Le droit à la communication de la preuve & le privilège de l'informateur

R v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524 (CanLII)

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[77]      An accused’s right to make full answer and defence, a principle of fundamental justice constitutionally protected under s. 7 of the Charter, includes the right to full and timely disclosure, the right to know the case to meet, the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence proffered for admission by the Crown, and the right to cross-examination: Crevier, at para. 52. 

[78]      On the other hand, neither the right to make full answer and defence nor the right to disclosure is absolute.  For example, however fundamental, the right to make full answer and defence does not reach so far that it issues a blank cheque to an accused to pursue any and every conceivable tactic and line of inquiry in service of defending him or herself against an allegation of crime: Crevier, at para. 53; R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 64.  Context and the presence and influence of other competing interests are of importance in establishing the outer boundaries of the right: Crevier, at para. 53. 

[79]      Nor is an accused’s right to disclosure absolute.  It is subject to the discretion of the Crown, a discretion which extends to the enforcement of CI privilege: R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at pp. 335-36 and 339.

[80]      Confidential informant privilege is a class privilege.  The rule is of fundamental importance to the workings of our criminal justice system: Bisaillon v. Keable, 1983 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60, at p. 105; R. v. Leipert, 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 10.

[81]      Informer privilege is of such importance that, once established, a court is not entitled to balance the benefit that enures from the privilege against countervailing considerations: Leipert, at paras. 12 and 14.  The only exception to the rule is innocence at stake.  No exception exists for the right to make full answer and defence: Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 43(CanLII), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253, at para. 28.

[82]      Preservation of the near absolute nature of CI privilege has significant implications for the redaction process as well as for requests for further disclosure about the informant’s sources of knowledge or the nature of the information provided.  It is virtually impossible for a court to know what details may reveal the identity of a CI: Leipert, at para. 28; World Bank Group v. Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 (CanLII), 395 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 129.

[83]      An absolute CI privilege rule, subject only to the innocence at stake exception, is consistent with the protection the Charteraccords to the right to a fair trial: Leipert, at para. 24; Vancouver Sun, at para. 28.

Comment apprécier la légalité et la raisonnabilité d'une fouille sans mandat

R. v. Amare, 2014 ONSC 4119 (CanLII)

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[85]          As to the police authority to search a vehicle without a search warrant, the following principles apply:

(1)         warrantless searches are an exception in Canadian law and are presumptively unreasonable unless justified by the Crown on a balance of probabilities: R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at para. 21; R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 (CanLII), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 84

(2)         however, “[a] warrantless search…may be justified at common law if it is a search incident to arrest”: R. v. Valentine, 2014 ONCA 147 (CanLII), at para. 43 (appln for leave to appeal filed [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 183)

(3)         if the arrest itself is not lawful or valid, then the search incident to such an arrest is itself unlawful and therefore unreasonable and violative of s. 8 of the Charter: Chehil, at para. 55; R. v. Caslake, 1998 CanLII 838 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 13; R. v. Day, 2014 NLCA 14 (CanLII), at para. 60 (appeal as of right filed [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 136)

(4)         a search incident to arrest is constrained by these limits:

In Cloutier [v. Langlois, 1990 CanLII 122 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158], L'Heureux-Dubé J. also recognized the potential breadth of this police power. She held that the court must balance the state's interests in law enforcement and the protection of the police against the arrested person's interest in privacy in order to determine whether a search was a reasonable and justifiable use of the police power. She then set out three important limits on the power to search incident to arrest (at p. 186):

1. This power does not impose a duty. The police have some discretion in conducting the search. Where they are satisfied that the law can be effectively and safely applied without a search, the police may see fit not to conduct a search. They must be in a position to assess the circumstances of each case so as to determine whether a search meets the underlying objectives.

2. The search must be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, such as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against the accused. The purpose of the search must not be unrelated to the objectives of the proper administration of justice, which would be the case for example if the purpose of the search was to intimidate, ridicule or pressure the accused in order to obtain admissions.

3. The search must not be conducted in an abusive fashion and in particular, the use of physical or psychological constraint should be proportionate to the objectives sought and the other circumstances of the situation.

If all three of these conditions are met, and the arrest itself is lawful, the search will be "authorized by law" for the purposes of s. 8 of the Charter. In the case at bar there is no allegation that the arrest was unlawful or that the search was abusive. Rather, the problem in this case is that the objective and scope of the search exceeded its permissible limits.

(Caslake, at para. 14)

(5)         in appropriate cases, a search incident to arrest may be executed upon a motor vehicle: Caslake; Day.

