and a joint submission on sentence, this Court has said that:
i) The facts of the case ought to be fully disclosed so that the sentencing judge is aware of all the circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating factors.
ii) Where the proposed sentence is not obviously within the accepted range of sentence for that offence, counsel, and particularly Crown counsel, should explain to the court the reasons for departing from a sentence within that range. In R. v. G.W.C., supra, Berger, J.A., illustrated this point by noting that the joint submission may be the result of an evidentiary gap in the Crown’s case, or the absence of an essential witness.
[34] The requirement to inform the sentencing judge of all of the circumstances guiding the joint submission was not intended to be taken as a direction that counsel must reveal their negotiating positions or the substance of their discussions leading to the agreement. These are private negotiations which need not, and normally should not, be disclosed to the court. R. v. Roberts, 2001 ABQB 520 (CanLII), 2001 ABQB 520, [2001] A.J. No. 772.
Lien vers la décision
[33] As to the obligations of counsel wishing to resolve a case by way of guilty plea and a joint submission on sentence, this Court has said that:
i) The facts of the case ought to be fully disclosed so that the sentencing judge is aware of all the circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating factors.
ii) Where the proposed sentence is not obviously within the accepted range of sentence for that offence, counsel, and particularly Crown counsel, should explain to the court the reasons for departing from a sentence within that range. In R. v. G.W.C., supra, Berger, J.A., illustrated this point by noting that the joint submission may be the result of an evidentiary gap in the Crown’s case, or the absence of an essential witness.
[34] The requirement to inform the sentencing judge of all of the circumstances guiding the joint submission was not intended to be taken as a direction that counsel must reveal their negotiating positions or the substance of their discussions leading to the agreement. These are private negotiations which need not, and normally should not, be disclosed to the court. R. v. Roberts, 2001 ABQB 520 (CanLII), 2001 ABQB 520, [2001] A.J. No. 772.
jeudi 19 avril 2012
Le calcul de la détention préventive
R. c. Gosselin, 2011 QCCQ 11688 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[64] Le tribunal ne peut pas se ranger à l'opinion préconisée dans Johnson pour les mêmes motifs évoqués dans d'autres décisions citées précédemment concluant que d'octroyer un crédit d'un jour et demi dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, peu importe les circonstances, serait faire fi de l'intention du législateur.
[65] D'ailleurs, le tribunal ne décèle aucune ambiguïté dans le nouveau texte.
[66] L'ancien article 719(3) du Code se limite à prescrire que le tribunal peut prendre en compte toute période que la personne a passé sous garde par suite de l'infraction. Incidemment, le nouveau paragraphe (3) reprend le même texte; il y ajoute une limite au temps pouvant être alloué pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire.
[67] La modification au paragraphe (3) et l'addition de quatre nouveaux paragraphes ((3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4)) témoignent d'une intention, non pas d'écarter toute la discrétion judiciaire que la Loi maintient, mais de l'encadrer, d'abord, en limitant le crédit pouvant être alloué par le juge pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire, et ensuite, en introduisant au procédé de la détermination de ce crédit une rationalisation en ce que le tribunal doit dorénavant motiver toute décision d'allouer du temps pour la période passée sous garde (paragraphe (3.2)), une obligation jusqu'alors inexistante dans le Code.
[68] En outre, le paragraphe (3.3) imposant des inscriptions au dossier du détenu permettra de rendre compte avec le plus d'exactitude possible de la peine véritablement imposée et répondre notamment aux impératifs de transparence et d'intelligibilité auxquels le public est en droit de s'attendre.
[69] Dès lors, et dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, incluant même les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code, le temps alloué pour la période passée en détention provisoire ne peut excéder un jour pour chaque jour passé sous garde.
