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mercredi 12 février 2025

La croyance de l'accusé que sa conduite est adéquate ou que personne ne sera lésé ne constitue pas une défense face à une accusation de fraude

R. v. Benson (M.) et al., 2012 MBCA 94

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136                     The Crown must prove both the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence.  The actus reus of fraud has two elements, a dishonest act and deprivation.  In order to succeed, the Crown has to establish dishonest deprivation.  The dishonest act is established by objective proof of deceit, falsehood or “other fraudulent means.”  What constitutes a lie or a deceitful act for the purpose of the actus reus is judged on the objective facts.  All that need be determined is whether the accused, as a matter of fact, represented that a situation was of a certain character when, in reality, it was not.  The meaning of “other fraudulent means” is also determined objectively, by reference to what a reasonable person would consider to be a dishonest act.  See R. v. Théroux1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5.

137                     The element of deprivation is satisfied on proof of detriment, prejudice or risk of prejudice to the economic interests of the victim, caused by the dishonest act.  It is not essential that there be actual economic loss as to the outcome of the fraud, or that the accused have profited from the fraud.  See R. v. Olan et al.1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175 at 1182.

138                     The mens rea of fraud is the intentional commission of the prohibited acts (deceit, falsehood, or other dishonest act) knowing or desiring the consequences proscribed by the offence (deprivation, including the risk of deprivation).  The mens rea of fraud consists in the subjective knowledge of the prohibited act, and subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another (which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim’s pecuniary interests are put at risk).  See R. v. Zlatic1993 CanLII 135 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29.

139                     The proper focus in determining the mens rea of fraud is to ask whether the accused intentionally committed the prohibited acts (deceit, falsehood, or other dishonest act) knowing or desiring the consequences proscribed by the offences (deprivation, including the risk of deprivation).  The personal feeling of the accused about the honesty of the act or its consequences is no more relevant to the analysis than is the accused’s awareness that the particular acts undertaken constitute a criminal offence (see Théroux).

140                     Where the conduct and knowledge are established, the accused is guilty whether he actually intended the prohibited consequence or was reckless as to whether it would occur.  The accused’s belief that the conduct is not wrong or that no one will be hurt in the end affords no defence.  There is no requirement of subjective awareness of dishonesty.  An accused’s belief that an act is honest will not help him if it is objectively dishonest, as determined by reasonable persons (Théroux).  This should be distinguished from the accused’s belief in facts that, if true, would deprive the act of its dishonest character.  The test for a guilty mind is an objective one.

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