Ce que doit faire l'agent de la paix dans les meilleurs délais selon l'article 320.28 Ccr

R v Kluz, 2025 SKKB 9

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[13]                                 As noted, s. 320.28(1) requires that peace officers perform two tasks “as soon as practicable”:

a.      Make a demand on the accused for a breath sample; and

b.      Obtain the breath samples.

[14]                                 There are no issues taken on this appeal with the officer making the breath demand as soon as practicable. The issue is whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

[15]                                 In interpreting the phrase “as soon as practicable”, courts have made the following determinations:

a.      The phrase is not synonymous with as soon as possible: R v Vanderbruggen (2006), 2006 CanLII 9039 (ON CA), 206 CCC (3d) 489 (Ont CA) at para 12;

b.      The phrase is also not synonymous with the term “forthwith”: R v Racine, 2014 SKCA 73 at para 16, 438 Sask R 310;

c.      The “as soon as practicable” standard requires that breath samples be taken within a reasonably prompt time in the circumstances: R v Prestupa, 2016 SKCA 118 at para 16, 485 Sask R 152 [Prestupa];

d.      The test is grounded in common sense: Prestupa at para 19;

e.      The touchstone for determining whether breath samples were taken as soon as practicable is whether the police acted reasonably: R v Burwell, 2015 SKCA 37 at para 18, 472 Sask R 1 [Burwell];

f.      The Crown does not need to provide a detailed explanation of what occurred during every minute that the accused was detained: Burwell at para 18, R v Peepeetch, 2018 SKQB 65 at para 43, 23 MVR (7th) 257; and

g.      A delay caused by waiting for a tow truck does not necessarily create a situation where the sample is not taken as soon as practicable: R v Wetzel, 2013 SKCA 143 at para 22, 427 Sask R 261.

État du droit quant aux prélèvements sanguins en lien avec l'infraction de capacité de conduite affaiblie par l'alcool

R. c. Bergeron, 2024 QCCS 1034 

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[23]        L’agent de la paix qui a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une personne a conduit un moyen de transport, alors que sa capacité de conduire était affaiblie à un quelconque degré par l’effet de l’alcool, peut lui ordonner de fournir un échantillon de sang à condition de le faire dans les meilleurs délais[3].

[24]        Les prélèvements sanguins ne peuvent être effectués que par un médecin ou un technicien qualifié et s’ils ne risquent pas de mettre en danger la santé de cette personne[4].

[25]        L’analyse des délais, avant d’obtenir l’avis d’un médecin et la prise d’un échantillon sanguin en milieu hospitalier, requiert une analyse minutieuse et adaptée au contexte[5]. L’action policière est fort limitée dans un milieu hospitalier; les obligations des policiers prévues au Code criminel[6] se confrontent aux propres obligations et priorités du personnel médical[7].

[26]        Sauf en de rares circonstances, il serait inopportun d’exiger que la poursuite assigne, lors d’un procès, un gestionnaire de l’hôpital ou le personnel médical afin d’expliquer le délai écoulé dans l’attente du prélèvement de l’échantillon sanguin[8].

[27]        La poursuite n’a pas à démontrer, minute par minute, l’intervention policière; il suffit de démontrer le caractère raisonnable du délai à l’intérieur duquel les échantillons sont prélevés. Un échantillon de sang prélevé dans un délai raisonnablement rapide, compte tenu des circonstances, répond aux exigences du Code criminel. Il n’y a aucune obligation que les prélèvements soient effectués le plus rapidement possible. Il faut plutôt se demander si les policiers ont agi raisonnablement compte tenu de l’ensemble des circonstances[9].

[28]        Un tribunal d’appel doit examiner avec déférence les conclusions du juge du procès. Il ne peut intervenir qu’en cas d’erreur manifeste et dominante, de verdict déraisonnable ou d’erreur judiciaire. Le rôle du Tribunal n’est pas de déterminer si d’autres conclusions sont raisonnables, mais plutôt si l’inférence tirée par le juge d’instance est raisonnable à l’égard de la preuve[10].

