Les limites du droit à l'avocat de son choix à l'étape de l'audition

R. v. McCallen, 1999 CanLII 3685 (ON CA)

Lien vers la décision

Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes not only the right to retain counsel but the right to retain the counsel of the accused's choice and the right to be represented by that counsel throughout the proceedings. The right to counsel of choice is not absolute. Counsel must be competent, willing to accept the retainer, available with a reasonable time and free from any conflict of interest. That said, absent compelling reasons, the government and the courts should not be involved in decisions about which counsel clients may choose to act on their behalf.

The decision to fix a date for trial is discretionary. When choosing a trial date the court must act judicially and balance a number of factors, including the availability of an accused's counsel of choice within a reasonable period of time. The trial judge in this case exercised his discretion unreasonably in the circumstances in simply fixing a trial date and not attempting to approach the scheduling issue in a co-operative manner so that the accused could be given a reasonable opportunity to have K represent him. The trial judge was apparently motivated by a rigid adherence to what he later referred to as a 90-day rule, i.e., a trial must be heard within 90 days of the first appearance in the Ontario Court (General Division). No such rule exists. It was possible that the trial judge was rigidly applying a 90-day guideline.

It is well established that s. 10(b) includes not only the right to retain counsel but the right to retain the counsel of the accused's choice and the right to be represented by that counsel throughout the proceedings.

In R. v. Speid 1983 CanLII 1704 (ON CA), (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 596, 8 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (C.A.), Dubin 

J.A. described this as a fundamental right. At p. 598 O.R., p. 20 C.C.C., he said:

The right of an accused to retain counsel of his choice has long been recognized at common law as a fundamental right. It has been carried forth as a singular feature of the Legal Aid Plan in this province and has been inferentially entrenched in the Charter of Rights which guarantees everyone upon arrest or detention the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. However, although it is a fundamental right and one to be zealously protected by the Court, it is not an absolute right and is subject to reasonable limitations.

There are sound reasons why this right was considered to be a fundamental component of the criminal justice system well before the enactment of the Charter and why it was recognized as a right deserving of constitutional protection in the Charter. The solicitor-client relationship is anchored on the premise that clients should be able to have complete trust and confidence in the counsel who represent their interests. Clients must feel free to disclose the most personal, intimate and sometimes damaging information to their counsel, secure in the understanding that the information will be treated in confidence and will be used or not used, within the boundaries of counsels' ethical constraints, in the clients' best interests. The law recognizes the uniqueness of this confidential relationship by providing special protection from compelled disclosure of information that is exchanged between clients and their counsel.

In addition, the relationship of counsel and client requires clients, typically untrained in the law and lacking the skills of advocates, to entrust the management and conduct of their cases to the counsel who act on their behalf. There should be no room for doubt about counsel's loyalty and dedication to the client's case. It is human nature that the trust and confidence that are essential for the relationship to be effective will be promoted and more readily realized if clients have not only the right to retain counsel but to retain counsel of their choice

The law is clear that the decision to fix a date for trial is discretionary and that in choosing a date the court must act judicially and balance a number of factors including the availability of an accused's counsel of choice within a reasonable period of time. Many of the same factors come into play in decisions whether to adjourn a trial date in order to permit an accused's counsel of choice to be available. The emphasis is on the reasonableness of the delay involved in accommodating the accused's choice; if the counsel of choice is not available within a reasonable time, then the rights of the accused must give way to other considerations and the accused will be required, if he or she chooses to be represented, to retain another counsel who is available within a reasonable period of time: see R. v. Lai, [1991] O.J. No. 725 (Gen. Div.); R. v. Barette, 1976 CanLII 180 (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 121, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189 and R. v. Smith reflex, (1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 90, 35 O.A.C. 301.

In determining what is a reasonable period of time, the court will balance many factors including the reason counsel is not available sooner, the previous involvement of the particular counsel in the case, the public interest in having criminal cases disposed of in an expeditious manner, the age and history of the case, the availability of judicial resources and the best use of courtroom facilities, the availability of the complainant and witnesses, the availability and use of Crown counsel and law enforcement officers and the potential impact of the scheduling decisions on the rights of an accused under s. 11(b) of the Charter guaranteeing a trial within a reasonable period of time: see Smith, supra, at p. 93; Lai, supra.

