L'utilité du contre-interrogatoire

R. v. Storry, 2018 BCCA 483

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[52]        Cross-examination is a valuable and necessary tool to ferret out inconsistencies in a witness’s evidence, to impeach a witness’s credibility and to fulfill the truth-seeking function of a trial: R. v. Magalong, 2013 BCCA 478 at para. 38; R. v. Keror, 2017 ABCA 273 at para. 37; R. v. C.J.L., 2004 MBCA 126 at paras. 29–30; and R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 769 at para. 12. In short, there can be significant probative value in admitting evidence solely for these purposes, especially where credibility of key witnesses is the central issue.

Plus l’expert omet de prendre en considération des faits pertinents, moins le jury peut accorder de poids à son opinion

R. c. Charlebois, 2000 CSC 53

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22                              Le juge du procès a d’abord mentionné le témoignage du D^r Lafleur au début de son exposé au jury, lorsqu’il a donné ses directives sur l’évaluation de la preuve d’expert.  Juste avant l’ajournement, il a résumé le fondement de l’opinion du D^r Lafleur de la façon suivante:

 

Vous avez, à mon avis, à peser avec beaucoup de soin, le témoignage du D^r Lafleur parce que les conclusions du D^r Lafleur sont contestées dans la thèse de la Couronne.  Dans bien des cas, le D^r Lafleur a fait allusion à des déclarations obtenues par toute une série de personnes qui ont témoigné devant vous, mais par contre, il y a certaines autres choses qu’il n’avait jamais consultées.  Notamment, la cassette de 911.  Notamment, les photographies, le plan de l’appartement.  Il ne s’était non plus adressé à la position de la victime dans une évaluation qui a touché très, très près à la défense de légitime défense. 

 

Je n’émets aucune opinion sur la valeur de son témoignage, c’est à vous de décider, mais évidemment, vous devez regarder non seulement les données auxquelles il s’est adressé, mais également les choses qu’il n’a pas regardées pour arriver à sa conclusion.

 

Cette directive est manifestement appropriée.  Comme l’exige l’arrêt Lavallee, précité,  à la p. 896, «[l]e juge doit, bien sûr, faire comprendre au jury que plus l’expert se fonde sur des faits non établis par la preuve moins la valeur probante de son opinion sera grande.»  J’ajouterais que le corollaire est également vrai: plus l’expert omet de prendre en considération des faits pertinents, moins le jury peut accorder de poids à son opinion.

Un contre-interrogatoire abusif peut rendre le procès inéquitable

El Morr c. R., 2010 QCCA 812

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[101]      L'intimée plaide qu'il faut relativiser les choses :

[…] rappelons qu'il s'agissait ici d'un procès devant juge seul et non d'un procès devant jury et la facture du jugement de première instance démontre que le juge n'a fait aucun usage de la question ici contestée ou de la réponse donnée par l'appelant. La seule référence faite par le premier juge du passage de l'appelant dans l'armée est celle livrée par l'appelant lui-même à propos de ses connaissances des armes à feu et de leur maniement.

[Souligné dans l'exposé écrit de l'intimée.]

[102]      Je ne retiens pas cet argument. Il est vrai qu'un procès présidé par un juge seul réduit considérablement le risque que cette preuve crée de la confusion à l'égard des enjeux soulevés. Par contre, comme le soulignait l'avocat de l'appelant à l'audience, ce n'est pas une raison en soi ni une licence pour justifier le dépôt d'éléments de preuve inadmissibles ou encore les questions illégales. Comme le mentionne à ce sujet le juge Helper dans R. v. W. (R.S.) (1990), 1990 CanLII 10983 (MB CA), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 149 (Man. C.A.), à la p. 157, un arrêt prononcé à la suite d'un procès présidé par un juge seul :

A trial judge is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that proceedings before him (or her) are conducted fairly. He has an overriding duty in every case to ensure a fair trial. He is the ultimate umpire whose duties include excluding inadmissible evidence and preventing cross-examination which goes beyond permissible limits, even though not objected to by counsel for the accused.

