R. c. Zarow, 2024 QCCA 441
3- Parallel proceedings and the disclosure of an accused’s defence
[55] The parties debated the motion relying almost entirely on this Court’s decision in R. c. Couche-Tard[26] and the judge, understandably, ruled on that basis.
[56] Couche-Tard concerned a situation where the prosecution repudiated a plea agreement in a gas-pump price-fixing scheme – after having been privy to the defence and the expert evidence of one company in the context of the plea discussions – and then decided to lay a charge against a related corporate entity.[27]
[57] However, contrary to the position put forward by Mr. Zarow, I am of the view that Couche-Tard does not purport to establish an airtight and general principle of law that a presumption of prejudice always flows from the prosecution learning the accused’s version of events through parallel proceedings and would always result in a stay of proceedings. I have not found any decision supporting such a broad principle.
[58] Indeed, while not completely irrelevant, Couche-Tard does not address the issue raised in this case: whether, in the context of parallel proceedings, a fair criminal trial may be held for Mr. Zarow after disclosure of the disciplinary council’s decision to the police investigator, the prosecutor and the complainant.
[59] The relevant set of principles are those enunciated in a long line of cases addressing the context of proceedings (including civil trials, disciplinary hearings, commissions of inquiry) on the same facts (or closely related facts) held in parallel to ongoing criminal charges.
[60] Accordingly, to decide whether the stay of proceedings was premature in this case, as the prosecution argues, a proper understanding of these principles is essential.
[61] These principles include: (1) determining whether a stay of proceedings parallel to a criminal prosecution may be granted to prevent the disclosure of the accused’s defence in those other proceedings; (2) considering the constitutional safeguards protecting the principle against self-incrimination; and (3) determining whether publication bans and confidentiality orders should be issued in disciplinary proceedings to prevent the disclosure of an accused’s defence or version of events that are the subject of a criminal charge.
(a) Stay of parallel proceedings to prevent the disclosure of the accused’s defence
[62] Any discussion of parallel proceedings must start with the seminal case of Stickney v. Trusz.[28] In that case, Zuber J. (as he then was) refused to stay a civil action because of related criminal charges and formulated the following test:
However, whatever may be said about the origin of the language, the weight of authority, at least in Ontario, is that the discretion to stay an action should be exercised in extraordinary or exceptional cases. In any event, it would appear that the difference in terminology is more apparent than real. Since there is now no general rule that civil cases must be stayed because of criminal charges arising out of the same facts, and since the matter is now within the discretion of the Court, it is obvious that it is incumbent upon the applicant to show some reason why the discretion should be exercised. In that sense he must demonstrate that his case is an exception or a case other than ordinary.[29]
[Emphasis added]
[63] Stickney was followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Nash v. Ontario[30] and Schreiber v. Canada,[31] as well as by this Court in Obadia c. Sam Levy & Associés Inc.[32]
[64] In Nash,[33] the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that the potential disclosure of an accused’s defence or self-incriminating evidence in civil proceedings is not, in and of itself, sufficient to warrant the stay of those proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal charges:
[14] As to issue (4), no general rule in this jurisdiction requires a stay of civil cases merely because criminal charges relating to the same matter are pending. In fact, a court will normally deny a stay unless the applicant demonstrates that his or her case is an extraordinary or an exceptional one: see Stickney v. Trusz (1973), 1973 CanLII 423 (ON SC), 2 O.R. (2d) 469 at p. 471, 45 D.L.R. (3d) 275 (H.C.J.), affirmed (1974), 1974 CanLII 1379 (ON SCDC), 3 O.R. (2d) 538 at p. 538, 46 D.L.R. (3d) 80 (Div. Ct.), affirmed (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 538 at 539, 46 D.L.R. (3d) 80 at 82 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1974] S.C.R. xii, 28 C.R.N.S. 127n.
