R. c. Martin, 1992 CanLII 3189 (QC CA)
Lien vers la décision
Avant d'analyser la preuve relative à chacun des cinq chefs, il importe de revoir à ce sujet les exigences posées par l'article 292(1) du Code criminel (maintenant l'article 332).
Dépouillé du texte qui n'a ici aucune pertinence l'article 292(1) se lit:
Commet un vol quiconque, ayant reçu .... de l'argent .... avec instructions d'affecter à une fin .... que spécifient les instructions la totalité ou une partie de cet argent .... frauduleusement et en violation des instructions reçues affecte à une autre fin ou verse à une autre personne l'argent .... ou toute partie de cet argent ....
Deux éléments sont essentiels à la commission de cette offense: des instructions spécifiques et une violation frauduleuse de ces instructions.
Au sujet de la spécificité des instructions le texte même de l'article paraît assez clair: «ayant reçu de l'argent avec instructions d'affecter à une fin que spécifient les instructions ....».
Il suit du texte même de la loi que l'existence d'instructions ne saurait découler de simples expectatives et ne saurait davantage être établie implicitement. L'exigence de la spécificité des instructions repousse l'idée que l'existence des instructions puisse être implicite.
Cette interprétation de l'article 292(1) me paraît conforme à l'arrêt unanime de la Cour suprême du Canada dans LOWDEN c. LA REINE 1982 CanLII 194 (CSC), [1982] 2 R.C.S. 60, 68 C.C.C.(2d) 531, 139 D.L.R.(3d)257. Au nom de la Cour le juge Lamer (alors puîné) s'exprime comme suit (page 67):
Le juge Moir énonce très clairement et précisément le principe de l'art. 292 de la façon suivante:
[TRADUCTION] Je crois devoir expliquer comment, à mon avis, s'applique l'art. 292. S'il y a, dans les circonstances de l'espèce, un lien de débiteur à créancier entre les parties à l'opération, il faut des instructions écrites pour qu'il puisse y avoir une déclaration de culpabilité. S'il n'y a pas de lien de débiteur à créancier, il incombe à la poursuite de faire la preuve des instructions. Ces instructions doivent être établies hors de tout doute raisonnable.
En l'espèce, on dit qu'il n'y a pas de lien de débiteur à créancier entre l'agence de voyages et le client. Cela n'élimine pas la nécessité des instructions, seule la nécessité d'instructions écrites disparaît. Suivant ses termes, l'art. 292 exige des «instructions d'affecter à une fin ou de verser à une personne que spécifient les instructions la totalité ou une partie de cet argent».
La conclusion à laquelle j'en viens est entièrement conforté par l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario R. v. Brown (1956) 116 C.C.C. 112 et sur de nombreuses autres décisions canadiennes.
Avec égards, je suis d'avis que pour invoquer l'art. 292, du Code criminel, la preuve doit établir que l'agence avait reçu les instructions de conserver l'argent et de l'appliquer uniquement aux fins énoncées dans les instructions. Cette preuve n'a pas été faite et la poursuite échoue à cause de l'absence de preuve des instructions requises.
En parlant des clients de l'agence, il avait déjà mentionné:
[TRADUCTION] En l'espèce, on dit que les clients de l'agence de voyages s'attendaient à ce que l'argent soit employé à l'achat de billets et à aucune autre fin. Rien dans la preuve n'appuie un accord ou des instructions en ce sens entre l'appelant et les clients. C'est une conclusion qu'on prétend implicite dans le lien entre les parties.
. . .
Il est évident qu'il est nécessaire de trouver ... les instructions prévues à l'art. 292 pour que cet article s'applique. Les attentes des clients ne sont pas pertinentes. Pour que l'accusé soit criminellement responsable, l'argent doit avoir été payé selon des instructions et accepté selon ces instructions. C'est une question de contrat ou d'instructions, et non d'attente.
Je souscris à cette interprétation du droit exprimée par le juge Moir.
Avec égards, cependant, je ne puis être d'accord avec la proposition qu'il n'y a pas de preuve permettant de conclure à l'existence d'instructions, pas plus que je n'estime que les attentes des clients ne sont pas pertinentes, même si je dois ajouter que les attentes, envisagées isolément, n'équivalent pas à des instructions.
Le juge Moir est d'avis que, selon la majorité, les attentes des clients, lorsqu'on examine ce qui était implicite dans leurs rapports avec l'agence, suffisaient à créer des «instructions» de la nature de celles qu'envisage l'art. 292. Si c'était là la conclusion de la Cour, je serais d'accord avec le juge Moir que de simples «attentes» chez des personnes, si l'on n'a pas fait la preuve que la personne qui reçoit les biens connaît cette attente et qu'elle reconnaît que la remise de ces biens vise uniquement à combler ces attentes, ne peuvent, en droit, constituer des «instructions»; une conclusion de la Cour d'appel en ce sens constituerait une erreur de droit sur laquelle il serait dissident. Mais, comme je l'ai dit, ce n'est pas le cas. Le juge en chef McGillivray, aux motifs duquel a souscrit le juge Brennant (juge ad hoc), a dit:
[TRADUCTION] À mon avis, le paiement d'une somme d'argent à une agence de voyages pour un voyage déterminé, à une date précise, sur un vol régulier, ou le paiement d'une somme d'argent pour une réservation précise dans un hôtel déterminé pour une époque donnée crée plus qu'une simple relation de débiteur à créancier. À mon avis, il est implicite qu'on s'attend à ce que l'agent obtienne le billet ou qu'il rende l'argent. J'estime que ce n'est pas un cas où, si un vol aérien était annulé, l'agent serait responsable en dommages. Il me paraît évident que le public comprendra que l'agent allait affecter l'argent à la réservation. Si le vol est annulé, l'agent n'en est pas responsable. Il s'est acquitté pleinement de son obligation envers le client, et on doit s'attendre à ce que la société aérienne rende l'argent.
Le Juge en chef, en parlant de ce qui est «implicite» traitait du fait qu'il y avait plus qu'une simple relation de débiteur à créancier. Il n'a nullement suggéré que ce que le client attendait implicitement de la relation constituait des «instructions». Pour appuyer sa conclusion qu'il existait des instructions, on ne peut passer sous silence, outre la constatation de ces attentes, qu'en fait, l'appelant a reçu et a «accepté» l'argent qui lui était confié dans le but évident de combler ces attentes, en toute connaissance de ces attentes qui lui ont été communiquées de façon «expresse», et que par ses agissements, il a employé l'argent de façon contraire à la fin à laquelle il était destiné.
À la lecture de ces propos il ne semble faire aucun doute que de simples attentes ne peuvent faire présumer de l'existence d'instructions au sens de l'article du code.
On peut, comme élément de preuve servant à établir l'existence d'instructions spécifiques, tenir compte des attentes ou expectatives mais les instructions ne peuvent s'inférer de ces attentes seules.
C'est à la lumière de ces enseignements que je me propose de revoir la preuve sur laquelle le juge de première instance s'appuie pour affirmer que dans chaque cas la victime a remis à l'appelant une somme d'argent «avec la mention explicite» que cette somme serve à payer le terrain.
mardi 31 juillet 2012
mardi 24 juillet 2012
Les éléments constitutifs de l'infraction d'abus de confiance criminel
R v Solar, 2012 SKQB 113 (CanLII)
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[10] For the accused to be found guilty of a breach of trust, Crown counsel must prove each of the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the accused was a trustee of some thing;
(2) that the accused converted the thing to an unauthorized use; and
(3) that the accused intended to defraud.
The first two elements are the actus reus of the offence of breach of trust, and the third is the mens rea. I will deal with each separately.
[11] In respect to the actus reus, s. 2 of the Criminal Code defines a “trustee” as follows”
“trustee” means a person who is declared by any Act to be a trustee or is, by the law of a province, a trustee, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a trustee on an express trust created by deed, will or instrument in writing, or by parol;
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[10] For the accused to be found guilty of a breach of trust, Crown counsel must prove each of the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the accused was a trustee of some thing;
(2) that the accused converted the thing to an unauthorized use; and
(3) that the accused intended to defraud.
The first two elements are the actus reus of the offence of breach of trust, and the third is the mens rea. I will deal with each separately.
[11] In respect to the actus reus, s. 2 of the Criminal Code defines a “trustee” as follows”
“trustee” means a person who is declared by any Act to be a trustee or is, by the law of a province, a trustee, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a trustee on an express trust created by deed, will or instrument in writing, or by parol;
L'identification d'une signature / Les paramètres à considérer par la Cour
R. v. Cunsolo, 2011 ONSC 1349 (CanLII)
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[242] Proof that an accused authored certain writing may afford circumstantial evidence that not only was he or she acquainted with the subject matter to which the writing is connected, but also, depending on the context, that the accused was actively engaged in participating in any described transaction.