[103]      Dans R. c. Duguay, [2001] J.Q. n° 4037, J.E. 2001-1769 (C.A. Qué.), au paragr. 46, le juge Biron écrivait, pour la Cour :

Présumé innocent, un accusé a droit à un procès équitable. 

[104]      Or, un contre-interrogatoire abusif peut rendre le procès inéquitable. Dans R v. R. (A.J.), (1994) 1994 CanLII 3447 (ON CA), 94 C.C.C.(3d) 168 (C.A. Ont.), le juge Doherty écrit :

23     There are, however, well-established limits on cross- examination. Some apply to all witnesses, others only to the accused. Isolated transgressons of those limits may be of little consequence on appeal. Repeated improprieties during the cross-examination of an accused are, however, a very different matter. As the improprieties mount, the cross-examination may cross over the line from the aggressive to the abusive. When that line is crossed, the danger of a miscarriage of justice is very real. If improper cross-examination of an accused prejudices that accused in his defence or is so improper as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, an appellate court must intervene […]

[Je souligne.]

[105]      Dans R. v. White (1999), 1999 CanLII 3695 (ON CA), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 373 (C.A. Ont.), le juge Doherty s'exprime ainsi :

6            There is no need to review the well-established and unfortunately ever-growing line of authority relating to improper cross-examination by Crown counsel. Improper cross-examination of an accused may taint a trial either by resulting in actual prejudice to an accused or by creating the appearance of unfairness.

[Je souligne.]

[106]      Je suis d'avis que c'est le cas en l'espèce et que le contre-interrogatoire de l'appelant a mis en cause l'équité du procès. Le juge ne pouvait demeurer passif. Dans R. v. Snow (2004), 2004 CanLII 34547 (ON CA), 190 C.C.C. (3d) 317 (C.A. Ont.), il est écrit :

[24] On the other hand, a trial judge is certainly entitled to control the proceedings and to intervene when counsel fail to follow the rules or abide by rulings. A trial judge is not a mere observer who must sit by passively allowing counsel to conduct the proceedings in any manner they choose. It is well recognized that a trial judge is entitled to manage the trial and control the procedure to ensure that the trial is effective, efficient and fair to both sides:

[107]      Dans ces circonstances, la disposition réparatrice du paragr. 686 (1)b)(iii) C.c.r. ne saurait s'appliquer: R. c. Fanjoy, 1985 CanLII 53 (CSC), [1985] 2 R.C.S. 233; R. c. Khan, 2001 CSC 86 (CanLII), [2001] 3 R.C.S. 823. Par ailleurs, et de toute façon, la preuve n'est pas suffisamment forte, notamment à cause de la question de l'identité du tireur, pour conclure que le procès ne pouvait se terminer que par un verdict de culpabilité.

L'article 503(1)(a) Ccr ne permet pas aux policiers de toujours détenir une personne 24 heures avant sa comparution; il ne fixe qu'une limite temporelle édictant ce qu'est un délai déraisonnable

R v Reilly, 2019 ABCA 212

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[4]               The Criminal Code sets out a tiered regime for release after arrest, starting with the arresting officer:

(a)               In some situations a peace officer need not arrest and detain an accused person, but can simply issue an appearance notice to him or her (s. 495(2) and 496; Form 9).

(b)               If the accused is arrested, the arresting officer has a discretion to release the accused on a promise to appear or recognizance, rather than detaining the accused (s. 503(1)(c) and 502; Forms 10, 11, 11.1).

(c)               If the arresting officer is not satisfied that the accused should be released, he or she can refer the matter to the “officer in charge”, who can determine if release is appropriate (s. 498, 503(1)(c) and 502). The officer in charge has wide powers to impose conditions on release (s. 499(2) and 503(2.1).

(d)               If the officer in charge does not release the accused, the matter is referred to the Crown Bail Office, which can recommend release, or refer the matter to a bail hearing.

(e)               If the accused is not released by this stage, release is considered at a bail hearing before a justice (s. 503(1)(a)).

