R. v. Yonkman, 2005 BCCA 561
[9] This being a purely circumstantial case, the conviction can be sound only if it was open to the judge to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence as a whole was consistent with Yonkman being in the Jeep at the residence and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion (the rule in Hodge’s Case (1838), 1838 CanLII 1 (FOREP), 168 E.R. 1136). This Court has recognized that, in a case of this kind, fingerprint evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction, but the court must be satisfied on the evidence as a whole that the fingerprint was not left by the accused where it was found at some time other than when the crime was committed: R. v. M.R.I. (1992), 1992 CanLII 309 (BC CA), 14 B.C.A.C. 65 ¶ 29, and R. v. W.J.S., [1995] B.C.J. No. 318 ¶ 6 (QL) (C.A.). There must be a temporal connection between the fingerprint being left and the commission of the crime.
[10] The frailty in the Crown’s case is the lack of any evidence that would establish that Yonkman’s fingerprint on the mirror was left there when the Jeep was being driven to or from the residence as opposed to some earlier time. The Crown did not establish how long Yonkman had access to the Jeep. Apart from the fact that the ignition appeared to have been tampered with, there was no evidence as to whether the Jeep had been stolen, and, more particularly, if it had, when that had occurred. There is on the evidence then no reason why Yonkman’s fingerprint could not have been left on the mirror days, weeks, or months before the crime was committed.
[11] The Crown cites various decisions of this Court where fingerprint evidence has supported convictions: R. v. O’Neill (1996), 1996 CanLII 976 (BC CA), 71 B.C.A.C. 295; R. v. MacFadden (1981), 1981 CanLII 342 (BC CA), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 305; R. v. Christopherson, [1986] B.C.J. No. 703 (QL); and R. v. Stephen, (7 March 1973) Vancouver No. 793/72, as well as other decisions, but in none can it be said that the temporal connection that is missing here was inferred. The case that is perhaps closest in factual terms is the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Dufresne v. The Queen (1966), 1966 CanLII 981 (QC CA), 50 C.R. 208. There, in a case tried before a jury, a conviction based on the accused’s fingerprint being found on the rear-view mirror of a car used in an armed robbery of a bank was upheld on the basis that it was open to the jury to infer from the evidence that the accused had participated in the commission of the crime. But, unlike here, the evidence there was that the car had been stolen less than two hours before the robbery. The accused’s opportunity to leave his fingerprints on the car was therefore known to have been time-limited. There was some temporal connection established.
Aucun commentaire:
Publier un commentaire