Les soins médicaux sont une chose nécessaire à l’existence au sens de l’art. 215(1) et le défaut de fournir des soins médicaux est une omission par laquelle une personne peut engager sa responsabilité criminelle sous 215(2)a) ii)

R. v. S.J., 2015 ONCA 97 

Lien vers la décision

[53]      As mentioned, Naglik described the applicable standard for finding criminal liability under s. 215 of the Code.  The Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s actions were a “marked departure” from what a reasonably prudent person would do: Naglik, at pp. 141-143, 148 and Peterson, at para. 35.

[54]      Section 215 of the Code imposes an objective or community standard of conduct.  The duty is not one of perfection.  Similarly, mere negligence does not suffice.  Rather, the question is whether there has been a “marked departure”.  A parent is not required to run to a doctor or hospital whenever illness or the prospect of injury arises: Pertab, at paras. 35-37; R. v. Alexander, 2011 ONSC 980, at para. 61; and R. v. Boone, [2002] O.J. No. 2796, at paras. 27-34.

(c)         Defence of Lawful Excuse

[55]      As is evident from the language of s. 215(2) of the Code, a lawful excuse provides an accused with a defence and serves to prevent the punishment of the morally innocent: Peterson, at para. 37.[4]

(d)         Necessitous Circumstances

[57]      Early decisions such as R. v. Wilson (1933), 1933 CanLII 278 (AB CA), 3 W.W.R. 417 and R. v. McDonald, [1942] O.J. No. 319 dealt with the prosecutions of husbands for allegedly leaving their wives in destitute or necessitous circumstances by failing to provide support.

[58]      Boone is a more recent example of a case addressing s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Code.  In that case, the court found a father guilty under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Code for failure to provide his two year old child with necessaries of life that consisted of the obtaining of appropriate, available medical attention in a timely fashion.  The trial judge was uncertain that the child’s life was endangered or that his health was permanently endangered within the meaning of s. 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Code, but was satisfied by reason of his age and serious injuries that he was in necessitous circumstances.

H.     Grounds of Appeal

(i)     First Issue: Necessitous Circumstances

[59]      The first issue turns on whether a failure to provide medical attention is captured by s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Code.

[60]      As mentioned, the appellants concede that medical attention is a necessary of life within the meaning of s. 215(1) of the Code.  However, they submit that failure to provide medical attention does not amount to necessitous circumstances and therefore does not fall within s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Code.  They state that necessitous circumstances encompass natural needs such as food, shelter and clothing, not medical attention.  Failure to provide medical attention may only constitute an offence if the conduct falls within s. 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Code.  That is, the failure to provide medical attention must endanger the life of the person to whom the duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered permanently.

[63]      Statutory interpretation is governed by the approach described in Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 87, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

[64]      Section 215(2)(a) creates two offences both of which are predicated on a failure to perform the legal duties imposed by s. 215(1)(a) or (b).  This case involves s. 215(1)(a) and specifically the duty owed by parents to a child.  Section 215(2)(a)(i) addresses the situation in which the parents’ failure to perform their duties under s. 215(1)(a) puts the child to whom the duty is owed at risk of harm because of the child’s dire circumstances (destitute or necessitous).  Section 215(2)(a)(ii) addresses the situation in which the parents’ failure to perform their duties under s. 215(1)(a) puts the child at risk by virtue of the consequence of the failure to perform the duty (endangers the life or causes or is likely to cause health to be endangered permanently).  A failure to provide medical attention could well generate the risk of harm proscribed by either offence.

[65]      The purpose of s. 215 of the Code is aimed at the protection of others.  The subsections of s. 215 of the Code have a common object – the imposition of a defined legal duty of care on an individual in charge of another: Naglik, at pp. 141-143 and Peterson, at para. 35.  Children under the age of 16, who are the subject matter of s. 215(1)(a) of the Code and owed such a duty of care, exemplify this protective objective. 

[66]      The terms “destitute” and “necessitous circumstances”, which are found in s. 215(2)(a)(i), are not defined in the Code.  ”Necessitous” is defined in Oxford Dictionaries[5] as “lacking necessaries of life, needy”.  As mentioned, in oral argument, the appellants conceded that medical attention is a necessary of life within the meaning of s. 215(1) of the Code.  It follows that the failure to provide necessaries of life – in this case medical attention – may amount to necessitous circumstances.

