L'état du droit quant au retrait des accusations découlant de la discrétion du Poursuivant

R v Beauchamp, 2014 ABPC 113

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[9]               The Attorney General’s power to‘withdraw’ a charge or information is an incident of the Crown prerogative. It pre-dates the enactment of the Criminal Code and is not expressly referred to therein. Notwithstanding that absence, however, there is no doubt that the power not only exists but is exercised by Crown Prosecutors on a daily basis. As Watt J.A. recently commented in R v McHale, 2010 ONCA 361; leave denied [2010] 3 S.C.R. vi (‘McHale’) (at para.32):

 

Despite the absence of express or necessarily implied authority in the Criminal Code, it is well‑established that the Attorney General has the authority to withdraw an information prior to plea ...

 

See also: R v Karpinski, 1957 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1957] S.C.R. 343 (per Kerwin C.J.C. at p.343) and, more generally, Criminal Procedure in Canada, Penney, et al, LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2011, at pp.453-5; Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada, 2^nd ed., Ewaschuk, Canada Law Book, 12:7040.

 

[10]            Subsection 8(2) C.C. provides that:

 

8.(2) The criminal law of England that was in force in a province immediately before April 1, 1955 continues in force in the province except as altered, varied, modified or affected by this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada.

 

This is the statutory source of a Crown Prosecutor’s power to withdraw charges. Unfortunately, it provides little guidance with respect to the procedure governing the exercise of this power. Courts have had to look to the common law when developing procedures for its implementation. “The precise contours of the common law power of the Attorney General to withdraw an information are not expressly defined, or for that matter fully developed.” McHale, per Watt J.A. at para.36, emphasis added.

 

[11]           It is clear that the power to withdraw charges is that of the Attorney General; not the court. See: R v Garcia and Silva, 1969 CanLII 450 (ON CA), [1970] 3 C.C.C. 124 (Ont.C.A.). Judicial regulation of the process is limited in scope. In R v Osborne (1975), 1975 CanLII 1357 (NB CA), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 405 (N.B.C.A.) The court was moved to comment in that regard (at pp.411-12):

 

I would point out the refusal of the trial Judge to permit a withdrawal of the original information for assault before any evidence is adduced is an usurpation by the Court of the administrative function of the Crown prosecutor and the Attorney‑General to determine who and for what offence any person should be prosecuted. Case law clearly indicates the Courts should distinguish between private prosecutions and those carried on by the Crown. They show the Courts should not interfere with the administration of justice by making the matter of withdrawal a means of controlling the Crown's discretion to prosecute and thereby bring the executive and judicial branches of government into conflict. They point out and emphasize that the business of withdrawals is strictly that of the Attorney‑General or his agents before the Court. They equate the right of withdrawal to the right to grant a stay of proceedings. The Crown prosecutor is in a better position than the Judge to know how serious any particular case is. Further the prosecutor is the representative of The Queen and it is inconceivable the Court should refuse the right of Her Majesty to withdraw an information or stay a prosecution.

 

[12]           The timing of an application to withdraw charges may determine whether the court has any role to play. A Crown Prosecutor’s right to withdraw charges before plea is unfettered. There is no application to withdraw the charge at that stage; the charge is withdrawn by executive direction. This dynamic was noted by the court in Re Forrester and the Queen, 1976 CanLII 1433 (AB KB), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 221 (Alta.S.C.T.D.) (‘Forrester’) where Quigley J. stated:

 

In the present case the Crown appeared to apply for a withdrawal but in effect it need not have had to frame its intentions by way of a request, and in any event the Provincial Judge clearly stated the effect of what transpired when he said "... the charge is withdrawn by the Crown"

 

[13]           After plea, however, it is incumbent upon a Crown Prosecutor to seek leave of the court before withdrawing a charge. The court in Re Blasko and the Queen (1975), 1975 CanLII 1405 (ON SC), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 321 (Ont.H.C.) referenced that caveat in these terms:

 

Prior to the preferring of an indictment or the entering of a plea and the tendering of evidence, an information may be withdrawn without the leave of the Court. Where a Crown Attorney has tendered evidence after the taking of a plea, the trial Judge is seized with jurisdiction and the information cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the trial Judge.  