[243] The prosecution may establish that a writing was made by an accused on the basis of an admission or agreement or, where disputed, by:
(1) a witness acquainted with the accused’s writing
(2) expert evidence
(3) comparative evaluation by the trier of fact without the testimony of a witness.
[244] These proof processes, particularly the latter two described above, inevitably involve a comparison of unknown or disputed writing to a handwriting sample authenticated at trial to be genuine in the sense of a proved exemplar of the accused’s writing, whether by admission or other persuasive proof.
[245] Introduction of the opinion of a handwriting expert subjects the expert’s conclusions to the scrutiny generally applicable to expert evidence. The opinion of a properly qualified expert, based upon an appropriate foundation, amounts to a piece of evidence which a trier of fact evaluates for acceptance or rejection and, where accepted, the assignment of what weight it properly deserves. On occasion, as in the present case, where the expert’s report concludes one writer authored certain documents without identifying the writer, it is accepted for the truth of its contents with minimal defence submissions as to weight as the defence submits that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused is that writer. This approach is entirely consistent with the approach advocated in R. v. Coburn reflex, (1982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 463 (Ont. C.A.) of avoiding a credibility contest between documentary and viva voce evidence.
[246] A trier of fact is entitled, and indeed not precluded, as a matter of common law, to undertake a comparative analysis of handwriting specimens without the intervention of witnesses interpreting or identifying the relevant writing – a deliberative and fact-finding process which is not ousted by s. 8 of the Canada Evidence Act which provides:
Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting those writings, may be submitted to the court and jury as proof of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute.
See R. v. Abdi 1997 CanLII 4448 (ON CA), (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 13-23, 25; R. v. Malvoisin (2006), 36 M.V.R. (5th) 187 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4.
[247] It is important as an aspect of the accused knowing the case to be met, that he or she be on notice that the trier of fact may engage in comparative handwriting identification analysis: R. v. Flynn, 2010 ONCA 424 (CanLII), 2010 ONCA 424, at para. 20; R. v. Anderson, 2005 BCCA 143 (CanLII), 2005 BCCA 143, at paras. 11-14.
[248] “Handwriting is an acquired skill that becomes ingrained; it is habitual as well as individualized”: S.H. James & J.J. Nordby (eds.), Forensic Science – An Introduction to Scientific and Investigative Techniques (2nd ed.) (CRC Press), at p. 359. Handwriting identification comparison is based on a number of assumptions including:
(1) the underlying axiom of handwriting comparison is that no two individuals write in the same way
(2) over time, a person develops personal and distinctive characteristics or features in his or her handwriting, effectively yielding a unique individual pattern which can be discerned by observation of sufficient samples of handwriting.
See G.M. Chayko & E.D. Gulliver, Forensic Evidence in Canada (2nd ed.) (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1999), at p. 509; K.M. Matthews, J.E. Pink, A.D. Tupper, A.E. Wells, The Expert – A Practitioner’s Guide (Scarborough, Thomson Canada Limited, 1995), at pp. 13-5; D.M. Risinger & M.J. Saks, “Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise” (1996), 82 Iowa Law Rev. 21, at p. 67.
[249] “The recognition, correct interpretation, and complete comparison of all of its qualities, elements, and characteristics, are the essential phases of a scientific handwriting examination” and “[t]he process of comparison...is reasoning regarding similarities and differences”: A.S. Osborn, Questioned Documents (2nd ed.) (Toronto: The Carswell Company, Limited, 1929), at pp. 97, 237.
[250] Accordingly, a trier of fact is entitled to use his or her “own eyes and...common sense” in making “an educated and reasonable comparison” of handwriting properly tendered in evidence (Abdi, at paras. 26, 29). The notion of writing undoubtedly includes printing and other text: National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (The National Academics Press, 2009), at p. 164 (“handwriting includes cursive or script stroke writing, printing by hand, signatures, numerals, or other written marks or signs”); J. Levinson, Questioned Documents: A Lawyer’s Handbook (San Diego, Academic Press, 2001), at p. 41 (query whether writer uses special signs or marks or “certain abbreviations or pictographic techniques in writing”).
[251] The trier should be encouraged to proceed by the use of objective criteria as the foundation for any opinion should one prove possible. The dependability or reliability of the trier’s conclusion and the weight to be attributed to such conclusion are case-specific issues. It is expected that the trier will focus on “the distinctiveness of the writings in issue” (Abdi, at para. 25), for example the manner in which particular letters are written: Flynn, at paras. 17-18. In some instances, the trier may be invited to look at the similarity of the misspelling of certain words and the irregular spacing of others: R. v . G.D.C., 2010 ONCA 381 (CanLII), 2010 ONCA 381, at para. 4.
[252] Handwriting comparison, even by experts, is no easy task. As a general rule, it is recognized that there is a potential danger in making unassisted handwriting comparisons in the absence of expert or other evidence relating to the writings: Abdi, at paras. 27, 29; Malvoisin, at para. 4. This cautionary theme is hardly surprising given the scope of examination which might be undertaken by an expert as described at p. 510 of the Chayko and Gulliver text:
The characteristics which are assessed include: line quality; writing fluency and legibility; rhythm of movements; pen pressure; slope of handwriting; spacing between characters, words and lines of information; alignment of characters, words and lines of handwriting; direction of strokes; manner of connecting and disconnecting characters and words; initial and terminal movements; size of writing; character design; internal consistency of movements; proportions within characters and one of character to another; arrangement of writing; presence or absence of pen lifts, hesitations and hiatuses; and the design and positioning of punctuation marks, diacritics, accents and other symbols.
See also Risinger & Saks, “Science and Nonscience in the Courts...”, at pp. 67-73; Matthews et al., The Expert..., at p. 13-3; Osborn, Questioned Documents, chs. IX, X.
[253] The trier of fact must therefore exercise caution in performing comparative handwriting analysis for any number of reasons including:
(1) weakness of proof respecting the “known” sample of the accused’s writing
(2) the lack of expertise and experience in performing the task
(3) lack of access to special equipment utilized by experts and laboratories
(4) the quality of the handwriting exemplar, including consideration of length and clarity: Abdi, at para. 27; Risinger/Saks, at p. 35; Chayko/Gulliver, at p. 510; I. Freckelton & H. Selby, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law (Ontario; Carswell, 1999), at pp. 126-7
(5) the deficits occasioned to the process by photocopies: Chayko/Gulliver, at pp. 520-1; Matthews et al., at p. 13-8
(6) the natural variation in everyone’s handwriting (“intrasource variation”): Chayko/Gulliver, at p. 510; Matthews et al., at p. 13-5
(7) given that different individuals may well have similar handwriting: (A. Gold, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law: The Scientific Approach (2nd ed.) (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2009), at p. 143), the necessity of separating out class master patterns from identifying significant individuality of features and habitual repetition of same supporting the view that the samples are the product of a single writer
(8) deciding how many features or attributes of similarity are required to move beyond resemblance to identification of a writer: Chayko/Gulliver, at p. 512; Matthews et al., at p. 13-9
(9) identification of not superficial, but persistent and fundamental, differences in the relevant samples detracting from the probative force of discerned similarities: Matthews et al., at p. 13-9; Osborn, at p. 205.
[254] On the latter point, at pp. 245, 262, 381-2, 383 and 385 of his text, Osborn very persuasively discusses the significance of not only material and repeated similarities but also the role of relevant differences:
...if the conclusion of identity is reached, either in a person or a handwriting, there must not remain significant differences that cannot reasonably be explained. This ignoring of the differences, or the failure properly to account for them, is the cause of most of the errors in handwriting identification.
. . .
It also needs to be emphasized that two writings are identified as being by the same writer by the absence of fundamental divergences as well as by a combination of a sufficient number of similarities. The process is always a double operation, positive and negative, and if error is to be avoided neither part of the process should be overlooked. In order to reach the conclusion of identity of two sets of writings there must not be present significant and unexplained divergences. These divergences must, however, be something more than mere trivial variations that can be found in almost any handwriting.
. . .
It should be clearly understood that a correct conclusion in any case, as stated in other connections, is based only upon a combination of common qualities and individual characteristics in sufficient number so that it is reasonable to say that they would not all accidentally coincide in two writings by different writers.
. . .
Errors in identification of handwriting are mainly due to two causes. The first of these is the lack of knowledge regarding these common similarities in many handwritings, as already described, and the second is due to the overlooking, ignoring, or incorrect interpretation of the differences in two handwritings. Ignorance or inexperience may lead to wrong reasoning on any of these general or individual qualities or may omit reasoning.
. . .
Errors are also due to the fact that identity is inferred from mere superficial qualities that are not individual.