[67]      Neither the purpose of s. 215 of the Code read as a whole, nor its language, compels the interpretation advanced by the appellants.  There is nothing that would suggest that liability for a failure to provide medical attention should be restricted to, and bound by, the requirements of s. 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Code.  Failure to provide medical treatment can lead to criminal liability under either s. 215(2)(a)(i) or s. 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Code; the one does not preclude the other.

(ii)     Second Issue: Causal Connection

[68]      The appellants complain that including medical attention in the ambit of s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Code results in criminalizing a failure to obtain treatment of no consequence.  They argue that criminal liability for failure to provide necessaries of life follows only where the failure has resulted in permanent danger to the health or life of that person.  They submit that there must be a causal connection between the appellant’s failure to provide necessaries of life and the child’s necessitous circumstances and here there was none.

[69]      I disagree.  Inclusion of medical attention in the ambit of s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Code does not compel criminality for any failure to provide medical attention.  In order for there to be criminal liability, the child must be in necessitous circumstances and the conduct must amount to a “marked departure” from what a reasonably prudent parent would have done in the circumstances: Naglik, at p. 143.  This requirement imposes a limitation on actionable criminality.  There was no need for the Crown to establish that the appellants’ failure to obtain medical treatment would have made any difference.  That is a requirement of s. 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Code. 

La différence entre l'écart marqué et l'écart marqué et important

Fournier c. R., 2016 QCCS 5456

Lien vers la décision

[73]        Voici comment la norme de faute doit être établie selon la juge Charron :

[48]      Toutefois, il n’est pas nécessaire de prouver une mens rea subjective du type que je viens de décrire pour établir l’infraction, puisque la faute que visait le législateur en adoptant l’art. 249 englobe une gamme plus étendue de comportements. Par conséquent, bien que la preuve de la mens rea subjective soit clairement suffisante, elle n’est pas essentielle. Dans le cas d’infractions de négligence comme celle qui nous intéresse, le fait de commettre l’acte interdit, en l’absence de l’état mental de diligence approprié, peut en effet suffire pour constituer la faute requise. On détermine la présence d’une mens rea objective en appréciant le comportement dangereux par rapport à la norme que respecterait une personne raisonnablement prudente. Si le comportement dangereux constitue un « écart marqué » par rapport à cette norme, l’infraction sera établie. Comme nous l’avons vu, ce qui constitue un « écart marqué » par rapport à la norme que respecterait un conducteur raisonnablement prudent est une affaire de degré. Le manque de diligence doit être suffisamment grave pour mériter d’être puni. Il n’y a aucun doute qu’un comportement de quelques secondes peut constituer un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de la personne raisonnable. Néanmoins, comme l’a souligné avec justesse le juge Doherty dans l’arrêt Willock, [TRADUCTION] « un comportement de si courte durée se produisant pendant la conduite d’un véhicule, conduite par ailleurs irréprochable à tous égards, suggère davantage l’extrémité civile que l’extrémité criminelle du continuum de la négligence » (par. 31). Bien que l’affaire Willock concerne l’infraction de négligence criminelle, qui se situe à un point plus élevé sur le continuum de la conduite négligente, cette observation s’applique tout autant à l’infraction de conduite dangereuse.

[49]      Si le comportement ne constitue pas un écart marqué par rapport à la norme que respecterait un conducteur raisonnablement prudent, il n’est pas nécessaire de poursuivre l’analyse. L’infraction n’aura pas été établie. En revanche, si le juge des faits est convaincu, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que la conduite objectivement dangereuse constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme, il devra considérer la preuve relative à l’état d’esprit véritable de l’accusé — si une telle preuve a été présentée — pour déterminer si elle permet de douter raisonnablement qu’une personne raisonnable, placée dans la même situation que l’accusé, aurait été consciente du risque créé par ce comportement.  En l’absence d’une telle preuve, le tribunal pourra déclarer l’accusé coupable.

[Le soulignement est ajouté]

[74]        Dans l'affaire J.F.[44], un acte d’accusation unique comportait deux chefs d’homicide involontaire coupable par omission. Chaque chef reprochait une infraction sous-jacentes différente : dans un cas, la négligence criminelle (art. 219 C.cr.); dans l'autre l'omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence (art. 215 C.cr.).

