Ce que constitue de l'aide ou de l'encouragement au sens de l'article 21 Ccr

R. v. Almarales, 2008 ONCA 692

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66]         Section 21(1)(b) applies to aiders. A person is a party to a crime as an aider if that person:

•        Does (or, in the case of a legal duty, omits to do) something that helps the (or a) principal to commit the offence [the conduct requirement]; and

•        Provides the assistance with the intention of helping the (or, a) principal to commit the offence [the fault requirement].

R. v. Maciel (2007), 2007 ONCA 196 (CanLII), 219 C.C.C. (3d) 516 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 86, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2007), 220 C.C.C. (3d) vi; R. v. Hibbert, 1995 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, 99 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at paras. 36-37.

[67]         Section 21(1)(c) governs abettors. Despite its use of the verb “abets”, rather than the more expansive “does or omits to do anything for the purpose of abetting”, abetting includes conduct and fault elements similar to those of aiding. A person is a party to a crime as an abettor if that person:

•        Says or does something that encourages the (or, a) principal to commit the offence [the conduct requirement]; and

•        Offers the encouragement by words or conduct with the intention of encouraging the (or, a) principal to commit the offence [the fault requirement].

R. v. Helsdon (2007), 2007 ONCA 54 (CanLII), 216 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 43-44.

Une fausse déclaration délibérée fournie à la police durant l'enquête policière peut équivaloir à de l'entrave à la justice

R. v. Theriault, 2020 ONSC 3317 

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[234]      In terms of the offence of attempt to obstruct justice, s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code makes it an offence for a person to wilfully attempt in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice. The attempt must be wilful and it must result in at least a risk that, without any further action, an injustice will result; see R. v. Yarlasky, 2005 CanLII 3936 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 606 (Ont.C.A.). It is not required that the attempt be successful or even possible; see R. v. Hansen, 2016 ONSC 548, aff’d 2018 ONCA 46 and R. v. David (2009), 2009 CanLII 37705 (ON SC), 68 C.R. (6^th) 139 (Ont.S.C.J.) at paras. 24-26. The “course of justice” includes the investigative stage of the process; see R. v. Wijesinha, 1995 CanLII 67 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 422 at paras. 27-34 and R. v. Spezzano (1977), 1977 CanLII 1371 (ON CA), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 87 (Ont.C.A.). A knowingly false statement given to police during the course of an investigation can amount to attempt to obstruct justice. The falsity of the statement can be based on a material omission.

[235]      However, in the absence of a duty to provide information, mere omission standing alone is generally not sufficient to make out the offence of obstruct justice. The statement as a whole must be assessed in context. If, by virtue of a material omission, the statement made to an investigator is false in the sense that it has the tendency to obstruct, defeat or corrupt the ends of justice, the actus reus of the offence has been established. If the statement, including the omission, was given with the requisite intent to obstruct, defeat or corrupt the ends of justice, the offence is complete; see R. v. Hoggarth (1956), 1956 CanLII 515 (BC CA), 25 C.R. 174 (B.C.C.A) and R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5 at para. 52.

Les principes applicables à l'infraction d'entrave à la justice

R. v. Matthew Melo, 2014 ONSC 1364

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[22]      For me to find Mr Melo guilty of obstructing justice, Crown counsel must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the following essential elements of the offence:

i.              that Mr Melo is guilty of the conduct alleged, (i.e., that he withheld evidence pertaining to a firearms investigation);

ii.            that his conduct had a tendency to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice; and

iii.           that Mr Melo intended, by his conduct, to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice.

[23]      By way of general principles applicable to the determination of such issues, I note that they include the following:

•         Although “the course of justice” in this context includes judicial proceedings, either existing or proposed, it is not limited to such proceedings.  The offence under s.139(2) also includes attempts by a person to obstruct, prevent or defeat a prosecution which he contemplates may take place, notwithstanding that no decision to prosecute has been made; see R. v. Spezzano (1977), 1977 CanLII 1371 (ON CA), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 87 (C.A.).

•         The term “course of justice” also includes an investigatory stage which may lead to a prosecution:  R v. Wijesinha, 1995 CanLII 67 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 422.

•         Although framed in the language of an “attempt”, s.139(2) in fact creates a substantive offence, the gist of which is the doing of an act which has a tendency to prevent or obstruct the course of justice and which is done for that purpose; see R. v. May (1984), 1984 CanLII 3489 (ON CA), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Ont.C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused, [1984] 2 S.C.R. vii.

