Revue par la Cour d'appel du Manitoba des règles relatives à la détentions aux fins d'enquête

R v McKenzie, 2022 MBCA 3 

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The Investigative Detention

 

The Law

 

[10]                     The Supreme Court has recognized several common law police powers that permit interference with an individual’s liberty or property on the basis of the ancillary powers doctrine using the two-stage framework set out in R v Waterfield, [1963] 3 All ER 659 (CCA) (see Fleming v Ontario, 2019 SCC 45 at paras 41-55).

[11]                     Under the Waterfield framework, the lawfulness of police action turns on whether (a) the action falls within the general scope of a statutory or common law duty, and (b) the action involves a justifiable exercise of police powers associated with the duty (see Waterfield at 661; and Fleming at para 46).

[12]                     On the second stage of the Waterfield framework, a court assesses whether the interference was “reasonably necessary for the carrying out of the particular duty” (R v MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3 at para 36).  To answer that question, several competing interests are weighed:  (1) the importance of the performance of the duty to the public good, (2) the necessity of the interference with individual liberty for the performance of the duty, and (3) the extent of the interference with individual liberty (see MacDonald at para 37).

[13]                     One common law police power that has been recognized is in relation to investigative detentions (see R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52).  A police officer may detain an individual for investigative purposes “where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual is connected to particular criminal activity and that such a detention is reasonably necessary in the circumstances” (R v MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 at para 35; see also Mann at para 45).  An investigative detention affords police the ability to take reasonable measures to investigate an offence (see R v Clayton, 2007 SCC 32 at para 33).  As was said in Mann, “police officers must be empowered to respond quickly, effectively, and flexibly to the diversity of encounters experienced daily on the front lines of policing” (at para 16).

[14]                     The common law power of investigative detention is not limited to “a specific known criminal act” but extends to recent or ongoing criminal activity that is reasonably suspected (R v Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 at para 35).

[15]                     In Mann, the Supreme Court explained how the second stage of the Waterfield framework should be assessed in the context of an investigative detention in this way (at para 34):

 

. . .  The detention must be viewed as reasonably necessary on an objective view of the totality of the circumstances, informing the officer’s suspicion that there is a clear nexus between the individual to be detained and a recent or on-going criminal offence.  Reasonable grounds figures at the front-end of such an assessment, underlying the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the particular individual is implicated in the criminal activity under investigation.  The overall reasonableness of the decision to detain, however, must further be assessed against all of the circumstances, most notably the extent to which the interference with individual liberty is necessary to perform the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent of that interference, in order to meet the second prong of the Waterfield [framework].

 

[16]                     The objective of the reasonable suspicion standard for a lawful investigative detention is for meaningful judicial review of what the police knew at the time of their decision making so that society’s interest in the detection and punishment of crime can be balanced with maintaining individual rights and freedoms (see R v Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11 at paras 24-25).

[17]                     The standard of reasonable grounds to suspect is both “an objective and subjective standard” (Mann at para 27).  While a reasonable suspicion must be grounded in objective facts that stand up to independent scrutiny, it is a lower standard on the spectrum of standards of proof than reasonable grounds to believe as “it engages the reasonable possibility, rather than probability, of crime” (Chehil at para 27; see also MacKenzie at para 74; and The Director of Criminal Property and Forfeiture v Ramdath et al, 2021 MBCA 23 at para 25).

[18]                     Reasonable suspicion is assessed by the court examining the totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of the detention (see Chehil at paras 29-35; and MacKenzie at paras 71-73).  This is a broad contextual inquiry that is “fact-based, flexible, and grounded in common sense and practical, everyday experience” to ascertain whether the constellation of factors rise above the level of a generalized suspicion or hunch (Chehil at para 29).

[19]                     Because the reasonable suspicion standard is invariably fact-driven, there is little in the way of guidance as to when the threshold will be met. However, what is not disputed is that, if the sum of the objectively discernable facts support the conclusion of possible recent or ongoing criminal behaviour by the individual to be detained, then the standard of reasonable suspicion is met even if there is a reasonable innocent alternative in the circumstances.  There is no duty on police to undertake further investigation to seek out exculpatory factors or to rule out possible innocent explanations (see Chehil at para 34).  The nature of the judicial inquiry does not require a court to choose between competing inferences or assess which was the most likely possibility at the time.  While the courts have an important duty to protect the rights and freedoms of everyone, they must be mindful in an after-the-fact assessment of the reality that police often have to make quick decisions in dynamic, unpredictable and dangerous situations based on imperfect, evolving or even wrong information.  The Supreme Court has accepted that “more innocent persons will be caught” under the reasonable suspicion standard than the reasonable grounds standard (MacKenzie at para 85; and see Chehil at para 28).

[20]                     Finally, an investigative detention is not a “de facto arrest” (Mann at para 35).  Police powers governing investigative detentions and arrests are different (see Mann at para 45; and R v Suberu, 2007 ONCA 60 at para 40, aff’d 2009 SCC 33).  An investigative detention is intended to generally be “a brief and limited suspension of a citizen’s right to go about his or her business freely” (James A Fontana & David Keeshan, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada, 11th ed (Toronto:  LexisNexis, 2019) at 1096).

[21]                     An investigative detention that is carried out in conformity with common law police powers and in an otherwise reasonable manner is not an arbitrary detention for the purposes of section 9 of the Charter (see Mann at paras 20, 45).