La distinction entre l'affaiblissement des capacités en générale et l'affaiblissement des capacités de conduire

R. c. Guillemette, 2011 QCCS 1964 (CanLII)

[15] Dans son mémoire, l'appelante énonce la question en litige : les facultés de l'intimé étaient-elles affaiblies un tant soit peu par l'alcool? Or, avec égards, cette question est imparfaite. Par contre, le juge ne se méprend pas sur la question essentielle qu'il doit résoudre. Dans sa décision, le juge fait référence au véritable test applicable — et il a raison — qui est: les facultés de conduire de l'intimé étaient-elles affaiblies un tant soit peu par l'alcool?

[16] En effet, notre Cour d'appel dans les arrêts R. c. Guibord, [1998] J.Q. no 564 au par. 11 et R. c. Laprise [1996] J.Q. no 3950, a reconnu l'application des principes énoncés par l'arrêt R. c. Stellato 1994 CanLII 94 (C.S.C.), [1994] 2 R.C.S. 478 de la Cour suprême, tels qu'appliqués par l'arrêt c. Andrews, 1996 CanLII 6628 (AB C.A.), (1996), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 392, rendu peu après par la Cour d'appel de l'Alberta.

[17] Dans ce dernier arrêt, d'ailleurs mentionné par le premier juge, la Cour fait la distinction entre l'affaiblissement des capacités en générale et l'affaiblissement des capacités de conduire. Le ministère public doit prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l'habileté de conduire de l'accusé est affaiblie légèrement par l'alcool ou une drogue conformément à l'arrêt R. c. Stellato, précité, la question n'étant pas de savoir si l'habileté générale d'une personne est affaiblie.

[18] Dans l'arrêt R. c. Andrews, précité, la Cour écrit aux pp. 399 et 402:

This case turns upon the meaning of the words in s.253(b) of the Criminal Code, "while the person's ability to operate the vehicle ... is impaired by alcohol". The trial judge felt that the Stellato decision meant that "slight impairment by the accused at the particular time" was sufficient for a conviction. In applying this as the legal test, he made a critical error. He failed to focus the issue upon the question of whether Mr. Andrews' ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired.

The courts must not fail to recognize the fine but crucial distinction between "slight impairment" generally, and "slight impairment of one's ability to operate a motor vehicle". Every time a person has a drink, his or her ability to drive is not necessarily impaired. It may well be that one drink would impair one's ability to do brain surgery, or one's ability to thread a needle. The question is not whether the individual's functional ability is impaired to any degree. The question is whether the person's ability to drive is impaired to any degree by alcohol or a drug. In considering this question, judges must be careful not to assume that, where a person's functional ability is affected in some respects by consumption of alcohol, his or her ability to drive is also automatically impaired.

Impairment is a question of fact which can be proven in different ways. On occasion, proof may consist of expert evidence, coupled with proof of the amount consumed. The driving pattern, or the deviation in conduct, may be unnecessary to prove impairment. More frequently, as suggested by Sissons C.J.D.C. in McKenzie, [1955] A.J. No. 38 proof consists of observations of conduct. Where the evidence indicates that an accused's ability to walk, talk, and perform basic tests of manual dexterity was impaired by alcohol, the logical inference may be drawn that the accused's ability to drive was also impaired. In most cases, if the conduct of the accused was a slight departure from normal conduct, it would be unsafe to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his or her ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. Put another way, as was done in Stellato, the conduct observed must satisfy the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the ability to drive was impaired to some degree by alcohol. McKenzie does not state a rule of law. It suggests a reasonable, common sense approach to the assessment of evidence necessary for proof....

[21] D'ailleurs, les propos du juge Fish alors à la Cour d'appel du Québec, dans l'arrêt R. c. Newman 1995 CanLII 5458 (QC C.A.), (1995) 99 C.C.C. (3d) 275 aux pages 279 et 280, sont à-propos:

The trial in this case was a straightforward affair. No complex question, either of fact or of law, had been raised in argument by either side. There was no dispute as to the constituent elements of the offences charged. The issues were clearly delineated and the outcome depended solely on the judge's appreciation of the evidence.

On the second count, a conviction would lie only if the trial judge was satisfied that the accused's ability to drive was in fact impaired. Proof of bad driving was neither required nor decisive: … Intoxication and impairment were questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact: … Any degree of impairment was sufficient …. but mere evidence of consumption of alcohol or a drug was not.