Une objection au dépôt en preuve d'un certificat d'analyse des échantillons d'alcool doit avoir lieu au moment où la preuve est présentée et non lors des plaidoiries à la fin du procès

R. c. Thelisma, 2010 QCCS 3420 (CanLII)

[9] La question est donc de savoir si l'appelant pouvait, lors de ses observations à la fin du procès, formuler des objections à l'égard de l'admissibilité du certificat déjà déposé en preuve.

[10] La jurisprudence sur cette question est unanime.

[11] Dans R. c. C.(L.), le juge Rochette écrit ce qui suit:

Si l'appelant entendait soulever l'absence de motifs raisonnables tant au plan du Code criminel que de la Charte, il aurait dû s'objecter au dépôt des résultats d'analyse de l'alcootest et forcer le ministère public à faire la démonstration de tels motifs. Il aurait dû soulever cette prétendue lacune dans la preuve et forcer l'administration d'une preuve additionnelle, ou faire lui-même cette preuve. Il aurait dû le faire assez tôt pour que le poursuivant puisse répliquer efficacement.

[12] Dans l'arrêt R. c. Gundy, le juge Rosenberg de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario énonce l'approche suivante lorsque la question de l'admissibilité des résultats d'un alcootest est en cause:

To summarize, on a charge of "over 80" or impaired driving, where an issue arises as to the admissibility of the results of the Intoxilizer/Breathalyzer analysis, the trial court should proceed as follows:

Generally

1. If the accused does not challenge the admissibility of the results of the Intoxilizer/Breathalyzer analysis on the basis that the accused's rights under the Charter were violated, the Crown is not required to establish that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the s. 254(3) demand.

2. Any objection to the admissibility of the results of the analysis should ordinarily be made, at the latest, when the Crown tenders the evidence either through a certificate under s. 258(1)(g) or by way of oral testimony.

3. Where the accused intends to object to the admissibility of the results of the analysis on the basis of a violation of the Charter, the accused should comply with Rule 30 of the Rules of the Ontario Court of Justice in Criminal Proceedings, although a trial judge has a discretion to dispense with notice in a proper case.

Charter challenge because of lack of reasonable and probable grounds

4. Where the accused objects to the admissibility of the results of the analysis pursuant to ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make the demand, the burden is on the Crown to establish the requisite grounds.

5. Reasonable and probable grounds involve an objective and subjective test. Where the grounds depend upon a "fail" from an approved screening device, the Crown must prove that the officer reasonably believed that he or she was using an approved device.

6. In the absence of credible evidence to the contrary, the officer's testimony that he or she made a demand with an approved screening device is sufficient evidence that the officer had the requisite reasonable belief. The officer is not required to give the particular model number or otherwise identify the device. Obvious errors such as incomplete reference to the model number do not undermine the officer's testimony that the device was an approved screening device.

7. Where the officer did not have the requisite reasonable and probable grounds, the warrantless seizure of breath samples for analysis in an Intoxilizer or breathalyzer is an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of s. 8 and the results may be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

[13] Le juge Rosenberg examine aussi spécifiquement la question de la tardiveté d'une objection au dépôt en preuve d'un certificat d'analyse des échantillons d'haleine.

[14] Il formule les observations suivantes:

Defence counsel took no objection to the admissibility of the results of the Intoxilizer tests either when the certificate was tendered during the evidence of Constable Twilley or during the testimony of the Intoxilizer operator, Constable Cormier. He also did not object to Constable Cormier's testimony about the results of the tests or the admissibility of the Subject Test Reports that also showed the results of the Intoxilizer tests. Further, no objection was taken to the admissibility of any of this evidence at the close of the Crown's case. Finally, the defence expert referred to this evidence during his testimony. The first inkling that there was any concern about the admissibility of this part of the Crown's case came a month later during submissions. In my view, the objections came too late.

[…]

In my view, the trial judge erred in permitting the defence to challenge the admissibility of the certificate and the results of the Intoxilizer test at the completion of the trial. Allowing the argument at that stage did not serve the interests of justice. I do not agree that the Crown was not prejudiced by the manner in which the challenge to the evidence unfolded. Had timely objection been taken, Crown counsel would have had the option of calling additional evidence. A month later, the case was closed and presumably the witnesses were gone. As it turned out, the trial judge dismissed the objection, but the Crown could have been unfairly prejudiced because of the defence's failure to make a timely objection. These observations do not relate solely to the Charter issue but apply to all of the other objections to the admissibility of the Intoxilizer results that were taken by counsel for the first time at the end of the case.

[15] Il réfère aussi à la décision de la Cour d'appel de Saskatchewan dans R. c. Enden où le juge Sherstobitoff écrit ce qui suit:

It is trite law that an objection to the admissibility of evidence must be made when the evidence is tendered. See R. v. Pelletier 1995 CanLII 3923 (SK C.A.), (1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 139, 128 Sask. R. 214 (Sask. C.A.) and R. v. Kutynec reflex, (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 7 O.R. (3d) 277 (Ont. C.A.). To allow the delay argument at the final argument stage of the trial would deprive the Crown of the opportunity to lead evidence relevant to the issue. It is further noted in this respect that the respondent did not cross-examine the Crown witnesses respecting delay, and did not take up the Crown on its offer to put the officer who accompanied the arresting officer on the stand for cross-examination.

[16] Finalement, dans l'affaire R. c. Charrette, le juge Moldaver écrit ceci:

I am further satisfied that as a matter of policy and sound criminal procedure, the Rilling principle should apply equally to s. 258(1)(c) as it does to s. 258(1)(g). When one considers the carnage and destruction caused by impaired drivers, I do not think we should be promoting "trial by ambush" in "over 80" trials. In Gundy, this court made it clear that the notice requirements for Charter applications should, as a rule, be adhered to and that non-Charter motions to exclude evidence should be raised before or when the evidence is proffered (see Gundy at paras. 19-24 and 50).

[17] Toutes ces décisions établissent le même principe. Une objection au dépôt en preuve d'un certificat d'analyse des échantillons d'alcool doit avoir lieu au moment où la preuve est présentée et non lors des plaidoiries à la fin du procès.