CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASEBOOK 2012

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http://www.ducharmefox.com/Areas/Custom/ContentFiles/Documents/2012-Revised-Criminal-Procedure-Casebook.pdf

Criminal Procedure - The Law Society of British Columbia

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http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/becoming/material/CriminalProcedure.pdf

LA DÉONTOLOGIE JUDICIAIRE APPLIQUÉE — TROISIÈME ÉDITION

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http://www.conseildelamagistrature.qc.ca/fr/medias/fichiers/publication/A6124_Deontologie_WEB_EP1_28.pdf

Principes de déontologie judiciaire

Le présent document a pour objet de fournir des conseils d’ordre déontologique aux juges nommés par le gouvernement fédéral.

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Aucune nécesssité de prouver la négligence quant à une accusation de 86 (2) Ccr

R. v. Libon, 2013 BCCA 156 (CanLII)

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[32]        An additional underpinning of the appellant’s argument is that the clear intent of s. 86(2) is to prevent firearms and ammunition from being stored together in an unsafe manner. In the appellant’s submission, there was no danger because the only reasonable inference is that the operable firearm and ammunition were incompatible. In making that submission the appellant seeks to import an element of intention into the Regulations. That submission was laid to rest in this Court’s decision in R. v. Smillie 1998 CanLII 7050 (BC CA), (1998), 129 C.C.C. (3d) 414, [1998] 111 B.C.A.C. 277 at para. 35:

[35]      The offence which we are dealing with in the case at bar does not require negligence as part of the actus reus. The Regulations in question specify particular action, to store handguns in accordance with a certain standard. The offence does not consist of a failure to take reasonable precautions in response to a general duty to take care, it is the failure to store in accordance with the standards dictated by the Regulations which constitutes the offence. The manner of storage is prescribed by statute, not judged by reasonable person standards. For this offence it is irrelevant that the accused has failed to turn his mind to the risk inherent in the careless storage of firearms. Failure to advert to a risk does not form part of the mens rea of this offence. The only duty placed upon the accused is to do what the Regulations require. He cannot avoid his duty by proclaiming that he has found an equally safe, or even better way to store his handguns.

La différence entre les articles 86 (1) Ccr & 86 (2) Ccr

R. v. Smillie, 1998 CanLII 7050 (BC CA)

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[35] The offence which we are dealing with in the case at bar does not require negligence as part of the actus reus.  The regulations in question specify particular action, to store handguns in accordance with a certain standard.  The offence does not consist of a failure to take reasonable precautions in response to a general duty to take care, it is the failure to store in accordance with the standards dictated by the regulations which constitutes the offence.  The manner of storage is prescribed by statute, not judged by reasonable person standards.  For this offence it is irrelevant that the accused has failed to turn his mind to the risk inherent in the careless storage of firearms.  Failure to advert to a risk does not form part of the mens rea of this offence.  The only duty placed upon the accused is to do what the regulations require.  He cannot avoid his duty by proclaiming that he has found an equally safe, or even better way to store his handguns.

[36] The difference is important.  In cases where negligence forms a part of the actus reus, the Crown must prove negligence as part of its case (a marked departure from the standard of reasonableness).  In the case at bar the Crown need not prove negligence or carelessness to obtain a conviction, only that the handguns were stored in any way other than in accordance with the regulations.  Although the offence does not require proof of negligence, it does allow a defence of due diligence.  The accused may avoid liability if he raises a reasonable doubt that he took reasonable steps to prevent the event that forms the basis of the charge from happening.  The offence is thus one of strict liability bearing the classic features of a regulatory offence, or "penal" offence as described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wholesale Travel, supra.

Les principes de droit applicables à l'infraction d'usage négligent d'une arme à feu

R. c. Brassard, 2011 QCCQ 8719 (CanLII)

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c)         L'usage négligent d'une arme à feu

[43]            L'article 86 C. cr. vise l'atteinte de l'objectif suivant :

Cette disposition vise à protéger les personnes contre les actes de négligence, susceptibles d'entraîner des lésions corporelles pour autrui.  Parce que les armes à feu et les munitions peuvent occasionner des blessures graves ou une perte de vie, le législateur a reconnu qu'il importe que les personnes en possession de ces articles aient l'obligation de les utiliser, de les porter, de les manipuler, de les expédier ou de les entreposer d'une manière prudente et sûre.

[44]            Dans l'arrêt Gosset, précité, la question posée par la Cour est la suivante : quel est le critère approprié pour déterminer ce en quoi consiste la «négligence» dans le contexte du par. 86(2) du Code criminel lorsqu'elle est l'infraction sous‑jacente de l'infraction d'homicide involontaire coupable résultant d'un acte illégal? 

