R v Granada, 2013 ABCA 404
[9] The intended victim herein, of course, was the Co-op supermarket in question and, by extension, its employees. The store’s customers that purchased the tampered food were really in the nature of “collateral damage” from the perspective of the appellant. The fact is that they were being used as “pawns” in her attack against the Co-Op. Nonetheless, these individuals also ended up being victims as was conceded by appellant’s counsel.
[10] The definition of “victim” in section 722(4) includes “a person to whom harm was done or suffered physical or emotional loss as a result of the commission of an offence”. We agree with the comments in R v Duffus, 2000 CanLII 22831 (ON SC), [2000] OJ No 4850 where the Provincial Court judge stated at para 8:
In changing the definition of ‘victim’ in section 722(4)(a) from “the person” to whom harm was done, to “a person” to whom harm was done, Parliament changed the limiting nature of the definition to a more inclusive definition, from a narrow delineation to a wider more expansive definition. Parliament expanded victimization to include not only the direct victim, that is, the victim-recipient of the harm done but also the victim or victims directly affected by the commission of the offence.
[11] In argument before us, Crown counsel pointed to impacts within the definition of the Code provision which landed on store staff. It was for some store staff not merely a matter of facing economic loss to the business and the imperiling of their employment. Some were pricked by pins when examining goods. During the course of the investigation of these crimes, a cloud of suspicion descended upon at least some of the employees there. At least one’s position escalated to that of a suspect who had to provide fingerprints and submit to stressful inquiry. The expert evidence before the sentencing judge suggested that the appellant was, at the very least, reckless to the foreseeable consequences for store staff of such dangerous offences. In a very real sense they were specific targets of her crimes. In our view, everyone who filed a Victim Impact Statement was properly entitled to do so and they were properly received by the sentencing court.
[12] The appellant further complains that some of the statements contained in the Victim Impact Statements include what she claims to be inflammatory language, specifically the following: “worst nightmare”, “reign of terror”, and “terrorism”. The phrase “Reign of Terror” was the title that Andrew Lukacik gave to his Victim Impact Statement in which he stated, inter alia, that one of his customers had told him “you know, this is a form of terrorism;” In our view, this language was merely reflective of the situation that these Co-op supermarket staff members found themselves to be in as a result of the appellant’s actions. In any event, none of these phrases were employed by the Provincial Court Judge in his reasons for sentence.
[13] Furthermore, there was no information of any significance contained in the Victim Impact Statements that represented anything new over and above that which was already before the Provincial Court judge as a result of the trial itself. The Victim Impact Statements dealt with the impact that the appellant’s actions had on the authors of those statements and did not represent some tirade against the appellant personally.
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