[255] After undertaking handwriting comparison, a trier will arrive at a determination on the comparative identification question. The Chayko and Gulliver text, at p. 511, describes the process in this way:
The conclusions expressed in handwriting comparisons range from certainty to probability to being inconclusive. The terminology and conclusion levels vary among laboratories. One frequently used scale of conclusions is:
1. Definitive – “The questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The questioned handwriting has been identified (or eliminated) as having been executed by the writer of the specimens”.
2. Strong probability – “There is a strong probability that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The similarities (or differences) found definitely indicate that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimen”.
3. Probability – “The similarities (or differences) found tend to indicate that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The similarities (or differences) suggest that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens”.
4. Neutral – “It was not possible to determine whether or not the questioned signature was executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The questioned handwriting has not been identified or eliminated as being executed by the writer of the specimens”.
[256] In their text, at p. 153, Freckelton and Selby refer to unqualified identification (no doubt existing, with opinion in absolute terms that document ‘X’ was written by the writer of document ‘Y’), inconclusive identification (“no useful opinion can be given”), and qualified identification described in this way:
This conclusion is expressed in terms of a degree of probability. While qualified opinion evidence in isolation may satisfy the civil standard of proof, it would not be sufficient to secure a criminal conviction. It may, however, provide corroboration of other evidence or be of value to the defence in raising a reasonable doubt.
See also National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Evidence..., at p. 166 (discussion of 5 and 9-point scales for expressing subjective conclusions of handwriting comparison and identification).
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[242] Proof that an accused authored certain writing may afford circumstantial evidence that not only was he or she acquainted with the subject matter to which the writing is connected, but also, depending on the context, that the accused was actively engaged in participating in any described transaction.
[243] The prosecution may establish that a writing was made by an accused on the basis of an admission or agreement or, where disputed, by:
(1) a witness acquainted with the accused’s writing
(2) expert evidence
(3) comparative evaluation by the trier of fact without the testimony of a witness.
[244] These proof processes, particularly the latter two described above, inevitably involve a comparison of unknown or disputed writing to a handwriting sample authenticated at trial to be genuine in the sense of a proved exemplar of the accused’s writing, whether by admission or other persuasive proof.
[245] Introduction of the opinion of a handwriting expert subjects the expert’s conclusions to the scrutiny generally applicable to expert evidence. The opinion of a properly qualified expert, based upon an appropriate foundation, amounts to a piece of evidence which a trier of fact evaluates for acceptance or rejection and, where accepted, the assignment of what weight it properly deserves. On occasion, as in the present case, where the expert’s report concludes one writer authored certain documents without identifying the writer, it is accepted for the truth of its contents with minimal defence submissions as to weight as the defence submits that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused is that writer. This approach is entirely consistent with the approach advocated in R. v. Coburn reflex, (1982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 463 (Ont. C.A.) of avoiding a credibility contest between documentary and viva voce evidence.
[246] A trier of fact is entitled, and indeed not precluded, as a matter of common law, to undertake a comparative analysis of handwriting specimens without the intervention of witnesses interpreting or identifying the relevant writing – a deliberative and fact-finding process which is not ousted by s. 8 of the Canada Evidence Act which provides:
Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting those writings, may be submitted to the court and jury as proof of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute.
See R. v. Abdi 1997 CanLII 4448 (ON CA), (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 13-23, 25; R. v. Malvoisin (2006), 36 M.V.R. (5th) 187 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4.
[247] It is important as an aspect of the accused knowing the case to be met, that he or she be on notice that the trier of fact may engage in comparative handwriting identification analysis: R. v. Flynn, 2010 ONCA 424 (CanLII), 2010 ONCA 424, at para. 20; R. v. Anderson, 2005 BCCA 143 (CanLII), 2005 BCCA 143, at paras. 11-14.
[248] “Handwriting is an acquired skill that becomes ingrained; it is habitual as well as individualized”: S.H. James & J.J. Nordby (eds.), Forensic Science – An Introduction to Scientific and Investigative Techniques (2nd ed.) (CRC Press), at p. 359. Handwriting identification comparison is based on a number of assumptions including:
(1) the underlying axiom of handwriting comparison is that no two individuals write in the same way
(2) over time, a person develops personal and distinctive characteristics or features in his or her handwriting, effectively yielding a unique individual pattern which can be discerned by observation of sufficient samples of handwriting.
See G.M. Chayko & E.D. Gulliver, Forensic Evidence in Canada (2nd ed.) (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1999), at p. 509; K.M. Matthews, J.E. Pink, A.D. Tupper, A.E. Wells, The Expert – A Practitioner’s Guide (Scarborough, Thomson Canada Limited, 1995), at pp. 13-5; D.M. Risinger & M.J. Saks, “Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise” (1996), 82 Iowa Law Rev. 21, at p. 67.
[249] “The recognition, correct interpretation, and complete comparison of all of its qualities, elements, and characteristics, are the essential phases of a scientific handwriting examination” and “[t]he process of comparison...is reasoning regarding similarities and differences”: A.S. Osborn, Questioned Documents (2nd ed.) (Toronto: The Carswell Company, Limited, 1929), at pp. 97, 237.
[250] Accordingly, a trier of fact is entitled to use his or her “own eyes and...common sense” in making “an educated and reasonable comparison” of handwriting properly tendered in evidence (Abdi, at paras. 26, 29). The notion of writing undoubtedly includes printing and other text: National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (The National Academics Press, 2009), at p. 164 (“handwriting includes cursive or script stroke writing, printing by hand, signatures, numerals, or other written marks or signs”); J. Levinson, Questioned Documents: A Lawyer’s Handbook (San Diego, Academic Press, 2001), at p. 41 (query whether writer uses special signs or marks or “certain abbreviations or pictographic techniques in writing”).
[251] The trier should be encouraged to proceed by the use of objective criteria as the foundation for any opinion should one prove possible. The dependability or reliability of the trier’s conclusion and the weight to be attributed to such conclusion are case-specific issues. It is expected that the trier will focus on “the distinctiveness of the writings in issue” (Abdi, at para. 25), for example the manner in which particular letters are written: Flynn, at paras. 17-18. In some instances, the trier may be invited to look at the similarity of the misspelling of certain words and the irregular spacing of others: R. v . G.D.C., 2010 ONCA 381 (CanLII), 2010 ONCA 381, at para. 4.
[252] Handwriting comparison, even by experts, is no easy task. As a general rule, it is recognized that there is a potential danger in making unassisted handwriting comparisons in the absence of expert or other evidence relating to the writings: Abdi, at paras. 27, 29; Malvoisin, at para. 4. This cautionary theme is hardly surprising given the scope of examination which might be undertaken by an expert as described at p. 510 of the Chayko and Gulliver text:
The characteristics which are assessed include: line quality; writing fluency and legibility; rhythm of movements; pen pressure; slope of handwriting; spacing between characters, words and lines of information; alignment of characters, words and lines of handwriting; direction of strokes; manner of connecting and disconnecting characters and words; initial and terminal movements; size of writing; character design; internal consistency of movements; proportions within characters and one of character to another; arrangement of writing; presence or absence of pen lifts, hesitations and hiatuses; and the design and positioning of punctuation marks, diacritics, accents and other symbols.
See also Risinger & Saks, “Science and Nonscience in the Courts...”, at pp. 67-73; Matthews et al., The Expert..., at p. 13-3; Osborn, Questioned Documents, chs. IX, X.
[253] The trier of fact must therefore exercise caution in performing comparative handwriting analysis for any number of reasons including:
(1) weakness of proof respecting the “known” sample of the accused’s writing
(2) the lack of expertise and experience in performing the task
(3) lack of access to special equipment utilized by experts and laboratories
(4) the quality of the handwriting exemplar, including consideration of length and clarity: Abdi, at para. 27; Risinger/Saks, at p. 35; Chayko/Gulliver, at p. 510; I. Freckelton & H. Selby, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law (Ontario; Carswell, 1999), at pp. 126-7
(5) the deficits occasioned to the process by photocopies: Chayko/Gulliver, at pp. 520-1; Matthews et al., at p. 13-8
(6) the natural variation in everyone’s handwriting (“intrasource variation”): Chayko/Gulliver, at p. 510; Matthews et al., at p. 13-5
(7) given that different individuals may well have similar handwriting: (A. Gold, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law: The Scientific Approach (2nd ed.) (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2009), at p. 143), the necessity of separating out class master patterns from identifying significant individuality of features and habitual repetition of same supporting the view that the samples are the product of a single writer
(8) deciding how many features or attributes of similarity are required to move beyond resemblance to identification of a writer: Chayko/Gulliver, at p. 512; Matthews et al., at p. 13-9
(9) identification of not superficial, but persistent and fundamental, differences in the relevant samples detracting from the probative force of discerned similarities: Matthews et al., at p. 13-9; Osborn, at p. 205.