[…]
[16] The cases are clear that the threshold test to be met before a stay is granted is high. The mere fact that criminal proceedings are pending at the same time as civil proceedings is not sufficient ground for a stay of the latter: Stickney v. Trusz, supra. Even the potential disclosure through the civil proceedings of the nature of the accused’s defence or of self-incriminating evidence is not necessarily exceptional: see Belanger v. Caughell, supra; Stickney v. Trusz, supra; Seaway Trust Co. v. Kilderkin Investments Ltd., supra. This high threshold test should not be relaxed merely [because] it is the Crown that requests the stay. An applicant, whether it is the Crown or the accused, must meet the same burden of proving extraordinary or exceptional circumstances. The test is not on a balance of convenience for the Crown and something higher for the accused. To the extent that the motions court judge held that it is, he erred.
[Emphasis added]
[11] […] [L]a Cour est d’avis que des allégations d’ordre général ne suffisent pas et qu’il incombe à celui qui demande la suspension, même si les instances sont reliées par des contextes factuels identiques, de préciser des motifs démontrant le préjudice dans la conduite de la défense au criminel.
[…]
[16] En bref, la règle n’est toujours pas la suspension et celui qui la requiert doit démontrer que les circonstances risquent de mettre en péril son droit à un procès équitable au criminel. La simple possibilité de dévoilement de la défense n’est pas en soi suffisante et ne confère pas aux circonstances le caractère exceptionnel nécessaire. Enfin il convient dans ces cas, de citer l'article 11 du Code criminel:
Aucun recours civil pour un acte ou une omission n’est suspendu ou atteint
du fait que l’acte ou omission constitue une infraction criminelle.
et de considérer comme en l’espèce, que le but des procédures en faillite n’est pas d’obtenir de la preuve pour l’instance criminelle mais bien pour la fin légitime de poursuivre la réalisation des actifs du failli.[35]
[Emphasis added]
[66] Similarly, in Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy),[36] Cory J., on behalf of two other judges, adopted those principles where the concurrent proceedings were the hearings of a commission of inquiry and a forthcoming criminal trial:
[165] Neither the fact that an individual is subject to other judicial or state-initiated proceedings in addition to a criminal trial (Re Orysiuk and The Queen (1977), 1977 ALTASCAD 205 (CanLII), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 445 (Alta. C.A.)) nor that these proceedings may be held contemporaneously with the criminal trial (Stickney v. Trusz (1973), 1973 CanLII 423 (ON SC), 2 O.R. (2d) 469 (H.C.)) precludes the fairness of that trial. As with pre-trial publicity or any other action or circumstance which is alleged to jeopardize an accused’s fair trial rights, what must be proven is not simply the act itself or the existence of the circumstances, but rather the prejudice which flows from them. That prejudice has not been demonstrated in this case. As a general rule, it is desirable that the public inquiry proceed as quickly as possible. However, in the present case, as the Attorney General has elected to proceed with and is now well into the criminal trial, I trust that such care and courtesy will be displayed by the Commission and the judge presiding at the trial that the managers and their counsel will not be unduly prejudiced by the commencement of simultaneous proceedings.
[…]
[167] Should the criminal trials of the two accused have been held simultaneously with the public inquiry they would present no more than a potential risk. That potential risk would not be enough to establish a breach of s. 11(d). To hold to the contrary would jeopardize all civil actions, administrative hearings, and professional disciplinary proceedings which relate in some manner to criminal trials and proceed contemporaneously with them.[37]
[Emphasis added]
[67] In The Director of Child and Family Services v. JG and KB,[38] Mainella J.A. of the Manitoba Court of Appeal summarized this line of cases and underlined the presumption that parallel proceedings on the same facts can be fairly carried out:
[16] It is a fundamental principle that the law assumes that concurrent proceedings on the same facts can be conducted fairly (see Phillips v Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), 1995 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 at para 165). Absent exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, a civil proceeding does not await a related criminal prosecution (see Stickney v Trusz (1973), 1973 CanLII 423 (ON SC), 2 O.R. (2d) 469, at 471 (H Ct J), aff’d (1974), 1974 CanLII 1379 (ON SCDC), 3 OR (2d) 538 (Div Ct), aff’d (1974) 3 OR (2d) 538 at 539 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1974] SCR xii; and Ma Wai Kay v McGay Limited; McGay Limited v Wong (1979), 1979 CanLII 3153 (MB KB), 6 Man. R. (2d) 292 at paras 12-14 (QB).