In this appeal, the respondent was not released by the arresting officer or the officer in charge, and instead was detained pending a bail hearing.

[5]               The continuing detention of the respondent was accordingly governed by s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code:

503 (1) A peace officer who arrests a person with or without warrant or to whom a person is delivered under subsection 494(3) or into whose custody a person is placed under subsection 163.5(3) of the Customs Act shall cause the person to be detained in custody and, in accordance with the following provisions, to be taken before a justice to be dealt with according to law:

(a)  where a justice is available within a period of twenty-four hours after the person has been arrested by or delivered to the peace officer, the person shall be taken before a justice without unreasonable delay and in any event within that period, and

(b)  where a justice is not available within a period of twenty-four hours after the person has been arrested by or delivered to the peace officer, the person shall be taken before a justice as soon as possible,

unless, at any time before the expiration of the time prescribed in paragraph (a) or (b) for taking the person before a justice,

(c)  the peace officer or officer in charge releases the person under any other provision of this Part, or

(d)  the peace officer or officer in charge is satisfied that the person should be released from custody, whether unconditionally under subsection (4) or otherwise conditionally or unconditionally, and so releases him.

The “officer in charge” is defined in s. 493 as the officer responsible for the lock-up or place to which the accused is taken after arrest. A “justice” is defined in s. 2 as a justice of the peace or a provincial court judge.

[6]               Section 503(1)(a) provides a dual time limit for the holding of the bail hearing. The detained person must be taken before a justice a) without unreasonable delay, and b) in any event no later than 24 hours after the person was arrested. As will be seen (infra, para. 9) the respondent was detained for approximately 35 hours before he was taken before a justice, resulting in his application for a stay of proceedings.

[7]               Section 503(1)(a) does not provide that the police can always hold a detained person for 24 hours; that is just the outside limit of what is “unreasonable delay”: R. v E.W., 2002 NFCA 49 at paras. 13-5, 168 CCC (3d) 38; R. v Precourt (1976), 1976 CanLII 692 (ON CA), 18 OR (2d) 714 at p. 722 (CA). While it is obviously contemplated that a detained person will be released within a reasonable time after bail is granted, the section does not specify a time within which actual release must occur. The 24 hour time limit is until the detained person is “taken before a justice”, not until the time he or she actually walks out of the police station.

Le droit d’être informé sans délai anormal de l’infraction précise qui est reprochée vu par la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Cisar, 2014 ONCA 151

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[11]      Section 11(a) of the Charter guarantees a person charged with an offence the right “to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence”. The provision thus provides two forms of constitutional protection. The primary protection is notice of the specific offence. Without notice of the specific offence an accused may be deprived of the ability to make full answer and defence. Accused have the right to know with what they are charged so they can make decisions about their defence, assemble evidence and prepare to meet the prosecution case. This element of s. 11(a) is largely codified in s. 581 of the Criminal Code, which sets out the minimum requirements for sufficiency of an information: R. v. Cancor Software Corp. (1990), 1990 CanLII 6817 (ON CA), 74 O.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.) and R. v. Lucas (1983), 1983 CanLII 3578 (NS CA), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 159 (S.C. App. Div.). In the latter case, Jones J.A. referred to this court’s pre-Charter decision in R. v. Toth, 1959 CanLII 111 (ON CA), [1959] O.R. 137 (C.A.), which described as a “fundamental principle of our law that an indictment must charge an offence in such a manner as clearly to bring home to an accused an accurate knowledge of the offence with which he is charged”. In Cancor, this court also referred to an article by E. Ratushny -- "The Role of the Accused in the Criminal Process" – in W.S. Tarnopolsky & G.A. Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), at 352, which identifies another reason for this s. 11(a) guarantee. It supports the important element of the rule of law that an accused can only be charged with an offence known to law:

A specific accusation presupposes a specific offence in law. It, therefore, provides an opportunity at the outset for the accused to challenge the authority of the officials of the state to subject him to the criminal process. If no offence exists in law, the accusation can be attacked and quashed, thereby terminating the proceeding.

