Actus reus et mens rea de l'infraction de possession d'une substance désignée en vue d'en faire le trafic

R. c. Daher, 2006 QCCQ 11851 (CanLII)

[117] Le Tribunal a pour sa part pris connaissance de l'arrêt R. c. Chan dans lequel le juge Simmons de la cour d'appel d'Ontario se prononce non seulement sur l'actus reus et la mens rea de l'infraction de possession d'une substance désignée en vue d'en faire le trafic, mais également sur la possibilité d'une déclaration de culpabilité de tentative de possession d'une substance dans le but d'en faire le trafic lorsque la preuve est insuffisante pour justifier la condamnation à l'égard de l'infraction complète.

[118] Dans cette cause, les policiers avaient intercepté le colis, avant la livraison, qui contenait neufs paquets d'héroïne d'une valeur d'environ deux millions de dollars, pour n'en laisser qu'un gramme.

[119] La Cour décida que l'accusé pouvait être déclaré coupable de l'infraction même s'il n'était en possession que d'un gramme d'héroïne dans la mesure où les circonstances étaient telles que l'accusé s'attendait à en recevoir une quantité supérieure.

[120] Le Tribunal retient, des motifs exprimés par le juge Simmons, les passages suivants relativement à l'actus reus et à la mens rea :

« 30 Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act sets out two components of the actus reus of the offence that it creates: i) that the accused possess a substance; and ii) that the substance possessed actually be a substance named in one of the schedules to the act.

31 The relevant authorities establish that the mens rea of the offence includes knowledge of the nature of the substance in the sense that an accused person must believe that it is a controlled substance. 3 R. v. Beaver, 1957 CanLII 14 (S.C.C.), [1957] S.C.R. 531, 118 C.C.C. 129; United States of America v. Dynar 1997 CanLII 359 (S.C.C.), (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.); and see also the quotation at para. 39 below.3 Further, s. 5(2) specifically requires that the accused person possess the controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

32 Notably however, none of s. 5(2), the definition of "traffic", or the relevant authorities refers to quantity or to knowledge of a particular quantity as an element of the offence or as a component of the actus reus.

33 That said, the quantity of a controlled substance that an accused person possesses often plays a role in determining whether an inference of possession for the purpose of trafficking should be drawn. However, the fact that quantity can be, and often is, an indicium of purpose does not make it a part of the actus reus of the offence. »

[121] Il ajoute et conclut sur le point :

« 43 In my view, the offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking was complete in this case at the moment the appellant obtained possession of the controlled delivery package containing heroin. What the appellant would have done, or did, later, with the single gram of heroin that was in the package, is not
only speculative, it is irrelevant. »

[122] En ce qui concerne la tentative de possession en vue d'un trafic, l'appelant plaidait que celle-ci n'était pas reconnue comme un crime en droit canadien.

[123] À la lecture de l'article 5(2) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances et de l'article 24 du Code criminel, le juge Simmons écrit que rien n'indique à l'article 24 qu'il ne peut s'appliquer à l'article ci-haut mentionné.

[124] S'appuyant sur les faits précis de cet arrêt et faisant les distinctions nécessaires avec l'arrêt R. c. Dungey, la décision la plus pertinente sur la question, la Cour décide en ces termes que la tentative de possession en vue de trafic constitue un crime au Canada :

« 64 Further, although s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code makes it clear that acts that amount to "mere preparation" are "too remote to constitute an attempt", it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which acts or omissions falling short of obtaining possession would be sufficiently proximate to evidence an attempt. Taking this case as an example once again, hat the police intervened at a point when Mr. Tran was about to hand the controlled delivery package to Mr. Zhong and Mr. Zhong was about to hand the money to Mr. Tran, I see no impediment to holding that Mr. Zhong's actions were sufficient to constitute an attempt.

[…]

[68] In my view, although possession for the purpose of trafficking shares certain characteristics of inchoate offences such as counselling and conspiracy, it also reflects a progression in behaviour that has reached the stage of criminal conduct.

69 Strictly inchoate crimes are a unique class of criminal offences in the sense that they criminalize acts that precede harmful conduct but do not necessarily inflict harmful consequences in and of themselves. It can thus be appreciated that it could extend the criminal law too far to reach behind those acts and criminalize behaviour that precedes those acts. However, although possession for the purpose of trafficking precedes the substantive offence of trafficking, it can hardly be said that it does not, of itself, inflict harmful consequences. It represents a state of affairs in which preparatory behaviour has crystallized into the acquisition of a controlled substance. This state of affairs is in itself harmful to society and the level of harm is exacerbated by the accompanying purpose of trafficking.

70 In my view, possession for the purpose of trafficking reflects a progression in behaviour sufficiently advanced to warrant reaching behind it and criminalizing behaviour that amounts to an attempt to achieve that state of affairs. I see no policy justification for refusing to make it subject to the law of attempt. I would not give effect to this alternative ground of appeal. »