 

The need for such a limitation no doubt arises from the fact that the accused who has entered plea is often considered, from that point in time, to be in jeopardy. See, for example, R v Petersen, 1982 CanLII 200 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 493.

 

[14]           The act of withdrawing a charge may take different forms. Perhaps the easiest and most efficient method of doing so is to withdraw the charge ex facie curiae. Crown Counsel, “ ... does this very simply by not bringing the accused and the charge into Court,” R v Grocutt (1977), 1977 CanLII 2058 (AB KB), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 76 (Alta.S.C.T.D.). Quigley J. expressed the same view in Forrester, when he stated:

 

Where the agent of the Attorney‑General knows in advance that he will withdraw an information he can cause the information to be delivered to him prior to Court and then simply refrain from placing that information before the trial Judge. The information is literally "withdrawn". The trial Judge having no information before him has no jurisdiction over the offence.

 

[15]            Where Crown Counsel is aware of the fact that charge(s) are to be withdrawn before plea, there is nothing to prevent her or him from contacting the Clerk of the Court to instruct that withdrawal. If possible, those instructions should be given well before proceedings commence (in person or in writing) so as not to inconvenience the accused, counsel or the court. Even on a docket or trial day, some economy can be achieved by pre-court instruction to the Clerk of the Court that charge(s) are withdrawn.

 

[16]            The efficacy of proceeding in that fashion can be seen in the operation of the ‘Alternative Measures Program’ (‘AMP’). See: s.717 C.C. Where the accused has agreed to participate in AMP (with the consent of the Attorney General), no plea to the charge is entered. Rather, the entry of plea is adjourned for a number of months in order to afford the accused an opportunity to meet the conditions of the AMP agreement. If those conditions are met by the return date, charge(s) are withdrawn, usually with the accused in attendance.

 

[17]            Given the foregoing discussion, every effort should be made to determine compliance with the AMP agreement well before the return date. If there is compliance, the accused (and/or counsel acting on the accused’s behalf) should be advised before the return date that the charge(s) will be withdrawn and that (s)he need not attend court. If, for some reason, this cannot be communicated before the return date, it ought to be undertaken ex facie curiae on the return date itself.

 

[18]            This manner of proceeding is not unique or even unusual. An identical process is currently in operation where the Attorney General elects to exercise another of its prerogative powers (now statutorily codified), viz. the stay of proceedings. See: s.579 C.C.

 

Effect of Withdrawing Charges

 

[19]            What effect does the withdrawal of a charge have on any legal process (such as an arrest warrant) which has already been issued in relation to that charge?

 

[20]            In R v Stewart (1978) 1978 CanLII 2443 (ON SC), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 62 (Ont.H.C.) the accused elected to be tried in a superior court of criminal jurisdiction on an information alleging a single crime. After a hearing, he was denied bail. On the date set for preliminary inquiry, a second information was present in court charging the same crime as the first information plus an additional count. No bail hearing was held in relation to that second information. The accused was ordered to stand trial on the second information and the first information was ultimately withdrawn.

 

[21]            The accused thereafter applied for habeas corpus on the basis that the detention order made on the first information was of no force or effect from the time that information was withdrawn. Linden J. agreed. He ruled (at para.5):

 

I hold that a detention order springs from the information, not from the offence itself. Once an information is withdrawn or declared void, then I believe that any detention order based upon that information must also fall.

 

[22]            A similar result follows when the Attorney General elects to enter a stay of proceedings. Subsection 579(1) C.C. provides that:

 

579. (1) The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose may, at any time after any proceedings in relation to an accused or a defendant are commenced and before judgment, direct the clerk or other proper officer of the court to make an entry on the record that the proceedings are stayed by his direction, and such entry shall be made forthwith thereafter, whereupon the proceedings shall be stayed accordingly and any recognizance relating to the proceedings is vacated.

