L'affaiblissement des facultés n'a pas à être marqué dans le cadre d'une accusation pour facultés affaiblies

R. c. Aubé, 1993 CanLII 4143 (QC C.A.)

D'ailleurs, cette formulation exprimée par l'arrêt R. c. McKenzie, qui ajoutait au texte dudit article en utilisant l'expression «marked impairment», formulation acceptée à tort dans quelques décisions citées par l'appelant, fut rectifiée par d'autres plus récentes notamment de R. v. Stellato, précitée, et auparavant par R. v. Bruhjell, (C.A. B.C.), décision inédite du l8 septembre 1986; R.v. Campbell, (C.A. P.E.), 26 M.V.R. (2d), 3l9. La Cour d'appel d'Ontario, dans l'arrêt unanime cité précédemment, a correctement statué que le fardeau de la preuve de culpabilité hors de tout doute raisonnable est rempli lorsque la preuve est faite que les facultés de conduire un véhicule automobile pour un accusé étaient affaiblies par l'alcool ou une drogue, et pas davantage. En effet, ce que le législateur exige dans l'article 253a) c'est de reconnaître un affaiblissement de la capacité de conduire, mais non pas un affaiblissement «marqué». L'arrêt R. v. Stellato, pp. 5 et 6:

«The court noted in Smith that if Parliament had intended to proscribe any impairment, however slight, it could have done so. On the other hand, if Parliament had intended to proscribe impaired driving only where accompanied by a marked departure from the norm, it also could have done so. With all due respect to those who hold a contrary view, it is my opinion that the interpretation of s. 253(a) which was advanced in Winlaw, Bruhjell and Campbell is the correct one. Specifically, I agree with Mitchell J.A. in Campbell that the Criminal Code does not prescribe any special test for determining impairment. In the words of Mitchell J.A., impairment is an issue of fact which the trial judge must decide on the evidence and the standard of proof is neither more nor less than that required for any other element of a criminal offence: courts should not apply tests which imply a tolerance that does not exist in law.

In all criminal cases the trial judge must be satisfied as to the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be registered. Accordingly, before convicting an accused of impaired driving, the trial judge must be satisfied that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a drug. If the evidence of impairment is so frail as to leave the trial judge with a reasonable doubt as to impairment, the accused must be acquitted. If the evidence of impairment establishes any degree of impairment ranging from slight to great, the offence has been made out.

In the present case, the trial judge applied the correct test for impairment. There was sufficient evidence adduced at trial from which he could find that the Crown had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol at the material time. Consequently, the Summary Conviction Appeal court did not err in dismissing the appellant's appeal.

I would grant leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal.»