[45]            L'analyse de la jurisprudence faite par le juge en chef Lamer l'amène à conclure que le critère à utiliser pour déterminer si la négligence a été établie ou non, doit être objectif. Dans l'arrêt Finlay, rendu le même jour, le juge en chef précise ce critère objectif. Il s'exprime ainsi :

Le critère objectif de la négligence est étudié dans l'arrêt R. c. Gosset, [1993] 3 R.C.S. 000, rendu simultanément.  Dans cet arrêt, j'ai conclu que l'interprétation adéquate de l'élément de faute en vertu du par. 86(2) est la conduite qui constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence qu'observerait une personne raisonnablement prudente.  S'il existe un doute raisonnable soit que la conduite en question ne constituait pas un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence, soit que les précautions raisonnables ont été prises pour s'acquitter de l'obligation de diligence dans les circonstances, il faut prononcer un verdict d'acquittement.  Dans Gosset, j'ai conclu que l'évaluation objective de la faute devait également prendre en considération la capacité d'un accusé de satisfaire à la norme de diligence requise dans les circonstances et sa possibilité de contrôler ou de compenser ses lacunes.  Il n'y a toutefois pas d'«inversion de la charge de la preuve» qui imposerait à un accusé d'établir selon la prépondérance des probabilités qu'il a exercé une diligence raisonnable permettant d'écarter une imputation de faute en vertu du par. 86(2).

Comme je l'indique dans l'arrêt Gosset, il faut faire une distinction entre la négligence civile et la négligence «pénale».  Dans le contexte de la négligence pénale, où une conclusion d'insouciance peut entraîner une peine d'emprisonnement, l'évaluation de la responsabilité ne va plus, comme c'est le cas en matière civile, dans le sens de la répartition de la perte; cette évaluation se rattache plutôt à la sanction de la conduite moralement blâmable, afin d'éviter de punir les personnes qui n'auraient pu agir autrement.

 Pour être conforme au principe de justice fondamentale voulant que la personne moralement innocente ne soit pas privée de sa liberté, l'évaluation objective de la faute en vertu du par. 86(2) doit permettre que l'existence d'un doute raisonnable quant à savoir si l'accusé a pris suffisamment de précautions pour éviter de créer des risques ou s'il avait la capacité de satisfaire à la norme de diligence qu'observerait une personne raisonnablement prudente dans les circonstances donne lieu à un acquittement. 

[46]            Dans Gosset, il ajoute :

En conséquence, on ne peut soutenir que le par. 86(2) du Code criminel vise à punir un état d'esprit; en fait, cette disposition crée plutôt une infraction de négligence, qui, comme l'intention et l'insouciance, peut constituer un fondement de faute valide en droit criminel.  Pour déclarer une personne coupable en vertu de cette disposition, il faut établir qu'il y a eu une conduite qui constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence qu'observerait une personne raisonnablement prudente dans les circonstances.  S'il existe un doute raisonnable que la conduite en question ne constitue pas un écart marqué par rapport à cette norme de diligence ou encore que des précautions raisonnables ont été prises pour s'acquitter de l'obligation de diligence dans les circonstances, un verdict d'acquittement doit être prononcé.

[47]            De façon plus concrète, le juge Lamer propose au juge des faits une liste de contrôle aux fins de la détermination de la faute en vertu de l'article 86 C.cr. : 

(1)  La conduite de l'accusé constitue‑t‑elle un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence qu'observerait une personne raisonnable dans les circonstances de l'infraction?

                        Si la réponse est négative, l'accusé doit être acquitté puisqu'il n'a pas eu une conduite négligente par rapport à un critère objectif.  Toutefois, si la réponse est affirmative, il faut alors indiquer au jury qu'il doit examiner la deuxième question:

(2)  Est‑ce que la conduite de l'accusé constituait un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence requise:

a)  soit parce qu'il n'a pas réfléchi à l'obligation de diligence ni, par conséquent, au risque de préjudice que sa conduite comportait;

b)  soit parce que, en raison de faiblesse humaines (sic), il n'avait pas la capacité de réfléchir à l'obligation de diligence?

                        Si c'est l'hypothèse a) qui est retenue, l'accusé doit être déclaré coupable puisque le droit criminel ne peut permettre que le fait de ne pas avoir été conscient d'une chose constitue une excuse à la responsabilité criminelle en cas de négligence.  Si la réponse est b), il y a lieu de procéder à la troisième étape de l'examen et d'indiquer au jury d'examiner la troisième question:

(3)  Dans le contexte de l'infraction en question, une personne raisonnable possédant les capacités de l'accusé aurait‑elle fait en sorte d'être conscient de l'obligation de diligence requise.

[48]            Essentiellement, le juge d'instance doit d'abord établir si la conduite reprochée à l'accusé constitue un écart marqué par rapport à la norme de diligence puis, déterminer si l'accusé était en mesure de reconnaître qu'il n'avait pas satisfait à la norme de diligence requise dans les circonstances.

[49]            Voilà, de façon succincte, les principes de droit applicables à la présente affaire.