(emphasis added)

 

[23]            While s.579(1) C.C. makes reference only to “any recognizance”, it is clear that any order of detention or release relating to the relevant charge or information is terminated once a stay of proceedings is entered. See: R v Jones (1997), 1996 CanLII 12421 (ON CA), 113 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont.C.A.). Even ‘restraint orders’ (s.462.33 C.C.) issued in relation to the stayed charge or information cease to have effect. See: R v De Trang, 2004 ABCA 246. The court in R v Smith (1992), 1992 CanLII 325 (BC CA), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 70 (B.C.C.A.) succinctly stated that (at para.20): “Without a Charter consideration, it is clear that once the Crown exercises its s.579 right to direct a stay be entered, the judge hearing the prosecution is functus and without jurisdiction to proceed further.”

 

[24]            Both common law and the Criminal Code give the Attorney General special powers to halt proceedings before a criminal court. The weight of authority supports the position that all process or orders associated with those proceedings are also (and automatically) terminated by the exercise of those powers. It is worth noting that it is invariably in the accused’s own best interests that the legal force of orders interfering with her or his liberty interests be terminated once the criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding itself has been lawfully terminated. Accordingly, an arrest warrant issued on the basis of an information ceases to have any force or effect from the moment that the information is lawfully withdrawn.

 

[25]            Criminal Code and common law provisions relating to the withdrawal or staying of charges apply both to proceedings by indictment and proceedings by summary conviction. See: s.795 C.C. And those provisions apply, mutatis mutandis, to proceedings governed by the Provincial Offences Procedure Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.P-34 (‘POPA’). See: POPA, s.3.

La défense d'abandon

R. c. Gauthier, 2013 CSC 32

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[49]                          Pour toutes ces raisons, je reformulerais ainsi l’analyse déjà énoncée dans Whitehouse et Kirkness pour statuer sur la recevabilité de la défense d’abandon, afin de répondre aux particularités qui marquent les différents degrés et formes de participation criminelle. 

[50]                          La personne qui participe à une infraction en accomplissant ou en omettant d’accomplir quelque chose dans le but d’aider quelqu’un à la commettre ou en encourageant quelqu’un à la commettre (par. 21(1) du Code criminel), ou encore en formant avec d’autres le projet de poursuivre une fin illégale et de s’y entraider et qu’une infraction est commise lors de la réalisation de cette fin commune (par. 21(2) du Code criminel), peut invoquer la défense d’abandon si la preuve permet d’établir les éléments suivants :

(1)     il existe une intention d’abandonner le projet criminel ou de s’en désister;

(2)    cet abandon ou ce désistement a été communiqué en temps utile par l’intéressé à ceux qui désirent continuer;

(3)     la communication a servi d’avis non équivoque à ceux qui désirent continuer;

(4)     l’accusé a pris, proportionnellement à sa participation à la commission du crime projeté, les mesures raisonnables, dans les circonstances, soit pour neutraliser ou autrement annuler les effets de sa participation soit pour empêcher la perpétration de l’infraction.

[51]                          Je reconnais que, dans certaines circonstances, et ce, même selon le mode de participation mentionné au par. 21(1) du Code criminel, la communication en temps utile par l’accusé de son intention non équivoque d’abandonner l’entreprise illégale sera jugée suffisante pour neutraliser les effets de sa participation criminelle.  En d’autres circonstances, et principalement dans les cas où une personne aide à la commission de l’infraction, il est difficile de concevoir que le simple fait pour cette personne de communiquer en temps opportun à l’auteur principal sa volonté de se retirer du projet d’infraction sera jugé raisonnable et suffisant pour satisfaire à l’analyse formulée au paragraphe précédent. 

[52]                          En conclusion et plus particulièrement dans le cadre du par. 21(1) du Code criminel, la défense d’abandon d’intention ne devrait être soumise au jury que s’il existe au dossier des éléments de preuve susceptibles d’étayer la conclusion selon laquelle une personne ayant initialement participé à la poursuite d’une fin illégale a subséquemment pris les mesures raisonnables dans les circonstances soit pour neutraliser les effets de sa participation soit pour empêcher la perpétration de l’infraction.

