R. c. Paradis, 2016 QCCS 115 (CanLII)
[30] C’est donc dire que contrairement aux prétentions de la mise en cause, la notion de « fruits de l’enquête » n’est pas aussi généreuse qu’elle le prétend. Il faut en retenir qu’aux fins de la communication de la preuve, la Couronne s’entend uniquement du poursuivant et non des autres entités fédérales, provinciales ou voire même des tiers.
[31] C’est donc dire que les renseignements entre les mains de tiers, incluant la police et les autres entités étatiques, ne peuvent généralement pas faire l’objet d’une divulgation de type Stinchcombe.
[32] Quant à la communication de renseignements entre les mains d’un tiers étranger au litige, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario mentionne ce qui suit :
[83] A separate disclosure/production scheme exists for records and information in the hands of third parties, strangers to the litigation. This scarcely surprises. After all, third parties are under no obligation and have no duty to assist the parties in litigation or to disclose information to them: O’Connor, at para. 102.
[84] The third party scheme involves two steps or stages. It is initiated by service of a subpoena duces tecum on the third party record-holder, as well as a notice of application and supporting material on the record holder and prosecuting authority: O’Connor, at para. 134. The purpose of the subpoena duces tecum is to have the material requested brought to the trial judge who will determine whether and to what extent the material will be produced. The application sets out the grounds upon which production is sought. The supporting material seeks to establish the relevance of the material to an issue at trial including:
i. the unfolding of the narrative;
ii. the credibility of a witness;
iii. the reliability of other evidence; or
iv. the competence of a witness to testify: O’Connor, at para. 134; McNeil, at paras. 27, 33.
[85] For the purposes of this third party production regime, a record-holder need not be a complete stranger to the litigation. Recall that Crown entities, other than the prosecuting Crown, are third parties under this regime: McNeil, at para. 13. And this is so even though some records of the same entity may be subject to the first party disclosure scheme of Stinchcombe: McNeil, at para. 15.
[33] Au sujet des renseignements recherchés, mais non communiqués par la poursuite concernant, entre autres, des données historiques sur l’utilisation d’un appareil de détection approuvé dans des affaires antérieures pour des infractions semblables, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario mentionne ce qui suit :
[91] Two principal factors determine the disclosure/production regime that will apply when an accused seeks disclosure of something the Crown has not provided. The first has to do with the nature of the information of which disclosure/production is sought. The second concerns who is in possession or control of that information.
[92] Turning first to the nature of the information. The descriptive “fruits of the investigation” accurately captures the subject-matter of first party/Stinchcombe disclosure. The term embraces relevant, non-privileged information related to the matters the Crown intends to adduce in evidence against an accused, as well as any information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it may assist an accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer and defence. The information may relate to the unfolding of the narrative of material events, to the credibility of witnesses or the reliability of evidence that may form part of the case to meet.
[93] In its normal, natural everyday sense the phrase “fruits of the investigation” posits a relationship between the subject-matter sought and the investigation that leads to the charges against an accused. It refers to information acquired by means and in consequence of that investigation. The information includes, but is not co-extensive with, evidence, much less admissible evidence.
[94] The disclosure/production sought in this case falls beyond the boundaries of “fruits of the investigation”.
[95] In this case, a substantial component of the information sought consists of historical records of the operation of the same approved instrument during the investigation of others for similar offences. These records have no association with the offence with which the respondent was charged and for which he faced trial. The information was not created, produced or even located during the investigation of the respondent and his alleged offences. The records played no role in the acquisition of any evidence available for proffer in the prosecution of the respondent. Indeed, much of it originates in the investigation of others for offences they are alleged to have committed at times and in places unrelated to the investigation of the respondent.
[35] Les renseignements recherchés en possession de tiers doivent être vraisemblablement pertinents pour faire l’objet d’une communication. Il s’agit là de la norme que le requérant doit rencontrer pour permettre au juge réviseur de déterminer la portée d’une ordonnance de communication éventuelle.
[36] À ce sujet, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, toujours dans l’affaire Jackson, s’exprime ainsi :
[126] In the third party/O’Connor production landscape, “likely relevant” occupies a prominent place. The term designates the standard or burden an applicant must meet to have the trial judge review the records to determine whether or to what extent production will be ordered.
[127] The standard “likely relevant” imposes a significant, but not an onerous, burden on an applicant: O’Connor, at para. 24; McNeil, at para. 29. This threshold plays a meaningful role in screening applications to prevent the defence from engaging in speculative, fanciful, disruptive, unmeritorious, obstructive and time-consuming requests for production: R. v. Chaplin, 1995 CanLII 126 (CSC), 1995 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727, at para. 32; O’Connor, at para. 24; McNeil, at para. 29.
[128] The “likely relevant” threshold is not onerous because an applicant cannot be required, as a condition of accessing information that may assist in making full answer and defence, to demonstrate the specific use to which they might put information that they have not seen:R. v. Durette, 1994 CanLII 123 (CSC), 1994 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469, at p. 499; O’Connor, at para. 25; McNeil, at para. 29. The trial judge does not balance competing interests to determine whether the “likely relevant” threshold has been met under O’Connor:McNeil, at para. 32.
[129] Under the third party/O’Connor production regime, “likely relevant” means that there is a reasonable possibility that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to testify: O’Connor, at para. 22; McNeil, at para. 33. An “issue at trial” includes not only material issues concerning the unfolding of the events which form the subject-matter of the proceedings, but also evidence relating to the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of other evidence: O’Connor, at para. 22; McNeil, at para. 33.
[130] Under O’Connor, an applicant who satisfies the “likely relevance” standard is entitled to have the records sought produced to the trial judge for inspection to determine whether, or to what extent, the records will be produced to the applicant: McNeil, at para. 34.
(Le Tribunal souligne)
[37] En l’espèce, rien n’indique que la mise en cause a démontré à l’intimée en quoi les renseignements recherchés pouvaient être vraisemblablement pertinents pour assurer sa défense.
Aucun commentaire:
Publier un commentaire