R. v. Pare, 2010 ONCA 563
[9] This case turns on the meaning to be attached to s. 139(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, which provides that every one who, in a judicial proceeding, “dissuades or attempts to dissuade a person by threats, bribes or other corrupt means from giving evidence” shall be deemed to wilfully attempt to obstruct the course of justice. The gist of the offence is the use of corrupt means to influence a witness. As is said in some of the cases, merely attempting by reasoned argument to have a witness tell the truth is not an offence. But attempting to persuade a witness to change their testimony, even to change the testimony to what the accused believes is the truth, is an offence where the means of persuasion is corrupt. Offering money to a complainant in a criminal case to change her testimony is a classic example of corrupt means. See R. v. Kotch (1990), 1990 ABCA 348 (CanLII), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 132 (Alta. C.A.) at 136.
[10] In my view, the mens rea of the offence is made out where the accused intentionally offers the improper inducement for the purpose of dissuading the witness from giving evidence, even if the accused is merely trying to persuade the witness to tell what the accused believes is the truth. The term “wilfully” requires that the accused act intentionally – for example, that the words used be intended as a threat. More importantly, “wilfully” also requires proof that the threat or inducement was made for the prohibited purpose of dissuading the witness. But the Crown need not prove that the accused otherwise had an improper motive. Equally, it is no defence that the accused’s motive was to ensure that the truth was told at the judicial proceeding. For the purposes of this case it is unnecessary to decide whether recklessness would also suffice to establish that the accused acted wilfully. See R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 1979 CanLII 1927 (ON CA), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.), at 379-82.
Aucun commentaire:
Publier un commentaire