Revue du droit relatif à la complicité

R v Abdulkadir, 2018 ABPC 244

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[419]      Party liability can arise under s. 21(1)(b) or (c) where the individual either aids or abets the party who committed the offence.  To understand how that liability could arise it is necessary to explore the relevant jurisprudence related thereto.  I will now set out some of that relevant jurisprudence.  

[420]      In R v Briscoe 2010 SCC 13 (CanLII), [2010] 1 SCR 411 (SCC) (Briscoe), Charron J. reviewed the mens rea and actus reus necessary for an individual to be a party to the offence of another:  At paras. 14 to 17 she explained:  

The actus reus of aiding or abetting is doing (or, in some circumstances, omitting to do) something that assists or encourages the perpetrator to commit the offence.  While it is common to speak of aiding and abetting together, the two concepts are distinct, and liability can flow from either one.  Broadly speaking, “[t]o aid under s. 21(1) (b) means to assist or help the actor. . . .  To abet within the meaning of s. 21(1) (c) includes encouraging, instigating, promoting or procuring the crime to be committed”: R. v. Greyeyes, 1997 CanLII 313 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 825, at para. 26.  The actus reus is not at issue in this appeal.  As noted earlier, the Crown argued at trial that Mr. Briscoe was both an aider and an abettor.  The trial judge’s finding that Mr. Briscoe performed the four acts of assistance described above is not disputed.

Of course, doing or omitting to do something that resulted in assisting another in committing a crime is not sufficient to attract criminal liability.  As the Court of Appeal for Ontario wrote in R. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1974), 1974 CanLII 707 (ON CA), 3 O.R. (2d) 629, “one does not render himself liable by renting or loaning a car for some legitimate business or recreational activity merely because the person to whom it is loaned or rented chooses in the course of his use to transport some stolen goods, or by renting a house for residential purposes to a tenant who surreptitiously uses it to store drugs” (p. 640).  The aider or abettor must also have the requisite mental state or mens rea.  Specifically, in the words of s. 21(1) (b), the person must have rendered the assistance for the purpose of aiding the principal offender to commit the crime.

The mens rea requirement reflected in the word “purpose” under s. 21(1) (b) has two components:  intent and knowledge.  For the intent component, it was settled in R. v. Hibbert, 1995 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, that “purpose” in s. 21(1) (b) should be understood as essentially synonymous with “intention”.  The Crown must prove that the accused intended to assist the principal in the commission of the offence.  The Court emphasized that “purpose” should not be interpreted as incorporating the notion of “desire” into the fault requirement for party liability.  It is therefore not required that the accused desired that the offence be successfully committed (Hibbert, at para. 35).  The Court held, at para. 32, that the perverse consequences that would flow from a “purpose equals desire” interpretation of s. 21(1) (b) were clearly illustrated by the following hypothetical situation described by Mewett and Manning:

If a man is approached by a friend who tells him that he is going to rob a bank and would like to use his car as the getaway vehicle for which he will pay him $100, when that person is . . . charged under s. 21 for doing something for the purpose of aiding his friend to commit the offence, can he say “My purpose was not to aid the robbery but to make $100”?  His argument would be that while he knew that he was helping the robbery, his desire was to obtain $100 and he did not care one way or the other whether the robbery was successful or not.

(A.W. Mewett and M. Manning, Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1985), at p. 112)

The same rationale applies regardless of the principal offence in question.  Even in respect of murder, there is no “additional requirement that an aider or abettor subjectively approve of or desire the victim’s death” (Hibbert, at para. 37 (emphasis deleted)).

As for knowledge, in order to have the intention to assist in the commission of an offence, the aider must know that the perpetrator intends to commit the crime, although he or she need not know precisely how it will be committed.  That sufficient knowledge is a prerequisite for intention is simply a matter of common sense. …

[421]      The other man or men in the apartment were under no legal obligation to intervene to stop the assault so liability pursuant to s. 21(1)(b) cannot arise on that basis.  To make the other man or men parties to the sexual assault committed by the accused the other men or man must have done something to aid the accused in a manner to facilitate his sexual assault upon the complainant.  The complainant testified that they were trying to have sex with her, they opened her legs, and they told her to open her mouth.  It is clear that the accused had sex with her.  If a man other than the accused told her to open her mouth, helped to move her legs apart, or tried to have sex with her that man would be a party to the sexual assault committed by the accused.  She might have been able to hear or feel that more than one man was involved but that was not clear on the evidence.  Therefore, I am unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence that a man other than the accused was involved in aiding the accused in facilitating his sexual assault upon the complainant.  