[…]
[18] When an individual faces a civil proceeding in addition to a related criminal charge, the concern that arises is whether continuation of the civil proceeding may infringe the individual’s right to a fair trial in the criminal matter if it is not adjourned or temporarily stayed (see Nash v Ontario (1995), 1995 CanLII 2934 (ON CA), 27 OR (3d) 1 at 7 (CA)). In such cases, the relevant inquiry for a court, in exercising its discretion as to whether there are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to stay or adjourn a civil proceeding, relates to whether there is specific prejudice to the fair-trial rights of the applicant on the criminal charge that cannot adequately be addressed by the rules governing the civil proceeding or a remedy available to an accused in the criminal process. The threshold to justify the granting of a stay or adjournment of a civil proceeding in favour of a criminal proceeding is a “high one” (Schreiber v Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 2001 CanLII 20859 (ON CA), 153 OAC 137 at para 4).
[68] In The Director of Criminal Property and Forfeiture v. Gurniak et al., Steel J.A. of the Manitoba Court of Appeal also observed that the required analysis is rooted in a presumption that the parallel proceedings can and are expected to be conducted fairly:
[39] When an individual faces a civil proceeding concurrent to a related criminal charge, the concern that arises is whether continuation of the civil proceeding may infringe the individual’s right to a fair trial in the criminal matter. In such cases, the ordinary three-part test referred to above is not used.
[40] Instead, the relevant test for a court, in exercising its discretion, is whether there are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which show that the right of the applicant on the criminal charge cannot adequately be addressed by the rules governing the civil proceeding or a remedy available to an accused in the criminal process (see Lieu). There is no presumption in favour of a stay solely from the fact that concurrent criminal charges are pending. Indeed, the presumption is exactly the opposite. The law assumes that concurrent proceedings can be conducted fairly unless shown otherwise.[39]
[Emphasis added]
[69] Finally, in her conclusion, Steel J.A. underlined that it is expected that criminal courts will provide the necessary protection to the accused if needed:
[83] Civil and criminal actions are distinct proceedings. There are different parties, with different purposes and different standards of proof. The Court should not order a stay of proceedings as soon as there is the slightest risk that evidence will be revealed. The case law in this area is clearly to the effect that a criminal court has the means to protect the rights of an accused and, in this case, the defendants.
[70] From this review, I cannot see how one could conclude that the disclosure of the disciplinary council’s decision established a breach of trial fairness so irreparable that a stay of the criminal proceedings was necessary without first demonstrating that a real and concrete prejudice resulted from the transmission of the decision.
[71] The abuse of process test requires “prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial […] that ‘will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome’”.[40] The “concern is whether there is ongoing unfairness to the accused”.[41] Further below, I will address the fact that the disclosure of the disciplinary council’s decision by the syndic (not a state actor involved in the criminal prosecution against Mr. Zarow) was made in violation of the confidentiality orders and whether this should have been considered in ruling on the motion for a stay of proceedings.
[72] The parties were wrong to argue the motion on the basis of a presumption of prejudice similar to the ones applicable in the context of solicitor-client or litigation privilege, or the one discussed in Couche-Tard. In many situations, the presumption of prejudice exists in part because the court is faced with the dilemma whereby “to explore the matter in depth may require the very confidential information for which protection is sought to be revealed”.[42]
[73] In this case, there is no difficulty in assessing whether the prejudice is already irreparable. The prejudice can be assessed by the mere reading of the decision, as we have done. The disclosed information is known, finite and accessible. The decision merely summarized Mr. Zarow’s testimony and defence.
[74] In any case, in most situations involving a question of privilege, where presumed prejudice is not rebutted, it results in the disqualification of a lawyer or the firm. But where a stay of criminal charges is sought, the assessment of prejudice is qualitatively different under the Babos test because of the need to weigh society’s interest in a trial on the merits. Hence, as Armstrong J.A. aptly observed in R. v. Bruce Power Inc., “[c]ommon sense suggests that every breach of solicitor-client privilege does not attract the ultimate remedy. Some breaches of privilege are trivial and would not call for a stay of proceedings”.[43]
[75] I hasten to add that I am not suggesting that the transmission of the council’s decision was trivial. Nonetheless, whether a prejudice was established by Mr. Zarow needed to be considered. Moreover, such a determination, in my view, should not have been made prematurely.