[86]          To be reasonable, any search must be executed in a reasonable manner:

(1)         it must be borne in mind that when the police work in a close encounter with someone who may have committed a criminal offence, they must have reasonable resort to measures to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, harm to themselves: R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52 (CanLII), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 43; R. v. Mellenthin, 1992 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at p. 623

(2)         when the police execute extraordinary measures as an aspect of arrest or search, consideration of whether their actions are based upon reasonably based and genuinely held beliefs, depends not only the factual circumstances of a particular case, but also the experience of the officers in similar situations, and their related training - “Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions”: Florida v. J.L., at p. 272 - the courts should exercise some caution before attempting “to micromanage the police’s choice of equipment”: R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31 (CanLII), [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, at para. 31

(3)         indeed, the courts have recognized the real potential for the presence of firearms in the immediate vicinity of significant quantities of illicit drugs as the trafficker seeks to protect his or her valuable commodity: United States v. Garcia, U.S.C.A. 10th Cir. (May 12, 2014; No. 13-2155), at pp. 12-3, 16; United States v. Beltram, U.S.C.A. 7th Cir. (May 15, 2014; No. 12-2990), at p. 9.

Le cadre juridique applicable à l'examen de la légalité d'une arrestation (incluant quand les motifs raisonnables proviennent d'un informateur)

R. v. Amare, 2014 ONSC 4119 (CanLII)

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[83]          In assessing whether the police breached s. 9 of the Charter in arresting a person, the following considerations apply:

(1)         an arbitrary arrest includes an unlawful arrest: R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at paras. 55, 57

(2)         an arrest will be unlawful, and arbitrary, if the arresting officer does not have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the subject has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offence: Criminal Code, s. 495(1)

(3)         although it has been observed that “the onus is on the Crown to show that the objective facts” rise to the level supporting a lawful detention (R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 (CanLII), [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220, at para. 45), it has generally been recognized that the onus is on the accused to demonstrate that his detention was unlawful: R. v. Nartey, 2013 ONCA 215 (CanLII), at para. 14

(4)         not only must the police officer have reasonable grounds in the subjective sense of a personal, honestly-held belief, but also the asserted grounds must be justified upon an objective measure of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the officer: R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 (CanLII), [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250, at paras. 62-3, 83; R. v. Storrey, 1990 CanLII 125 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at pp. 250-1

(5)         in other words, the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard “consists of compelling and credible information that provides an objective basis”, objectively discernible facts, for drawing inferences as to the existence of factual circumstances: Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at para. 117

(6)         the fact “that an experienced constable has an honest subjective belief, while not conclusive, is itself some evidence that the belief is objectively reasonable”: R. v. Biccum, 2012 ABCA 80 (CanLII), at para. 21; see also R. v. Luong, 2010 BCCA 158 (CanLII), at para. 19; Chehil, at para. 47

(7)         reasonable and probable grounds does not involve a mathematical assessment of facts and circumstances but rather a common-sense, non-technical approach – it is necessarily a qualitative standard upon which reasonable people can differ in some cases: R. v. Campbell (2010), 2010 ONCA 588 (CanLII), 261 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 52-4 (affd 2011 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 549); Chehil, at paras. 29, 62, 69; MacKenzie, at para. 71; R. v. Ward, 2012 ONCA 660 (CanLII), at para. 116

(8)         that said, reasonable grounds is about “probabilities” (Chehil, at paras. 27-8; MacKenzie, at para. 74), not confidence at the level of no reasonable doubt (R. v. Debot (1986), 1986 CanLII 113 (ON CA), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 219 (affd (1989), 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.), at pp. 198, 213), nor at the low threshold of mere suspicion or possibility (R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 37; R. v. Baron (1993), 1993 CanLII 154 (SCC), 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510 (S.C.C.), at paras. 43, 47

(9)         the standard of reasonable probability applied to the totality of the circumstances, considering the relevant facts cumulatively, where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion and possibility, does not demand that police officers “always be correct, but that they always be reasonable” United States v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2012)

(10)      reasonable probability does not require that the level of confidence of the officer rise to the equivalent of, or beyond, a balance of probabilities: Mugesera, at para. 14; R. v. Spence, 2011 BCCA 280 (CanLII), at para. 31; R. v. Loewen (2010), 2010 ABCA 255 (CanLII), 260 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 18 (affd 2011 SCC 21 (CanLII), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 167); R. v. Jacobson (2006), 2006 CanLII 12292 (ON CA), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 270 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 22; Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1052 (2013)