•         It is not necessary that the tendency materialized; see R. v. Graham (1985), 1985 CanLII 3644 (ON CA), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 210 (Ont.C.A.), affd 1988 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 214.  The gravamen of the offence under s.139(2) is the wilful attempt to obstruct justice, and it does not matter that the attempt was not only unsuccessful but could not have been successful; see R v. Hearn (1989), 1989 CanLII 3938 (NL CA), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 376 (Nfld.C.A.), affd 1989 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1180.

•         The offence nevertheless requires the specific intention to obstruct justice; see R. v. Charbonneau (1992), 1992 CanLII 2979 (QC CA), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 49 (Que.C.A.).

La mens rea de l'infraction d'entrave à la justice

R v Yazelle, 2012 SKCA 91

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[1]        The offence of attempting to obstruct justice pursuant to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code is a substantive offence (see: R. v. May (1984), 1984 CanLII 3489 (ON CA), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.)) and one of specific intent (see: R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 52, and R. v. Charbonneau (1992), 1992 CanLII 2979 (QC CA), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 49 (Que. C.A.)). The sole issue arising in the appeal is whether, in acquitting Christopher Gene Yazelle of obstruction, the trial judge misapprehended the mens rea requirement of the offence.

[4]        The Crown does not dispute that obstruction is a specific intent offence. While it had initially submitted that, in this case, the mens rea of the offence of obstruction is manifest upon proof of the actus reus of the offence, the Crown agreed in oral argument that the requisite mens rea requires proof of an intention to obstruct justice, not just an intention to do an act which has the effect of obstructing justice (see: R. v. Beaudry; R. v. Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at paras. 38-39; and R. v. Esau, 2009 SKCA 31, 324 Sask. R. 95). Nevertheless, due to the natural consequence of the actus reus in this case (i.e., a refusal to testify), the Crown says the only inference available is that Mr. Yazelle intended to obstruct justice. As to the question of law alone which is necessary to found the Crown’s appeal, the Crown submits the trial judge erred by conflating motive and intent to improperly conclude that a specific intent to obstruct had not been made out on the evidence before the court.

Les principes qui prévalent en matière de dédommagement

Legault c. R., 2008 QCCA 1228 

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[7]               L’ordonnance de dédommagement fait partie du processus de détermination de la peine[2]. Elle émane d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire qui doit être exercé avec circonspection[3].

[8]               En général, une « cour d’appel est assujettie à une norme élevée de retenue à l’égard de la peine imposée par le juge de première instance »[4] et elle ne doit pas « remettre en question la décision du juge qui prononce la peine à moins que celle-ci ne soit manifestement inappropriée » [5].

[9]               L'appelant allègue que l'ordonnance de dédommagement met en péril ses chances de réadaptation et le contraint à demeurer perpétuellement le débiteur d'une obligation qu'il ne pourra jamais exécuter. Le ministère public n’a pas contesté les conclusions de l’appel. Le directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales écrit :

L’intimée reconnaît que le juge de première instance aurait dû tenir compte des ressources financières du délinquant avant de lui imposer une ordonnance de dédommagement selon l’article 738 du Code criminel et ce, tel que nous l’enseigne les arrêts R. c. Fitzgibbon, 1990 CanLII 102 (CSC), [1990] 1 R.C.S. 1005 et R. c. Zelensky, 1978 CanLII 8 (CSC), [1978] 2 R.C.S. 940.

Alors, imposer trois ordonnances de dédommagement – totalisant un montant de 1 174 499,04 $ à un individu de 21 ans sans emploi, sans actif significatif, sans formation particulière et déjà sujet à trois autres ordonnances de même nature dans des dossiers connexes – ne respecte pas la capacité de payer de l’appelant.

Par conséquent, uniquement pour le motif exposé précédemment et en raison des circonstances particulières de ce pourvoi, le ministère public consent au présent appel et à l’annulation des ordonnances selon l’article 738 du Code criminel émises dans le dossier 605-01-005170-067.

[10]           Les principes qui prévalent en matière de dédommagement sont exposés par l'auteur François Dadour[6] :

1.            L’ordonnance de dédommagement doit être rendue avec circonspection ;

2.            Cette ordonnance fait partie intégrante de la détermination de la peine en ce qu’elle participe à la sanction du contrevenant, lie ce dernier au dédommagement de la victime, le prive du fruit de l’infraction qu’il a commise et facilite la remise en état de la victime ;

3.            Le juge d’instance doit considérer l’objectif visé par le créancier du dédommagement, de même que l’existence de procédures civiles ;

4.            L’ordonnance de restitution n’est pas un substitut à ces procédures civiles ;

[...]

