30 In the Crown’s submission, the information provided to the lead investigator by the other CRA employee was simply summaries of calculations which are admissible in their own right since they were based on evidence which had already been properly admitted at the trial. See R. v. Scheel (1978), 1978 CanLII 2414 (ON CA), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 31 (Ont. C.A.). Furthermore, as argued previously by the Crown, there was no legal relevance to the calculations. The Crown did not have to prove the accused’s expenses. They were relevant only for sentencing. Finally, since they were business records according to the common law exception to the hearsay rule, they could have been admitted on that basis.
31 It is noteworthy that, before the summary conviction appeal court, the Crown did not argue that the expense calculations were admissible as business records under the common law exception. It argued that the expense figures in the corroborating invoices were exhibits in the cause properly before the trial judge. They were facts the trial judge was entitled to consider and ultimately accept through the evidence of the lead investigator.
32 However, as noted by the appeal judge and defence counsel, that is not how the matter was treated by the trial judge. The trial judge considered the expense calculations and records as business records of the CRA. She relied upon the calculations in her assessment of overall tax liability. The accused’s counsel had indicated at the outset that he was intending to question the expenses calculated by the CRA, what steps were taken to determine what they were and what was included.
33 The reference to business records by the trial judge is unclear. If it is a reference to a business record as contemplated by the CEA, then the trial judge erred. If it is a reference to a business record under the common law exceptions, they may have been admissible in appropriate circumstances after an assessment of their necessity and reliability had been done in accordance with the principled approach for the admissibility of hearsay statements. See R. v. Khan, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, and R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787. That does not appear to have been undertaken or even argued.
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