[70] Le paragraphe (3.1) crée une exception. À cet égard, le tribunal ne peut pas davantage se rallier à la décision dans Johnson. La préposition « malgré » connote l'idée d'une concession ou d'un compromis annoncé par le texte auquel elle est liée. Conséquemment, le paragraphe (3.1) qui commence par « malgré le paragraphe (3) », constitue véritablement une exception. Ainsi, « malgré » l'obstacle que représente la règle générale du paragraphe (3), le tribunal peut allouer un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde si les circonstances le justifient. Cependant, sont exclus de cette exception, le cas échéant, les détenus se trouvant dans les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code.
[71] Comme il s'agit d'une exception à la règle générale, le détenu a le fardeau de faire une preuve que les circonstances justifient d'accroître le crédit. Il n'existe pas de présomption selon laquelle la période passée en détention provisoire mérite le crédit maximum, en l'occurrence, selon les nouvelles dispositions, d'un jour et demi. La lecture combinée des paragraphes (3) et (3.1) ne permet pas une autre interprétation qui tienne compte de l'intention du législateur.
[72] Quant aux circonstances pouvant justifier d'accroître le crédit, le paragraphe (3.1) n'en excepte aucune. Elles peuvent être tout aussi multiples que variées. Le tribunal rejette la proposition avancée dans Johnson selon laquelle les circonstances ne se rapporteraient qu'à l'aspect quantitatif de la détention provisoire. Le texte lui-même n'appuie pas cette interprétation qui du reste irait à l'encontre des critères dégagés par le droit prétorien admettant depuis longtemps les conditions pénibles de détention provisoire comme étant l'un des facteurs à considérer lorsqu'il s'agit d'établir le crédit auquel a droit le détenu au moment de recevoir sa peine. Rien dans le texte des nouvelles dispositions ne permet de croire que le Parlement entendait rendre ces critères dorénavant obsolètes.
[73] Cela étant, la réduction du crédit alloué pour tenir compte de la détention provisoire se traduira par des peines plus longues. On ne peut pas non plus disconvenir que dans certains cas, les personnes détenues en détention provisoire passeront plus de temps incarcérées que celles libérées en attente du procès. Toutefois, il faut présumer que le législateur connaissait l'éventualité de ces cas de figure à laquelle peut donner lieu le calcul des échéances de la peine aux fins du seuil d'admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle ou de la remise statutaire de peine.
[74] Par ailleurs, il faut rappeler que le tribunal a bénéficié dans Johnson d'une preuve factuelle sur les effets systémiques des lois régissant l'application des peines sur la longueur de l'incarcération de la personne détenue en détention provisoire. Ce n'est pas le cas en l'instance. Dès lors, doit-on considérer, par exemple, comme un fait notoire, une remise de peine quasi automatiquement accordée à presque toutes les personnes condamnées à l'emprisonnement? Quoi qu'il en soit, et vu l'interprétation du tribunal des paragraphes (3) et (3.1), il n'est pas nécessaire de répondre à cette question.
[75] En application de ce qui précède, le tribunal conclut que le défendeur ne démontre pas des circonstances justifiant de lui accorder un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde.
[76] Sans remettre en cause les conditions difficiles inhérentes à la détention provisoire, le défendeur ne convainc pas que sa situation s'écarte de façon marquée de celle de tout individu privé de sa liberté dans l'attente de son procès. Au-delà de l'isolement dans une cellule 24 heures sur 24, les conditions de détention restent floues. Si la décision d'isoler le défendeur semble être une mesure de protection, on ne sait pas quand elle est prise ni qui la prend ni sur la foi de quel motif exactement. On ne sait pas non plus si le défendeur lui-même demande cette protection, pas plus la période totale passée en isolement compte tenu d'un séjour semble-t-il à l'hôpital. Le défendeur allègue des problèmes de santé mais on ne sait pas en quoi la détention provisoire aurait été pour ce motif plus pénible. On établit pas non plus en quoi consiste le quotidien d'une personne détenue à l'abri de la population carcérale.
