R. v. McSween, 2020 ONCA 343
[90] The mens rea for the child pornography offences was also addressed in R. v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, [2014] S. C.J. No. 43, 2014 SCC 43.3 The accused in that case was charged with [page60] possession of child pornography, as well as making child pornography available through an Internet file-sharing program called "LimeWire." Cromwell J. held, at para. 83:
There is no dispute that the accused in a prosecution under s. 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code must be proved to have had knowledge that the pornographic material was being made available. This does not require, however, as the trial judge suggested, that the accused must knowingly, by some positive act, facilitate the availability of the material. I accept Caldwell J.A.'s conclusion that the offence is complete once the accused knowingly makes pornography available to others. As he put it,
[i]n the context of a file sharing program, the mens rea element of making available child pornography under s. 163.1(3) requires proof of the intent to make computer files containing child pornography available to others using that program or actual knowledge that the file sharing program makes files available to others.
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