L’exigence de la mens rea de l'infraction prévue à l’art. 215

R. c. Goforth, 2022 CSC 25

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[27]                        L’article 215 crée une infraction de négligence pénale. Il « a en effet pour but l’établissement d’un niveau minimal uniforme de soins à fournir pour les personnes auxquelles il s’applique. Or, cela ne peut se réaliser que si ceux auxquels incombe l’obligation sont tenus de respecter dans leur conduite une norme de la société plutôt qu’une norme personnelle » (R. c. Naglik, 1993 CanLII 64 (CSC), [1993] 3 R.C.S. 122, p. 141-142 (soulignement omis)). La responsabilité repose sur ce dont une personne raisonnable dans une situation semblable à celle de l’accusé aurait eu connaissance ou prévu, de sorte que la « faute consiste dans l’absence de l’état mental de diligence requis » (R. c. Beatty, 2008 CSC 5, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 49, par. 8). La disposition sanctionne le comportement qui constitue un écart marqué par rapport à une norme objective de diligence raisonnable. Plus précisément, la mens rea requise dans le cas de l’art. 215 est établie lorsque la Couronne prouve que la conduite de l’accusé constitue « un écart marqué par rapport à la conduite d’un parent raisonnablement prudent dans des circonstances où il était objectivement prévisible que l’omission de fournir les choses nécessaires à l’existence risquerait de mettre en danger la vie de l’enfant ou d’exposer sa santé à un péril permanent » (Naglik, p. 143; voir aussi R. c. J.F., 2008 CSC 60, [2008] 3 R.C.S. 215, par. 8).

[28]                        Dans l’arrêt R. c. Roy, 2012 CSC 26, [2012] 2 R.C.S. 60, par. 36, le juge Cromwell a fourni un cadre d’analyse utile afin de déterminer si la mens rea objective a été établie :

      Il est utile d’aborder le sujet en posant deux questions. La première est de savoir si, compte tenu de tous les éléments de preuve pertinents, une personne raisonnable aurait prévu le risque et pris les mesures pour l’éviter si possible. Le cas échéant, la deuxième question est de savoir si l’omission de l’accusé de prévoir le risque et de prendre les mesures pour l’éviter si possible constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence que respecterait une personne raisonnable dans la même situation que l’accusé. [En italique dans l’original.]

[29]                        En l’espèce, la Couronne devait prouver, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que M. Goforth avait la mens rea requise pour l’infraction sous‑jacente prévue à l’art. 215 ainsi que la mens rea requise pour les infractions d’homicide involontaire coupable et d’infliction illégale de lésions corporelles.

[30]                        Pour satisfaire à l’exigence de la mens rea dans le cas de l’art. 215, la Couronne devait prouver : a) qu’il était objectivement prévisible, pour une personne raisonnable dans la même situation que l’accusé, que l’omission de fournir de la nourriture, des liquides ou des soins médicaux risquerait de mettre en danger la vie de l’enfant ou d’exposer sa santé à un péril permanent; et b) que le comportement de l’accusé s’écartait de façon marquée de celui auquel on se serait attendu d’un parent, d’un parent d’accueil, d’un gardien ou d’un chef de famille raisonnablement prudent dans les circonstances.

La police doit agir avec diligence pour assurer l'exercice du droit à l'avocat si elle est forcée de décaler l'exercice de ce droit pour une raison sérieuse

R. v. Keshavarz, 2022 ONCA 312

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[71]      In Rover, this court recognized that in specific circumstances the implementational component of the right to counsel may be suspended. Those specific circumstances often involve concerns over police or public safety or the preservation of evidence: see Rover, at para. 26. See also Suberu, at para. 42; Griffith, at para. 38. Indeed, the suspension of the implementational component of the right to counsel has been recognized in the context of needing to execute search warrants, just like this case: see Strachan, at pp. 998-99; Rover, at para. 26; R. v. Learning, 2010 ONSC 3816, 258 C.C.C. (3d) 68, at paras. 71-75; and Griffith, at para. 38.  