[76] While a presumption of prejudice was applied in Couche-Tard, its nature was carefully delineated by Savard J.A. (as she then was):
[35] Le fait qu’en l’espèce l’obtention des moyens de défense de l’intimée ne soit pas le résultat d’une violation d’un droit protégé, comme c’est le cas en matière de violation du secret professionnel, ne justifie pas, selon moi, une conclusion différente quant à l’existence d’une présomption de préjudice. Certes, un accusé ne bénéficie pas d’un « droit » à une entente sur le plaidoyer, ni d’une protection constitutionnelle à l’encontre de sa répudiation. Toutefois, contrairement à ce que plaide le ministère public, ce n’est pas la divulgation en soi des moyens de défense de l’intimée qui lui cause préjudice, mais plutôt la décision du ministère public de déposer des accusations après les avoir obtenus conformément à l’entente sur le plaidoyer avec Alimentation ultérieurement répudiée. Dans un tel contexte, il est légitime de présumer que l’équilibre entre le ministère public et l’accusé à la base de notre système de justice criminelle est modifié, en faveur du premier et, conséquemment, au détriment du second.
[Emphasis added]
[77] Whatever prejudice may have derived from the transmission of the decision to the police investigator, the prosecutor and the complainant, it must be identified and must go beyond the mere disclosure of the decision. Cory J. underlined this in Westray: “As with pre-trial publicity or any other action or circumstance which is alleged to jeopardize an accused’s fair trial rights, what must be proven is not simply the act itself or the existence of the circumstances, but rather the prejudice which flows from them” [Emphasis added].[44]
[78] Before ordering a stay of the criminal charge against Mr. Zarow, it was necessary to determine whether there was indeed a prejudice to his right to a fair trial because of an unfair advantage or change to the police investigation,[45] or an unfair change of strategy by the prosecution at trial,[46] or because the complainant was tainted by the transmission of the decision.
[79] Moreover, with respect to prospective prejudice to a Charter right, the burden is quite demanding as “relief will only be granted in circumstances where the claimant is able to prove that there is a sufficiently serious risk that the alleged violation will in fact occur”.[47]
[80] When assessing the prospective breach of Mr. Zarow’s right to a fair trial, caution must be taken to avoid speculative reasoning. As Cory J., writing in Westray,[48] pointed out, this is of prime importance, and any potential breach of the s. 11(d) fair trial right is best determined at the time of trial:
[110] Frankly, I cannot see much difference between the test of “high degree of probability” and that of “a real and substantial risk”. The essence of both tests is that before a court will restrain government action, it must be satisfied that there is a very real likelihood that in the absence of that relief an individual’s Charter rights will be prejudiced. This determination cannot be made in the abstract. Rather, the proper approach should be a contextual one, which takes into account all the surrounding circumstances, including, for example, the nature of the right said to be threatened and the extent to which the anticipated harm is susceptible of proof. This was the method advocated by Wilson J. in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. The nature and importance of the government action sought to be restrained is also a significant factor but it should be considered under s. 1 of the Charter.
[111] Thus the applicable standard may fluctuate between the requirement of “a real and substantial risk”, “a high probability” or even a “virtual certainty” of a Charter breach depending upon all the circumstances presented by the particular case and the particular applicant.
[112] In assessing a threatened breach of s. 11(d) of the Charter, it must be remembered that the right to a fair trial is of fundamental importance to the criminal process. This Court has already decided that the question of a breach or potential breach of the s. 11(d) fair trial right is best determined at the time of trial: Vermette, supra, at p. 992. While this is not an absolute rule, it is a factor which complicates the task of an individual seeking to establish a prospective breach of the section as it requires a court to speculate as to whether or not the right to a fair trial will be violated when, in the future the criminal charges against the accused are brought to trial. Because it is an exercise in speculation, it will be difficult for the applicant to demonstrate the high degree of probability that a Charter breach will occur which is required to warrant relief being granted. As well it must be remembered that an applicant will always have the opportunity to apply for relief to the trial court once the prejudice, flowing, for example, from the publicity, is more easily ascertainable and demonstrable.