Possession d'armes à feu sans permis et certificat d'enregistrement - Éléments constitutifs de cette infraction

Pomerleau c. R., 2014 QCCQ 2041 (CanLII)

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[50]        L'article 91 du Code criminel prévoit que quiconque en a sa possession des armes à feu sans être titulaire à la fois d'un permis et des certificats d'enregistrement, se rend coupable d'une infraction criminelle. Selon les termes de l'article 117.11 C.cr., il appartient à l'accusé de prouver qu'il est titulaire d'un permis et du certificat d'enregistrement

Entreposage de diverses armes à feu en contravention au règlement - Éléments constitutifs de cette infraction

Pomerleau c. R., 2014 QCCQ 2041 (CanLII)

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[48]        Au paragraphe 86(2) du Code criminel le législateur traite de la question de l'entreposage des armes à feu en rendant passible de responsabilité criminelle la contravention au Règlement sur l'entreposage, la manipulation, le transport, l'expédition et le maniement des armes à feu des particuliers.

[49]        Les articles 5 à 7 du même règlement énoncent les règles d'entreposage applicables à chacune des catégories d'armes à feu. Ainsi, le ministère public doit prouver qu'il s'agit d'une arme à feu, que l'accusé ne remplit pas une des conditions visées par les critères du règlement et qu'il a agi d'une manière négligente conformément aux critères de la négligence criminelle.

L'exécution d'un mandat de perquisition dans une maison d'habitation permet la fouille des alentours

R. v. Le (T.D.), 2011 MBCA 83 (CanLII)

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95                 In my opinion, it can safely be said that in Canada, a warrant for premises identified by a civic address includes, at the very least, the curtilage or grounds around the primary or main building on the property.  On the facts here, this includes the flower bed located in the back of the fenced-in area, which the exhibits indicate could fairly be described as typical of many residential backyards found in the City of Winnipeg. 

L’endroit à perquisitionner doit apparaître avec autant de précision sur le mandat

R. v. Nickason and Lothrop, 2004 BCPC 316 (CanLII)

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[11]      It must be remembered that the rationale for requiring specificity of location on the face of a warrant is to avoid warrants becoming an instrument of abuse: Re McAvoy (1971), 12 CRNS 56 (NWT Terr. Ct.). The best way to protect that principle is to ensure that any person who is authorized to execute the warrant should, by looking at the warrant itself, be able to obtain a reasonably precise conception of the place which is to be searched. The warrant in this case plainly does not meet that test. I agree with the Defendants that this warrant is so seriously defective concerning the description of the place to be searched that it is void.

La jurisprudence est divisée à savoir si un garage détaché fait partie de la définition d'une maison d'habitation

R. v. Rodriguez, 2014 ABPC 44 (CanLII)

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[74]           A dwelling-house includes an attached garage, a car port and any private underground parking structure attached to the dwelling-house.

R v Hyde, 2010 ABPC 30 (CanLII), 2010 ABPC 30                                            

R v Kaltsidis, 2005 OJ No 3733 (ONCJ)

R v Chomik, 2011 ABPC 152 (CanLII), 2011 ABPC 152

[75]           Judicial opinion as to whether a detached garage is part of a dwelling-house is divided.    

                    

R v Laplante 1987 CanLII 209 (SK CA), (1987), 59 Sask. R. 251

R v Hutmann (1996), CarswellAlta 866 (ABPC)

R v Hall, 2003 BCSC 1433 (CanLII), 2003 BCSC 1433

 R v M.(N.) 2007 CanLII 31570 (ON SC), (2007), 223 CCC (3d) 417(ONSC)

R v Vo, 2011 ABQB 701 (CanLII), 2011 ABQB 701

R v Moser, 2012 ONCJ 209 (CanLII), 2012 ONCJ 209

La fouille des « dépendances », de « l’enceinte » ou du « périmètre » de la maison d’habitation

R. v. N.M., 2007 CanLII 31570 (ON SC)

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[365]        In Det. Lowry’s ITO there are no grounds of belief specific to the out-buildings and, subject to the curtilage argument, such omission would constitute a substantive and fatal facial defect in the warrant materials with the words, “and related out[-]buildings”, amounting to a boiler-plate-like add on.  I will return later to the issue of whether reasonable grounds did in fact exist to believe the things to be searched for would likely be discovered in a search of the out-buildings.  Of course, the fact that the police had facts which could have formed a basis for issuance of a warrant does not validate the information or the warrant: R. v. Harris and Lighthouse Video Centres Ltd. 1987 CanLII 181 (ON CA), (1987), 35 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at 15 (leave to appeal refused [1987] S.C.R. vii). 

[368]        At common law, “the hoary concept of “curtilage”” (U.S. v. Arboleda, 633 F. 2d 985, 992 (2^nd Cir. 1980)) relates to property considered to be an integral part of the house.  In Lauda, at 374, the court referred to “…the house, including the area immediately surrounding it (referred to as the “curtilage”)”.  In U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987), in a discussion of the curtilage issue, the court cited 4 W. Blackstone Commentaries 225, “no distant barn, warehouse or the like are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man’s castle of defence.”  Hutchinson, in Search and Seizure Law in Canada (Carswell) at page 16-31, states:

As the common law consistently recognized that authority to search must be strictly limited to the precise structure or place set out in the order (which would only include the “curtilage”), a search of a dwelling-house does not import authority to search any outbuildings, garages, sheds, barns, receptacles, lockers, etc., at the same location as the principal residence.  Accordingly, if the police want to search such outbuildings, they should be expressly included in the warrant.                                          (emphasis added)

[375]        Turning to decisions where the courts have considered the curtilage to not include places searched by the police: Dunn (barn 50’ from residence); R. v. LaPlante 1987 CanLII 209 (SK CA), (1987), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 63 (Sask. C.A.) (workshop 40’ from dwelling);Tesfai, at para. 20, 24-5 (retaining wall a few feet distant from home’s patio). 