9.      Le dédommagement en double peut être évité par le recours aux juridictions civiles ;

10.   L’ordonnance de dédommagement peut être indiquée lorsqu’un jugement civil est inexécutoire suite à la faillite du débiteur.

[11]           L’auteur ajoute :

Il est à noter que le juge d’instance a le pouvoir de rendre une ordonnance de dédommagement pour un montant inférieur aux dommages causés. En effet et en lien avec un commentaire similaire quant au quantum des amendes, il n’est ni souhaitable ni approprié qu’une ordonnance de dédommagement mette en péril les chances de réhabilitation du contrevenant par la destruction de son patrimoine.[7]

[12]           L’auteur Ruby partage le même avis :

A compensation order which would ruin the offender financially, thus impairing chances of rehabilitation, should not be imposed; neither should one be made where compliance would be particularly onerous or impossible, nor where enforcement would be difficult or impossible. The totality principle applies to the whole of the sentence, including the order of restitution.[8]

[13]           La jurisprudence a également établi que le juge qui rend l’ordonnance de dédommagement doit tenir compte des ressources financières de l’accusé[9], même si la capacité ne doit pas toujours être le facteur déterminant.[10] Comme l'explique le juge Doherty, s'exprimant pour la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, dans Taylor[11] :

[5] It has been stated many times that restitution is a discretionary order.  It should only be made with restraint and caution and not only in order to avoid putting the victim through the extra legal expense of going to the civil courts or as a substitute for civil procedure.

[6] As stated by Martin J.A., speaking for this court, in R. v. Scherer (1984), 1984 CanLII 3594 (ON CA), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 30 at 38:

It may be that in some cases it would be inappropriate to make a compensation order in an amount that is unrealistic to think that the accused could ever discharge.

[7] In his reasons, the trial judge said:

The only possible way to complete that part of his rehabilitation is through penal consequences.  Because of the magnitude of the crime, the duration of the crime, there is no other way to compensate the victims other than his family, then by a penitentiary term [emphasis added].

[8] He then ordered restitution. The restitution order appears to have been added as an afterthought to permit the victim to avoid the costs of a civil action.  The Crown had not asked for a restitution order.

[9] The relevant factors and objectives to the imposition of a restitution order have been discussed by this court in R. v. Devgan (1999), 1999 CanLII 2412 (ON CA), 136 C.C.C. (3d) 238 and R. v. Biegus (1999), 1999 CanLII 3815 (ON CA), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 245.  An order for restitution must also bear some reality to the circumstances of the appellant and must be directly associated with the sentence imposed as the public reprobation of the offence.  In the circumstances of this case, the overriding factor is the means of the appellant.  There is no ability, as noted by the trial judge, to pay even the most minute part of this staggering amount, with no expiry date.  It would kill all hope for the appellant for the future and it would likely impair his chances of rehabilitation.  The order is clearly excessive and futile and the trial judge erred in that regard.

[10 ]It remains open to the victim to take proceedings in the civil court, if so advised.

[Nous soulignons]

 

[14]           En conclusion, une ordonnance de dédommagement doit être rendue avec pondération et circonspection afin de remplir les objectifs et principes de la détermination de la peine soit, plus particulièrement, la réparation des torts, la conscience de la responsabilité, la dénonciation et la dissuasion. Cette ordonnance ne constitue pas le substitut à un recours civil.  Lorsque la capacité de payer est absente, comme en l’espèce, il est déraisonnable de rendre une ordonnance de dédommagement de plus d’un million de dollars. Il importe de souligner que   l’ordonnance de dédommagement survie à la libération d’un failli[12].  En l'espèce, le montant du dédommagement est si excessif que le délinquant ne pourra jamais l'acquitter, ce qui met en péril le principe de réinsertion sociale.

L'ordonnance de dédommagement s'inscrit dans le cadre de l'imposition d'une peine proportionnelle et les principes généraux de détermination de la peine

R. v. Castro, 2010 ONCA 718 

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[21] Section 738(1)(a) governs the making of restitution orders when money has been taken. It gives the court discretion to order the offender to make restitution by paying the victim "an amount not exceeding the replacement value of the property as of the date the order is imposed, less the value of any part of the property that is returned . . . where the amount is readily ascertainable".

