La mens rea de l'infraction de distribution de pornographie juvénile

R. v. Giuseppe Michienzi, 2013 ONSC 1025

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[22]         Subsection 163.1(3) prohibits the distribution of child pornography.  There are two basic ways to commit the offence of distribution of child pornography. The first way occurs if a person “transmits, makes available … or exports child pornography”. The second way occurs if a person “possesses for the purpose of transmission, making available … or exportation any child pornography”. The actus reus is satisfied if the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt one of these alternate methods of distributing child pornography. The indictment in this case particularized the means of distribution: “makes[1] available child pornography”. 

[23]         Mr. Justice Martin in R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 1979 CanLII 1927 (ON CA), 25 O.R. (2d) 705, 101 D.L.R. (3d) 488 (C.A.) at p. 717 stated  as follows:

The general mens rea which is required and which suffices for most crimes where no mental element is mentioned in the definition of the crime, is either the intentional or reckless bringing about of the result which the law, in creating the offence, seeks to prevent and, hence, under s. 281.2(1) is either the intentional or reckless inciting of hatred in the specified circumstances.

[24]         Watt and Fuerst in Tremeear’s Criminal Code (Toronto: Carswell, 2012), define the elements of s. 163.1(3) as follows:

            Under s. 163.1(3) any listed method of distribution, possession or making child pornography available is sufficient to prove the external circumstances. The mental element includes not only the intention to cause the external circumstances of the offence and knowledge of the character of the subject matter, but also, where charged, proof of the purpose of [the defendant’s] possession. (emphasis in original)

 

[25]         The accused is charged with “makes available child pornography”. Subsection 163.1(3) does not specify the mental state for this method of distribution. A subjective mental state is presumed since the distribution of child pornography is a serious criminal offence. The gravamen of this method of distribution is knowledge of the character of the images with the intention to make the images available to others. Mr. Michienzi conceded that he knew the character of the images, namely pornographic images of children, by virtue of his guilty plea to count 1.

[26]         In R. v. Pressacco, 2010 SKQB 114, 352 Sask. R. 276, Currie J. held that ss. 163.1(3) required the Crown to prove that the accused had the intent to make child pornography available (Pressacco at para. 24). In R. v. Lamb, 2010 BCSC 1911, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2701, Ehrcke J. followed Pressacco and held that the mens rea for ss. 163.1(3) is an intention to make child pornography available to others.

[27]         In R. v. Spencer, 2011 SKCA 144, 377 Sask. R. 280 at paras. 51-60, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 73, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal reviewed the limited jurisprudence concerning the requisite mental element for the offence of distributing child pornography. The court held that ss. 163.1(3) “requires that an accused knowingly make available child pornography” (Spencer, at para. 62).

[28]         I find that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to make child pornography available to others as stated in the above jurisprudence.

[29]         The alternative method of committing the offence occurs when a person “possesses for the purpose of…making available…any child pornography”. The common law holds that: (1) a subjective mens rea of knowledge is required for the element of possession (Beaver v. The Queen, 1957 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1957] S.C.R. 531; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 at paras. 15-16), and (2) a subjective state of mind of recklessness is not sufficient (R. v. Sandhu (1989), 1989 CanLII 7102 (ON CA), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 492 (Ont. C.A.).

[30]         The Criminal Code sometimes expresses the requirement for intent with the words “for a purpose” (Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law, 5^th ed. (Toronto: Thomson, 2007), at pp. 223-224).  The gravamen of this method of distribution of child pornography is knowledge of the images (which images satisfy the Criminal Code definition of child pornography) with the intent or purpose of making the pornographic images of children available to others (R. v. Taylor (1974), 1974 CanLII 1452 (BC CA), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 36, [1974] B.C.J. No. 858 (C.A.), at p. 41).

[31]         In my view, the mental state of intention is required for the alternate ways of committing the offence. Further, the mental state of recklessness is not sufficient.