[376]        In the present case, the factual circumstances do not reasonably support the workshop being within the curtilage of the N.M. dwelling considering:

(1)        The detached out-building was at least 35’ distant on Det. Lowry’s estimate.  He did not search the building.  I find the more accurate estimate to be that of the resident, N.M., that the separation was about 70’.

(2)        The building is itself a significant size at 70’ x 30’ perhaps larger than the dwelling.  The building was used for storage and tools.  There is no evidence of uses approaching the heightened expectations of privacy associated with a personal dwelling- house. 

[377]        Returning to the issue as to whether reasonable grounds did exist to search the out-buildings, I am unpersuaded that such was the case given the nature of the property to be searched for and the information from Manser as to where it was located.  The belief of the police that the property might be located in the out-buildings was at the level of unfounded speculation, not credibly-based probability.  To borrow the words of Rosenberg J.A. in a different context in Hosie, at 394, the inclusion of related out[-]buildings amounted to “reliance upon ritualistic phrases without regard to the facts of the particular case”.

[378]        Even had reasonable grounds existed to search the out-buildings, a further facial validity issue exists as a result of the non-specific language of their descriptions in the warrant.  Search warrants are highly intrusive of privacy interests: Baron, at 530;CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada reflex, (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 426 (S.C.C.) at 434.  As a result, there is an expectation that the “building, receptacle or place” to be searched will be described with some precision.  Fontana, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada (3d) (Butterworths – 1992) at page 66 notes:

Power to conduct an entry and search has by tradition and common law been limited to the place described in the instrument of search: hence the necessity for a very precise description.  Many warrants have been struck down for lack of precision in the description of the place alone, since the search was to be limited to such place and the warrant gave no power to search outbuildings or conveyances at the place described unless specifically set out therein. 

[379]        In this case, the warrant issued for “related out-buildings”.  There is an ambiguity and lack of specificity about the places to be searched.  Is it all out-buildings or is the warrant open to the interpretation that the police are to sort out a “related” out-building from an “unrelated” out-building once on scene – an impermissibly broad discretion departing from obedience to the prior authorization model: R. v. Noble 1984 CanLII 2156 (ON CA), (1984), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 146 (Ont. C.A.) at 155 (general warrants offensive to the common law because they “leave to the discretion of the officer…what premises to search”). 

Le pouvoir de perquisitionner une maison d’habitation n’inclut pas celui de fouiller un véhicule localisé sur la propriété

R. v. Vu, 2004 BCCA 230 (CanLII)

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[33]   As mentioned, I am unable to find any meaningful distinction between the circumstances in Brownand those in the case at bar.  In my view, the trial judge in the present case was obliged to follow the ruling in Brown that the authority to search a dwelling house does not include the authority to search vehicles on the property.  And accordingly the search of the Honda was unlawful and contrary to s. 8.

[36]   It would appear from the foregoing that the trial judge's opinion of the good faith of the officers is based on their having reasonable grounds to believe the vehicle may provide evidence related to the offence under investigation.  While appellate courts must defer to the trial judge's determination of good faith, here I think the trial judge proceeded on an erroneous principle.  Surely the likelihood that the vehicle might contain relevant evidence is, in the absence of exigent circumstances or a search incidental to an arrest, only a basis for obtaining another warrant, one that clearly authorizes a search of the vehicle.

Les critères à rencontrer pour obtenir une prorogation du délai d'appel des verdicts

Lebreux c. R., 2014 QCCA 770 (CanLII)

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[4]           Pour espérer obtenir une prorogation du délai d'appel des verdicts, le requérant devait notamment établir les éléments suivants :

-     qu'il avait l'intention d'en appeler de sa condamnation pendant le délai d'appel;

-     la diligence à présenter sa demande;

-     la demande de prorogation;

-     les explications au soutien du retard à agir;

-     la longueur du retard;

-     le sérieux des moyens d'appel

Les séquelles d’un passage à la cour et les diverses conséquences, pour un individu, d’une déclaration de culpabilité à une accusation portée par voie de procédure sommaire

Par Me Walid Hijazi du bureau d'avocats Desrosiers, Joncas, Massicotte dans le cadre du Colloque conjoint du Barreau de Montréal et la Cour municipale de Montréal / 19 janvier 2011 

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Trucs et astuces de la magistrature

Par l’honorable Dominique B. Joly de la Cour municipale de la Ville de Montréal (à l'époque) dans le cadre du Colloque conjoint Barreau de Montréal et Cour municipale de Montréal / 19 janvier 2011

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Principes légaux en matière de preuve d’identification

R. c. Mellatdoust, 2014 QCCQ 4558 (CanLII)

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[69]        Le juge des faits détermine la crédibilité et le poids à accorder à la version d’un témoin oculaire. Lorsque l’identification est contestée, tel que dans le présent cas, la jurisprudence enseigne que le juge des faits doit apporter une attention particulière lorsqu’il exerce son pourvoir discrétionnaire.