[22] A restitution order forms part of a sentence. In accordance with general sentencing principles, a restitution order is entitled to deference and an appellate court will only interfere with the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion on the basis of error in principle or if the order is excessive or inadequate: see R. v. Devgan (1999), 1999 CanLII 2412 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 161, [1999] O.J. No. 1825, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 238 (C.A.), at para. 28. [See Note 2 below] [page616]

[23] A restitution order should not be made as a mechanical afterthought to a sentence of imprisonment: R. v. Siemens, 1999 CanLII 18651 (MB CA), [1999] M.J. No. 285, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (C.A.), at para. 10. Care must be taken not to simply add a restitution order to a sentence of imprisonment which, in itself, is a fit punishment for the crime, as this can amount to excessive punishment and offend the totality principle.

[24] The starting point for any discussion of the objectives and factors that inform a judge's exercise of discretion in making a restitution order is the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Zelensky, 1978 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940, [1978] S.C.J. No. 48. While the decision deals with predecessor legislation, [See Note 3 below] the decision of Laskin C.J.C. nevertheless serves as a blueprint for the considerations to be taken into account in making a restitution order under s. 738(1). These considerations were summarized by Labrosse J.A. in Devgan, at para. 26, as part of a non-exhaustive list:

In Zelensky, Laskin C.J. identified certain objectives and factors that relate to the application of s. 725(1). These considerations have been expanded upon in subsequent cases. Below, I have consolidated these objectives and factors, all of which are relevant to the issue of what constitutes a proper exercise of discretion for the purpose of s. 725(1). 1. An order for compensation should be made with restraint and caution; 2. The concept of compensation is essential to the sentencing process:
(i) it emphasizes the sanction imposed upon the offender;
(ii) it makes the accused responsible for making restitution to the victim;
(iii) it prevents the accused from profiting from crime; and [page617]
(iv) it provides a convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery for the victim; 3. A sentencing judge should consider:
(i) the purpose of the aggrieved person in invoking s. 725(1);
(ii) whether civil proceedings have been initiated and are being pursued; and
(iii) the means of the offender. 4. A compensation order should not be used as a substitute for civil proceedings. Parliament did not intend that compensation orders would displace the civil remedies necessary to ensure full compensation to victims. 5. A compensation order is not the appropriate mechanism to unravel involved commercial transactions; 6. A compensation order should not be granted when it would require the criminal court to interpret written documents to determine the amount of money sought through the order. The loss should be capable of ready calculation. 7. A compensation order should not be granted if the effect of provincial legislation would have to be considered in order to determine what order should be made; 8. Any serious contest on legal or factual issues should signal a denial of recourse to an order; 9. Double recovery can be prevented by the jurisdiction of the civil courts to require proper accounting of all sums recovered; and 10. A compensation order may be appropriate where a related civil judgment has been rendered unenforceable as a result of bankruptcy.

[26] In general, the omission of a judge to give consideration to a relevant factor gives rise to reviewable error. Thus, the omission of a sentencing judge to give any consideration to the relevant factor of the offender's ability to repay the amount of money taken is an error. A restitution order is not intended to undermine the prospects for rehabilitation of the offender: see, e.g., R. v. Ali, 1997 CanLII 2655 (BC CA), [1997] B.C.J. No. 2516, 98 B.C.A.C. 239 (C.A.); [page618] R. v. Biegus, 1999 CanLII 3815 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 4963, 141 C.C.C. (3d) 245 (C.A.), at paras. 15 and 22; and R. c. Ford, 2002 CanLII 34585 (QC CQ), [2002] J.Q. no 4751, 2 C.R. (6th) 348 (C.Q. crim. & pén.).

[27] Reviewing courts have, however, consistently held that no single factor is itself determinative of whether a compensation order should be granted and that the weight to be given to individual considerations will depend on the circumstances of each case. Those circumstances include two considerations I wish to emphasize: the nature of the offence and, when money has been taken, what has happened to the money.

[28] Insofar as the nature of the offence is concerned, in cases involving breach of trust, the paramount consideration is the claims of the victims: Fitzgibbon, at pp. 1014-15 S.C.R. Ability to pay is not the predominant factor. Indeed, where the circumstances of the offence are particularly egregious, such as where a breach of trust is involved, a restitution order may be made even where there does not appear to be any likelihood of repayment: R. v. Yates, 2002 BCCA 583 (CanLII), [2002] B.C.J. No. 2415, 169 C.C.C. (3d) 506 (C.A.), at paras. 12 and 17.