[12]      The second right protected by s. 11(a) and the right in issue in this appeal is the right to be informed without unreasonable delay. The content of this right must be considered in the context in which it is found. In my view, like the right to be informed of the specific offence, the object of the protection against unreasonable delay is also primarily to protect the right to make full answer and defence. This understanding of the objective of s. 11(a) is also consistent with the context provided by other parts of s. 11 of the Charter, particularly the related right to trial within a reasonable time in s. 11(b). The extensive case law considering s. 11(b) has identified the rights protected by that provision as (1) the right to security of the person; (2) the right to liberty, and (3) the right to a fair trial. In R. v. Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, at p. 786, the court explained how those rights are protected:

The right to security of the person is protected in s. 11(b) by seeking to minimize the anxiety, concern and stigma of exposure to criminal proceedings. The right to liberty is protected by seeking to minimize exposure to the restrictions on liberty which result from pre-trial incarceration and restrictive bail conditions. The right to a fair trial is protected by attempting to ensure that proceedings take place while evidence is available and fresh.

[13]      Until an accused has been informed of the charge, it is only the right to a fair trial that is impacted by delay. If accused are not aware of the charge, they are not subject to the anxiety, concern and stigma of exposure to criminal proceedings and their liberty is not impacted.

[14]      The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Delaronde, 1997 CanLII 404 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 213, appears to have approved of a form of analysis of s. 11(a) that is similar to s. 11(b) analysis. Delaronde was an appeal from a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal reported at 1996 CanLII 6332 (QC CA), [1996] R.J.Q. 591. An English translation of the Court of Appeal’s decision is reported at 115 C.C.C. (3d) 355. The Supreme Court of Canada in oral reasons dismissed the accused’s appeal for the reasons of Otis J.A. in the Court of Appeal. Later, Lamer C.J.C. in a short addendum left open the possibility that s. 11(a) may also protect against prejudice to economic interests for which s. 24(1) might provide remedies. As he said at para. 5: “Having charges pending against one can affect decisions one must make in one’s life that are unrelated to the preparation of a defence.” This aspect of s. 11(a) is not an issue in this case, except as a factor the trial judge took into consideration at sentencing.

[15]      In her reasons in Delaronde, Otis J.A. held that delay under s. 11(a) should be analyzed using the same factors as under s. 11(b), namely: the length of the delay, waiver of time periods, the reasons for the delay and prejudice to the accused. The findings of fact by the trial judge in this case have simplified the analysis. The delay runs from the date the charge was laid until the appellant was arrested and informed of the charge; that is, from April 30, 1999 to August 24, 2007, over eight years. The trial judge found that while the appellant may have been aware of possible civil proceedings by Spicer Corporation, and may have been taking steps to avoid having to deal with Spicer, he was not aware of the criminal charges until his arrest. The trial judge also found that the delay in informing the appellant of the charges was the responsibility of the authorities. The trial judge also found that there was no waiver of any s. 11(a) time periods by the appellant. The trial judge held that the authorities had caused the delay. As he said, “the bottom line is that the investigation was so inadequate I am not going to hold [the appellant] responsible for it and I do hold the authorities responsible”. This finding is fully supported by the evidence. Given the information provided by Spicer Corporation, even a modest effort by the police would have resulted in the appellant being found and informed of the charges after he returned to Canada in 2000.

La fin de l'appel téléphonique en lien avec l'exercice du droit à l'avocat et l'appréciation d'une potentielle interférence des policiers à cet effet

R. v. Jones, 2005 ABCA 289 

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[11]           The appellant also suggests that the police officer should have asked him whether he required further time. However, the police officer had not interrupted the appellant nor had he suggested to him that his time was up. On the only evidence, the appellant knocked on the door because he had  terminated his efforts and was ready to proceed to the next step. The police officer reasonably concluded from the appellant’s actions that the appellant had terminated his efforts to try to call his own lawyer. In the circumstances, an inquiry about whether the appellant needed more time would have been redundant. As he knew that the appellant had been unable to reach his own lawyer, the police officer reminded the appellant that he could seek the assistance of legal aid counsel or other counsel. The appellant responded that he did not wish to do so. We do not agree with the suggestion of counsel for the appellant that the police officer’s attempt to provide additional information to the appellant constituted an improper interference with the appellant’s right to consult counsel of his own choice. 