[254] On the latter point, at pp. 245, 262, 381-2, 383 and 385 of his text, Osborn very persuasively discusses the significance of not only material and repeated similarities but also the role of relevant differences:
...if the conclusion of identity is reached, either in a person or a handwriting, there must not remain significant differences that cannot reasonably be explained. This ignoring of the differences, or the failure properly to account for them, is the cause of most of the errors in handwriting identification.
. . .
It also needs to be emphasized that two writings are identified as being by the same writer by the absence of fundamental divergences as well as by a combination of a sufficient number of similarities. The process is always a double operation, positive and negative, and if error is to be avoided neither part of the process should be overlooked. In order to reach the conclusion of identity of two sets of writings there must not be present significant and unexplained divergences. These divergences must, however, be something more than mere trivial variations that can be found in almost any handwriting.
. . .
It should be clearly understood that a correct conclusion in any case, as stated in other connections, is based only upon a combination of common qualities and individual characteristics in sufficient number so that it is reasonable to say that they would not all accidentally coincide in two writings by different writers.
. . .
Errors in identification of handwriting are mainly due to two causes. The first of these is the lack of knowledge regarding these common similarities in many handwritings, as already described, and the second is due to the overlooking, ignoring, or incorrect interpretation of the differences in two handwritings. Ignorance or inexperience may lead to wrong reasoning on any of these general or individual qualities or may omit reasoning.
. . .
Errors are also due to the fact that identity is inferred from mere superficial qualities that are not individual.
[255] After undertaking handwriting comparison, a trier will arrive at a determination on the comparative identification question. The Chayko and Gulliver text, at p. 511, describes the process in this way:
The conclusions expressed in handwriting comparisons range from certainty to probability to being inconclusive. The terminology and conclusion levels vary among laboratories. One frequently used scale of conclusions is:
1. Definitive – “The questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The questioned handwriting has been identified (or eliminated) as having been executed by the writer of the specimens”.
2. Strong probability – “There is a strong probability that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The similarities (or differences) found definitely indicate that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimen”.
3. Probability – “The similarities (or differences) found tend to indicate that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The similarities (or differences) suggest that the questioned handwriting was (or was not) executed by the writer of the specimens”.
4. Neutral – “It was not possible to determine whether or not the questioned signature was executed by the writer of the specimens” or “The questioned handwriting has not been identified or eliminated as being executed by the writer of the specimens”.
[256] In their text, at p. 153, Freckelton and Selby refer to unqualified identification (no doubt existing, with opinion in absolute terms that document ‘X’ was written by the writer of document ‘Y’), inconclusive identification (“no useful opinion can be given”), and qualified identification described in this way:
This conclusion is expressed in terms of a degree of probability. While qualified opinion evidence in isolation may satisfy the civil standard of proof, it would not be sufficient to secure a criminal conviction. It may, however, provide corroboration of other evidence or be of value to the defence in raising a reasonable doubt.
See also National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Evidence..., at p. 166 (discussion of 5 and 9-point scales for expressing subjective conclusions of handwriting comparison and identification).
jeudi 19 juillet 2012
L'assouplissement de la règle de la meilleure preuve selon la Cour d'Appel de Colombie-Britannique
R. c. Routhier, 2003 CanLII 55328 (QC CM)
Lien vers la décision
[181] Les tribunaux ont formulé que la règle de la meilleure preuve, qui est applicable aux preuves physiques, ne doit pas être administrée de façon rigoriste.
[182] Les propos du juge Taggart de la Cour d’appel de la Colombie Britannique dans R. c. Betterest Vinyl Manufacturing et al., reflex, (1989) 52 C.C.C. (3d), 441, à la page 447, sont concluants :
As I read the text writers and the authorities we are no longer bound to apply strictly the best evidence rule as it relates to copies of documents and especially to photocopies of them. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 17, pp. 8-9, states:
The logic of requiring the production of an original document where it is available rather than relying on possibly unsatisfactory copies, or the recollections of witnesses, is clear, although modern techniques make objections to the first alternative less strong.
That passage was referred to in R. v. Cotroni 1979 CanLII 38 (SCC), (1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 1 at p. 9, 93 D.L.R. (3d) 161, (1979) 2 S.C.R. 256. I will deal with that decision later.
P.K. McWilliams in Canadian Criminal Evidence, supra, in his discussion on “original” documents, quotes at p. 92 from the decision of Limerick J.A. in R. v. Alward (1976), 32 C.C.C.(2d) 416 at p. 429, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 290, 15 N.B.R. (2d) 551 (C.A.): “I can see no reason why a carbon copy of the memorandum made simultaneously with the original would not be as accurate as the original…” and goes on to say (p. 93): “with the recent development of photocopying devices it is arguable that they should be admitted as originals as well even though they are subsequently made.”
In Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed. (1982), p. 70, the effect of the best evidence rule is said to go more to weight than to admissibility:
In the present day, then, it is not true that the best evidence must, or even may, always be given, though its non-production may be a matter for comment or affect the weight of that which is produced.
The following passage at p.71 also illustrates how the rule is applied:
In Kajala v. Noble, The Times, March 13, 1982 the Divisional Court said that the only remaining instance of the rule was that if an original document was available in one’s hands it must be produced. In that case the court held that justices had been entitled to rely on a copy of a video cassette recording made from an original shown on the BBC television news bulletins. The original was in the possession of the BBC and the copy was produced and identified by an employee of that organisation. The justices had been satisfied that it was an authentic copy. They accepted that the BBC policy of refusing to allow the original to leave their premises was reasonable and that the film crew who took the original was overseas.
The strongest argument by text writers against the strict application of the rule is found in Wigmore on Evidence (Chadboum (page 448) rev. (1972), vol. 4 at Sect.1191, on p. 434) it is contended that where the accuracy of a copy is not disputed there is no justification for refusing its admission:
What is most needed today, for this rule in general, is flexibility. This could be given by the following provisions: Production of the original may be dispenses with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
[183] Cet exposé prenait assise sur le jugement du juge Pigeon de la Cour Suprême dans R. c. Papalia, 1979 CanLII 38 (CSC), (1979) 2 R.C.S. 256.
[184] Plus récemment, la Cour d’appel de la Colombie Britannique statua de nouveau dans R. c. Pham, 1999 BCCA 571 (CanLII), (2000) 139 C.C.C. (3d) 539 (permission d’appeler à la Cour suprême refusée, 1999, S.C.C.A. no. 545). Il s’agissait d’un policier qui témoignait sur des documents qu’il avait vus dans un sac à main mais qu’il n’avait pas saisis. Citant la cause de R. c. Mills (C.A. 770102, B.C.C.A.), l’honorable juge Brajdwood écrit ce qui suit, à la page 544:
I agree with the reasons for judgment of the learned trial judge in her finding that the principles enunciated in the case of R. v. Mills (8 September 1978), CA770102 (B.C.C.A.) have binding authority. In the Mills case, Hinkson J. A. stated:
… The evidence at trial disclosed that in the residence the police officer had found two passports, one of which contained a photograph of the appellant and contained a physical description and other details of the holder of that passport. The police officer did not take the passport into his possession, he testified, but he made notes as to its contents. At trial, the passport was not in the possession of the Crown. The police officer explained that he had not taken it into his possession and then gave evidence as to its contents from his notes. In my view, in those circumstances that evidence was admissible.
The passport in the above case was located in the residence in which the accused was arrested and the officer did not take it into his possession. Also, in R. v. West (8 February 1989), Victoria V00766 (B.C.C.A.) summarised 6 W.C.B. (2d) 424), this Court held that a store manager could testify respecting the store’s inventory from his notes of information that he had called up and displayed on the store’s computer screen. This evidence was tendered in order to prove an inventory from a store in order to prove a theft in a case involving breaking and entering. Hinkson J. A., speaking for the Court, ruled as follows:
It is my view that the evidence of the manager was admissible. It seems to me that he was entitled, as manager to look at the information displayed on the computer screen which he called up from the computer’s memory bank with respect to the inventory of these particular products. He was entitled to testify as to what he read on the screen. He was entitled to testify, of course, about what he observed with respect to the “facing up” of the stock. He was entitled to testify with respect to his physical count of the inventory. In my opinion, dealing with his evidence as to what he read on the computer screen, that evidence was admissible. The objection is that it was really hearsay and, as (page 545) such, inadmissible. But, in my opinion, the evidence was admissible and any question as to its accuracy would go to weight rather than admissibility.
Lien vers la décision
[181] Les tribunaux ont formulé que la règle de la meilleure preuve, qui est applicable aux preuves physiques, ne doit pas être administrée de façon rigoriste.