[422]      I turn now to abetting.  Again, some jurisprudence as to the meaning of abetting is useful.  In R v Greyeyes 1997 CanLII 313 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 825 (SCC) (Greyeyes), the Court opined at para. 38:  

“Section 21(1)(c) simply provides that any person who abets any person in committing an offence is a party to that offence.  In order to secure a conviction, the Crown must prove not only that the accused encouraged the principal with his or her words or acts, but also that the accused intended to do so:  R. v. Curran (1977), 1977 ALTASCAD 284 (CanLII), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 151 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Jones (1977), 65 Cr. App. R. 250 (C.A.).  It is the establishment by the Crown of that intention which satisfies the mens rea or guilty mind requirement of s. 21(1) (c).”

[423]      In R v Almarales (2008), 2008 ONCA 692 (CanLII), 237 CCC (3d) 148 (Ont CA) at para. 67 the Court observed:

Section 21(1)(c) governs abettors. Despite its use of the verb “abets”, rather than the more expansive “does or omits to do anything for the purpose of abetting”, abetting includes conduct and fault elements similar to those of aiding. A person is a party to a crime as an abettor if that person:

•  Says or does something that encourages the (or, a) principal to commit the offence [the conduct requirement]; and

•  Offers the encouragement by words or conduct with the intention of encouraging the (or, a) principal to commit the offence [the fault requirement].

[424]      In Vu, the Court opined at paras. 58-9: 

Under s. 21(1), a person is criminally liable, as a party to an offence, if that person, having the requisite intent, plays one of the three enumerated roles in the offence — principal, aider or abettor.  An individual will bear the same responsibility for the offence regardless of which particular role he or she played: R. v. Thatcher, 1987 CanLII 53 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 652, at pp. 689-90.  As this Court recently explained in R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 411, a person becomes a party to an offence when that person — armed with knowledge of the principal’s intention to commit the crime and with the intention of assisting the principal in its commission — does (or, in some circumstances, omits to do) something that assists or encourages the principal in the commission of the offence (paras. 14-18).

In my view, the well-established principles of s. 21(1) criminal liability apply with equal force to continuing offences that have been completed in law but not in fact.  In particular, where an accused — with knowledge of the principal’s intention to see a continuing offence through to its completion — does (or omits to do) something, with the intention of aiding or abetting the commission of the ongoing offence, party liability is established.

Ce qu'il faut pour qu'il puisse y avoir condamnation d'un complice et certains facteurs d'appréciation

R. v Biring, 2023 BCSC 2466

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[357]   The potential liability as a party to the offence pursuant to s. 21(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is as a person who actually commits it (the so‑called principal offender), or who aids (ss.(b)) or abets (ss.(c)) a person who commits it.

[358]   Joint participants in a fatal assault can be convicted as co‑principals, as explained in R. v. L.I.H., 2003 MBCA 97:

Where several persons participate and assist each other in an assault which is intended to cause death or which they know will likely cause death, and the death of the victim is achieved, then each participant may be considered a joint principal offender to the murder [or any offence involving an assault] under s. 21(1)(a). This is so no matter which member of the group actually delivered the killing blow and even when it is not known which person struck the killing blow. 

This passage was cited with approval by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Miazga, 2014 BCCA 312, at para. 17.

[359]   Conviction as an aider requires an act or omission that assists the person who commits the offence, and that is done with the knowledge of that offence and an intention to assist the person who commits it: R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13,  at parags. 14-17. Mere presence at the scene of the offence does not support liability as an aider. The classic reference for that principle is Dunlop and Sylvester v. The Queen, 1979 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 881.