[77] En somme, le défendeur peut justifier l'application de la règle générale du crédit d'un jour par jour passé sous garde, ne serait-ce parce qu'il ne bénéficie pas durant cette période de crédits-jours aux fins de la remise statutaire de peine, vu l'article 719(1) du Code, mais il ne convainc pas qu'il ait été assujetti à des conditions si oppressives fondant d'accorder le crédit maximum prévu au paragraphe (3.1)
Lien vers la décision
[64] Le tribunal ne peut pas se ranger à l'opinion préconisée dans Johnson pour les mêmes motifs évoqués dans d'autres décisions citées précédemment concluant que d'octroyer un crédit d'un jour et demi dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, peu importe les circonstances, serait faire fi de l'intention du législateur.
[65] D'ailleurs, le tribunal ne décèle aucune ambiguïté dans le nouveau texte.
[66] L'ancien article 719(3) du Code se limite à prescrire que le tribunal peut prendre en compte toute période que la personne a passé sous garde par suite de l'infraction. Incidemment, le nouveau paragraphe (3) reprend le même texte; il y ajoute une limite au temps pouvant être alloué pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire.
[67] La modification au paragraphe (3) et l'addition de quatre nouveaux paragraphes ((3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4)) témoignent d'une intention, non pas d'écarter toute la discrétion judiciaire que la Loi maintient, mais de l'encadrer, d'abord, en limitant le crédit pouvant être alloué par le juge pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire, et ensuite, en introduisant au procédé de la détermination de ce crédit une rationalisation en ce que le tribunal doit dorénavant motiver toute décision d'allouer du temps pour la période passée sous garde (paragraphe (3.2)), une obligation jusqu'alors inexistante dans le Code.
[68] En outre, le paragraphe (3.3) imposant des inscriptions au dossier du détenu permettra de rendre compte avec le plus d'exactitude possible de la peine véritablement imposée et répondre notamment aux impératifs de transparence et d'intelligibilité auxquels le public est en droit de s'attendre.
[69] Dès lors, et dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, incluant même les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code, le temps alloué pour la période passée en détention provisoire ne peut excéder un jour pour chaque jour passé sous garde.
[70] Le paragraphe (3.1) crée une exception. À cet égard, le tribunal ne peut pas davantage se rallier à la décision dans Johnson. La préposition « malgré » connote l'idée d'une concession ou d'un compromis annoncé par le texte auquel elle est liée. Conséquemment, le paragraphe (3.1) qui commence par « malgré le paragraphe (3) », constitue véritablement une exception. Ainsi, « malgré » l'obstacle que représente la règle générale du paragraphe (3), le tribunal peut allouer un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde si les circonstances le justifient. Cependant, sont exclus de cette exception, le cas échéant, les détenus se trouvant dans les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code.
[71] Comme il s'agit d'une exception à la règle générale, le détenu a le fardeau de faire une preuve que les circonstances justifient d'accroître le crédit. Il n'existe pas de présomption selon laquelle la période passée en détention provisoire mérite le crédit maximum, en l'occurrence, selon les nouvelles dispositions, d'un jour et demi. La lecture combinée des paragraphes (3) et (3.1) ne permet pas une autre interprétation qui tienne compte de l'intention du législateur.
[72] Quant aux circonstances pouvant justifier d'accroître le crédit, le paragraphe (3.1) n'en excepte aucune. Elles peuvent être tout aussi multiples que variées. Le tribunal rejette la proposition avancée dans Johnson selon laquelle les circonstances ne se rapporteraient qu'à l'aspect quantitatif de la détention provisoire. Le texte lui-même n'appuie pas cette interprétation qui du reste irait à l'encontre des critères dégagés par le droit prétorien admettant depuis longtemps les conditions pénibles de détention provisoire comme étant l'un des facteurs à considérer lorsqu'il s'agit d'établir le crédit auquel a droit le détenu au moment de recevoir sa peine. Rien dans le texte des nouvelles dispositions ne permet de croire que le Parlement entendait rendre ces critères dorénavant obsolètes.
[73] Cela étant, la réduction du crédit alloué pour tenir compte de la détention provisoire se traduira par des peines plus longues. On ne peut pas non plus disconvenir que dans certains cas, les personnes détenues en détention provisoire passeront plus de temps incarcérées que celles libérées en attente du procès. Toutefois, il faut présumer que le législateur connaissait l'éventualité de ces cas de figure à laquelle peut donner lieu le calcul des échéances de la peine aux fins du seuil d'admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle ou de la remise statutaire de peine.