[182] Les propos du juge Taggart de la Cour d’appel de la Colombie Britannique dans R. c. Betterest Vinyl Manufacturing et al., reflex, (1989) 52 C.C.C. (3d), 441, à la page 447, sont concluants :
As I read the text writers and the authorities we are no longer bound to apply strictly the best evidence rule as it relates to copies of documents and especially to photocopies of them. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 17, pp. 8-9, states:
The logic of requiring the production of an original document where it is available rather than relying on possibly unsatisfactory copies, or the recollections of witnesses, is clear, although modern techniques make objections to the first alternative less strong.
That passage was referred to in R. v. Cotroni 1979 CanLII 38 (SCC), (1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 1 at p. 9, 93 D.L.R. (3d) 161, (1979) 2 S.C.R. 256. I will deal with that decision later.
P.K. McWilliams in Canadian Criminal Evidence, supra, in his discussion on “original” documents, quotes at p. 92 from the decision of Limerick J.A. in R. v. Alward (1976), 32 C.C.C.(2d) 416 at p. 429, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 290, 15 N.B.R. (2d) 551 (C.A.): “I can see no reason why a carbon copy of the memorandum made simultaneously with the original would not be as accurate as the original…” and goes on to say (p. 93): “with the recent development of photocopying devices it is arguable that they should be admitted as originals as well even though they are subsequently made.”
In Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed. (1982), p. 70, the effect of the best evidence rule is said to go more to weight than to admissibility:
In the present day, then, it is not true that the best evidence must, or even may, always be given, though its non-production may be a matter for comment or affect the weight of that which is produced.
The following passage at p.71 also illustrates how the rule is applied:
In Kajala v. Noble, The Times, March 13, 1982 the Divisional Court said that the only remaining instance of the rule was that if an original document was available in one’s hands it must be produced. In that case the court held that justices had been entitled to rely on a copy of a video cassette recording made from an original shown on the BBC television news bulletins. The original was in the possession of the BBC and the copy was produced and identified by an employee of that organisation. The justices had been satisfied that it was an authentic copy. They accepted that the BBC policy of refusing to allow the original to leave their premises was reasonable and that the film crew who took the original was overseas.
The strongest argument by text writers against the strict application of the rule is found in Wigmore on Evidence (Chadboum (page 448) rev. (1972), vol. 4 at Sect.1191, on p. 434) it is contended that where the accuracy of a copy is not disputed there is no justification for refusing its admission:
What is most needed today, for this rule in general, is flexibility. This could be given by the following provisions: Production of the original may be dispenses with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
[183] Cet exposé prenait assise sur le jugement du juge Pigeon de la Cour Suprême dans R. c. Papalia, 1979 CanLII 38 (CSC), (1979) 2 R.C.S. 256.
[184] Plus récemment, la Cour d’appel de la Colombie Britannique statua de nouveau dans R. c. Pham, 1999 BCCA 571 (CanLII), (2000) 139 C.C.C. (3d) 539 (permission d’appeler à la Cour suprême refusée, 1999, S.C.C.A. no. 545). Il s’agissait d’un policier qui témoignait sur des documents qu’il avait vus dans un sac à main mais qu’il n’avait pas saisis. Citant la cause de R. c. Mills (C.A. 770102, B.C.C.A.), l’honorable juge Brajdwood écrit ce qui suit, à la page 544:
I agree with the reasons for judgment of the learned trial judge in her finding that the principles enunciated in the case of R. v. Mills (8 September 1978), CA770102 (B.C.C.A.) have binding authority. In the Mills case, Hinkson J. A. stated:
… The evidence at trial disclosed that in the residence the police officer had found two passports, one of which contained a photograph of the appellant and contained a physical description and other details of the holder of that passport. The police officer did not take the passport into his possession, he testified, but he made notes as to its contents. At trial, the passport was not in the possession of the Crown. The police officer explained that he had not taken it into his possession and then gave evidence as to its contents from his notes. In my view, in those circumstances that evidence was admissible.
The passport in the above case was located in the residence in which the accused was arrested and the officer did not take it into his possession. Also, in R. v. West (8 February 1989), Victoria V00766 (B.C.C.A.) summarised 6 W.C.B. (2d) 424), this Court held that a store manager could testify respecting the store’s inventory from his notes of information that he had called up and displayed on the store’s computer screen. This evidence was tendered in order to prove an inventory from a store in order to prove a theft in a case involving breaking and entering. Hinkson J. A., speaking for the Court, ruled as follows:
It is my view that the evidence of the manager was admissible. It seems to me that he was entitled, as manager to look at the information displayed on the computer screen which he called up from the computer’s memory bank with respect to the inventory of these particular products. He was entitled to testify as to what he read on the screen. He was entitled to testify, of course, about what he observed with respect to the “facing up” of the stock. He was entitled to testify with respect to his physical count of the inventory. In my opinion, dealing with his evidence as to what he read on the computer screen, that evidence was admissible. The objection is that it was really hearsay and, as (page 545) such, inadmissible. But, in my opinion, the evidence was admissible and any question as to its accuracy would go to weight rather than admissibility.
mercredi 18 juillet 2012
Arrêt de principe de la Cour d'Appel concernant les conditions qui doivent être satisfaites pour que l'appelant soit remis en liberté pendant l'appel
Raîche c. R., 2012 QCCA 1222 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[5] Le paragraphe 679(3) C.cr. énonce les conditions qui doivent être satisfaites pour que l'appelant soit remis en liberté pendant l'appel. Il doit établir que: 1) son appel n'est pas futile; 2) il se livrera en conformité avec les termes de l'ordonnance; 3) sa détention n'est pas nécessaire dans l'intérêt public.
[6] Dans son Guide annoté sur les procédures et techniques de plaidoiries devant la Cour d'appel, l'auteur Pierre L. Bienvenue explique le fondement de la requête pour remise en liberté provisoire de la façon suivante:
571 – L'appel qu'un accusé intente à l'encontre d'un verdict de culpabilité qu'il estime non fondé ou à l'encontre d'une peine qu'il estime excessive n'aurait pas grand sens, s'il devait purger toute sa peine (ou du moins une part substantielle de celle-ci) avant que son appel ne soit entendu par la Cour d'appel. Le législateur a donc prévu, pour éviter que de tels appels ne deviennent ainsi théoriques, dépouillés de tout intérêt autre que d'être exonéré ou soulagé sur papier, la faculté pour l'accusé appelant de demander sa « mise en liberté en attendant la décision de l'appel » : ce, en fonction des conditions (par. 679(3) ou (4) C.cr.) et selon les modalités (par. 679(5) et (5.1) qu'il y a associées. De leur côté, les juges de la Cour d'appel ont établi la nécessité d'un affidavit détaillé du requérant pour les éclairer en regard de ces conditions (art. 53 R.P.C.A.). Nous étudierons ci-après ce régime particulier de remise en liberté, à la lumière de la jurisprudence afférente.
[7] Examinons chacun des trois critères énoncés au paragraphe 679(3) C.cr.
[8] L'appel n'est pas futile. Comme le rappelle la juge Bich dans Lacroix c. R., la requête pour permission de faire appel sur des questions mixtes de fait et de droit ayant été accueillie, on ne peut pas parler de frivolité. L'avocat du Ministère public suggère d'examiner le mémoire d'appel de l'appelant pour refaire l'exercice et conclure à la faiblesse de son appel. Cette proposition est erronée. D'une part, l'appelant n'a pas à prouver le bien-fondé de ses moyens d'appel; il suffit qu'il établisse que les questions soulevées sont défendables. D'autre part, il est inapproprié pour le juge saisi d'une telle requête de se prononcer sur le fond du dossier.
[9] Ici, l'appel n'est pas futile. Les questions posées visent à déterminer si la conduite de l'appelant est criminelle ou si elle s'apparente plutôt à une faute civile. Cette détermination est particulièrement délicate et elle nécessite un examen détaillé de la preuve. À ce stade, il suffit de constater que le juge saisi de la requête pour permission d'appeler du verdict a été satisfait de la suffisance des motifs invoqués par l'appelant.
[10] L'appelant se livrera en conformité avec les termes de l'ordonnance. Il n'y a aucune raison de croire que cette condition ne sera pas satisfaite. D'ailleurs, l'avocat du Ministère public n'a fait aucun commentaire sur cet élément. Je signale que l'appelant a respecté les conditions de sa remise en liberté depuis le début des procédures en 2009 ce qui constitue, selon la jurisprudence, un facteur déterminant.
[11] La détention de l'appelant n'est pas nécessaire dans l'intérêt public. Il s'agit ici d'analyser deux facteurs soit 1) la protection et la sécurité du public et 2) la confiance du public dans l'administration de la justice. Le critère « protection et la sécurité du public » nécessite une évaluation du risque que présente l'appelant s'il est remis en liberté pendant l'appel. L'appelant est sans antécédents judiciaires et il a respecté ses conditions de remise en liberté, et ce, depuis le début des procédures. Je suis d'avis que ces faits permettent de conclure que le public ne court pas de risques.
