Le droit d’un accusé à l’avocat de son choix

Racine c. R., 2011 QCCA 2025 (CanLII)

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[31]        Le droit d’un accusé à l’avocat de son choix est fondé sur la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. On cite généralement l’arrêtMcCallen sur ce point :

[31] Section 10 (b) of the Charter provides:

            10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention

            …

            (b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right;…

[32] It is well established that s. 10 (b) includes not only the right to retain counsel but the right to retain the counsel of the accused’s choice and the right to be represented by that counsel throughout the proceedings.

[33] In Re Regina and Speid reflex, (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (Ont. C.A.), Dubin J.A. described this as a fundamental right. At p. 20, he said:

            The right of an accused to retain counsel of his choice has long been recognized at common law as a fundamental right. It has been carried forth as a singular feature of the Legal Aid Plan in this province and has been inferentially entrenched in the Charter of Rightswhich guarantees everyone upon arrest or detention the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. However, although it is a fundamental right and one to be zealously protected by the court, it is not an absolute right and is subject to reasonable limitations.

[32]        Les derniers mots de cette citation font voir que la règle comporte une limite et que parfois un juge peut refuser de reporter une affaire et, par voie de conséquence, obliger un accusé à procéder avec un avocat qui ne serait pas son premier choix ou même, dans certains cas, à procéder sans avocat, si l’accusé ne veut plus être représenté par ce dernier.

[33]        Cette limite à la règle est explicitée dans ce même arrêt :

[45] The law is clear that the decision to fix a date for trial is discretionary and that in choosing a date the court must act judicially and balance a number of factors including the availability of an accused’s counsel of choice within a reasonable period of time.  Many of the same factors come into play in decisions whether to adjourn a trial date in order to permit an accused’s counsel of choice to be available. The emphasis is on the reasonableness of the delay involved in accommodating the accused’s choice; if the counsel of choice is not available within a reasonable time, then the rights of the accused must give way to other considerations and the accused will be required, if he or she chooses to be represented, to retain another counsel who is available within a reasonable period of time: see R. v. Lai, [1991] O.J. No. 725 (Gen. Div.);Barette v. The Queen (1976), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189 (S.C.C.) and R.v. Smith reflex, reflex, (1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 90 (Ont. C.A.).

[46] In  determining what is a reasonable period  of  time,  the court  will balance many factors including the reason counsel  is not available sooner, the previous involvement of the  particular counsel in the case, the public interest in having criminal cases disposed of in an expeditious manner, the age and history of  the case, the availability of judicial resources and the best use  of courtroom  facilities, the availability of  the  complainant  and witnesses,  the  availability and use of Crown  counsel  and  law enforcement  officers and the potential impact of the  scheduling decisions  on  the rights of an accused under  s.  11(b)  of  the Charter guaranteeing a trial within a reasonable period of  time. See Smith, supra, at p. 93; Lai, supra.

[34]        Tous les facteurs ci-dessus mentionnés sont certes importants, mais celui de l’attention due aux témoins l’est particulièrement à mon avis.

[35]        C’est par ordre du tribunal que les témoins sont convoqués et contraints de se rendre au palais, « toute affaire cessante », selon la formule traditionnelle. La Charte des droits des témoins commande à la Magistrature « d’éviter l’assignation répétée du témoin et de minimiser pour lui les inconvénients; ».