(11)      in assessing whether she or he has reasonable grounds, a police officer must take into account all available information disregarding only such information as she or he has good reason to believe is unreliable: R. v. Golub (1997), 1997 CanLII 6316 (ON CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 203 – the officer is not required “to undertake further investigation to seek out exculpatory factors or rule out possible innocent explanations”: Chehil, at paras. 34, 67

(12)      an officer’s training and experience may provide “an objective experiential…basis” for grounds of belief: Chehil, at para. 47; MacKenzie, at paras. 62-4, 73

(13)      a court reviewing the existence of reasonable grounds concerns itself “only with the circumstances known to the officers”: R. v. Wong, 2011 BCCA 13 (CanLII), at para. 19 (leave to appeal denied [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 90) (emphasis in original)

(14)      provided that the officer who directs that an arrest take place has reasonable and probable grounds, officers acting under his or her direction are deemed to be acting on those grounds: Debot (S.C.C.), at pp. 206, 214.

[84]          Not infrequently, the police act upon hearsay information received from a confidential informant. Within limits, they are entitled to do so:

(1)         general principles can be derived from these authorities:

Consequently, a mere statement by the informant that he or she was told by a reliable informer that a certain person is carrying on a criminal activity or that drugs would be found at a certain place would be an insufficient basis for the granting of the warrant. The underlying circumstances disclosed by the informer for his or her conclusion must be set out, thus enabling the justice to satisfy himself or herself that there are reasonable grounds for believing what is alleged. I am of the view that such a mere conclusory statement made by an informer to a police officer would not constitute reasonable grounds for conducting a warrantless search or for making an arrest without warrant. Highly relevant to whether information supplied by an informer constitutes reasonable grounds to justify a warrantless search or an arrest without warrant are whether the informer's "tip" contains sufficient detail to ensure it is based on more than mere rumour or gossip, whether the informer discloses his or her source or means of knowledge and whether there are any indicia of his or her reliability, such as the supplying of reliable information in the past or confirmation of part of his or her story by police surveillance. I do not intend to imply that each of these relevant criteria must be present in every case, provided that the totality of the circumstances meets the standard of the necessary reasonable grounds for relief.

(Debot (OCA), at pp. 218-9)

…

In my view, there are at least three concerns to be addressed in weighing evidence relied on by the police to justify a warrantless search. First, was the information predicting the commission of a criminal offence compelling? Secondly, where that information was based on a "tip" originating from a source outside the police, was that source credible? Finally, was the information corroborated by police investigation prior to making the decision to conduct the search? I do not suggest that each of these factors forms a separate test. Rather, I concur with Martin J.A.'s view that the "totality of the circumstances" must meet the standard of reasonableness. Weaknesses in one area may, to some extent, be compensated by strengths in the other two.

...

In my opinion, it should not be necessary for the police to confirm each detail in an informant's tip so long as the sequence of events actually observed conforms sufficiently to the anticipated pattern to remove the possibility of innocent coincidence. As I noted earlier, however, the level of verification required may be higher where the police rely on an informant whose credibility cannot be assessed or where fewer details are provided and the risk of innocent coincidence is greater.

(Debot (SCC), at pp. 215, 218)

…

I conclude that the following propositions can be regarded as having been accepted by this court in Debot and Greffe [(1990), 1990 CanLII 143 (SCC), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.)].

(i)    Hearsay statements of an informant can provide reasonable and probable grounds to justify a search. However, evidence of a tip from an informer, by itself, is insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

(ii)   The reliability of the tip is to be assessed by recourse to "the totality of the circumstances". There is no formulaic test as to what this entails. Rather, the court must look to a variety of factors including:

(a)   the degree of detail of the "tip";

(b)   the informer's source of knowledge;

(c)   indicia of the informer's reliability such as past performance or confirmation from other investigative sources.