[70]        Les inconstances de la mémoire humaine et son rôle dans l’identification erronée affligent le système judiciaire depuis longtemps. De tous les types de preuve, c’est l’identification par témoin oculaire qui est la plus susceptible d’entraîner une erreur judiciaire. Conscient de cette défaillance, les tribunaux ont été amenés à définir la preuve d’identification comme étant fragile en soi et cette définition est devenue concrètement un principe de droit. Dans l’arrêt R. c. Burke, le juge Sopinka explique ce qui suit :

[52]      La jurisprudence regorge de mises en garde contre l'acceptation fortuite d'une preuve d'identification, même lorsque cette identification est faite par confrontation visuelle directe de l'accusé.  En raison de l'existence de nombreux cas où l'identification s'est révélée erronée, le juge des faits doit être conscient des [TRADUCTION] «faiblesses inhérentes de la preuve d'identification qui découlent de la réalité psychologique selon laquelle l'observation et la mémoire humaines ne sont pas fiables»: R. c. Sutton, 1969 CanLII 497 (ON CA), [1970] 2 O.R. 358 (C.A.), à la p. 368.  Dans R. c. Spatola, 1970 CanLII 390 (ON CA), [1970] 3 O.R. 74 (C.A.), le juge Laskin (plus tard Juge en chef de notre Cour) fait observer ce qui suit au sujet de la preuve d'identification (à la p. 82):

 [TRADUCTION]  Les erreurs de reconnaissance ont un long passé documenté.  Les expériences en matière d'identification ont fait ressortir la fragilité de la mémoire et la faillibilité des pouvoirs d'observation.  Des études ont démontré l'assurance qui se bâtit progressivement à partir d'une identification initiale qui peut être erronée [. . .] La question même de l'admissibilité de la preuve d'identification, sous certains de ses aspects, a généré suffisamment de crainte dans certains ressorts pour qu'onhésite avant de s'en remettre aveuglément à une telle preuve, lorsqu'elle est admise, pour prononcer une déclaration de culpabilité . . . [Je souligne.]

[71]        Tel que la juge Charron (alors juge de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario) le stipule dans R. v. Miaponoose, (Ont. C.A.) : « [e]yewitness testimony is in effect opinion evidence, the basis of which is very difficult to assess ». L’opinion d’un témoin oculaire quant à l’identification d’un suspect est seulement valable dans la mesure où ce témoin est capable de faire référence à des faits perceptibles relatifs à l’apparence du suspect. La valeur accordée au témoignage d’un témoin oculaire doit être évaluée et analysée en prenant en compte les divers facteurs psychologiques et physiologiques qui ont menés le témoin à identifier le suspect.

[72]        Dans R. v. Gonsalves, le juge Hill de la Cour supérieure de l’Ontario, effectue une revue jurisprudentielle des questions que le juge des faits doit se poser lorsqu’il est face à un témoin oculaire d’une identification contestée, à savoir :

[39]      Our experience with eyewitness identification evidence has taught us to use discriminating scrutiny for badges of unreliability. Judicially created checklists, based on long experience with the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification evidence, assist in assessment of the circumstances of a specific identification: The Queen v. Nikolovski, at 409, 412; Mezzo v. The Queen, at 129-132 perWilson J. Was the suspect a complete stranger or known to the witness? Was the opportunity to see the suspect a fleeting glimpse or something more substantial? (a fleeting glance of a suspect by an eyewitness is generally unsatisfactory: R. v. Carpenter, [1998] O.J. No. 1819 (C.A.) at para. 1).  Was the setting in the darkness of night or in well-illuminated conditions? Was the sighting by the witness in circumstances of stress (R. v. Nikolovski, at 412, 418; R. v. Francis, [2002] O.J. No. 4010 (C.A.) at para. 4)? Did the witness commit the description to writing or report the description to the police in a timely way? Is the witness' description general, generic or vague or is there a description of detail including distinctive features of the suspect and his or her clothing (R. v. Ellis, [2008] O.J. No. 361 (C.A.) at para. 5, 8; R. v. F.A., at para. 64; R. v. Richards, at para. 9)? Were there intervening circumstances, capable of tainting or contaminating the independence of the identification, between the witness' initial sighting of the suspect and the rendering of the descriptive account to the police or the court? Has the witness described a distinguishing feature of the suspect not shared by the accused or conversely has the witness' description of the suspect failed to include mention of a distinctive feature of the accused? Is the eyewitness identification unconfirmed?