[75]        Comme l'explique le juge Fish, le même élément de faute doit être prouvé pour les deux infractions :

[7]        L’élément de faute nécessaire pour entraîner une déclaration de culpabilité était, pour l’essentiel, commun aux deux chefs d’accusation d’homicide involontaire coupable. Pour le premier chef, il s’agissait de l’élément de faute de l’infraction sous-jacente de négligence criminelle et, pour le deuxième chef, de l’élément de faute de l’omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence. Aucune de ces infractions n’exige la preuve de l’intention ou de la prévision réelle d’une conséquence prohibée. Le jury devait déterminer, à l’égard des deux chefs, non pas ce que savait l’intimé ou quelle était son intention, mais ce qu’il aurait dû prévoir.

[76]        Le juge Fish décrit ensuite la différence entre l'écart marqué (art. 215) et l'écart marqué et important (art. 219) :

[8]        Quant au chef reposant sur l’omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence, il incombait au ministère public d’établir que l’omission de protéger l’enfant placé en famille d’accueil constituait « un écart marqué par rapport à la conduite d’un parent raisonnablement prudent dans des circonstances où il était objectivement prévisible que l’omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence risquerait de mettre en danger la vie de l’enfant ou d’exposer sa santé à un péril permanent » : R. c. Naglik, 1993 CanLII 64 (CSC), [1993] 3 R.C.S. 122, p. 143 (je souligne).  On comprendra plus tard pourquoi j’ai souligné le mot « risquerait » dans la description de l’infraction faite par le Juge en chef, qui s’exprimait au nom de la Cour sur ce point.

[9]        Quant au chef alléguant la négligence criminelle, le ministère public devait démontrer que la même omission constituait un écart marqué et important (par opposition à un écart marqué) par rapport à la conduite d’un parent raisonnablement prudent dans des circonstances où l’accusé soit a eu conscience d’un risque grave et évident pour la vie de son enfant, sans pour autant l’écarter, soit ne lui a accordé aucune attention : R. c. Tutton, 1989 CanLII 103 (CSC), [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1392, p. 1430-1431; R. c. Sharp (1984), 1984 CanLII 3487 (ON CA), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 428 (C.A. Ont.).

[77]        L'élément de faute nécessaire n'exige pas la preuve de l'intention ou de la prévision réelle d'une conséquence prohibée, mais plutôt ce que l'accusé aurait dû prévoir[45].

[78]        Les éléments essentiels de l'infraction d'homicide involontaire coupable retenus par le juge Fish dans cette affaire peuvent être résumés par le tableau suivant[46] :

Omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence (art. 215 C.cr.)	Négligence criminelle (art. 219 C.cr.)
(1) L’accusé a manqué à son obligation de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence.	(1) L’accusé a manqué à son obligation.
(2) La conduite de l’accusé représentait un écart marqué par rapport à la conduite d’une personne raisonnable dans les mêmes circonstances en ce qu’il était objectivement prévisible que l’omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence risquerait de mettre en danger la vie de la victime ou d’exposer sa santé à un péril permanent.	(2) La conduite de l’accusé représentait un écart marqué et important (par opposition à un écart marqué) par rapport à la conduite d’un parent raisonnablement prudent dans des circonstances où l’accusé soit a eu conscience d’un risque grave et évident pour la vie de son enfant, sans pour autant l’écarter, soit ne lui a accordé aucune attention.
(3) L’accusé prévoyait, ou aurait dû prévoir, le risque que sa conduite créait.	(3) L’accusé prévoyait, ou aurait dû prévoir, le risque que sa conduite créait.

[79]        Le cadre d'analyse adopté par le juge Fish dans l'arrêt J.F. permet l'identification des éléments essentiels applicables en l'espèce.

[80]        Lorsque l'infraction sous-jacente sur laquelle se fonde une accusation d'homicide involontaire coupable consiste en une infraction de responsabilité stricte, la poursuite doit établir les éléments suivants : 1) la commission d'une infraction de responsabilité stricte objectivement dangereuse; 2) la conduite de l'accusé constitue un écart marqué à la conduite d'une personne raisonnable placée dans les mêmes circonstances[47]; et 3) compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, une personne raisonnable aurait prévu le risque de lésions corporelles.