(R. v. Garofoli (1990), 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.), at p. 191)

(2)         in considering whether informant information is compelling, a number of factors are considered including the degree of specificity or detail in the tipster’s account, the currency of the information, whether the informant has first-hand or direct knowledge of the relevant facts, etc:

First, as to the detail or particularity of the informer's information, the fewer the details the greater the risk of innocent coincidence or a false tip: Regina v. Lewis (1998), 1998 CanLII 7116 (ON CA), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) at 490; Regina v. Sutherland (2001), 2000 CanLII 17034 (ON CA), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 231 (Ont. C.A.) at 239; Regina v. Haskell, 2004 ABQB 474 (CanLII), [2004] A.J. No. 804 (Q.B.) at para. 90. A lack of detail plunges the tip into the range of rumour, gossip and speculation: Regina v. Zammit (1993), 1993 CanLII 3424 (ON CA), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 112 (Ont. C.A.) at pp. 120-1; Regina v. Woodworth and Woodworth, [2006] N.S.J. No. 26 (S.C.) at para. 57, 63. Greater precision enhances reliability: Regina v. Wiley (1993), 1993 CanLII 69 (SCC), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.) at 170; Lewis, at p. 489; Regina v. Shoghi-Baloo, [1999] O.J. No. 325 (C.A.) at para. 3 (leave to appeal refused [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 297). A tip can be compelling even if it contains some inaccuracies: Regina v. Kesselring (2000), 2000 CanLII 2457 (ON CA), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 119 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 123.

…

Second, dealing with the informer's source or means of knowledge, the reliability of an informer's information is diminished by an absence of any sense as to how the tipster acquired his or her information: Zammit, supra at 120-1; Regina v. Traverse(2003), 2003 NLCA 18 (CanLII), 175 C.C.C. (3d) 537 (Nfld. & Lab. C.A.) at para. 2-6, 20; Regina v. Deol (2006), 2006 MBCA 39 (CanLII), 208 C.C.C. (3d) 167 (Man. C.A.) at para. 16; Woodworth, at para. 57, 63; Regina v. MacDonald, [2005] O.J. No. 551 (S.C.J.) at para. 18.

(R. v. Baldwin (2007), 2007 CanLII 41427 (ON SC), 52 C.R. (6th) 13 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 49-50)

(3)         in assessing the reliability of the tip, the credibility of the informant is important including consideration as to whether he or she is an untested source or has a track record of providing accurate information to the police in the past (R. v. Markiewicz, 2014 ONCA 455 (CanLII), at para. 2; R. v. Soto, 2011 ONCA 828 (CanLII), at paras. 8-9), the tipster’s own criminal antecedents, whether any benefit was sought or promised or actually given in exchange for the information, and, whether the informant is anonymous or identified to the police as in the latter case the source is exposed to the jeopardy of being charged with public mischief or obstruction of justice for deliberately misleading the police: R. v. Noorali, 2010 ONSC 2558 (CanLII), at para. 40 (affd 2012 ONCA 589 (CanLII)); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274-5 (2000)

(4)         while effective corroboration of a confidential informant’s information need not confirm all details of his or her account, and need not confirm the commission of the alleged crime itself (R. v. Caissey, 2007 ABCA 380 (CanLII), [2007] A.J. No. 1342 (C.A.), at para. 23 (affd 2008 SCC 65 (CanLII), 2008 S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 2)), there should be confirmation of something(s) material within the communicated information as opposed to routine or commonly available facts

(5)         in order to protect a confidential informer’s identity, the police are not required to disclose the informer’s identity or information that might tend to disclose his or her identity: Leipert v. The Queen (1997), 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.), at p. 397; Farinacci et al. v. The Queen (1994), 1994 CanLII 123 (SCC), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), at pp. 53-9; Regina v. Scott (1991), 1990 CanLII 27 (SCC), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 300 (S.C.C.), at pp. 312-5; Regina v. Hosie (1996), 1996 CanLII 450 (ON CA), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 399-400

(6)         accordingly, in criminal proceedings, the state may provide to the court and the accused only redacted information from a confidential informant in an effort to protect his or her identity – in these circumstances, while that may be the limit of what is available by way of disclosure, and recognizing that such measures as a judicial summary of the redacted material may be impossible without compromising the informant’s identity (R. v. Beckford, 2014 ONCA 66 (CanLII), at para. 4), there may nevertheless be options in some cases:

The police and the Crown were under a legal obligation to protect the identity of confidential informants: R. v. Leipert, 1997 CanLII 367 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 15. Defence counsel did not suggest at trial that he could bring his case within the innocence at stake exception to the confidential informant privilege, thereby entitling him to access to the informant's identity. This is the only recognized exception to that privilege: R. v. Leipert, at paras. 20-22. Nor did trial counsel challenge the legitimacy of the confidential-informant claim advanced by the Crown. Counsel did not contend that any of the editing was unnecessary or otherwise improper. He did not ask the trial judge to examine the unredacted information, review the editing process and perhaps order further disclosure or provide judicial summaries of the redacted contents: see R. v. Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at pp. 1460-61.