Le rafraichissement de la mémoire du témoin et l'allégation d'ajustement du témoignage

Parenteau c. R., 2007 QCCA 71 

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[40]           Il importe ici de faire une distinction. Les références faites, quant à la divulgation de la preuve par l’avocat du ministère public, visant le détail des rapports de filature qui précisaient les heures d’observation des appelants, sont permises. Le fait de demander à Dormoy si la lecture de ces rapports l’a aidé à se rafraîchir la mémoire ne saurait équivaloir à la conclusion qu’il a ajusté son témoignage selon ces informations surtout que ce dernier a mentionné lors de son interrogatoire principal : « … les heures, je m'en souviens parce que je viens de les voir il y a pas tellement longtemps »[5]. D’ailleurs, le témoin a précisé à plusieurs reprises qu’il ne pouvait se rappeler des heures précises, n’ayant pas l’avantage d’avoir noté celles-ci dans un rapport comme l'on fait les policiers. Cela étant, l’on ne saurait conclure que l’on a reproché au témoin d’avoir pris connaissance de cette preuve.

Il n'est pas nécessaire qu'une déclaration extrajudiciaire soit complète pour être admissible; il suffit qu'elle permettre une juste compréhension des verbalisations de la personne

R. v. Mallory, 2007 ONCA 46

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[203]      In our view, the trial judge erred in approaching the utterances as a series of separate statements rather than as one statement.  It is well accepted that if the Crown tenders the statement of an accused, it cannot pick and choose those parts of the statement that it would like the jury to hear; it must take “the good with the bad”, and both the “good” and the “bad” are admitted for their truth, for and against the accused.  Moreover, a party wishing to adduce a statement must put in as much of the statement as is necessary to permit a fair understanding of the individual utterances. 

[204]      The principle and its purpose were reviewed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta in R. v. Girvin (1916), 1916 CanLII 669 (AB CA), 27 C.C.C. 265 at 271-72 (Alta. S.C.):

When the Crown, or a party wishes to use as evidence a confession or admission, the Crown or the party must ordinarily prove the confession or admission in its entirety, that is, with what is favourable as well as with what is unfavourable to the accused or the opposite party and when there is not this strict obligation or when it is not fulfilled the accused or the opposite party has a right to put in the favourable portion which has been omitted; and the favourable portion is evidence for the accused or the opposite party, equally with the unfavourable portion, at least in this sense, that it must be taken as interpreting the unfavourable part, which cannot be given a meaning as it stood by itself but only as modified by the favourable part.

…

So that not only is a prisoner entitled as of right to have a statement made by him considered in its entirety and in the absence of evidence of the falsity of any exculpatory portion, to have that exculpatory portion accepted as true; but, as another aspect of the same thing, he is entitled as of right to have such a statement considered in its entirety so that the true meaning of his statement may be made manifest for it is but in accordance with the plain dictates of justice and common sense that his statement, if used against him, shall be used only in the true sense in which he made it.

And not only is he so entitled, but, in order that the true sense of his statement may be ascertained, he is entitled to shew the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of it to the like extent that in the case of a contract he is entitled to shew them in order to assist in its interpretation.