[72]      The difficulty with suspending the facilitation of contact with counsel is that the seriousness of doing so cannot be gainsaid. As noted by Doherty J.A. in Rover, at para. 45, the right to counsel is a “lifeline” for all those who are detained. The right to counsel assists detainees with regaining their liberty and acts as a “guard against the risk of involuntary self-incrimination”: Suberu, at para. 40. As well, there is a recognized “psychological value” to providing access to counsel, a value that “should not be underestimated”: Rover, at para. 45.

[73]      At the same time, the critical importance of protecting the safety of the public and law enforcement, as well as preserving evidence – particularly evidence such as deadly weapons that are illegal to possess – cannot be refuted.

[74]      To resolve the inherent tension that arises when these laudable goals collide, the law permits a delay in the facilitation of the right to counsel, but only where the police have turned their minds to the specific circumstances of the case and concluded “on some reasonable basis, that police or public safety, or the need to preserve evidence, justifies some delay in granting access to counsel”: Rover, at para. 27. Doherty J.A. explained the test as follows in Rover, at para. 33:

[T]o fall within the exception to the requirement that an arrested person be allowed to speak to counsel without delay, the police must actually turn their mind to the specific circumstances of the case, and they must have reasonable grounds to justify the delay. The justification may be premised on the risk of the destruction of evidence, public safety, police safety, or some other urgent or dangerous circumstance.

[75]      Where those circumstances prevail, the police must move as efficiently and reasonably as possible to minimize any ensuing delay: see Rover, at para. 27; Griffith, at para. 38. They must also suspend any questioning of the detainee until such time as the implementational component of the right to counsel has been accommodated.

Les policiers peuvent exceptionnellement retarder la mise en application du droit prévu à l’alinéa 10b) de la Charte après avoir considéré les circonstances particulières entourant leur intervention et avoir raisonnablement conclu qu’il en ressort que leur protection, celle du public ou la nécessité de préserver un élément de preuve le requiert

R. v. Griffith, 2021 ONCA 302

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[38]      Courts have recognized that specific circumstances, including concerns for police safety, public safety, or the preservation of evidence, may justify some delay in providing a detainee access to counsel: Suberu, at para. 42; Rover, at para. 26; and La, at para. 38. Such concerns must be case-specific rather than general concerns applicable to virtually any case: Rover, at para. 27; La, at paras. 39-40. As Doherty J.A. explained in Rover — decided almost a year after the execution of the warrants in this case — the police may delay access to counsel “only after turning their mind to the specifics of the circumstances and concluding, on some reasonable basis, that police or public safety, or the need to preserve evidence, justifies some delay in granting access to counsel”: Rover, at para. 27. Even if such circumstances exist, the police must take reasonable steps to minimize the delay in granting access to counsel: Rover, at para. 27; La, at para. 40.

Il existe des circonstances justifiant un délai dans l'exercice du droit à l'avocat & le droit à l’assistance d’un avocat est comme un « canal de communication » qui empêche le détenu d'être entièrement à la merci des policiers pendant sa détention

R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745

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[24] Section 10(b) of the Charter guarantees to anyone arrested or detained the right "to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right" (emphasis added).

[25] Section 10(b) obliges the police to advise a detained person of the right to speak with counsel without delay and, if the detained person exercises that right, the police must immediately provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel: R. v. Suberu, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460, [2009] S.C.J. No. 33, 2009 SCC 33, at paras. 38, 42; R. v. Bartle, 1994 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, at pp. 191-92 S.C.R.

[26] The s. 10(b) jurisprudence has, however, always recognized that specific circumstances may justify some delay in providing a detainee access to counsel. Those circumstances often relate to police safety, public safety or the preservation of evidence. For example, in R. v. Strachan, 1988 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, [1998] S.C.J. No. 94, the court accepted that the police could delay providing access to counsel in order to properly gain control of the scene of the arrest and search for restricted weapons known to be at the scene. Subsequent cases have accepted that specific circumstances relating to the execution of search warrants can also justify delaying access to counsel until the warrant is executed: see, e.g., R. v. Learning, [2010] O.J. No. 3092, 2010 ONSC 3816, 258 C.C.C. (3d) 68 (S.C.J.), at paras. 71-75.