Crown counsel at trial also did not ask the trial judge to consider the unredacted version of the information before determining the merits of the appellant's s. 8 claim. Crown counsel was content to have the validity of the warrant and, hence, the reasonableness of the search determined on the contents of the redacted information. As observed in Leipert, at para. 38:

The issue before the trial judge was whether there were reasonable grounds for the issuance of the warrant. If the Crown wished to limit its defence of the reasonableness of the warrant and subsequent search to particular grounds, it was entitled to do so. At the end of the day the task of the judge was to make a ruling on reasonableness on the basis of the information relied on by the Crown. [Emphasis added.]

In summary, the Crown was content to have the reasonableness of the search determined exclusively on the basis of the redacted information. The defence did not challenge the validity of the confidential informant claims, seek access to the identity of those informants nor challenge the editing done by the Crown to protect the identity of those informants. In my view, these positions taken on the voir dire have significance in the s. 24(2) analysis.

(R. v. Blake (2010), 2010 ONCA 1 (CanLII), 251 C.C.C. (3d) 4 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 15-7)

(7)         where the Crown proceeds in its argument on the basis of the redacted information alone to support the existence of reasonable grounds, it cannot purport to rely upon a submission that the police in fact had more grounds in the undisclosed material: Blake, at para. 29; R. v. Dhillon (2010), 2010 ONCA 582 (CanLII), 260 C.C.C. (3d) 53 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 63

(8)         in any event, determining whether or not, on the totality of circumstances, the police had reasonable grounds based on a confidential informant’s tip is largely a fact-driven exercise with case-to-case comparisons of modest assistance at best – that said, the facts of the present case do not align with the authority relied upon by the defence (R. v. Daley, 2014 ONSC 1079 (CanLII) – no vehicle licence plate number provided (para. 18), no belief in informer’s past reliability (para. 25), no corroboration (para. 26)), falling more so into the range of circumstances identified in other cases: Noorali; R. v. Caravaggio, 2012 ONCA 248 (CanLII), at para. 4.

Le tribunal jouit du pouvoir de contrôler ses procédures et de refuser de procéder à une audition sur des questions a priori sans fondement

Zampino c. R., 2016 QCCQ 2255 (CanLII)

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[11]            La jurisprudence reconnaît que le tribunal jouit du pouvoir de contrôler ses procédures et de refuser de procéder à une audition sur des questions a priori sans fondement.  Ce principe a été confirmé à plusieurs occasions par les tribunaux, notamment par la Cour suprême dans R. c. Pires; R. c. Lising, où la Cour précise ce qui suit au paragraphe 35 :

Les préoccupations touchant l’utilisation judicieuse des ressources judiciaires sont tout aussi légitimes aujourd’hui, et peut‑être même davantage, qu’elles ne l’étaient il y a 15 ans […].  Pour que notre système de justice fonctionne, les juges qui président les procès doivent être en mesure de veiller au bon déroulement des instances.  L’un des mécanismes leur permettant d’y arriver est le pouvoir de refuser de procéder à une audition de la preuve lorsque la partie qui en fait la demande est incapable de démontrer qu’il est raisonnablement probable que cette audience aidera à résoudre les questions soumises au tribunal.

[12]            Dans R. v. Bains, au paragraphe 69, la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique énonce ce qui suit sur ce même sujet :

There is no absolute right to a voir dire merely because an accused chooses to allege a Charter violation. An applicant must show that a voir dire is necessary and would assist the “proper trial of the real issues”. 

[13]            En l’espèce, le requérant a reçu divulgation des fruits de l’enquête menée par la Sûreté du Québec dans le projet Faufil.  Il a également obtenu de très nombreux éléments émanant de la Commission qui ont été jugés pertinents pour un motif ou un autre.  Les déclarations ou témoignages, publics ou privés, qui ont été rendus devant la Commission sur le sujet du Faubourg Contrecœur par différentes personnes font notamment partie des éléments divulgués.  Les renseignements détenus par la Commission qui sont susceptibles d’affecter la crédibilité ou fiabilité de la preuve devant être produite au procès, incluant les témoignages, font également partie des éléments divulgués.

[14]            Il est vrai que le concept de pertinence dépend toujours du contexte propre à chaque affaire.  Il est également juste d’affirmer que dans le doute, le Tribunal doit toujours pencher en faveur de la divulgation des renseignements dont la pertinence est discutable.

