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[38] The misuse of corporate funds for personal purposes is dealt with in Olan, supra, R. v. Lemire, 1964 CanLII 52 (SCC),[1965] S.C.R. 174; Cox and Paton v. R., 1963 CanLII 78 (SCC), [1963] S.C.R. 500; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1982), [1984] Q.B. 624, 2 W.L.R. 447, 2 All E.R. 216 (C.A.); R. v. Black and Whiteside, supra; R. v. Marquardt (1972), 18 C.R.N.S. 162, 6 C.C.C. (2d) 372, 3 W.W.R. 256 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Shaw (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 348 (N.B.C.A.), and R. v. Briltz (1983), 1983 CanLII 2577 (SK QB), 24 Sask. R. 120 (Q.B.). Ewart, supra, at p. 85, made the following observation concerning the misuse of corporate assets:
. . . The issue does not revolve around the ownership of the company, or the alleged consent which the accused themselves might purport to give in their capacity as directors. Nor does it turn on whether the conduct was intra vires or ultra viresthe company, or authorized or unauthorized by the laws governing corporations. Instead, in determining dishonesty, the jury should simply be left to assess whether corporate funds were, in fact, used for bona fide corporate purposes or for the purposes of the accused.
[39] Nightingale described the principles underpinning her category of “trust, quasi-trust and confidence” at p. 3-26 as follows:
. . . Canadian courts are not particularly concerned about whether the relationship between the parties was truly a relationship of trust, or whether it was a relationship of principal and agent, or a fiduciary relationship. Rather, Canadian courts are primarily concerned about whether the position, however identified or labelled, was misused by the accused to the detriment of the complainant.
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