L'intention de tromper la cour est un élément essentiel de l'infraction de parjure

R. v. Buzeta, 2003 CanLII 12456 (ON SC)

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[32]        It is clear from the authorities that it is not necessary that the false statement underlying a charge of perjury actually mislead the Court.  It is sufficient if it is proved that the accused intended to mislead the Court:  see Regina v. Regnier (1955), 112 C.C.C. 79 at 79 (Ont.C.A.)  As well, mere recklessness is not sufficient to show the intent: See Besner v. The Queen (1976), 33  C.R.N.S. 122 (Que. CA) and The King v. Doyle (1906), 12 C.C.C. 69 (N.S. C.C.).

[33]        It is quite clear from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. The Queen (1960), 129 C.C.C. 202 at 206, that intent to mislead can be inferred from the evidence that establishes that the false evidence was given knowing it to be false.

[34]        Similarly, in Regina v. Wolf (1975), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 425, the Supreme Court of Canada described an intent to mislead as giving evidence which was “dishonest and deliberately asserted to prevent the Court from arriving at the decision upon credible evidence. “ While such an inference does not necessarily follow from the evidence establishing knowledge of the falsity, drawing an inference of an intent to mislead is generally not difficult where the lie is about a fact that is directly contradicted in the evidence.

[35]        In Hebert v. The Queen, 1989 CanLII 114 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 233 at 235 (S.C.C.) it was said,

While it is true that someone who lies generally does so with the intent of being believed, it is not impossible, though it may be exceptional, for a person to deliberately lie without intending to mislead.

[36]        Finally, the authorities make it clear that a subsequent explanation or motive for false testimony is not a defence to the charge where the Court finds that there is an initial intent to mislead.  An explanation that in giving false testimony someone has panicked due to stress is not an explanation or qualification of the statement, but merely a reason for uttering the lie.  See Regina v. Zazulak 1993 ABCA 254 (CanLII), (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 303 (Alta. C. A.), Aff’d 1994 CanLII 78 (SCC), (1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 415 (S.C.C.).