[73]        Le juge des faits doit, de plus, demeurer sceptique quant à une identification oculaire d’un suspect devant le tribunal. L’identification devant un tribunal a depuis longtemps été reconnue étant la forme la plus fragile de l’identification. Tel que souligné par la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt R.v. Hibbert, l’importance attribuée à l’identification à la cour d’un suspect est limitée à trois éléments. D’abord, cela confirme que le témoin croit que l’accusé est l’individu qu’il/elle a vu pendant toute la succession des événements de l’acte lui-même jusqu’à l’intervention policière. Comme telle, l’identification n’a presqu’aucune valeur. Deuxièmement, l’incapacité d’un témoin à identifier un suspect comme étant l’auteur du crime peut induire en erreur le juge des faits et l’inciter à déduire une conclusion défavorable injustifiée. Troisièmement, l’incapacité à identifier un suspect à la cour devrait peser dans la balance en faveur de la défense.

[74]        Notre collègue le juge Poulin, dans R. v. Haywood, déclare que les constatations de preuve circonstancielles peuvent être utiles à éliminer plusieurs dangers inhérents à la preuve d’identification d’un témoin oculaire. Cependant, dans certains cas où la preuve d’identification est sans fondement ni preuve circonstancielle, la fragilité de la preuve ne peut justifier une condamnation basée sur le principe de base du doute raisonnable.

[75]        Quant à la preuve par bande vidéo, si son exactitude ou sa continuité n’est pas contestée, elle peut apporter une preuve forte d’identification de l’accusé. Le tout dépend, bien entendu, de la qualité des images.

Revue de la jurisprudence sur la question du rafraichissement de la mémoire du témoin

R. v. Gadzo, 2009 ONCJ 126 (CanLII)

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[7]                        In Fleming v Toronto R.W. Co, [1911] O.J. No. 40, MacLaren J.A., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal commented on the means by which a witness could refresh a memory. The Court held:

23         The law on the subject is, I consider, correctly laid down in Phipson on Evidence, 5th ed., p. 466, as follows: "A witness may refresh his memory by reference to any writing made or verified by himself concerning and contemporaneously with the facts to which he testifies. ... The writing may have been made either by the witness himself, or by others, providing in the latter case that it was read by him when the facts were fresh in his memory, and he knew the statement to be correct."

In the case at bar, Officer Kerr verified the notes were his own and made contemporaneously to the events which led to the charge.

[8]                       In Daynes v British Columbia Electric Railway Co., [1912] B.C.J. No. 94, Irving J.A., of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, also commented on the test to refresh a memory. In paragraph, the Court stated:

The practice of refreshing one's memory is an everyday affair, whether for the purpose of giving evidence in Court or merely for the recalling of one's engagements. One looks at the note of the incident and then is able to act or speak with certainty. The note is not the evidence. The testimony of the witness is that, having refreshed his memory by looking at the note, he is now able to make a statement.

Martin J.A., also commented on the use of a copy of a note, in Daynes. In paragraph 10, the Court found:

Assuming that evidence to be material, I have no doubt, after examining all the authorities cited to us, and also The King v. The Inhabitants of St. Martin's, Leicester (1834), 2 A. & E. 210, and 13 Halsbury's Laws of England, 595-6, on Evidence, that it should have been admitted; the loss of the original notes was proved, also the transcript thereof on the following day, and the accuracy thereof, and the memory of the witness had been exhausted on the subject; the right to refresh his memory by reference to the "exact copy" had, in my opinion, been established.

It is substantiated in Daynes that an original note need not be available to a witness as long as the witness can testify the note being used is an ‘exact copy’ of the original. It is then the testimony of the witness that is for the trier of fact to weigh not the note itself.

[9]                       In R v K.G.B., [1998]O.J. No. 1859, Osborne J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal, reviewed the issue of witnesses refreshing their memories from statements made long ago to police. The Court held:

 17     The trial judge meticulously reviewed the testimony of both Mrs.D. and Mrs.McD. before he accepted it and relied on it. He concluded that the fact that both witnesses had refreshed their memories from statements that they had given to the police could affect the weight of their evidence. Nevertheless, he found as a fact that both witnesses had an independent recollection of the relevant events and that their evidence was reliable. The evidence of both witnesses supports this conclusion. In the end, the trial judge confronted the defence position concerning the weight to be given to Mrs.D.'s and Mrs.McD.'s evidence by stating in his reasons for conviction:

•It is the position of the defence that Mrs.D. and Mrs.McD. were honest but unreliable witnesses. The defence submits that Mrs.D. and Mrs.McD. should not have refreshed their memories from statements which were given to the police a substantial time, two and a half and three and a half years respectively, after the events ... While I believe that it is permissible for a witness to refresh his or her memory out of court from notes which were not made contemporaneously with the events about which he or she is testifying it is equally clear that doing so can, and does, affect the weight to be given to the witness's evidence.