[205]      This court spoke about the entire statement rule in R. v. Belanger (1975), 1975 CanLII 1267 (ON CA), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 10 at 15 (C.A.):

We are all of the view that the prosecution having elicited evidence that the appellants refused to go into the line-up, defence counsel was entitled to introduce before the jury, the whole of the utterance that took place in relation to the refusal of the appellant to go in the line-up.  In our view the prosecution, having introduced evidence that the accused refused to go in the line-up, it was not entitled to isolate that refusal from the rest of the utterance, in which the accused expressed their reason for refusing to go into the line-up.  In MacRae on Evidence, 7 C.E.D. (Ont. 2nd), at p. 275, the author says:

Where A puts in an admission by B and the admission as put in contains no portion favourable to B, B is nevertheless entitled to put in so much of the remainder of the utterance on the same subject as explains the part put in by A, in order to aid in the construction of the utterance as a whole.

 

See also R. v. Humphrey (2003), 2003 CanLII 6855 (ON CA), 172 C.C.C. (3d) 332 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lynch (1988), 30 O.A.C. 49 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Black and Mackie, 1965 CanLII 241 (ON CA), [1966] 3 C.C.C. 187 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Smith (1986), 1986 CanLII 7204 (NS CA), 71 N.S.R. (2d) 229 (N.S. C.A.); R. v. Bihun, 1965 CanLII 788 (MB CA), [1965] 4 C.C.C. 45 (Man. C.A.).

[206]      In determining whether statements qualify for separate treatment, factors to consider include the time gap between the utterances, the nature and form of the respective utterances, and the circumstances under which they were made: see R. v. Cybulski (1974), 1974 CanLII 1642 (MB CA), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 560 (Man. C.A.).

L'état du droit quant à la déclaration d'ouverture (opening statement) & quant à la plaidoirie (closing argument)

R. v. Mallory, 2007 ONCA 46

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[336]      The Crown’s role in the prosecution of criminal offences has long been recognized as quasi-ministerial. Success for the Crown is not measured in wins and losses.  We repeat here the words of Rand J. in R. v. Boucher, supra, at 270, “The role of the prosecutor excludes any notion of wining or losing; his function is a matter of public duty … It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.” Moreover, as Kerwin C.J. noted in R. v. Boucher at 265, the Crown’s role is to assist the jury

but he exceeds that duty when he expresses by inflammatory or vindictive language his own personal opinion that the accused is guilty, or when he expresses by inflammatory or vindictive language his own personal opinion that the accused is guilty, or when his remarks tend to leave the jury an impression that the investigation made by the Crown is such that they should find the accused guilty.

[337]      More recently, the Supreme Court acknowledged in R. v. Cook (1997), 1997 CanLII 392 (SCC), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at para. 21 (S.C.C.), rev’g (1996), 1996 CanLII 7935 (NB CA), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 334 (N.B.C.A.), that while “it is without question that the Crown performs a special function in ensuring that justice is served and cannot adopt a purely adversarial role towards the defence” it is also “well recognized that the adversarial process is an important part of our judicial system and an accepted tool in our search for the truth”.  Within the adversarial process the Crown is permitted to act as a strong advocate.  Within the bounds set out in R. v. Boucher, supra, “the Crown must be allowed to perform the function with which it has been entrusted”: R. v. Cook, supra, at para. 21.

[338]      It is well established that the opening address is not the appropriate forum for argument, invective, or opinion.  The Crown should use the opening address to introduce the parties, explain the process, and provide a general overview of the evidence that the Crown anticipates calling in support of its case: see R. v. Griffin, [1993] O.J. No. 2573 at paras. 25-31 (Gen. Div.); R. v. Porter, [1992] O.J. No. 2931 (Gen. Div.); R. v. Sun, [2002] O.J. No. 2166 (S.C.J.); R. v. White, [1997] O.J. No. 5899 (Gen. Div.).  Simply put, “the Crown’s opening address should be impartial and fair, a brief outline of the evidence that the Crown intends to call”:  R. v. Griffin at para. 31.  At the opening of the trial the rules constraining the Crown “should apply with even more vigour” than at the closing when by then the jurors have heard and seen all about the case: R. v. Griffin at para. 23.