[12] Quant au second volet de ce critère, celui qui se rattache à la confiance du public, je fais miens les propos du juge Doyon dans Guité précité :
À l’égard du second volet, les tribunaux doivent s’assurer que le public ne perdra pas confiance dans l’administration de la justice si l’appelant est mis en liberté. Le public dont il est question est celui qui connaît les règles de droit et qui est, comme l’écrit le juge Chamberland, «au fait de tous les tenants et aboutissants du dossier» : R. c. Do, REJB 1997 – 03809 (C.A.), et un public, comme le rappelait le juge Fish, alors à la Cour, «fully appreciative of the rules applicable under our system of justice» : Pearson c R., AZ-90011560 . Il s’agit donc d’un public qui est en mesure de se former une opinion éclairée, ayant pleinement connaissance des faits de la cause et du droit applicable, et qui n’est pas mû par la passion mais bien par la raison.
[13] En l'espèce, un public bien informé ne perdra pas confiance dans l'administration de la justice si l'appelant est remis en liberté durant l'appel. L'effet d'une telle remise en liberté est de retarder son emprisonnement pendant une certaine période si son appel devait être rejeté alors que, à l'inverse, il pourrait subir inutilement une peine d'emprisonnement si son appel était accueilli. Vu les circonstances du présent dossier, en particulier le profil de l'appelant, son comportement durant les procédures, l'absence d'antécédents judiciaires et ses moyens d'appel, je suis d'avis que la troisième condition du paragraphe 679(3) C.cr. est satisfaite.
Lien vers la décision
[5] Le paragraphe 679(3) C.cr. énonce les conditions qui doivent être satisfaites pour que l'appelant soit remis en liberté pendant l'appel. Il doit établir que: 1) son appel n'est pas futile; 2) il se livrera en conformité avec les termes de l'ordonnance; 3) sa détention n'est pas nécessaire dans l'intérêt public.
[6] Dans son Guide annoté sur les procédures et techniques de plaidoiries devant la Cour d'appel, l'auteur Pierre L. Bienvenue explique le fondement de la requête pour remise en liberté provisoire de la façon suivante:
571 – L'appel qu'un accusé intente à l'encontre d'un verdict de culpabilité qu'il estime non fondé ou à l'encontre d'une peine qu'il estime excessive n'aurait pas grand sens, s'il devait purger toute sa peine (ou du moins une part substantielle de celle-ci) avant que son appel ne soit entendu par la Cour d'appel. Le législateur a donc prévu, pour éviter que de tels appels ne deviennent ainsi théoriques, dépouillés de tout intérêt autre que d'être exonéré ou soulagé sur papier, la faculté pour l'accusé appelant de demander sa « mise en liberté en attendant la décision de l'appel » : ce, en fonction des conditions (par. 679(3) ou (4) C.cr.) et selon les modalités (par. 679(5) et (5.1) qu'il y a associées. De leur côté, les juges de la Cour d'appel ont établi la nécessité d'un affidavit détaillé du requérant pour les éclairer en regard de ces conditions (art. 53 R.P.C.A.). Nous étudierons ci-après ce régime particulier de remise en liberté, à la lumière de la jurisprudence afférente.
[7] Examinons chacun des trois critères énoncés au paragraphe 679(3) C.cr.
[8] L'appel n'est pas futile. Comme le rappelle la juge Bich dans Lacroix c. R., la requête pour permission de faire appel sur des questions mixtes de fait et de droit ayant été accueillie, on ne peut pas parler de frivolité. L'avocat du Ministère public suggère d'examiner le mémoire d'appel de l'appelant pour refaire l'exercice et conclure à la faiblesse de son appel. Cette proposition est erronée. D'une part, l'appelant n'a pas à prouver le bien-fondé de ses moyens d'appel; il suffit qu'il établisse que les questions soulevées sont défendables. D'autre part, il est inapproprié pour le juge saisi d'une telle requête de se prononcer sur le fond du dossier.
[9] Ici, l'appel n'est pas futile. Les questions posées visent à déterminer si la conduite de l'appelant est criminelle ou si elle s'apparente plutôt à une faute civile. Cette détermination est particulièrement délicate et elle nécessite un examen détaillé de la preuve. À ce stade, il suffit de constater que le juge saisi de la requête pour permission d'appeler du verdict a été satisfait de la suffisance des motifs invoqués par l'appelant.
[10] L'appelant se livrera en conformité avec les termes de l'ordonnance. Il n'y a aucune raison de croire que cette condition ne sera pas satisfaite. D'ailleurs, l'avocat du Ministère public n'a fait aucun commentaire sur cet élément. Je signale que l'appelant a respecté les conditions de sa remise en liberté depuis le début des procédures en 2009 ce qui constitue, selon la jurisprudence, un facteur déterminant.
[11] La détention de l'appelant n'est pas nécessaire dans l'intérêt public. Il s'agit ici d'analyser deux facteurs soit 1) la protection et la sécurité du public et 2) la confiance du public dans l'administration de la justice. Le critère « protection et la sécurité du public » nécessite une évaluation du risque que présente l'appelant s'il est remis en liberté pendant l'appel. L'appelant est sans antécédents judiciaires et il a respecté ses conditions de remise en liberté, et ce, depuis le début des procédures. Je suis d'avis que ces faits permettent de conclure que le public ne court pas de risques.
[12] Quant au second volet de ce critère, celui qui se rattache à la confiance du public, je fais miens les propos du juge Doyon dans Guité précité :
À l’égard du second volet, les tribunaux doivent s’assurer que le public ne perdra pas confiance dans l’administration de la justice si l’appelant est mis en liberté. Le public dont il est question est celui qui connaît les règles de droit et qui est, comme l’écrit le juge Chamberland, «au fait de tous les tenants et aboutissants du dossier» : R. c. Do, REJB 1997 – 03809 (C.A.), et un public, comme le rappelait le juge Fish, alors à la Cour, «fully appreciative of the rules applicable under our system of justice» : Pearson c R., AZ-90011560 . Il s’agit donc d’un public qui est en mesure de se former une opinion éclairée, ayant pleinement connaissance des faits de la cause et du droit applicable, et qui n’est pas mû par la passion mais bien par la raison.
[13] En l'espèce, un public bien informé ne perdra pas confiance dans l'administration de la justice si l'appelant est remis en liberté durant l'appel. L'effet d'une telle remise en liberté est de retarder son emprisonnement pendant une certaine période si son appel devait être rejeté alors que, à l'inverse, il pourrait subir inutilement une peine d'emprisonnement si son appel était accueilli. Vu les circonstances du présent dossier, en particulier le profil de l'appelant, son comportement durant les procédures, l'absence d'antécédents judiciaires et ses moyens d'appel, je suis d'avis que la troisième condition du paragraphe 679(3) C.cr. est satisfaite.
La requête de type Corbett et la conduite antérieure de la victime
Buzizi c. R., 2012 QCCA 906 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[62] En mars et septembre 2002, l'appelant a été condamné par un tribunal pour adolescents en rapport avec des accusations de bris d'engagement. En mars 2003, toujours devant le tribunal pour adolescents, il a été reconnu coupable d'agression armée. Enfin, il a été condamné en 2006 d'accusations de vol qualifié et de voies de fait simples.
[63] Le juge de première instance refuse la demande de limiter le contre-interrogatoire aux condamnations de 2002.
[64] Dans R. c. Tremblay, J.E. 2006-328, 2006 QCCA 75 (CanLII), 2006 QCCA 75, la Cour, se référant à R. c. Corbett, 1988 CanLII 80 (CSC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 670, résume ainsi la règle :
[17] L’article 12 de la Loi sur la preuve prévoit qu’un témoin peut être contre-interrogé relativement à ses condamnations antérieures. Dans R. c. Corbett, 1988 CanLII 80 (CSC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 670, la Cour suprême conclut que cette disposition ne contrevient pas aux articles 7 et 11(d) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés lorsqu’un accusé décide de témoigner pour sa défense. Cependant, le juge possède le pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter le contre-interrogatoire lorsque la divulgation complète causerait un préjudice plus grand que la valeur probante de cette preuve.
[65] La règle est l'inclusion, l'exclusion étant l'exception, et une cour d’appel doit faire preuve de déférence à l'égard d'une telle décision, qui relève de l'exercice d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire : R. c. Ranwez, 2007 QCCA 879 (CanLII), 2007 QCCA 879.
[66] Par ailleurs, cette Cour a encore récemment rappelé qu'il arrive que le nombre de condamnations soit pertinent pour apprécier la crédibilité d'un témoin : R. c. Daigneault, J.E. 2011-293, 2011 QCCA 148 (CanLII), 2011 QCCA 148.