18     I see nothing wrong with either witness reviewing her police statement before testifying. There is also nothing wrong with a defence counsel attempting to determine in cross-examination whether Mrs.D. or Mrs.McD. had a present memory of events about which she testified. What triggers recollection is not significant. This was long ago made clear in 1814 in Henry v. Lee (1814), 2 Chitty 124, where Ellenborough L.C.J. said:

•If upon looking at any document he can so far refresh his memory as to recollect a circumstance, it is sufficient; and it makes no difference that the memorandum is not written by himself, for it is not the memorandum that is the evidence but the recollection of the witness. [Emphasis in original.]

See also R. v. Muise (1974), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 487.

No suggestion was made in K.G.B that the witnesses had kept either the original (highly unlikely as it was a statement to the police) or a copy of their statement. Further the Court accepted that any document may be used to refresh a memory but made no inference that the document must have been maintained under the control of the witness.

[10]                  In R v Fliss, [2002] S.C.J. No. 15, Arbour J., of the Supreme Court of Canada, considered the issue of using a recording of a surreptitiously intercepted conversation by a police officer to refresh his or her memory. Justice Arbour held at paragraph 8:

This half-way remedy, if I may call it that, is what led to the procedural difficulty in the present case. It essentially precludes the admission in evidence not of the product of the intercept (the private communication), but of the best evidence thereof (the recording). In light of this, it would neither make sense, nor be feasible to attempt to preclude the witness from refreshing his or her memory from the recording. This simply continues to be a matter governed by the common law. A witness may refresh his or her memory prior to testifying, as long as he or she testifies from present memory revived by the instrument that refreshed it, whatever that instrument may be.

Binnie J, also writing in Fliss, held in paragraph 45:

There is also no doubt that the officer was entitled to refresh his memory by any means that would rekindle his recollection, whether or not the stimulus itself constituted admissible evidence. This is because it is his recollection, not the stimulus, that becomes evidence. The stimulus may be hearsay, it may itself be largely inaccurate, it may be nothing more than the sight of someone who had been present or hearing some music that had played in the background. If the recollection here had been stimulated by hearing a tape of his conversation with the accused, even if the tape was made without valid authorization, the officer's recollection -- not the tape -- would be admissible.

The Supreme Court verified in Fliss that a broad range of instruments or stimuli may be used to prompt a memory from which evidence can be given. By accepting that an instrument such as background music or the sight of someone could stimulate a memory, the Supreme Court effectively acknowledged that a witness need not have control over this stimulus.  

[11]                  In Cornerstone Co-operative Homes Inc. v Spilchuk, [2004] O.J. No. 4094, Quinn J., of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, set out guidelines for the refreshing of memory before and at trial. The Court held:

13 The following are some of the guiding principles in this area of the law:

•(a)  There is a distinction between present memory revived and past recollection recorded: in the former, something once remembered is again remembered by means of the memory being jogged by reference to, for example, a note; in the latter, "one has a record of what was once remembered but is no longer remembered . . . [I]t is only where a present memory is actually revived that it can be said to be 'refreshed'": see Mewett, Alan W., Witnesses (Toronto: Carswell, 1997 -- Rel. 2), pp. 13-2 and 13-3. [page107]

•(b) The memory of a witness may be refreshed by any document. "[A]nd it makes no difference that the memorandum is not written by [the witness], for it is not the memorandum that is the evidence but the recollection of the witness": see Henry v. Lee (1814), 2 Chit. 124, approved in R. v. B. (K.G.) 1998 CanLII 7125 (ON CA), (1998), 125 C.C.C. (3d) 61, [1998] O.J. No. 1859 (C.A.), at p. 67 C.C.C.

•(c)  In a case where a witness refreshes his or her memory "from some external source or event, she has a present memory, albeit one that has been refreshed; how reliable and truthful her recollection is, will be determined by the trier of fact . . .": see R. v. B. (K.G.), ibid.

•(d)  There is no need for the note or document used to refresh memory to have been made contemporaneously with the facts in the note or document: see R. v. B. (K.G.), supra, at p. 69 C.C.C.

•(e)  There is nothing wrong with a witness reviewing a written statement made by her years earlier for the purposes of refreshing her memory before trial and there is nothing wrong with cross-examining counsel attempting to determine whether the witness "had a present memory of events about which she testified": see R. v. B. (K.G.), supra, at p. 67 C.C.C.

•(f)  The statement in R. v. Kerenko, Cohen and Stewart, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 52, 49 D.L.R. (2d) 760 (Man. C.A.), at p. 53 C.C.C., that "it is only where the witness requires his notes to refresh his memory at trial that he may be called upon to produce them" (emphasis added) would not seem to be good law, at least in Ontario.

•(g)  It would also seem to be true that it does not make any difference how long before trial the refreshing occurs. Cross-examining counsel is entitled to explore this and other matters to ascertain the reliability and truthfulness of the witness.

The Court in b) accepted that a memory may be refreshed by a document not written by a witness which therefore may not necessarily have been under the control of the witness. In c), the use of an external source or event also implies that a witness may not have control over the source or event which stimulated the memory.