L’exigence de la mens rea de l'infraction prévue à l’art. 215

R. c. Goforth, 2022 CSC 25

Lien vers la décision

[27]                        L’article 215 crée une infraction de négligence pénale. Il « a en effet pour but l’établissement d’un niveau minimal uniforme de soins à fournir pour les personnes auxquelles il s’applique. Or, cela ne peut se réaliser que si ceux auxquels incombe l’obligation sont tenus de respecter dans leur conduite une norme de la société plutôt qu’une norme personnelle » (R. c. Naglik, 1993 CanLII 64 (CSC), [1993] 3 R.C.S. 122, p. 141-142 (soulignement omis)). La responsabilité repose sur ce dont une personne raisonnable dans une situation semblable à celle de l’accusé aurait eu connaissance ou prévu, de sorte que la « faute consiste dans l’absence de l’état mental de diligence requis » (R. c. Beatty, 2008 CSC 5, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 49, par. 8). La disposition sanctionne le comportement qui constitue un écart marqué par rapport à une norme objective de diligence raisonnable. Plus précisément, la mens rea requise dans le cas de l’art. 215 est établie lorsque la Couronne prouve que la conduite de l’accusé constitue « un écart marqué par rapport à la conduite d’un parent raisonnablement prudent dans des circonstances où il était objectivement prévisible que l’omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence risquerait de mettre en danger la vie de l’enfant ou d’exposer sa santé à un péril permanent » (Naglik, p. 143; voir aussi R. c. J.F., 2008 CSC 60, [2008] 3 R.C.S. 215, par. 8).

[28]                        Dans l’arrêt R. c. Roy, 2012 CSC 26, [2012] 2 R.C.S. 60, par. 36, le juge Cromwell a fourni un cadre d’analyse utile afin de déterminer si la mens rea objective a été établie :

      Il est utile d’aborder le sujet en posant deux questions. La première est de savoir si, compte tenu de tous les éléments de preuve pertinents, une personne raisonnable aurait prévu le risque et pris les mesures pour l’éviter si possible. Le cas échéant, la deuxième question est de savoir si l’omission de l’accusé de prévoir le risque et de prendre les mesures pour l’éviter si possible constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence que respecterait une personne raisonnable dans la même situation que l’accusé. [En italique dans l’original.]

[29]                        En l’espèce, la Couronne devait prouver, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que M. Goforth avait la mens rea requise pour l’infraction sous‑jacente prévue à l’art. 215 ainsi que la mens rea requise pour les infractions d’homicide involontaire coupable et d’infliction illégale de lésions corporelles.

[30]                        Pour satisfaire à l’exigence de la mens rea dans le cas de l’art. 215, la Couronne devait prouver : a) qu’il était objectivement prévisible, pour une personne raisonnable dans la même situation que l’accusé, que l’omission de fournir de la nourriture, des liquides ou des soins médicaux risquerait de mettre en danger la vie de l’enfant ou d’exposer sa santé à un péril permanent; et b) que le comportement de l’accusé s’écartait de façon marquée de celui auquel on se serait attendu d’un parent, d’un parent d’accueil, d’un gardien ou d’un chef de famille raisonnablement prudent dans les circonstances.

Revue de l'infraction de devoir de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence

R. v. Peterson, 2005 CanLII 37972 (ON CA)

Lien vers la décision

[34]         Section 215(1)(c) differs from section s. 215(1)(a), which imposes a duty on a “parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a family” to provide necessaries “for a child under the age of sixteen years”, and from s. 215(1)(b), which imposes a duty on spouses and common-law partners to provide necessaries of life to their spouses and partners.  Section 215(1)(c) makes it clear that the duty to provide necessaries is not limited to these relationships but can arise in other circumstances.  The duty arises when one person is under the other’s charge, is unable to withdraw from that charge, and is unable to provide himself or herself with necessaries of life.  The phrase “necessaries of life” includes not only food, shelter, care, and medical attention necessary to sustain life but also appears to include protection of the person from harm: R. v. Popen (1981), 1981 CanLII 3345 (ON CA), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 232 (Ont. C.A.) at 240.  Thus, s. 215(1)(c) obligations are driven by the facts and the context of each case.

[35]         Subsection 215(2) imposes liability on an objective basis.  The offence is made out by conduct showing a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person having the charge of another in circumstances where it is objectively foreseeable that failure to provide necessaries of life would risk danger to life or permanent endangerment of the health of the person under the charge of the other.  The personal characteristics of the accused, falling short of capacity to appreciate the risk, are not a relevant consideration. The use of the word “duty” is indicative of a societal minimum that has been established and is aimed at establishing a uniform minimum level of care: R. v. Naglik, 1993 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122 at paras. 37, 51 and 33 respectively.

