Dorval c. R., 2010 QCCA 2287 (CanLII)
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[33] Dans leur ouvrage Criminal Law, les auteurs Mewett, Manning et Sankoff résument bien l’impact de l’arrêt Beatty. Ils s’expriment en ces termes :
It follows that whatever the implications for criminal law theory may be, Beatty does not amount to a dramatic shift in the conceptual approach to dangerous driving. The key to the offence remains firmly fixed upon whether the driving of the accused, in all the circumstances, was a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver. All things considered, the most significant aspect of Beatty for the application of section 249 may have been the least remarked upon : a simple recognition that the criminal law must be applied with restraint, and the unanimous agreement of the Court that where a socially useful activity such as driving was concerned, ‘[t]he heavy sanction and stigma that follow a criminal offence should not be visited upon a person for a momentary lapse of attention ». Prior to Beatty, many courts focused their attention exclusively upon the conduct at the core of the offence, concluding that certain types of driving – for example, crossing into oncoming traffic while driving in perfect conditions – were always dangerous enough to contravene section 249, unless some unexplained and sudden phenomena demanded a different approach. In Beatty, the Supreme Court sensibly recognized that this narrow view was undesirable, and risked imposing the criminal sanction on a civil negligence standard. Dangerousness needs to be assessed in a wider sense, and the key to the marked departure test – whether part of the actus reus or mens rea – is that the conduct in question was more than simply negligence; rather, it amounted to driving so poorly that the stigma of a criminal sanction was warranted.
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