[27] These cases have, however, emphasized that concerns of a general or non-specific nature applicable to virtually any search cannot justify delaying access to counsel. The police may delay [page143] access only after turning their mind to the specifics of the circumstances and concluding, on some reasonable basis, that police or public safety, or the need to preserve evidence, justifies some delay in granting access to counsel. Even when those circumstances exist, the police must also take reasonable steps to minimize the delay in granting access to counsel: see, e.g., R. v. Patterson, [2006] B.C.J. No. 104, 2006 BCCA 24, 206 C.C.C. (3d) 70, at para. 41; R. v. Soto, [2010] O.J. No. 1644, 2010 ONSC 1734 (S.C.J.), at paras. 67-71; Learning, at para. 75; R. v. Wu, [2017] O.J. No. 653, 2017 ONSC 1003, 35 C.R. (7th) 101 (S.C.J.), at para. 78.

[28] Wu, at para. 78, provides a helpful summary of the law. That summary includes the following:

The assessment of whether a delay or suspension of the right to counsel is justified involves a fact specific contextual determination. The case law on this issue reveals some general guiding principles that provide a framework for this assessment:

 a.   The suspension of the right to counsel is an exceptional step that should only be undertaken in cases where urgent and dangerous circumstances arise or where there are concerns for officer or public safety.

. . . . .

 e.   Police officers considering whether circumstances justify suspending the right to counsel must conduct a case by case assessment aided by their training and experience. A policy or practice routinely or categorically permitting the suspension of the right to counsel in certain types of investigations is inappropriate.

(Emphasis added)

[29] In the present case, the evidence demonstrates that the officers involved in this investigation followed a practice that routinely prevented arrested persons from accessing counsel if the police intended to obtain a warrant to search a place for drugs and believed that the place had a connection to the arrested person. The rationale behind this practice appears to be that there is always a possibility that allowing an arrested person to speak to their lawyer could put the officers executing the warrant at risk or jeopardize the preservation of evidence. Under this practice, the appellant, as the occupier of the place to be searched, was prevented from contacting his lawyer, as were the two women who had been arrested earlier that evening.

[32] The police practice described by the officers replaces the narrow, case-specific exception to the constitutional right to speak to counsel without delay upon arrest with a protocol that routinely delays an arrested person's access to counsel for an [page145] indeterminate time, usually hours, whenever the police, for whatever reason, deem it appropriate to arrest them before applying for a search warrant. There is no evidence that any of the officers turned their mind to the specific circumstances of this case before deciding that the appellant would be arrested and denied access to counsel for several hours while the police sought, obtained and executed a search warrant. On the evidence of the police, there was no need to consider the specifics of this case. For them, the decision to arrest the appellant before seeking the search warrant dictated that the appellant would not be allowed to contact a lawyer until the warrant was executed.

[33] In my view, to fall within the exception to the requirement that an arrested person be allowed to speak to counsel without delay, the police must actually turn their mind to the specific circumstances of the case, and they must have reasonable grounds to justify the delay. The justification may be premised on the risk of the destruction of evidence, public safety, police safety, or some other urgent or dangerous circumstance. Furthermore, if the police determine that some delay in allowing an arrested person to speak to counsel is justified to permit execution of the warrant, then they must consider whether it is necessary to arrest the individual before they execute the warrant. The police cannot create a justification for delaying access to counsel by choosing, for reasons of convenience or efficiency, to arrest an individual before seeking, obtaining and executing a search warrant. Police efficiency and convenience cannot justify delaying an arrested person's right to speak with counsel for several hours.

[45] The right to counsel is a lifeline for detained persons. Through that lifeline, detained persons obtain, not only legal advice and guidance about the procedures to which they will be subjected, but also the sense that they are not entirely at the mercy of the police while detained. The psychological value of access to counsel without delay should not be underestimated.

[34] The effective implementation of the right to counsel guaranteed by s. 10(b) depends entirely on the police. The police must understand that right and be willing to facilitate contact with counsel. The practice under which the officers involved in this case operated demonstrates a disregard of a fundamental constitutional right. The appellant's right to speak with counsel was denied at the time of his arrest, when the police refused his request to speak with counsel.