[Emphasis added]
[81] These observations are pertinent regardless of whether or not criminal charges have already been filed, and whether or not the anticipated violation of the right to a fair trial stems from pre-trial publicity or from the disclosure of an accused’s defence in parallel proceedings.
[82] Without an identified prejudice, it is difficult to conclude that the transmission of the decision establishes a prospective prejudice to Mr. Zarow’s right to a fair trial – under the main category of the abuse of process doctrine – that “will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome”.[49]
[83] The disclosure of an accused’s version of events in proceedings other than the criminal case is, in some circumstances, an inevitable consequence of our system’s acceptance of parallel proceedings.
[84] There are indeed other situations where the prosecution becomes privy to the accused’s version of the events prior to trial. One such scenario is where persons separately charged with an offence, and persons suspected of an offence, are compelled as witnesses at the preliminary inquiries and criminal trials of other persons charged with the same offence. Those situations are constitutionally acceptable “unless it is established that the predominant purpose in compelling the testimony is incrimination of the witness” or “is a form of proposed pre-trial interrogation”.[50]
[85] I use this example only to show that there is no broad and inflexible rule which posits that, whenever the state indirectly learns of the accused’s defence prior to trial, a stay of proceedings must necessarily be imposed. For a court to order such a remedy, it is essential that a concrete prejudice to the right to a fair trial be established.
[86] This review of the law leads me to conclude that it is hardly surprising that “the courts generally take the position that the disciplinary proceedings can take place prior to the criminal proceedings, and that there are sufficient safeguards in the criminal justice system to protect the accused”.[51]
[87] I now turn my focus to the safeguards alluded to above, which were developed to protect the principle against self-incrimination in the criminal justice system and which are also available to Mr. Zarow.
(b) Protection of the principle against self-incrimination
[88] The principle against self-incrimination is “an overarching principle within our criminal justice system”[52] but it does not provide “absolute protection for an accused against all uses of information that has been compelled by statute or otherwise. The residual protections provided by the principle against self-incrimination as contained in s.7 [of the Charter] are specific, and contextually-sensitive”.[53] The principle “demands different things at different times, with the task in every case being to determine exactly what the principle demands, if anything, within the particular context at issue”.[54]
[89] Where non-criminal proceedings (such as civil trials, disciplinary hearings, commissions of inquiries) are taking place concurrently with criminal charges, the protection of the right against self‑incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter is triggered where testimonial compulsion exists.
[90] As mentioned earlier, the principle against self-incrimination is protected through three procedural safeguards, namely: (1) use immunity; (2) derivative use immunity; and (3) constitutional exemption:[55]
• Use immunity serves to protect the individual from having the compelled incriminating testimony used directly against him or her in a subsequent proceeding;
• The derivative use protection insulates the individual from having the compelled incriminating testimony used to obtain other evidence, unless that evidence is discoverable through alternative means; and
• The constitutional exemption provides a form of complete immunity from testifying where proceedings are undertaken or predominately used to obtain evidence for the prosecution of the witness.[56]
[91] A professional can be compelled to answer the syndic’s questions at the investigative stage (s. 122 of the Professional Code) or compelled to testify at the hearing stage (s. 147 of the Professional Code). The use immunity and derivative use immunity protections are applicable to a statement made to the syndic during the investigation stage or to the testimony under compulsion at the hearing.
[92] Furthermore, the protection against self-incrimination enshrined in s. 13 of the Charter is available to the professional who is also charged with a criminal offence, like Mr. Zarow, whether or not he was compelled to testify.[57] Of course, the prior testimony may be used for impeachment purposes.[58]
(c) Restrictions to the open court principle to protect the right to a fair trial
[93] Finally, in the context of non-criminal proceedings (including disciplinary proceedings) parallel to a criminal prosecution, I must say a few words concerning restrictions to the open court principle such as publication bans, in camera hearings and other similar restrictions. In order to overcome the strong presumption of openness, the stringent requirements of the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman framework or principles[59] must be met. Exceptions to the open court principle must not be granted on a routine basis.[60]
[94] It seems to me that, in the case at bar, one cannot assess whether a prejudice was established or was prematurely adjudicated by the judge unless one has a proper understanding of the application of the open court principle to proceedings parallel to a criminal prosecution.