[74] Par ailleurs, il faut rappeler que le tribunal a bénéficié dans Johnson d'une preuve factuelle sur les effets systémiques des lois régissant l'application des peines sur la longueur de l'incarcération de la personne détenue en détention provisoire. Ce n'est pas le cas en l'instance. Dès lors, doit-on considérer, par exemple, comme un fait notoire, une remise de peine quasi automatiquement accordée à presque toutes les personnes condamnées à l'emprisonnement? Quoi qu'il en soit, et vu l'interprétation du tribunal des paragraphes (3) et (3.1), il n'est pas nécessaire de répondre à cette question.
[75] En application de ce qui précède, le tribunal conclut que le défendeur ne démontre pas des circonstances justifiant de lui accorder un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde.
[76] Sans remettre en cause les conditions difficiles inhérentes à la détention provisoire, le défendeur ne convainc pas que sa situation s'écarte de façon marquée de celle de tout individu privé de sa liberté dans l'attente de son procès. Au-delà de l'isolement dans une cellule 24 heures sur 24, les conditions de détention restent floues. Si la décision d'isoler le défendeur semble être une mesure de protection, on ne sait pas quand elle est prise ni qui la prend ni sur la foi de quel motif exactement. On ne sait pas non plus si le défendeur lui-même demande cette protection, pas plus la période totale passée en isolement compte tenu d'un séjour semble-t-il à l'hôpital. Le défendeur allègue des problèmes de santé mais on ne sait pas en quoi la détention provisoire aurait été pour ce motif plus pénible. On établit pas non plus en quoi consiste le quotidien d'une personne détenue à l'abri de la population carcérale.
[77] En somme, le défendeur peut justifier l'application de la règle générale du crédit d'un jour par jour passé sous garde, ne serait-ce parce qu'il ne bénéficie pas durant cette période de crédits-jours aux fins de la remise statutaire de peine, vu l'article 719(1) du Code, mais il ne convainc pas qu'il ait été assujetti à des conditions si oppressives fondant d'accorder le crédit maximum prévu au paragraphe (3.1)
Comment computer la détention prévention pour une inculpation post-22 février 2010
R. v. Morris, 2011 ONSC 5206 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[22] The parties agree that the applicable provisions are sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code. These provisions, which came into force on February 22, 2010, allow enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to a maximum of 1.5:1 provided that (i) “the circumstances justify it”, and (ii) the person was not detained for reasons under s. 515(9.1) or under subsections 524(4) or (8):
[31] In my view, it is clear from a reading of ss. 719(3) and (3.1) that the general rule is that credit be given “up to 1:1”. Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 pursuant to subsection (3.1) is the exception. The general rule is articulated first and the exception follows. I am unable to accept Mr. Rippell’s argument that, in effect, the norm should be enhanced credit whenever the offender has served pre-sentence time.
[32] There is no ambiguity, in my view, that would justify such a departure from the clear wording of the statute. There is also no basis, or indeed justification, for this court to interpret this provision on the assumption that Parliament was not aware of the effect this provision would have on actual time served. Law-makers are presumed to enact legislation for a particular purpose, with consequences of which they are not only aware, but also, of which they approve as the means to achieving a particular end: to which the parties referred, addresses the principle that:
A second dimension endorsed by the modern principle [of statutory interpretation] is legislative intent. All texts, indeed all utterances, are made for a reason…. In at p. 2 the case of legislation, the law-maker wants to communicate the law that it intended to enact because that law, as set out in the provisions of a statute or regulation, is the means chosen by the law-maker to achieve a set of desired goals. Law-abiding readers (including those who administer or enforce the legislation and those who resolve disputes) try to identify the intended goals of the legislation and the means devised to achieve those goals, so that they can act accordingly. [Emphasis added.] (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008), at p. 2. ).