There is no formula that can be rigidly applied in balancing these different factors and what is reasonable in one case may not be reasonable in another. Rigid rules defeat the very nature of the discretionary decision that is required. However, guidelines are helpful because they provide a framework within which decisions can be made and bring a measure of predictability to scheduling decisions that will assist the various participants in the process. It is the trial courts that are in the best position to assess and balance the circumstances and resources that are available in a particular region and to develop the guidelines that make the most sense for that region. Guidelines should be used as such and should not be applied in an arbitrary or inflexible fashion, particularly when a trial date is being set that will deny an accused person counsel of choice: see R. v. Shute reflex, (1982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 354, 51 N.S.R. (2d) 83 (C.A.).

Le droit d’un accusé à l’avocat de son choix

Racine c. R., 2011 QCCA 2025 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

[31]        Le droit d’un accusé à l’avocat de son choix est fondé sur la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. On cite généralement l’arrêtMcCallen sur ce point :

[31] Section 10 (b) of the Charter provides:

            10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention

            …

            (b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right;…

[32] It is well established that s. 10 (b) includes not only the right to retain counsel but the right to retain the counsel of the accused’s choice and the right to be represented by that counsel throughout the proceedings.

[33] In Re Regina and Speid reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (Ont. C.A.), Dubin J.A. described this as a fundamental right. At p. 20, he said:

            The right of an accused to retain counsel of his choice has long been recognized at common law as a fundamental right. It has been carried forth as a singular feature of the Legal Aid Plan in this province and has been inferentially entrenched in the Charter of Rightswhich guarantees everyone upon arrest or detention the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. However, although it is a fundamental right and one to be zealously protected by the court, it is not an absolute right and is subject to reasonable limitations.

[32]        Les derniers mots de cette citation font voir que la règle comporte une limite et que parfois un juge peut refuser de reporter une affaire et, par voie de conséquence, obliger un accusé à procéder avec un avocat qui ne serait pas son premier choix ou même, dans certains cas, à procéder sans avocat, si l’accusé ne veut plus être représenté par ce dernier.

[33]        Cette limite à la règle est explicitée dans ce même arrêt :

[45] The law is clear that the decision to fix a date for trial is discretionary and that in choosing a date the court must act judicially and balance a number of factors including the availability of an accused’s counsel of choice within a reasonable period of time.  Many of the same factors come into play in decisions whether to adjourn a trial date in order to permit an accused’s counsel of choice to be available. The emphasis is on the reasonableness of the delay involved in accommodating the accused’s choice; if the counsel of choice is not available within a reasonable time, then the rights of the accused must give way to other considerations and the accused will be required, if he or she chooses to be represented, to retain another counsel who is available within a reasonable period of time: see R. v. Lai, [1991] O.J. No. 725 (Gen. Div.);Barette v. The Queen (1976), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189 (S.C.C.) and R.v. Smith reflex, reflex, (1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 90 (Ont. C.A.).

[46] In  determining what is a reasonable period  of  time,  the court  will balance many factors including the reason counsel  is not available sooner, the previous involvement of the  particular counsel in the case, the public interest in having criminal cases disposed of in an expeditious manner, the age and history of  the case, the availability of judicial resources and the best use  of courtroom  facilities, the availability of  the  complainant  and witnesses,  the  availability and use of Crown  counsel  and  law enforcement  officers and the potential impact of the  scheduling decisions  on  the rights of an accused under  s.  11(b)  of  the Charter guaranteeing a trial within a reasonable period of  time. See Smith, supra, at p. 93; Lai, supra.

[34]        Tous les facteurs ci-dessus mentionnés sont certes importants, mais celui de l’attention due aux témoins l’est particulièrement à mon avis.

[35]        C’est par ordre du tribunal que les témoins sont convoqués et contraints de se rendre au palais, « toute affaire cessante », selon la formule traditionnelle. La Charte des droits des témoins commande à la Magistrature « d’éviter l’assignation répétée du témoin et de minimiser pour lui les inconvénients; ».