[360]   Abetting “includes encouraging, instigating, promoting, or procuring the crime to be committed”: R. v. Greyeyes, 1997 CanLII 313 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 825. It occurs when an accused “says or does something that encourages the (or a) principal to commit the offence [the conduct requirement], and offers the encouragement by words or conduct with the intention of encouraging the or a principal to commit the offence [the fault requirement]: R. v. Almarales, 2008 ONCA 692, at para. 67.

[361]   Common unlawful purpose liability pursuant to s. 21(2) results where an accused form an intention in common to commit an offence and assist each other in it, and another offence is committed that is objectively foreseeable as a probable consequence of the original one. Crucially, the offence that is actually committed must be different from the original one: R. v. Patel, 2017 ONCA 702, from paras. 40-42. This is a provision that does not appear to apply in this case, since the unlawful act underlying the manslaughter would be the assault that the accused are alleged to have participated in jointly.

[362]   The proper scope of evidence showing animus on the part of the accused was explained in R. v. Boukhalfa, 2017 ONCA 660:

[174]   In prosecutions for unlawful homicide, evidence is often adduced to establish the nature of the relationship between the accused and the deceased. Sometimes, evidence is proffered to establish animus or motive on the part of an accused to kill the deceased [for which we can substitute unlawfully assault in this case]. Animus or motive is relevant to establish, not only an accused’s participation in the unlawful killing of the deceased, but also the state of mind with which [it]  was done.

[175]   Animus or motive may be established in a variety of ways. By evidence of things done, of words spoken, or of some combination of both. But what is offered in evidence must be relevant to establish the animus or motive alleged.

[176]   In R. v. Barbour, 1938 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 465, the Supreme Court of Canada cautioned that it is not every itm of evidence about a quarrel between an accused and a deceased that can establish feelings of hostility or malignity, thus animus or motive, to commit a crime. Transient ebullitions of annoyance and anger on the part of an accused, which pass away and lead to nothing, are not sufficient. We ought not slip into the habit of admitting evidence which, reasonably viewed, cannot tend to prove animus or motive or to explain the acts charged merely because it discloses some incident in the history of the relations of the parties: Barbour at p.469.  

[363]   The correct approach to circumstantial evidence was neatly summarized in R. v. Okojie, 2021 ONCA 773:

[137]   In a case in which proof of one or more essential elements of an offence depends exclusively or largely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt or of an essential element of the offence must be the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole: R. v. Villaroman 2016 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000…at paras. 30, 34

 [138]   Inferences consistent with innocence may, but need not, arise from proven facts. This is because these inferences may also arise from a lack of evidence: Villaroman, at paras. 35-36. To establish guilt, the Crown is required to negative these reasonable possibilities consistent with innocence, but need not negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with the innocence of an accused: Villaroman, at para. 37. These other plausible theories or reasonable possibilities must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence, or absence of evidence, not on speculation: Villaroman, at para. 37.

[139]   To support a finding of guilt based entirely or substantially on circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence, taken as a whole, and assessed in the light of human experience, must exclude any other reasonable alternatives: Villaroman, at para. 41; R. v. Ali,…2021 ONCA 362, at paras. 97, 98.

[364]   Further helpful guidance on this topic was provided in R. v. Hudson, 2021 ONCA 772:

[70]      The assessment of circumstantial evidence, whether by triers of fact at first instance or by an appellate court on a review for unreasonableness, does not involve an examination of individual items of circumstantial evidence in isolation and separately from the rest, adjudging them against the criminal standard of proof and rejecting them if they are found wanting, as surely they will be. No individual item of circumstantial evidence is ever likely to do so. They are the building blocks of proof, not the final product. It is commonplace that individual items of evidence adduced by the Crown examined separately and in isolation, have not a very strong probative value. But all the pieces have to be considered. Each one in relation to the whole. And it is the whole of them, taken together, whose cumulative force must be considered and may constitute a basis for conviction: Coté v. The King, 1941 CanLII 348 (SCC), [1941] S.C.J. No. 49, 77 C.C.C. 75, at p. 76 C.C.C