[36]         The objective basis of liability includes an assessment of whether the person in charge could have acted other than as he or she did.  For example, in Naglik at para. 36, a “crucial consideration” was that the evidence indicated the services of a public health nurse were made available to Naglik to help her in caring for her child, given her age, education, and lack of experience with children.  She refused to accept any assistance.

[37]         The words “without lawful excuse” in s. 215(2) provide a defence and serve to prevent the punishment of the morally innocent.  The obligation to provide necessaries is not absolute and may be excused, for example, where there is financial inability: Naglik, supra, and R. v. Yuman  (1910), 1910 CanLII 197 (ON CA), 17 C.C.C. 474 (Ont. C.A.).

[38]         On the other hand, I note that contributory negligence by the victim is not a defence for an accused charged with criminal negligence unless the injuries incurred are attributable solely to the victim: see Eugene G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada 2d ed. looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1987) at para 28:180, citing R. v. Lesuk, 2000 MBCA 24 (CanLII), [2000] 7 W.W.R. 462 (Man. C.A.) at para. 31 and other appellate decisions from Alberta, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island.

[39]         Section 215(2)(b) indicates that the failure to provide necessaries includes not only a failure to do a discrete act but also includes a failure to act in an ongoing relationship over a period of time: see Naglik, supra, at para. 36 in relation to section 215(2)(a)(ii), which is similar in wording to s. 215(2)(b).

[40]         In addition to the foregoing, I would make the following observations.  First, the relationship of the parties to each other is among the factors to consider in determining whether a person is in the charge of another.  The dependency of the parent under a disability on an independent adult child is justified not only by their past course of dealing in which the parent supported the child but also by their relationship to one another in which an element of trust will usually be present.  The history of the section supports the interpretation that the section was intended to require certain minimal standards in relation to dependants such as wives and children and was later broadened: see R. v. Middleton, [1997] O.J. No. 2758, at paras. 10-14.  The mere breach of a federal or provincial statute, such as s. 32 of the Family Law Act, which imposes a duty on a child to support a parent, does not constitute a crime.  It is nevertheless proper for the trier of fact to consider legislation governing the accused in order to determine whether the accused’s actions or inactions show a “marked departure” from the conduct expected: see by analogy R. v. Leblanc, 1975 CanLII 190 (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 339, R. v. Bergeron (1999), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 45 (Que. C.A.).

[41]         Second, the word “charge” is not unknown to the criminal law in other contexts involving adults.  In the impaired driving context, the court characterized having “care, charge or control” of a vehicle as requiring “a kind of domination as in the master-servant relationship and as in the parent-child or teacher-beginner relationship”: R. v. Slessor, 1969 CanLII 248 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 664 at 674.  The court did not restrict the meaning of charge too far, however, stating, “‘Charge’, too, is a word of broad comprehension.  One speaks of a person who is fixed with responsibility of supervision as one who is in ‘charge’”.  The Ontario Environmental Appeal Board also considered the meaning of the word charge in Re Karge (1996), 21 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 5 at para. 68-69.  It referred to the dictionary meanings of the word and concluded essentially that it means to have the responsibility to take care of someone, something, or somewhere. 

[42]         Used in these contexts the word “charge” connotes, among other things, the duty or responsibility of taking care of a person or thing.  Similarly, one of the definitions of charge in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (St. Paul, Minneapolis: West Publishing, 2004) is “to entrust with responsibilities or duties e.g. to charge the guardian with the ward’s care”.  What the definitions have in common is the exercise of an element of control by one person and a dependency on the part of the other.

[43]         In assessing whether one person is in the charge of another, the relative positions of the parties and their ability to understand and appreciate their circumstances is a factor to consider.  A parent who is not in full possession of his or her faculties may not appreciate that he or she cannot provide himself or herself with the necessaries of life and may not have the capacity to understand that he or she is in an unsafe or unhealthy environment that is likely to cause permanent injury.  Just as some contributory negligence by the victim is not a defence to a charge of criminal negligence, the inability of the victim to appreciate his or her need for necessaries and the victim’s unwillingness to cooperate is not a defence for an accused charged with failure to provide necessaries.  If the parent is otherwise in the child’s charge and the child cannot care for the parent due to the parent’s refusal to accept care, the child is obliged to seek the help of a community agency.  See Regina v. Stone & Dobinsons, [1977] Q.B. 354 at 361.

