Rechercher sur ce blogue

dimanche 11 février 2024

Comment les policiers doivent se gouverner face à un mandat de perquisition comportant une balise temporelle

R. v. Neill, 2023 ONCA 765

Lien vers la décision


[11]      In R. v. Branton (2001), 2001 CanLII 8535 (ON CA), 154 C.C.C. (3d) 139 (C.A.), at para. 35, this court held that language on a search warrant form referring to the “suspected commission or intended commission of an offence” exceeded the statutory power of search authorized by s. 487 of the Criminal Code, and rendered the search warrant invalid on its face.

[12]      Before the trial judge, the Crown conceded that, in light of Branton, the form used was in error. However, the Crown argued that the Information to Obtain (the “ITO”) clearly specified in Appendix A that the affiant “had reasonable grounds that the items in Appendix A [the Blackberry] will be found at [the police property bureau]”, thus, specifying the constitutional minimum standard.

[13]      The trial judge found that the police conduct in using the outdated search warrant Form 5 was “careless”. However, he found that, on the record before him, the error was harmless because there was no risk that the overbroad wording on the Form 5 allowed for an overbroad search. The officer who was the informant for the ITO, and who attended pursuant to the warrant to seize the Blackberry from the property bureau and transfer it to the Tech Crimes Unit, was the lead officer on the investigation and one of the officers involved in the initial seizure of the Blackberry from the appellant. His investigation was focused on public posting of images of child pornography. The trial judge found that there was “no chance that [this officer] would have been misled by the error in the form.” Relying on the decision of Fairburn J. (as she then was) in R. v. Nguyen2017 ONSC 1341, at paras. 115-16, the trial judge applied the principle of severance and found that the use of the Form 5 with outdated language did not render the warrant invalid.

[14]      The appellant argues that the doctrine of severance should not have been applied; rather, a s. 8 breach should have been found and questions about whether the overbroad language actually had any impact or would have caused confusion about the scope of the search authorized should have been considered in the s. 24(2) analysis.

[15]      In some cases, trial courts have applied the doctrine of severance in circumstances involving a Branton error; in other cases, trial judges have declined to sever the offending portion of a warrant: Nguyen, at paras. 115-16R. v. Nurse and Plummer2014 ONSC 1779, at paras 35-39 (affirmed on other grounds without reference to this issue, 2019 ONCA 260, 145 O.R. (3d) 241); R. v. N.M. (2007), 2007 CanLII 31570 (ON SC), 223 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 333-36R. v. Kramshoj2017 ONSC 2951R. v. Persaud2016 ONSC 8110. Whether or not severance is an appropriate remedy is a fact-specific analysis.

[16]      In the circumstances of this case, we see no error in the trial judge’s conclusion that the language of “suspected commission or intended commission of an offence” in the Form 5 was severable from the balance of the search warrant and that there was no risk of an overbroad search. In addition to the reasons given by the trial judge, we note Appendix B to the search warrant particularized the offences for which it authorized the seizure and forensic analysis of the Blackberry to completed offences of possession of and making available child pornography in the past. This removed any risk that an officer acting under the warrant would search for evidence of suspected or intended offences.

[17]      The second argument raised by the appellant in relation to the search warrant is that the police failed to comply with the time period set out in the search warrant. The search warrant authorized seizure of the Blackberry from the police property bureau “between 6:00 a.m. and 8:59 p.m. on April 23, 2015”. The police attended in that time frame to seize the Blackberry from the property bureau. However, the analysis of data from the Blackberry was not completed until May 4, 2015. As noted above, Appendix A, which formed part of the search warrant, included terms and conditions specifying that the warrant authorized analysis of the Blackberry for data involving the listed offences, and included direction as to the types of data. However, there was no time frame specified for the forensic analysis of the Blackberry. On appeal, the appellant maintains the argument made before the trial judge that the warrant should be read as requiring that the forensic analysis of the Blackberry be completed between 6:00 a.m. and 8:59 p.m. on April 23, 2015.