[365]   Hudson also offered a distillation of the essential principles that govern the use of after‑the‑fact conduct:

[136]   Evidence of after-the-fact conduct encompasses evidence of what an accused said and did after the offence with which the accused is charged is alleged to have been committed. Its boundaries are co-extensive with the limits of human experience. It is not offence-specific, but rather is non-discriminatory in relation to offences and legal settings. Its proper legal treatment is highly context and fact-specific: [R. v.] Calnen, [2019 SCC 6 (CanLII), [2019] 1 S.C.R. 301] at para. 106, per Martin J. (dissenting, but not on this point).

[137]   Evidence of after-the-fact conduct is not some special category of evidence. It is circumstantial evidence. Nothing more. Nothing less. Granted, it invokes a chain of reasoning different from other circumstantial evidence – retrospectant, rather than prospectant or concomitant. But that it does so does not alter its fundamental nature. And like other items of evidence received in a criminal trial, evidence of after-the-fact conduct is received if it is relevant, material, admissible under the applicable rules of evidence, and not excluded because its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value: Calnen, at para. 107...

[138]   As with other forms of circumstantial evidence, evidence of after-the-fact conduct allows the trier of fact to draw inferences grounded in an accused's words and conduct. There is nothing new or unique about this. To draw inferences, the trier of fact invokes logic, common sense, and human experience. As with all circumstantial evidence, evidence of after-the-fact conduct sponsors a range of inferences each of which must be reasonable according to the measuring stick of human experience. The inferences available depend on the nature of the conduct, the inference sought to be drawn from it, the positions of the parties, and the totality of the evidence. Evidence of after-the-fact conduct is not nullified simply because it may generate a range of inferences. For the most part, it is for the trier of fact to choose among those reasonable inferences which inference will be drawn: Calnen, at para. 112...

[139]   Evidence of after-the-fact conduct may give rise to imprecise reasoning. It may encourage triers of fact to jump to questionable conclusions. It may seem more probative than it is. And so it is that judges should instruct juries to take into account any alternative explanations advanced for the accused's behaviour. And in some cases, further specific limiting instructions or cautions may be necessary to counteract any specific reasoning risks associated with the particular evidence: Calnen, at para. 118...

[140]   As a general rule, evidence of after-the-fact conduct does not require any specific caution about its use in proof of guilt: R. v. White, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 433, [2011] S.C.J. No. 13, 2011 SCC 13, at paras. 21-22; R. v. Adamson, [2018] O.J. No. 4104, 2018 ONCA 678, 364 C.C.C. (3d) 41, at para. 58. Evidence of after-the-fact words and conduct often comprises several individual incidents, whether of things said, done, or both. The evidence should be considered as a whole, not in a piecemeal fashion, and together with the rest of the evidence received at trial: R. v. McLellan, [2018] O.J. No. 2941, 2018 ONCA 510, 362 C.C.C. (3d) 183, at para. 47.

Le cadre analytique prescrit par l'arrêt Gladue relatif à la détermination de la peine d'une personne autochtone

R. c. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (CSC)

Lien vers la décision

93                              Voyons comment nous pouvons faire un résumé général de l’analyse qui précède.

 

1.   La partie XXIII du Code criminel codifie l’objet et les principes essentiels de détermination de la peine ainsi que les facteurs dont le juge doit tenir compte pour fixer une peine appropriée eu égard au délinquant et à l’infraction.

 

2.   L’alinéa 718.2e) impose au juge de la détermination de la peine d’examiner toutes les sanctions substitutives applicables et de porter attention aux circonstances, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne les délinquants autochtones.

 

3.   L’alinéa 718.2e) n’est pas une simple codification de la jurisprudence existante. Il a un caractère réparateur. Il a pour objet de remédier au grave problème de la surreprésentation des autochtones dans les prisons et d’encourager le juge à aborder la détermination de la peine selon une approche corrective. Le juge est tenu de donner une force réelle à l’objet réparateur de la disposition.