[339]      With respect to closing addresses, the Crown is afforded greater latitude:  see R. v. Baltrusaitis (2002), 2002 CanLII 36440 (ON CA), 58 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.).  While Crown counsel must at all times conduct themselves with dignity and fairness, they are entitled to advance their position forcefully when making closing submissions. In R. v. Daly (1992), 57 O.A.C. 70 at 76 (C.A.), this court observed:

A closing address is an exercise in advocacy.  It is the culmination of a hard fought adversarial proceeding.  Crown counsel, like any other advocate, is entitled to advance his or her position forcefully and effectively.  Juries expect that both counsel will present their positions in that manner and no doubt expect and accept a degree of rhetorical passion in that presentation.

[340]      The closing address is the proper forum for argument and the Crown is certainly entitled to argue its case forcefully.  The Crown should not, however, engage in inflammatory rhetoric, demeaning commentary or sarcasm, or legally impermissible submissions that effectively undermine a requisite degree of fairness:  see R. v. Grover (1991), 1991 CanLII 25 (SCC), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 576 (S.C.C.), rev’g (1990), 1990 CanLII 11030 (ON CA), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 532 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Romeo (1991), 1991 CanLII 113 (SCC), 62 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), rev’g (1989), 1989 CanLII 7122 (NB CA), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 113 (N.B. C.A.); R. v. Munroe (1995), 1995 CanLII 8921 (ON CA), 96 C.C.C. (3d) 431 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d (1995), 1995 CanLII 84 (SCC), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 383 (S.C.C.).

[341]      In a protracted and hard fought trial such as this, one with months of pre-trial proceedings and allegations of abuse of process, it may be difficult for the Crown to resist rhetorical excess.  But resist it must, even when provoked by what Crown counsel perceives to be obstructive and truculent behaviour by the defence. 

[342]      In our view, the opening address of Crown counsel called for corrective action by the trial judge.  Crown counsel was not content to follow the orthodox path and open by simply outlining for the benefit of the jury the case she intended to present.  Regrettably, Crown counsel demeaned the position of the defence and the role of defence counsel, engaged in pre-emptive argument, undermined the presumption of innocence, and expressed her personal opinion as to the guilt of the appellants.  Phrases such as “the glaring spotlight of guilt” and the reference to there being “no shadows of doubt to crawl behind, no dark corners to hide from the scrutiny of truth”, and the suggestion that the defence would try to “seduce” the jury to ignore the evidence were plainly inappropriate and set an unfortunate tone for the balance of the trial.

[343]      We do not say that the trial judge necessarily erred by failing to declare a mistrial after the Crown opening.  We agree with the Crown that it was within the discretion of the trial judge to conclude that the comments were not so egregious as to require a mistrial.  On the other hand, it is our view that some corrective action was called for.  The trial judge should, at a minimum, have admonished the overly aggressive trial Crown for violating the R. v. Boucher, supra, standard and instructed the jury to ignore the objectionable passages of the Crown’s opening address.  As we have already indicated, by anticipating and attempting to pre-empt the attack on the integrity of the investigation, the Crown set the trial of that issue off on the wrong course.

[344]      In her closing address the Crown again demeaned and denigrated the role of defence counsel, and, with considerable rhetorical flourish, portrayed the defence as deceptive and obstructionist, intent upon diverting the jury’s attention from the truth. While it is not improper for the Crown to identify for the benefit of the jury defence arguments inviting speculation, Crown counsel’s comments in this case were not in keeping with the standard outlined in R. v. Boucher, supra.

[345]      We recognize that there are many cases involving similar remarks, uncorrected by the trial judge, that have been found by this and other courts not to be fatal:  see e.g. R. v. Baltrusaitis, supra; R. v. Clark (2004), 2004 CanLII 12038 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.); R. v. Daly, supra.  In view of the numerous other errors to which we have referred, it is not necessary for us to pronounce definitively upon the effect of the Crown’s rhetorical excesses.  Suffice it to say that we view the passages we have quoted from the Crown’s opening and closing to have been inappropriate, and that in our view, at a minimum,  the trial judge should have given a corrective instruction to redress the imbalance it created and to alleviate the risk that the jury might be improperly influenced.