[18]      The trial judge found that there was no s. 8 breach because the terms of the search warrant provided for a time frame for the seizure of the Blackberry from the property bureau (which the police complied with) but did not specify a time frame for the forensic analysis of the Blackberry. Relying on the decision of Paciocco J. (as he then was) in R. v. Barwell[2013] O.J. No. 3743 (Ont. C.J.), the trial judge found that where a warrant specifies a time frame for seizure of an electronic device from a police locker or property bureau, but does not specify a time frame for the forensic analysis, the timing of the forensic analysis is governed by ss. 489.1 and 490 of the Criminal Code (reports to a justice and detention of things seized by police). The trial judge found that police complied with the time specified in the warrant to seize the Blackberry from the police property bureau. He further found that the forensic analysis was completed while the detention order made for the Blackberry after it was first seized was still in force. As a result, he found no breach of s. 8 on this basis.

[19]      We see no error in the conclusions of the trial judge that the police complied with the terms of the warrant, which only included a time for when the police were to seize the Blackberry from the property bureau; that the warrant did not specify a time frame for the completion of the forensic analysis; and that the Blackberry was still subject to the detention order after the initial report to a justice at the time the forensic analysis was completed. As with the use of the outdated Form 5, the trial judge’s conclusions were fact-specific findings, grounded in the specific wording of the search warrant in this case. The decisions of R. v. D’Souza2016 ONSC 5855, at paras. 162-90, and R. v. Little2009 CanLII 41212 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 154-61, relied on by the appellant, are distinguishable from this case. In each of those cases, based on the specific wording of the warrant – which was different than in this case – the trial judge found that the time frame specified in the warrant applied to the forensic analysis process. The appellant did not argue either before the trial judge or in this court that the absence from the warrant of a specific time frame for the forensic analysis of the Blackberry to be completed violated s. 8 of the Charter.


Comment apprécier la décision policière de ne pas recourir à l'enregsitrement vidéo d'une déclaration extrajudiciaire d'un accusé

R. v. Marshall, 2005 CanLII 30051 (ON CA)

Lien vers la décision


[98] As noted in Oickle and Moore-McFarlane, the failure to record interrogations does not render them inherently suspect. Rather, a non-recorded interrogation becomes suspect when the following circumstances, which do not exist in this case, are all present: (1) the suspect is in custody; (2) recording facilities are readily available; and (3) the police deliberately interrogate the suspect without giving any thought to making a reliable record. The only custodial interrogation of the appellant took place after his arrest on September 29, 1997. It was completely recorded on videotape. In my view, the finding that the five impugned statements were voluntary was not tainted solely because they were not audio or videotaped, or because some of the attending officers did not testify on the voir dire.


Comment apprécier la possibilité pour un prévenu détenu de quitter la salle d'interrogatoire

R v Saretzky, 2020 ABCA 421

Lien vers la décision


[46]           The nature of the police conduct  the appellant does not dispute that the officer was polite and respectful throughout. And he agrees he was told he did not have to stay and talk, that he could leave at anytime, but notes that he was then in a locked room in a remand centre.

[47]           That is a significant factor as he had obviously lost his liberty and his movements within the institution were strictly controlled. However, while his incarceration provides important context, it does not answer the relevant question, which is whether the appellant’s freedom to choose to meet and talk with the officer was lost or impaired. In the unique circumstances of this case, the appellant’s refusal to meet with the officer when invited to do so only two months before, and the repeated advice that he need not stay or talk but could return to his cell if and when he wished, overcame any suggestion that his being an inmate denied him the freedom of choice to leave the interview room and return to his cell: see R v Wood1992 ABCA 27 at paras 19-20;  R v Heppner2019 BCCA 108 at para 68.

dimanche 21 janvier 2024

Un juge peut ordonner une évaluation sexologique en vue de la détermination de la peine

R. c. D'Amico, 2014 QCCQ 21007

Lien vers la décision


[1]           The Crown is asking for a pre-sentence report and a sexual behaviour assessment pursuant to sections 721 and 723 (3) of the Criminal Code.