[67] En l'espèce, si le juge de première instance avait accueilli la demande de l'appelant, le jury aurait eu l'impression que celui-ci a eu une conduite exemplaire depuis 2002, ce qui aurait tronqué la réalité, comme on le rappelle dans l'arrêt Tremblay, précité :
[23] Par ailleurs, comme il est permis de contre-interroger les autres témoins sur leurs antécédents judiciaires, le fait d’ «épurer » le casier judiciaire d’un accusé ou, pire, d’en taire complètement l’existence, peut avoir pour effet de donner au jury un portrait faussé de la réalité en lui laissant croire que seuls les témoins de la poursuite ont des antécédents et que leur crédibilité est donc affaiblie par rapport à celle de l'accusé qui, lui, n'en possède pas ou encore, en apparence, a été condamné moins souvent et pour des crimes différents de la réalité.
[68] Ici, les condamnations antérieures de l'appelant avaient une importance particulière puisque la défense a déposé une preuve de nature à démontrer la propension de la victime à la violence en support à la légitime défense. La Cour d'appel de l'Ontario rappelle, dans R. c. Williams, [2008] O.J. No 2054, que, dans une telle situation, la poursuite peut parfois répliquer en présentant une preuve de même nature contre l'accusé, pour éviter de donner un portrait faussé au jury :
58 When an accused relies on self-defence and leads evidence that the deceased was a violent person, the question of whether the Crown may lead reply evidence of the accused's propensity for violence arises. The Crown will be permitted to do so where it is necessary to enhance fairness and ensure that the trier of fact has a balanced, not a distorted, picture of what occurred between the deceased and the accused and of their respective dispositions for aggression. See R. v. Sparkes, [2005] O.J. No. 1883 (C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 408; R. v. Yaeck, [1989] O.J. No. 3002 (Sup. Ct.); R. v. Robertshaw, [1996] O.J. No. 1524 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)); R. v. Hines, [2001] O.J. No. 1112 (Sup. Ct.); R. v. Soikie, [2004] O.J. No. 2901 (Sup. Ct.).
[69] Cette preuve de la poursuite peut être obtenue par le contre-interrogatoire de l'accusé sur ses condamnations antérieures. Les antécédents judiciaires de l'appelant devenaient donc particulièrement importants en l'espèce vu la preuve de la défense sur le caractère de la victime.
[70] En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement cette preuve du caractère de la victime, comme le notent les auteurs Béliveau et Vauclair, dans Traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales, 18e ed., Cowansville, Édition Yvon Blais, 2011, à la page 230 :
[E]n principe, l'accusé ne peut, pour sa défense, démontrer le mauvais caractère général de la victime parce que cette preuve n'est généralement pas pertinente sur la question de savoir si l'accusé a commis l'infraction.
[71] Cette preuve peut toutefois être pertinente dans la mesure où elle démontre le caractère violent de la victime dans le contexte d'une allégation de légitime défense. C'est précisément le cas en l'espèce, et c'est donc à bon droit que l'appelant voulait soumettre la preuve les antécédents judiciaires de la victime au jury. Il a cependant tort en reprochant au juge d'avoir exclu certains volets de cette preuve
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[62] En mars et septembre 2002, l'appelant a été condamné par un tribunal pour adolescents en rapport avec des accusations de bris d'engagement. En mars 2003, toujours devant le tribunal pour adolescents, il a été reconnu coupable d'agression armée. Enfin, il a été condamné en 2006 d'accusations de vol qualifié et de voies de fait simples.
[63] Le juge de première instance refuse la demande de limiter le contre-interrogatoire aux condamnations de 2002.
[64] Dans R. c. Tremblay, J.E. 2006-328, 2006 QCCA 75 (CanLII), 2006 QCCA 75, la Cour, se référant à R. c. Corbett, 1988 CanLII 80 (CSC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 670, résume ainsi la règle :
[17] L’article 12 de la Loi sur la preuve prévoit qu’un témoin peut être contre-interrogé relativement à ses condamnations antérieures. Dans R. c. Corbett, 1988 CanLII 80 (CSC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 670, la Cour suprême conclut que cette disposition ne contrevient pas aux articles 7 et 11(d) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés lorsqu’un accusé décide de témoigner pour sa défense. Cependant, le juge possède le pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter le contre-interrogatoire lorsque la divulgation complète causerait un préjudice plus grand que la valeur probante de cette preuve.
[65] La règle est l'inclusion, l'exclusion étant l'exception, et une cour d’appel doit faire preuve de déférence à l'égard d'une telle décision, qui relève de l'exercice d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire : R. c. Ranwez, 2007 QCCA 879 (CanLII), 2007 QCCA 879.
[66] Par ailleurs, cette Cour a encore récemment rappelé qu'il arrive que le nombre de condamnations soit pertinent pour apprécier la crédibilité d'un témoin : R. c. Daigneault, J.E. 2011-293, 2011 QCCA 148 (CanLII), 2011 QCCA 148.
[67] En l'espèce, si le juge de première instance avait accueilli la demande de l'appelant, le jury aurait eu l'impression que celui-ci a eu une conduite exemplaire depuis 2002, ce qui aurait tronqué la réalité, comme on le rappelle dans l'arrêt Tremblay, précité :
[23] Par ailleurs, comme il est permis de contre-interroger les autres témoins sur leurs antécédents judiciaires, le fait d’ «épurer » le casier judiciaire d’un accusé ou, pire, d’en taire complètement l’existence, peut avoir pour effet de donner au jury un portrait faussé de la réalité en lui laissant croire que seuls les témoins de la poursuite ont des antécédents et que leur crédibilité est donc affaiblie par rapport à celle de l'accusé qui, lui, n'en possède pas ou encore, en apparence, a été condamné moins souvent et pour des crimes différents de la réalité.
[68] Ici, les condamnations antérieures de l'appelant avaient une importance particulière puisque la défense a déposé une preuve de nature à démontrer la propension de la victime à la violence en support à la légitime défense. La Cour d'appel de l'Ontario rappelle, dans R. c. Williams, [2008] O.J. No 2054, que, dans une telle situation, la poursuite peut parfois répliquer en présentant une preuve de même nature contre l'accusé, pour éviter de donner un portrait faussé au jury :
58 When an accused relies on self-defence and leads evidence that the deceased was a violent person, the question of whether the Crown may lead reply evidence of the accused's propensity for violence arises. The Crown will be permitted to do so where it is necessary to enhance fairness and ensure that the trier of fact has a balanced, not a distorted, picture of what occurred between the deceased and the accused and of their respective dispositions for aggression. See R. v. Sparkes, [2005] O.J. No. 1883 (C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 408; R. v. Yaeck, [1989] O.J. No. 3002 (Sup. Ct.); R. v. Robertshaw, [1996] O.J. No. 1524 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)); R. v. Hines, [2001] O.J. No. 1112 (Sup. Ct.); R. v. Soikie, [2004] O.J. No. 2901 (Sup. Ct.).
[69] Cette preuve de la poursuite peut être obtenue par le contre-interrogatoire de l'accusé sur ses condamnations antérieures. Les antécédents judiciaires de l'appelant devenaient donc particulièrement importants en l'espèce vu la preuve de la défense sur le caractère de la victime.
[70] En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement cette preuve du caractère de la victime, comme le notent les auteurs Béliveau et Vauclair, dans Traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales, 18e ed., Cowansville, Édition Yvon Blais, 2011, à la page 230 :
[E]n principe, l'accusé ne peut, pour sa défense, démontrer le mauvais caractère général de la victime parce que cette preuve n'est généralement pas pertinente sur la question de savoir si l'accusé a commis l'infraction.
[71] Cette preuve peut toutefois être pertinente dans la mesure où elle démontre le caractère violent de la victime dans le contexte d'une allégation de légitime défense. C'est précisément le cas en l'espèce, et c'est donc à bon droit que l'appelant voulait soumettre la preuve les antécédents judiciaires de la victime au jury. Il a cependant tort en reprochant au juge d'avoir exclu certains volets de cette preuve
lundi 16 juillet 2012
Sur preuve que l'appareil criminel est utilisé pour hâter la perception d'une créance, la poursuite pourrait être avortée pour abus de procédure
R. v. Hines, 1995 CanLII 4457 (NS SC)
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In his brief counsel for the accused cites an article entitled "Case Reference on Abuse of Power" reported in 37 C.R.N. 153 (1977) and references a number of cases, namely:
Rex v. Michigan Central Railway. (1907), W.W.R. 660, 17 C.C.C. 483 (Ont)
Rex v. Thorton (1926), 37 B.C.R. 344, 46 C.C.C. 249 (B.C.C.A)
Rex v. Leraux (1928), 3 D.L.R. 688 (Ont. C.A.)