[15]            Cependant, le droit d’un accusé à la divulgation de la preuve comporte indubitablement des limites.  Un accusé ne peut se fonder sur ce droit pour se lancer dans la proverbiale « partie de pêche » ou « recherche à l’aveuglette » de renseignements.  Le droit à la divulgation de la preuve est une composante essentielle du droit à une défense pleine et entière.  Il ne s’agit pas d’un droit permettant une inquisition sans limite sur l’organisme responsable d’une enquête, sur celui responsable d’une poursuite, ou sur un organisme distinct qui aurait analysé à des fins différentes une même trame factuelle.

[16]            Bien que le requérant ait effectivement été contraint de témoigner devant la Commission, il est clair qu’il bénéficie présentement de la protection des articles 7 et 13 de la Charte relativement à l’utilisation que les autorités peuvent faire de son témoignage et de toute preuve dérivée.  Il est également clair que le ministère public a l’intention de respecter ces deux garanties constitutionnelles et que la prétention du requérant à l’effet que des motifs obliques auraient alimenté la décision de la Commission de le faire témoigner est entièrement spéculative.

[17]            Même en appliquant un seuil de preuve très minimal, rien n’étaye l’allégation du requérant à l’effet que les renseignements sollicités pourraient potentiellement être d’une quelconque pertinence.  Le Comité de coordination mis en place en marge de la Commission n’avait pas pour fonction de recueillir quelque preuve que ce soit.  Les notes personnelles que les procureurs du ministère public auraient prises dans le cadre des audiences publiques de la Commission sont, de toute évidence, non pertinentes.  Et il en va de même des autres renseignements que sollicite le requérant par le biais de la présente requête.

[18]            En somme, pour paraphraser la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans R. v. Garrick, le requérant « [has] failed to meet the preliminary threshold contemplated by R. v. Kutynec ».

Le cumul des erreurs dans l'appréciation à savoir s'il est opportun ou non d'arrêter les procédures

Baazov c. Autorité des marchés financiers, 2018 QCCQ 4449 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

[192]     Le Tribunal est conscient du fait que la quantité de données recueillies à partir d’appareils électroniques (ordinateurs, cellulaires) peut être énorme et très difficile à gérer. Sans demander la perfection, on doit s’attendre à ce que cette preuve soit organisée et raisonnablement accessible. Le volume de la preuve à gérer ne peut pas  servir comme excuse pour justifier des erreurs répétées dans la divulgation de la preuve. Le Tribunal est même d’avis que plus la preuve à traiter est grande, plus il devient nécessaire pour le ministère public d’organiser la preuve et de la rendre accessible aux défendeurs. Comme l’a souligné le juge Boswell dans R. v. Dunn, 2009 CanLII 75397 (ON SC), au paragraphe 59 :

In my view, the importance of organization and searchability increases proportionately with the volume of material disclosed.  In other words, the greater the volume of material disclosed, the greater the need for organization and reasonable search capabilities

[193]     Rappelons que c’est la poursuite qui a la responsabilité de gérer et de contrôler la divulgation de la preuve. Pour reprendre les propos de la Cour dans Keyes, supra, ce n’est pas la fonction d’un tribunal d’excuser des erreurs de routine de la poursuite en les traitant de circonstances exceptionnelles.

[194]     Par ces décisions antérieures, le Tribunal, dans cette affaire, a priorisé la poursuite du procès nonobstant certaines difficultés dans la divulgation de la preuve. Est-ce qu’on est maintenant rendu au point où le cumul des erreurs ne permet plus d’excuser les impairs de la poursuite dans la divulgation de la preuve? Alors que la société a un intérêt certain à ce que les poursuites pénales soient jugées au fond,     est-ce qu’on peut toujours demander aux défendeurs d’encaisser les coups ou de subir les inconvénients des erreurs répétées de la poursuite?

[195]     Il ne faut pas oublier qu’en bout de ligne, ce sont les requérants dans cette affaire qui vont subir les conséquences d’un procès inéquitable en raison du retrait d’une preuve pertinente. À ce sujet, il y a lieu de citer les propos du juge Brunton dans Beaulieu c. R., 2011 QCCS 639 (CanLII), au paragraphe 32 :

Dans ce dossier, « l'utilisation optimale du matériel », compte tenu du volume sans précédent de la divulgation, est une préoccupation primordiale. Dans toute analyse, on doit également garder à l'esprit que les requérants font face à des accusations qui, si elles sont prouvées, résulteront, pour la plupart, en leur incarcération pour le restant de leur vie. La quantité de preuve communiquée à ce jour est difficile à décrire, car tellement volumineuse.