[12]                  In R v Colangelo, [2007] O.J. No 4070, Lampkin J., of the Ontario Court of Justice,  considered an appeal from a ruling where the trial court decided that a police officer must have an independent recollection of events prior to refreshing his memory from his notes.  The Court held:

26     Perhaps the first rule of the law of evidence is that all evidence that is relevant that goes to prove a fact in issue and not subject to any exceptions such as the rule against hearsay, is admissible: R. v. Zeolkowski 1989 CanLII 72 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1378; R. v. Watson, 108 C.C.C. (3d) 310, (Ont. C.A.); Cross on Evidence (6th ed. 1985).

27     Evidence is generally led through the viva voce testimony of witnesses. Witnesses do not often recall the event about which they are testifying or the details thereof. Witnesses may refresh their memory from a previous statement, even one not made contemporaneous with the events about which the witnesses seek to testify leaving it open to the defence to attempt to demonstrate through cross-examination that the witnesses had, in fact, no present memory of the events or that the memory was unreliable: R. v. B.(K.G.) 1998 CanLII 7125 (ON CA), (1998), 125 C.C.C. (3d) 61. Witnesses may also be allowed to refresh their memory by reference to an earlier deposition such as a preliminary hearing transcript: Reference Re R. v. Coffin, 1956 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1956] S.C.R. 191; 114 C.C.C. 1; 23 C.R. 1.

28     Professionals such as doctors, nurses, lawyers, judges, police officers, deal with hundreds of cases over the course of weeks, months or years. They cannot possibly recall all and so they make notes to trigger their memory of events. They may readily recall some cases -- the delivery by a doctor or a nurse of the first child; counsel's first murder case or initial appearance in the Supreme Court of Canada; the swearing in of a judge; the first investigation by a police officer into the affairs of a major criminal organisation. But in many, if not most cases, their memory will be refreshed only after consulting their notes. That does not mean to say that the person does not have an independent recollection of the event.

29     A forgetful witness may rely on any means to jar or spark a memory. What triggers recollection is not significant. In this way the witness' memory is presently revived in the witness box and he or she can then give oral testimony of the remembered event present memory revived. Although not the only way, the usual means to revive memory is by reference to a written document made at an earlier time by the witness: see The Law of Evidence in Canada, (2nd ed.) by Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, p. 924, para. 16.77. The evidence is the refreshed memory of the witness and not the document.

Justice Lampkin’s decision emphasizes the need for a witness to be allowed to use anything which triggers a recollection. This implies that the source of the ‘trigger’ need not have been within the control of the witness.

[13]                  The Law of Evidence in Canada, (2nd ed.), provides some helpful guidance as well. On page 931, Section 4 discusses ‘What Records or Devices May be Used to Refresh Memory?’ Subsection 16.91 states:

The use of a copy of the record, when the original is unavailable, has been judicially frowned on, unless the copy itself satisfies the test applicable to the original. In R v Elder, the Court refused to allow a policeman to use the typewritten copy of his notes, because the copy was prepared when the facts were no longer fresh in his mind. The better view, however, is that a copy may be used if the absence of the original is accounted for, and a witness proves that the copy is a true reproduction of the original. If the copy contains changes or is a distillation or summary of the original, its use should be disallowed unless the witness had a fresh recollection of the facts when the changes were made.

This reinforces the findings in Daynes.  If an original need not be produced and a true copy will suffice, when properly verified as such, it is therefore, clear that a police officer need not personally maintain his original notes.

La Cour suprême reconnaît l'utilisation d'une preuve de faits similaires pour démontrer un comportement répétitif ou systématique

R. c. Andriesanu, 1997 CanLII 9933 (QC CA)

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La valeur probante de la preuve de faits similaires tient habituellement au fait que les faits comparés sont "à ce point inhabituels et présentent des similitudes à ce point frappantes qu'elles ne peuvent raisonnablement pas être attribuées à une coïncidence" (R. c. C.(M.H.), 1991 CanLII 94 (CSC), [1991] 1 R.C.S. 763, p. 771). Le degré de similitude exigé varie en fonction du but recherché. Ainsi, lorsque la preuve de faits similaires tend à établir l'identité de l'accusé, la jurisprudence exige une "étiquette" ou une "véritable signature" de l'auteur du crime (Alward & Mooney c. R., [1978] 559; R. c. Morin, 1988 CanLII 8 (CSC), [1988] 2 R.C.S. 345, p. 371).  Les tribunaux font toutefois preuve d'une plus grande souplesse lorsque le but visé est de nier une défense de bonne réputation ou d'intention honnête par la preuve d'un comportement systématique (Boulet c. R., 1976 CanLII 144 (CSC), [1978] 1 R.C.S. 332; Guay, précité; Hewson c. R., 1978 CanLII 45 (CSC), [1979] 2 R.C.S. 82; R. c. Robertson, 1987 CanLII 61 (CSC), [1987] 1 R.C.S. 918; B.(C.R.), précité; R. c. Lietchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (CSC), [1993] 4 R.C.S. 333).