[2]           The Defence objects to such request.

[3]           The issue here is for the Tribunal to decide if the Court has jurisdiction to order non-consensual pre-sentence and sexual behaviour reports for sentencing purposes.

[4]           There is no obligation for the Tribunal to ask for a pre-sentence report to be done, as it is part of its discretional power[1].

[5]           In Nasogaluak[2], the Supreme Court has re-asserted that:

[…] “The determination of a fit sentence is […], an individualized process that requires the judge to weigh the objectives of sentencing in a manner that best reflects the circumstances of the case”. […]

[6]           In the scope of that goal, the judge, following the general principles at 718 to 718.2, has a large discretion[3]:

[43] The language in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Code is sufficiently general to ensure that sentencing judges enjoy a broad discretion to craft a sentence that is tailored to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. The determination of a “fit” sentence is, subject to some specific statutory rules, an individualized process that requires the judge to weigh the objectives of sentencing in a manner that best reflects the circumstances of the case (R. v. Lyons1987 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309; M. (C.A.); R. v. Hamilton (2004), 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.)). No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case. The relative importance of any mitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences. The judge’s discretion to decide on the particular blend of sentencing goals and the relevant aggravating or mitigating factors ensures that each case is decided on its facts, subject to the overarching guidelines and principles in the Code and in the case law.

[7]           The Quebec Court of Appeal has re-affirmed that discretionary power in Nguyen[4].

[8]           In Challes, justice Macleod, from Ontario Superior Court of Justice has asserted that the specific assessment order must be relevant to the issue of determining an appropriate sentence[5].

[9]           Justice Richard Marleau, in J.L.[6] made an exhaustive review of the law and the jurisprudence on a non-consensual request for pre-sentence and psychiatric reports.

[10]        Referring to Blackwell[7], justice Marleau concludes that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to order such reports, despite the absence of consent of the accused.

[11]        The Tribunal shares the same opinion.

[12]        In the scope of section 718 to 718.2 and of section 721(4) and 723(3) of the Criminal Code, the Tribunal is of the opinion that such reports are pertinent to the issue at stake, that issue being to individualize the sentence for the accused in harmony with the general principles of sentencing.

[13]        The Tribunal believes that there is a logical nexus and relevance between the accusations for which the accused has been found guilty and the Crown’s request.

[14]         The accused must know that he can refuse to participate to the evaluations.

[15]        If so, the accused must know that qualified persons for the preparation and the execution of the Tribunal’s order will be entitled to gather information on him and bring them to the Tribunal even if he will not have given his point of view.

[16]        The Tribunal orders that a pre-sentence report and a sexual behaviour assessment report be done in regards to the accused.

[17]        The Tribunal also orders that besides from such reports, other information in regards to 721(4) and 723(3) of the Criminal Code be gathered by qualified persons in the scope of this decision.

Comment apprécier le témoignage d’un accusé qui choisit de témoigner quant aux incohérences existant entre sa déclaration faite à la police et son témoignage rendu au procès

Boivin c. R., 2020 QCCA 1219

Lien vers la décision


[15]        Le droit de garder le silence est un droit protégé par l’article 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés[7] et se fonde sur les doctrines de la règle des confessions et du privilège de ne pas s’incriminer[8]. L’exercice du droit au silence par un accusé ne doit pas lui être préjudiciable[9].

[16]        Il en découle que le silence d’une personne détenue ou arrêtée, comme le souligne la Cour dans l’arrêt R. c. Lagacé, « ne peut lui être reproché pour servir de base à une déclaration de culpabilité ou plus simplement pour rejeter sa version, sauf en matière d’alibi, où le défaut de l’annoncer en temps utile peut en affecter la crédibilité »[10].

