Le pouvoir de perquisitionner une maison d’habitation n’inclut pas celui de fouiller un véhicule localisé sur la propriété

R. v. Vu, 2004 BCCA 230 (CanLII)

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[33]   As mentioned, I am unable to find any meaningful distinction between the circumstances in Brownand those in the case at bar.  In my view, the trial judge in the present case was obliged to follow the ruling in Brown that the authority to search a dwelling house does not include the authority to search vehicles on the property.  And accordingly the search of the Honda was unlawful and contrary to s. 8.

[36]   It would appear from the foregoing that the trial judge's opinion of the good faith of the officers is based on their having reasonable grounds to believe the vehicle may provide evidence related to the offence under investigation.  While appellate courts must defer to the trial judge's determination of good faith, here I think the trial judge proceeded on an erroneous principle.  Surely the likelihood that the vehicle might contain relevant evidence is, in the absence of exigent circumstances or a search incidental to an arrest, only a basis for obtaining another warrant, one that clearly authorizes a search of the vehicle.