 

4.   L’alinéa 718.2e) doit être interprété et examiné dans le contexte des autres facteurs mentionnés dans cette disposition et à la lumière de l’ensemble de la partie XXIII. Tous les principes et facteurs énoncés dans la partie XXIII doivent être pris en considération dans la détermination de la peine. Il faut porter attention au fait que la partie XXIII, par l’art. 718, l’al. 718.2e) et l’art. 742.1 notamment, a réaffirmé l’importance de la réduction du recours à l’incarcération.

 

5.   La détermination de la peine est un processus individualisé, et, dans chaque cas, il faut continuer de se demander quelle est la peine appropriée pour tel accusé, telle infraction dans telle communauté. Toutefois l’al. 718.2e) a l’effet de modifier la méthode d’analyse que  les juges doivent suivre lorsqu’ils déterminent la peine appropriée pour des délinquants autochtones.

 

6.   L’alinéa 718.2e) impose aux juges d’aborder la détermination de la peine à infliger à des délinquants autochtones d’une façon individualisée, mais différente parce que la situation des autochtones est particulière. En déterminant la peine à infliger à un délinquant autochtone, le juge doit examiner:

 

(A)      les facteurs systémiques ou historiques distinctifs qui peuvent être une des raisons pour lesquelles le délinquant autochtone se retrouve devant les tribunaux;

 

(B)      les types de procédures de détermination de la peine et de sanctions qui, dans les circonstances, peuvent être appropriées à l’égard du délinquant en raison de son héritage ou attaches autochtones.

 

7.   Aux fins de l’examen de ces considérations, le juge du procès aura besoin de renseignements concernant l’accusé. Les juges peuvent prendre connaissance d’office des facteurs systémiques et historiques généraux touchant les autochtones, et de la priorité donnée dans les cultures autochtones à une approche corrective de la détermination de la peine. Normalement, des renseignements spécifiques à l’affaire proviendront des avocats et d’un rapport présentenciel qui tiendra compte des facteurs énumérés au point 6, pouvant aussi provenir d’observations présentées par la communauté autochtone intéressée, habituellement celle du délinquant.  Le délinquant peut renoncer à réunir ces renseignements.

 

8.   En l’absence de solution de rechange à l’incarcération, la durée de la peine devra être soigneusement examinée.

 

9.   L’alinéa 718.2e) ne doit pas être considéré comme un moyen de réduire automatiquement la peine d’emprisonnement des délinquants autochtones. Il ne faut pas présumer non plus que le délinquant reçoit une peine plus légère du simple fait que l’incarcération n’est pas imposée.

                 10.   L’absence de programme de peines substitutives spécifique à une communauté autochtone n’élimine pas la possibilité pour le juge d’imposer une peine qui tienne compte des principes de la justice corrective et des besoins des parties en cause.

 

11.                             L’alinéa 718.2e) s’applique à tous les délinquants autochtones où qu’ils résident, à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur d’une réserve, dans une grande ville ou dans une zone rurale. Aux fins de déterminer la collectivité autochtone pertinente en vue de fixer une peine efficace,  le terme «collectivité» devrait recevoir une définition assez large pour inclure tout réseau de soutien et d’interaction qui pourrait exister, y compris en milieu urbain. En même temps, le fait que le délinquant autochtone habite dans un milieu urbain qui ne possède aucun réseau de soutien ne relève pas le juge qui inflige la peine de son obligation d’essayer de trouver une solution de rechange à l’emprisonnement.

 

                 12.   Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la période d’emprisonnement imposée à un délinquant autochtone pourra dans certaines circonstances être moins longue que celle imposée à un délinquant non-autochtone pour la même infraction.

 

                 13.   Il n’est pas raisonnable de présumer que les peuples autochtones ne croient pas en l’importance des objectifs traditionnels de la détermination de la peine, tels la dissuasion, la dénonciation et l’isolement, quand ils sont justifiés. Dans ce contexte, en règle générale, plus grave et violent sera le crime, plus grande sera la probabilité d’un point de vue pratique que la période d’emprisonnement soit la même pour des infractions et des délinquants semblables, que le délinquant soit autochtone ou non-autochtone.