[29] The decisions in Ali, Biegus and Ford do not involve a breach of trust. [See Note 4 below] By contrast, Fitzgibbon involved an undischarged bankrupt lawyer who acknowledged the amounts he owed. He was ordered to pay compensation to the Law Society of Upper Canada's Compensation Fund and to reimburse a client for the amount by which the client's losses exceeded the maximum allowable claim from the Compensation Fund. Cory J., writing on behalf of the court, stated, at pp. 1014-15 S.C.R.:

[The appellant] used his position to defraud the very persons who had every reason to trust and rely upon him. The fraudulent acts of a lawyer directed against his own clients warranted the imposition of a compensation order even though the lawyer's means at the time of sentencing were minimal. The claims of the victims of the fraudulent acts should be paramount. (Emphasis added)

[30] In imposing a sentence where the offender has used his or her position to commit a breach of trust, the primary considerations are the protection of the public, general deterrence and the repudiation of the conduct of which the offender was found guilty. Relevant factors include the length of time over which the conduct took place, whether the offence was a sophisticated and well-planned scheme, the amount involved [page619] and, most importantly, the impact of the offender's conduct on the victims. The secondary considerations are specific deterrence, rehabilitation and any mitigating circumstances such as a plea of guilty or co-operation with the authorities (in tracing the funds): Scherer, per Martin J.A., at para. 34.

[31] In Sherer, some of the victims had lost most or all of their life savings as a result of the offender's breach of trust. While Martin J.A. reduced the sentence of imprisonment from nine years to seven years, he upheld the compensation order in the amount of $2,173,164.21 to the persons aggrieved. [See Note 5 below] Restitution in that case recognized the victims' needs and at the same time underlined the larger social interest in the imposition of a sanction related to the crime.

[32] Whether or not a breach of trust has occurred, the impact of the crime on the victim is an important factor. In Biegus, the appellant was one of several co-accused convicted of bank theft. The ringleader, Hornett, worked for Intercon Security and as a result had access to the combinations of ATM machines in various Royal Bank branches. Biegus was brought in by Hornett and participated with him in seven thefts. After Biegus pleaded guilty, he co-operated fully with the police and returned $14,000 of the cash. He received a sentence of two years less a day in jail and was ordered to make restitution of the remaining amount stolen in the seven thefts with Hornett, namely, $638,534. The sentencing judge recognized that Biegus did not have the ability to pay this amount but did not say why this fact was irrelevant in imposing the order for restitution. On appeal, the court held that the sentencing judge erred in not addressing this factor and also erred by failing to take into account the potentia lly unfair effect to Biegus of the restitution orders already made against [page620] two other co- accused. The court did not say that Biegus engaged in any breach of trust. The restitution order was excessive and prevented Biegus's rehabilitation. The court noted that the bank's insurer had already repaid the bank $453,387.70. Furthermore, the bank could be in a position to recover a portion of its losses from Hornett. Therefore, the court reduced the amount of restitution to $264,000, the amount Biegus acknowledged he received from the robbery. Where the victim is a large institution, or is likely to have insurance for the amount of the loss, the impact on the victim will obviously be much less than in situations where disabled or elderly persons have lost their ability to earn income and to replace the money taken.

[33] This brings me to a discussion of the second consideration I wish to emphasize, namely, evidence as to what has happened to the money that was taken illegally and how this evidence factors into a determination of the ability to pay. [See Note 6 below]

[34] Ability to pay must take into consideration what disclosure has been made respecting where the money is or has gone. Depriving the offender of the fruits of his crime is one of the overarching goals of making a restitution order: see Working Paper 5: Restitution of the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), cited with approval by Laskin C.J.C. in Zelensky, at pp. 952-53. In cases of theft, robbery, fraud, breach of trust or the like, I see no reason why the court should accept an offender's bald assertion that he or she has no ability to make restitution because the money "is gone" when no evidence is proffered in support of this assertion. When the victims can clearly establish that "the replacement value of the property" under s. 738(1)(a) is the amount of money taken, surely it is the offender asserting that he or she has no ability to make restitution who is in the best position to provide transparency concerning what has happened to that m oney. A bald assertion that the money is gone should be given no weight. Similarly, when the location of the money illegally obtained by the offender is unknown, the sentencing judge is entitled to take that fact [page621] into account with respect to ability to pay in making a restitution order: see, e.g., R. v. Williams, [2007] O.J. No. 1604, 2007 CanLII 13949 (S.C.J.), per Hill J., at para. 41.

[35] To summarize, a restitution order is simply part of the determination of an overall fit sentence, and general sentencing principles apply. While consideration of the offender's ability to pay and the impact of a restitution order on an offender's rehabilitation are factors to be considered, the weight to be given to these factors will vary depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. When the offence involves a breach of trust, a primary consideration is the effect on the victim; rehabilitation is a secondary consideration. Furthermore, consideration of the ability to pay includes the ability to make payment from the money taken as a source of restitution.