Modèle pour faciliter la gestion de la preuve documentaire proposé par le juge O'REILLY

Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration) c. Seifert, 2006 CF 270 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

Pièce	Titre/Description	Témoin qui l’a présentée	Admissible		Motifs
			Oui	Non
P-1	Carte du camp de Balzano, redessinée à l’ordinateur par Ennio Marcelli			x	-         D. ne présente cette pièce qu’à des fins d’identification -         Fera l’objet d’une décision plus tard au cours de la commission rogatoire, de toute façon (voir pièce C-11)

L'article 37 L.p.C. et la procédure à suivre

R. c. Canuel, 2007 QCCS 6482 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

[6]               Dans un premier temps, le Tribunal est d'avis qu'il doit d'abord vérifier si des raisons d'intérêt public sont avancées par le ministère public – Article 37(1) et (4.1) L.p.C.

[7]               Si effectivement le ministère public a démontré prima facie un droit à la protection des renseignements recherchés, il faut alors vérifier si la divulgation de ces renseignements est préjudiciable en regard des raisons d'intérêt public avancées par le ministère public (art. 37(4.1) L.p.C.).

[8]               Par la suite, le Tribunal doit décider si la non-divulgation de l'information recherchée est susceptible ou non d'affecter l'issue du procès de par sa pertinence.

[9]               Si oui, le Tribunal passera à l'étape suivante, c'est-à-dire décider si le maintien du privilège pour les raisons d'intérêt public avancées par le ministère public est susceptible d'affecter le droit de l'accusé à une défense pleine et entière.

[10]            C'est donc à cette étape que le Tribunal doit se livrer à l'exercice de pondération imposé par les articles 37(4.1) et (5) L.p.C.

[11]            Or, selon nous, ce n'est que si le Tribunal est incapable, sur la foi des seules informations qui lui ont été présentées à l'audience, de décider d'accueillir ou non l'objection, qu'il peut alors consulter les documents ou entendre les informations en l'absence de l'accusé.

[12]            En d'autres termes, le Tribunal pourrait consulter les documents ou entendre la preuve dont on demande la divulgation au moment de se livrer à l'exercice de pondération imposée par les articles 37(4.1) et (5) L.p.C.

[18]            Or, afin de procéder à l'étape suivante de pondération, le Tribunal n'a pas suffisamment d'informations et doit examiner de plus près les renseignements recherchés, afin de compléter adéquatement l'exercice de pondération obligatoire et de décider si les raisons d'intérêt public avancées par le ministère public l'emportent sur le droit de l'accusé à une défense pleine et entière ou vice versa.

[19]            En d'autres termes, le tribunal pourrait consulter les documents ou entendre la preuve dont on demande la divulgation au moment de se livrer à l'exercice de pondération imposé par les articles 37(4.1) et (5) L.p.C. si c'est :

"the only way in wihich [he] could determine whether the specified public interest in non-disclosure of the subpoenaed witness' testimony outweiths in importance the public interest in disclosure" 

[20]            Selon la Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique :

"[b] efore making that determination the judge may wish to examine or hear the evidence and will at that time be able to give consideration to the possibility that other issues bearing on the relevance of any particular communication can and ought to be dealt with before he rules on the s. 37 objection."

[21]            Cette même Cour disait d'ailleurs, quelques années auparavant :

 "[i]f an objection is made, and the public interest is specified, then the trial judge may examine or hear the information in circumstances which he considers appropriate, including the absence of the parties, their counsel, and the public."

[22]            C'est ainsi que le tribunal peut permettre au ministère public de présenter des observations, en l'absence de l'accusé, avant qu'il ne se retire pour les examiner

Le privilège de l'enquête en cours

Société Radio-Canada c. R., 2010 QCCS 3289 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

[33]            Selon les auteurs Hubbard, Margotiaux et Duncan, il existe un privilège d'intérêt public qui vise la protection de renseignements concernant une enquête en cours. Ils décrivent l'étendue de ce privilège ainsi :

Investigative privilege is a recognized category of public interest privilege under both s. 37 and the common law.

(…)

Common law public interest privilege (…) may be invoked to protect a genuine police interest in maintaining secrecy in respect of ongoing investigations, ongoing investigative techniques and devices, and those persons who may be involved in investigations.

THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Lien vers le document

http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/sclr/article/viewFile/35021/31782

Revue de la jurisprudence sur l'exception du crime et sur le fardeau de la preuve applicable

R. v. Swearengen, 2003 CanLII 16208 (ON SC)

Lien vers la décision

Criminal Purpose Exception

[8] Not all communications between solicitor and client are protected. One of the well-established exceptions is when the communication with the solicitor is to advance a criminal or fraudulent purpose. Mr. Justice Dickson in Solosky v. the Queen (supra) noted, at pp. 835-36 S.C.R., p. 507 C.C.C.:

. . . if a client seeks guidance from a lawyer in order to facilitate the commission of a crime or a fraud, the communication will not be privileged and it is immaterial whether the lawyer is an unwitting dupe or knowing participant. The classic case is R. v. Cox and Railton
(1884), 14 Q.B.D. 153 in which Stephen J., had this to say
(p. 167): "A communication in furtherance of a criminal purpose does not 'come in the ordinary scope of professional employment'".

[9] The criminal purpose exception to solicitor-client privilege was also affirmed in Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski and Attorney-General of Quebec, supra. In setting out communications with a lawyer that will not be confidential, Lamer J. (as he then was) stated, at p. 873 S.C.R., p. 398 C.C.C.:

Communications made in order to facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud will not be confidential either, regardless of whether or not the lawyer is acting in good faith. [page28]

He also commented that, in some instances, the communication itself may be the actus reus of the crime. Mr. Justice Stephen's observation in R. v. Cox and Railton (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 153, was cited with approval in Descôteaux, at p. 881 S.C.R., p. 404 C.C.C.:

The reason on which the rule is said to rest cannot include the case of communications, criminal in themselves, or intended to further any criminal purpose, for the protection of such communications cannot possibly be otherwise than injurious to the interests of justice, and to those of the administration of justice. Nor do such communications fall within the terms of the rule . . . .

[Emphasis in original omitted]

[10] In R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14 (CanLII), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 321, Mr. Justice Major stated, at para. 37:

. . . only communications made for the legitimate purpose of obtaining lawful professional advice or assistance are privileged.

[11] The accused submits that if the witness interview notes are ordered produced, there will be a chill in the defence bar when conducting interviews of witnesses and making investigations related to a client's case. This argument is less persuasive given that it is the lawyer's notes sought to be produced here, and not the witnesses' own statements. Society has an interest in ensuring that solicitor-client privilege is not used as a vehicle for undermining the legal system.

[12] Privilege does not attach to communications made for a criminal purpose. There is no societal interest in permitting an individual to hide a criminal purpose behind the wall of solicitor-client privilege. To do so would undermine the integrity of the legal system; it would undermine the credibility of lawyers as officers of the court, a role that is critical to the functioning of the legal system.

The Burden of Proof

[13] The burden of proof in establishing that the criminal purpose exception applies to documents seized from a lawyer's office falls on the claimant. In this instance, it is the Crown. The standard is a prima facie case: that is, evidence that goes beyond allegation, but is not as cogent as proof on a balance of probabilities. See R. v. Hilborn, [1990] B.C.J. No. 1141 (QL) (S.C.). Spencer J. quotes with approval the criteria for prima facie proof at the investigative stage described by Ewaschuk J. in R. v. Whitmore reflex, (1987), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 555 (Ont. S.C.J.) [at p. 565]:

. . . the justice must be satisfied that there is some evidence before him from the informant and or his witnesses that the accused has committed the offence alleged against him and that there is some evidence against him on all the essential elements of the offence. [page29 ]

[14] In the case at bar, the two complainants testified at the preliminary inquiry about communications they made to the accused's former lawyer, in the face of a pending criminal charge, at the request of the accused. The transcript of their evidence is before this court.

[15] I am urged by the defence to taken into account the credibility of these witnesses, in that they have admitted lying to Mr. Dubinsky. While credibility may, in certain instances, be a relevant consideration for the court in determining whether a prima facie case has been made out by the claimant, I do not propose to usurp the role of the finder of fact in this case.

[16] The Crown has discharged its burden of establishing a prima facie case that the communication was for a criminal purpose. I am satisfied that the notes made by the lawyer reflect part of the actus reus of the alleged offence.

[17] Accordingly, the lawyer's notes of his discussions with the two witnesses do not constitute work product, and are not subject to the protection of solicitor-client privilege. The notes will be producible to the Office of the Crown Attorney and the police, subject to my comments below.