[17]        La preuve du silence d’un accusé avant son procès est uniquement admissible dans des circonstances particulières, c’est-à-dire lorsque la poursuite établit « une pertinence réelle et une justification légitime »[11], « lorsque la défense soulève une question qui démontre la pertinence du silence de l’accusé »[12] ou encore lorsque ce silence devient un fait en litige[13].

[18]        Le droit au silence continue de s’appliquer même si l’accusé accepte de communiquer certains renseignements à la police. Comme l’énonce la Cour suprême dans R. c. Turcotte :

Une personne peut fournir certains, aucun ou la totalité des renseignements qu’elle possède. L’interaction volontaire avec la police, même si elle est engagée par l’intéressé, ne constitue pas une renonciation au droit de garder le silence. Le droit de choisir de parler ou de garder le silence demeure entier tout au long de l’interaction.[14]

[19]        L’accusé a le droit de ne pas fournir certains renseignements lorsqu’il est interrogé par la police. À titre d’exemple, dans l’arrêt Lagacé[15], l’accusé fait une déclaration aux policiers et clame son innocence. Dans son témoignage rendu au procès, il identifie un tiers qui est, selon lui, l’auteur des coups de couteau assénés à la victime. L’avocate du ministère public le contre-interroge sur le fait qu’il n’a jamais fourni ces renseignements à la police. En plaidoirie, elle laisse entendre au jury que « les gens qui ne donnent pas leur version quand ils parlent aux policiers, habituellement, ce sont des gens peut-être un peu moins fiables » et s’interroge, toujours en s’adressant au jury, sur l’honnêteté et la transparence de l’accusé. Mon collègue, le juge Doyon, précise qu’une telle façon de faire, jumelée à l’absence de directive spécifique pour atténuer la portée des arguments du ministère public, « attaque de plein front le droit de l’appelant au silence » en laissant entendre « que de ne pas collaborer avec la police affecte la crédibilité de l’appelant et peut être un indice de sa culpabilité »[16].

[20]        Ainsi, le fait d’omettre de déclarer des renseignements à la police, pour ensuite les divulguer pour la première fois au moment du procès, ne peut être utilisé pour rejeter la version de l’accusé et ultimement conclure à sa culpabilité[17]. Autrement, l’exercice du droit au silence par un accusé interrogé par la police se retournerait contre lui au moment du procès, rendant ainsi le droit au silence complètement illusoire[18].

[21]        Dans la même veine, les questions d’un contre-interrogatoire ne doivent pas suggérer que la version des faits de l’accusé, présentée pour la première fois au procès, n’est pas crédible pour la raison qu’elle n’a pas été livrée antérieurement[19].

[22]        En revanche, l’accusé qui choisit de témoigner peut être contre-interrogé sur les incohérences existant entre sa déclaration faite à la police et son témoignage rendu au procès. Si le contre-interrogatoire a comme dessein de miner la crédibilité de l’accusé en mettant l’accent sur ces incohérences, il ne compromet pas le droit au silence[20].

[23]        L’avocat du ministère public peut ainsi suggérer, dans le cadre du contre-interrogatoire de l’accusé, que la version des événements pertinents exposée dans son témoignage est significativement différente de la version initiale donnée à la police[21].

[24]        Le juge des faits peut alors se fonder sur cette incohérence pour tirer une conclusion défavorable à l’égard de la crédibilité de l’accusé ou de la vraisemblance de la version offerte[22]. Cette conclusion ne repose pas sur l’exercice du droit au silence, mais sur l’incohérence des récits racontés par l’accusé. La déduction admissible ne se fonde pas sur le silence de l’accusé avant le procès, mais sur les différences matérielles entre les versions racontées[23].

Le dédommagement à la victime doit toujours être envisagé lors de la détermination de la peine

De simples mots ne constituent pas un voies de fait & la nécessité de prouver le caractère intentionnel de l'usage de la force permet une défense d'accident ou d'erreur de consentement honnête mais erroné

R. v. Dawydiuk, 2010 BCCA 162 Lien vers la décision [ 29 ]             Under s. 265 (1)(a) of the  Criminal Code , a person commits an assau...