[33] In this case, it is clear that Parliament would have known that enacting s. 719(3) using the language it chose to use would have the effect of restricting judges from giving any greater credit than one day for each day served in pre-trial custody. Parliament must have intended that enacting such a restriction would increase actual time served when compared to the previous, common practice of giving 2:1 credit, as a mandatory limit on time credited could have no other consequence but increasing the total time served.
[34] Similarly, Parliament would have known that by enacting subsection (3.1) using the phrase “despite subsection (3)”, that it would create an exception, and not a replacement, to subsection (3) “if the circumstances justify it”. Parliament would not have created an exception that was meant, in practice, to displace the very rule it created in the previous subsection.
[35] The defence position that 1.5:1 is to be the default would leave only (i) the absolute bars and (ii) the judicial discretion to reduce credit below 1.5:1 where, traditionally, judges have refused to grant enhanced credit (such as where the accused has unduly lengthened his or her pre-sentence custody by manipulating the justice system).
[36] In effect, the defence interpretation would read out the sub-clause in the first line of subsection (3.1): “if the circumstances justify it”. It would also make subsection (3) redundant. Neither of these consequences is consistent with the basic presumption that language in a statute has meaning.
Lien vers la décision
[22] The parties agree that the applicable provisions are sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code. These provisions, which came into force on February 22, 2010, allow enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to a maximum of 1.5:1 provided that (i) “the circumstances justify it”, and (ii) the person was not detained for reasons under s. 515(9.1) or under subsections 524(4) or (8):
[31] In my view, it is clear from a reading of ss. 719(3) and (3.1) that the general rule is that credit be given “up to 1:1”. Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 pursuant to subsection (3.1) is the exception. The general rule is articulated first and the exception follows. I am unable to accept Mr. Rippell’s argument that, in effect, the norm should be enhanced credit whenever the offender has served pre-sentence time.
[32] There is no ambiguity, in my view, that would justify such a departure from the clear wording of the statute. There is also no basis, or indeed justification, for this court to interpret this provision on the assumption that Parliament was not aware of the effect this provision would have on actual time served. Law-makers are presumed to enact legislation for a particular purpose, with consequences of which they are not only aware, but also, of which they approve as the means to achieving a particular end: to which the parties referred, addresses the principle that:
A second dimension endorsed by the modern principle [of statutory interpretation] is legislative intent. All texts, indeed all utterances, are made for a reason…. In at p. 2 the case of legislation, the law-maker wants to communicate the law that it intended to enact because that law, as set out in the provisions of a statute or regulation, is the means chosen by the law-maker to achieve a set of desired goals. Law-abiding readers (including those who administer or enforce the legislation and those who resolve disputes) try to identify the intended goals of the legislation and the means devised to achieve those goals, so that they can act accordingly. [Emphasis added.] (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008), at p. 2. ).
[33] In this case, it is clear that Parliament would have known that enacting s. 719(3) using the language it chose to use would have the effect of restricting judges from giving any greater credit than one day for each day served in pre-trial custody. Parliament must have intended that enacting such a restriction would increase actual time served when compared to the previous, common practice of giving 2:1 credit, as a mandatory limit on time credited could have no other consequence but increasing the total time served.
[34] Similarly, Parliament would have known that by enacting subsection (3.1) using the phrase “despite subsection (3)”, that it would create an exception, and not a replacement, to subsection (3) “if the circumstances justify it”. Parliament would not have created an exception that was meant, in practice, to displace the very rule it created in the previous subsection.
[35] The defence position that 1.5:1 is to be the default would leave only (i) the absolute bars and (ii) the judicial discretion to reduce credit below 1.5:1 where, traditionally, judges have refused to grant enhanced credit (such as where the accused has unduly lengthened his or her pre-sentence custody by manipulating the justice system).
[36] In effect, the defence interpretation would read out the sub-clause in the first line of subsection (3.1): “if the circumstances justify it”. It would also make subsection (3) redundant. Neither of these consequences is consistent with the basic presumption that language in a statute has meaning.
S'abonner à :
Messages (Atom)