L'état du droit en matière de suggestion commune

Sideris c. R., 2006 QCCA 1351 (CanLII)

[9] En matière de suggestion commune, l'état du droit est maintenant bien établi. Quoique le juge ne soit pas lié par une telle suggestion (notamment lorsqu'il y a plaidoyer de culpabilité, selon l'article 606, paragr. (1.1)b)(iii), C.cr.), il ne peut pas non plus l'écarter sans respecter les règles que résume le juge Fish, alors de la Cour, dans R. v. Douglas, reflex, (2002) 162 C.C.C. (3d) 37, J.E. 2002-249 (sub. nom. Verdi-Douglas c. R.), aux paragraphes 42-43 et 51-52 :

[38] I think it important to emphasize that the joint submission in this case was the object of lengthy and detailed negotiations over a considerable period of time by experienced and conscientious counsel on both sides, with the participation of the police officers in charge of the investigation, and clearly contingent on a plea of guilty by the appellant.

[…]

[42] Canadian appellate courts have expressed in different ways the standard for determining when trial judges may properly reject joint submissions on sentence accompanied by negotiated admissions of guilt.

[43] Whatever the language used, the standard is meant to be an exacting one. Appellate courts, increasingly in recent years, have stated time and again that trial judges should not reject jointly proposed sentences unless they are “unreasonable”, “contrary to the public interest”, “unfit”, or “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”.

[Suit, aux paragr. 44-50, une revue de la jurisprudence canadienne et d'un rapport ontarien sur le sujet.]

[51] In my view, a reasonable joint submission cannot be said to “bring the administration of justice into disrepute”. An unreasonable joint submission, on the other hand, is surely “contrary to the public interest”. Accordingly, though it is purposively framed in striking and evocative terms, I do not believe that the Ontario standard departs substantially from the test of reasonableness articulated by other courts, including our own. Their shared conceptual foundation is that the interests of justice are well served by the acceptance of a joint submission on sentence accompanied by a negotiated plea of guilty – provided, of course, that the sentence jointly proposed falls within the acceptable range and the plea is warranted by the facts admitted.

[52] Moreover, I agree with the Martin Report, cited earlier, that the reasonableness of a sentence must necessarily be evaluated in the light of the evidence, submissions and reports placed on the record before the sentencing judge (subject, of course, to amplification of that record on appeal in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and the governing case law). I believe as well that sentencing judges are bound to ensure, by putting the appropriate questions directly to the accused, that the negotiated guilty plea is voluntary and unambiguous. A full record in both respects will be essential to meaningful appellate review in those cases, fortunately rare, where an appeal is found to be warranted.

[10] Par ailleurs, dans Boucher-Gagnon c. R., 2006 QCCA 903 (CanLII), 2006 QCCA 903, J.E. 2006-1422, au paragr. 4, la Cour explique que lorsque le juge s'apprête à rejeter une suggestion commune en faveur d'une peine différente, il doit en principe donner aux parties l'occasion de lui faire part de leurs observations. Décrivant le comportement approprié, la Cour écrit que :

[4] Il est aussi reconnu que le juge doit aviser les parties et leur donner l'occasion de réagir. Il a enfin le devoir d'exposer les motifs qui le poussent à ne pas donner suite à la suggestion commune.

[5] Lorsque le juge se conforme en tous points à cette ligne de conduite, notre Cour doit à sa décision la déférence qui s'impose de façon générale en matière de détermination de la peine. C’est le cas en l’espèce.

[6] Après avoir entendu les représentations des avocats, le juge a fait état du scepticisme qui l'animait et il s'est accordé plusieurs heures de réflexion. Il a par la suite invité les parties à lui soumettre des observations supplémentaires et accordé à l'avocat de l'appelant un délai pour que celui-ci s'entretienne avec son client. Ce dernier s’est vu autorisé à ajouter à son témoignage et le juge a tenu compte des ajouts dans ses motifs.

[Renvois omis.]

[11] Dans cette affaire, la Cour renvoie notamment à R. v. Sinclair, 2004 MBCA 48 (CanLII), (2001) 185 C.C.C. (3d) 569, où la Cour d'appel du Manitoba explique que :

15 If, after being provided with that information and those submissions, the judge is still considering departing from the joint recommendation, he or she should advise counsel of that fact and provide them with an opportunity to make further submissions, if they so wish. Counsel may be able to respond to concerns the sentencing judge may have for departing from the recommended sentence. See R. v. Thomas (O.) reflex, (2000), 153 Man. R. (2d) 98, 2000 MBCA 148, at para. 7, Broekaert, at paras. 10-11, Booh, at para. 13, and R. v. Hatt 2002 PESCAD 4 (CanLII), (2002), 163 C.C.C. (3d) 552, 2002 PESCAD 4, at para. 15.

16 If, after those submissions, the sentencing judge remains of the view that the joint submission is unfit or unreasonable, the judge may impose a different sentence, but must give clear reasons for doing so.

[12] Dans le même sens, voir également : R. v. Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 (CanLII), (2001) 159 C.C.C. (3d) 434 (Alb. C.A.); R. v. G.P., 2004 NSCA 154 (CanLII), (2004) 192 C.C.C. (3d) 432 (N.S. C.A.); R. v. McKenzie, 2006 SKCA 13 (CanLII), (2006) 206 C.C.C. (3d) 569 (Sask. C.A.). Dans ce dernier arrêt, la Cour d'appel de la Saskatchewan indique que :

[17] We agree entirely with those statements. In our opinion, the trial judge erred in rejecting the joint submission and in not accepting the joint recommendations of two experienced counsel. First, the record clearly indicates that counsel made joint submissions and briefly described the facts and rationale as outlined above. They were not given an opportunity to make further submissions to justify the approach taken by them to the sentencing recommendations. Once the sentencing judge had concluded that he might not accept the joint submission fairness dictates that counsel be given an opportunity to make further submissions addressing the concerns expressed by a sentencing judge. See: R. v. G.W.C. [renvoi omis] and R. v. McKerricher.