R. v. Haraldson, 2012 ABCA 147
[7] The Criminal Code explicitly provides that there can be no consent if the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity (s. 273.1). Capacity to consent to sexual activity requires something more than the capacity to execute baseline physical functions. The question is the degree to which intoxication negates comprehension or volition. A drunk complainant may retain the capacity to consent: R. v. R.(J) (2006), 2006 CanLII 22658 (ON SC), 40 C.R. (6th) 97 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 17‑19, 43. Mere drunkenness is not the equivalent of incapacity: R. v. Jensen (1996), 1996 CanLII 1237 (ON CA), 106 C.C.C. (3d) 430 (Ont. C.A.). Nor is alcohol-induced imprudent decision making, memory loss, loss of inhibition or self control: R. v. Merritt, [2004] O.J. No. 1295 (Ont. S.C.J.). A drunken consent is still a valid consent. Where the line is crossed into incapacity may be difficult to determine at times. Expert evidence may assist and even be necessary, in some cases (R. v. Faulkner (1997), 1997 CanLII 1193 (ON CA), 120 C.C.C. (3d) 377 (Ont. C.A.)), though it is not required as a matter of law: R. v. Merritt, supra; R. v. Hernandez, [1997] A.J. No. 955 (Alta. C.A.), R. v. Cedeno, 2005 ONCJ 91, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 468 at para. 18.
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