[95] In cases dealing with the effects of pre-trial publicity, the “objective [of a fair trial] is readily attainable in the vast majority of criminal trials even in the face of a great deal of publicity”[61] and even without publication bans or confidentiality orders. As Cory J. noted in Westray, “[t]he solemnity of the juror’s oath, the existence of procedures such as change of venue and challenge for cause, and the careful attention which jurors pay to the instructions of a judge all help to ensure that jurors will carry out their duties impartially”.[62] Where the trial is to be held before a judge alone, an individual cannot “claim that his fair trial rights have been breached by excessive pre‑trial publicity”.[63]
[96] It is true that the preoccupation with pre-trial publicity is of a different nature from the issue in this case – i.e., the impact of the disclosure of an accused’s defence – but both concern the fairness of the accused’s trial.
[97] Consequently, the earlier analysis concerning the exceptional circumstances required to obtain a stay of parallel proceedings – because of the potential disclosure of the accused’s defence or self-incriminating evidence – is relevant and informs the discussion about whether publication bans and confidentiality orders pursuing the same objective (i.e., trial fairness) should be issued.
[98] Of course, confidentiality orders will permit the parallel proceedings to carry on, but at a resulting cost to the openness of disciplinary proceedings. Yet, as “the open court principle is engaged by all judicial proceedings, whatever their nature”,[64] and in view of “the crucial role that professional orders play in protecting the public interest”[65] and the heightened need for transparency of disciplinary proceedings,[66] it is likely that the strong presumption of openness[67] will prevail in most disciplinary proceedings, unless the stringent requirements of the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman principles are met.
[99] I am not suggesting that confidentiality orders of some sort should never be made in disciplinary proceedings to prevent the disclosure of an accused’s defence, nor am I suggesting that they should always be made. Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman framework is clearly a fact-specific and contextual endeavour. I am also fully aware of the existence of divergent views on this issue in the courts below and in disciplinary councils, which views need not be canvassed in this case.[68] Suffice it to say that I know of no case suggesting that such orders should always be made.
[100] Given the importance of the open court principle, it is crucial to understand that, in many cases, disciplinary proceedings parallel to a criminal prosecution will, in all likelihood, take place without confidentiality orders of the type issued in the present matter.
[101] If we were to conclude that the mere disclosure of Mr. Zarow’s defence through the improper transmission of the council’s decision is sufficient to result in a stay of the criminal proceedings – even without the demonstration of a real prejudice to the right to a fair trial – it would become necessary to issue some form of confidentiality order in every case of disciplinary proceedings parallel to a criminal prosecution in order to prevent the disclosure of an accused’s defence and a consequential stay of proceedings. In my view, the issuance of automatic confidentiality orders would be contrary to the open court principle.
[102] As mentioned earlier, the disclosure of an accused’s defence will be an inevitable by-product of proceedings parallel to a criminal prosecution where no confidentiality orders have been issued. Nevertheless, it is essential to emphasize that even under such circumstances, an accused retains access to robust constitutional safeguards and remedies[69] to prevent an unfair trial or to protect the integrity of the judicial process, including recourse to the abuse of process doctrine.[70]
[103] As L’Heureux-Dubé J. astutely observed in R. v. O’Connor:
[…] the Charter has now put into judges’ hands a scalpel instead of an axe — a tool that may fashion, more carefully than ever, solutions taking into account the sometimes complementary and sometimes opposing concerns of fairness to the individual, societal interests, and the integrity of the judicial system.[71]
[104] Lest there be any doubt, I am not trying to diminish the seriousness of the violation of the confidentiality orders, which, in the absence of any explanation, may amount to contempt of court (s. 142 of the Professional Code). But the motion for a stay of proceedings was based on the impact of the transmission of the decision on Mr. Zarow’s right to a fair trial – i.e., the main category of the abuse of process test – such that it is not necessary to qualify the seriousness of the violation of the confidentiality orders.[72]
Aucun commentaire:
Publier un commentaire