Rex v. Bell (1929), 51 C.C.C. 388 (B.C.C.A.)
Regina v. Lee (1956), 114 C.C.C. 371 (Alta. C.A.)
Regina v. Leclair (1956),115 C.C.C. 297 (Ont. C.A.)
Regina v. Brown (1963), 7 Cr. L. Q. 238 (Ont. C.C.)
Nebraska v. Morris (1971), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 282 (Man.)
All of these cases related to the use of criminal proceedings for the purpose of collecting a private civil debt, or for payment of civil claims for damages, or for punishment of a defaulting debtor. In most of these cases a stay was granted where the facts were clear and exceptional.
An interesting comment appears in the Bell cases at pages 391 to 392 as follows:
it is apparent to us that the criminal proceedings were manifestly not taken in vindication of public justice but wholly because of the appellant's refusal to comply with the demand to 'dig up the money or take the consequences.' The prosecution was, therefore an abuse of the process of the magistrate's court which we cannot countenance. We think that the Criminal Courts are not to be held in terrorem over alleged debtors."
With deference, it is my opinion that that is what has happened in this case ‑ the proceedings were not taken in vindication of public justice. And remember Bell was a collection of a civil debt. Here there is allegations of criminal extortion.
Other Ontario cases cited by the accused, namely R. v. Sparks (1981) case, 65 C.C. C. (2d) (Ont. Co. Court) and R. v. Van Holland reflex, (1984) 13, C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. Co. Court) involved civil debts and misappropriation, again where stays of proceedings were granted.
In Re: Reqina and Laird reflex, (1983) 4 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (Ont. High Court) the victim of a fraud asked the accused for repayment of money. Criminal proceedings were not threatened. Callaghan J. (as he then was) held at page 96:
"In order to conclude that the criminal process is being used for the prescribed purpose evidence of either an implied or express threat is usually present."
He held a stay was not appropriate in that case because there was no evidence of an implied or expressed threat.
A Nova Scotia case was cited R. v. Waugh reflex, (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 80 (N.S.C.A.), and a stay was not upheld on the facts as there was not an implied or express threat involved and it's clear on the facts that there was not.
In the case before me I am convinced that an express threat was apparent in the letters sent by the complainant to the accused.
In all of the cases cited by counsel for the accused where an express threat to go to the police was noted by the trial judge, the charges were stayed.
Now, on the other hand the Crown submits that to allow the prosecution to proceed would not "tarnish the integrity of the Court." With deference I am not in agreement with this submission. I do, however, agree that the "civil debt" aspect of the case should only be one factor to be considered in a possible stay of proceedings.
The case of R. v. Gelinas (1994, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 69 (Quebec C.A.) cited by the Crown can be distinguished. At page 74, Deschamp J. A. Judge of the Appeal states:
"..This is, therefore not a case where one person would have succeeded in using, to his own ends, the criminal justice system."
and I, again, go over-
("would have succeeded in using".) But rather a situation where an investigating officer used information transmitted to him in order to uncover facts which according to him justified criminal prosecution."
This is not the case before me. Ms. Blades could have succeeded. She could have succeeded in using the criminal justice system for her own ends. She provided the information to the police ‑ it was not a matter of an investigating officer uncovering facts in reading the letters. This woman knew who her doctor was. She knew who her witnesses were and she knew the evidence.
Lien vers la décision
In his brief counsel for the accused cites an article entitled "Case Reference on Abuse of Power" reported in 37 C.R.N. 153 (1977) and references a number of cases, namely:
Rex v. Michigan Central Railway. (1907), W.W.R. 660, 17 C.C.C. 483 (Ont)
Rex v. Thorton (1926), 37 B.C.R. 344, 46 C.C.C. 249 (B.C.C.A)
Rex v. Leraux (1928), 3 D.L.R. 688 (Ont. C.A.)
Rex v. Bell (1929), 51 C.C.C. 388 (B.C.C.A.)
Regina v. Lee (1956), 114 C.C.C. 371 (Alta. C.A.)
Regina v. Leclair (1956),115 C.C.C. 297 (Ont. C.A.)
Regina v. Brown (1963), 7 Cr. L. Q. 238 (Ont. C.C.)
Nebraska v. Morris (1971), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 282 (Man.)
All of these cases related to the use of criminal proceedings for the purpose of collecting a private civil debt, or for payment of civil claims for damages, or for punishment of a defaulting debtor. In most of these cases a stay was granted where the facts were clear and exceptional.
An interesting comment appears in the Bell cases at pages 391 to 392 as follows:
it is apparent to us that the criminal proceedings were manifestly not taken in vindication of public justice but wholly because of the appellant's refusal to comply with the demand to 'dig up the money or take the consequences.' The prosecution was, therefore an abuse of the process of the magistrate's court which we cannot countenance. We think that the Criminal Courts are not to be held in terrorem over alleged debtors."
With deference, it is my opinion that that is what has happened in this case ‑ the proceedings were not taken in vindication of public justice. And remember Bell was a collection of a civil debt. Here there is allegations of criminal extortion.
Other Ontario cases cited by the accused, namely R. v. Sparks (1981) case, 65 C.C. C. (2d) (Ont. Co. Court) and R. v. Van Holland reflex, (1984) 13, C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. Co. Court) involved civil debts and misappropriation, again where stays of proceedings were granted.
In Re: Reqina and Laird reflex, (1983) 4 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (Ont. High Court) the victim of a fraud asked the accused for repayment of money. Criminal proceedings were not threatened. Callaghan J. (as he then was) held at page 96:
"In order to conclude that the criminal process is being used for the prescribed purpose evidence of either an implied or express threat is usually present."
He held a stay was not appropriate in that case because there was no evidence of an implied or expressed threat.
A Nova Scotia case was cited R. v. Waugh reflex, (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 80 (N.S.C.A.), and a stay was not upheld on the facts as there was not an implied or express threat involved and it's clear on the facts that there was not.
In the case before me I am convinced that an express threat was apparent in the letters sent by the complainant to the accused.
In all of the cases cited by counsel for the accused where an express threat to go to the police was noted by the trial judge, the charges were stayed.
Now, on the other hand the Crown submits that to allow the prosecution to proceed would not "tarnish the integrity of the Court." With deference I am not in agreement with this submission. I do, however, agree that the "civil debt" aspect of the case should only be one factor to be considered in a possible stay of proceedings.
The case of R. v. Gelinas (1994, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 69 (Quebec C.A.) cited by the Crown can be distinguished. At page 74, Deschamp J. A. Judge of the Appeal states:
"..This is, therefore not a case where one person would have succeeded in using, to his own ends, the criminal justice system."
and I, again, go over-
("would have succeeded in using".) But rather a situation where an investigating officer used information transmitted to him in order to uncover facts which according to him justified criminal prosecution."
This is not the case before me. Ms. Blades could have succeeded. She could have succeeded in using the criminal justice system for her own ends. She provided the information to the police ‑ it was not a matter of an investigating officer uncovering facts in reading the letters. This woman knew who her doctor was. She knew who her witnesses were and she knew the evidence.
mercredi 11 juillet 2012
L'intention d'utiliser de la monnaie contrefaite comme argent n'est pas un élément de l'infraction
Duane c. La Reine, 1985 CanLII 21 (CSC)
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1. Le Juge en Chef‑‑Nous sommes d'accord avec la Cour d'appel à la majorité pour dire que l'intention d'utiliser de la monnaie contrefaite comme argent n'est pas un élément de l'infraction et que, vu les faits de cette affaire, l'appelante était en possession au sens de l'art. 408 du Code criminel.
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1. Le Juge en Chef‑‑Nous sommes d'accord avec la Cour d'appel à la majorité pour dire que l'intention d'utiliser de la monnaie contrefaite comme argent n'est pas un élément de l'infraction et que, vu les faits de cette affaire, l'appelante était en possession au sens de l'art. 408 du Code criminel.
Les critères de dissuasion et d'exemplarité doivent primer en matière de monnaie contrefaite
R. c. Blanchette, 1998 CanLII 12941 (QC CA)
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Il y a lieu de rappeler ici qu'avec la technologie moderne, il est relativement facile pour ceux et celles qui possèdent des compétences en matière de reprographie de contrefaire de la monnaie. À notre avis, les critères de dissuasion et d'exemplarité doivent primer afin de décourager ceux et celles qui pourraient d'aventure se lancer dans cette opération
Lien vers la décision
Il y a lieu de rappeler ici qu'avec la technologie moderne, il est relativement facile pour ceux et celles qui possèdent des compétences en matière de reprographie de contrefaire de la monnaie. À notre avis, les critères de dissuasion et d'exemplarité doivent primer afin de décourager ceux et celles qui pourraient d'aventure se lancer dans cette opération
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