[44]         A further consideration in determining whether a person is in the charge of another is whether one person has explicitly assumed responsibility for the other, for example, by obtaining a power of attorney for personal care or by publicly acknowledging to others in the community by words or conduct an assumption of responsibility.

[45]         The non-exhaustive criteria below illuminate the trial judge’s findings and the path he took to his conclusion that Arnold was in the charge of the appellant:

1.   Arnold was dependent: The trial judge found that in his state of dementia, Arnold was unable to provide himself with the necessaries of life.  As he never cooked, had no food in the apartment, and sometimes went days without food, he was dependent on someone else to provide him with food.  The trial judge also accepted Dr. Lam’s evidence that Arnold needed assistance in choosing appropriate clothing to wear as well as assistance with his personal grooming.

2.   The appellant had a familial relationship with Arnold and was aware of his father’s dependency.  The trial judge found that Dennis was fully aware that his father was in need of the necessaries of life.  It was manifestly obvious, particularly because Arnold lost up to thirty pounds during the winter and spring of 2000.

3.   The appellant controlled Arnold’s living conditions and kept him in an unsafe environment.  The trial judge found that the appellant had free access to Arnold’s rooms but kept all of the rooms he occupied locked when he was not there. The logical inference is that Dennis prevented Arnold from having access to the only working kitchen, bathing facilities, and properly working toilet in the house.  The trial judge also found that the toilet in the basement had no seat, was filthy, worked poorly; and the environment in which it was located was unsafe because the stairs to the basement were poorly lit and had no handrail until near the bottom.  The trial judge further found that the kitchen was unsafe even for a fit person.

4.   The appellant had control over Arnold’s personal care.  The appellant took steps to obtain the power to make decisions respecting Arnold’s personal care and had the ability to make decisions about his personal care.  Put another way, at the request of Dennis and his sister, Arnold entrusted them with the ability to make decisions respecting his personal care.  Quite apart from the power of attorney, when Dennis came home and Arnold was locked out, as frequently happened, the appellant took Arnold into his charge from the neighbours.  Thus, both legally and publicly Dennis assumed responsibility for Arnold.

5.   The appellant chose not to make decisions that would result in Arnold receiving the necessaries of life.  Dennis was made aware of community services that could assist him with the care of his father.  He took no steps pursuant to Const. Cutmore’s suggestions.  (One suggestion, as revealed in the evidence, was to contact a church across the street that operated an extensive Meals-on-Wheels program.)

6.   Arnold was incapable of withdrawing himself from the appellant’s “charge” due to age and illness.  He was too old, feeble, and senile to withdraw himself from the appellant’s charge.

[46]         When the trial judge’s reasons are considered in this manner, they disclose why the trial judge found that Arnold was under the appellant’s charge as well as why Arnold was unable to withdraw from his son’s charge.  Thus, the reasons disclose why the trial judge convicted Arnold and satisfy the requirements of Sheppard, supra.

[47]         With respect to the third element of the offence, namely, the failure to provide Arnold with the necessaries of life, the appellant relied on Linda’s evidence as contradicting the evidence that Dennis failed to provide Arnold with the necessaries of life and was under his charge.  The appellant submits that the trial judge was required to resolve the conflict in the evidence.  However, as Linda had not entered the house for at least six months prior to Arnold being apprehended, she was not in a position to testify about whether Dennis failed to provide Arnold with the necessaries of life.  Her evidence did not raise a conflict that necessitated resolution by the trial judge.  Thus the trial judge correctly found that the evidence was not really in dispute.

[48]         Insofar as the legal test for determining when a person is under the charge of another is concerned, the evidence that Arnold did not wish to bathe or change his clothes does not negate the appellant’s having charge of him.  The evidence simply supports the conclusion that Arnold had a mental disability that prevented him from exercising sound judgment to provide himself with the necessaries of life.  This disability cannot be used by Dennis as a defence for failing to provide Arnold with the necessaries of life.  Dennis could have called a community agency for help and did not.  Further, there was no evidence that Arnold ever refused food yet, Dennis did not provide him with food regularly.