L'obtention d'un mandat de perquisition n'est pas une "autre procédure" au sens de l'article 13 de la Charte

R. v. Baker, 1997 CanLII 11283 (SK QB)

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In order for the applicant's s. 13 argument to succeed, it would be necessary to conclude that the procedure by which a search warrant is obtained constitutes "other proceedings" within the meaning of s. 13.  If not, the right against self-incrimination does not arise to protect the applicant.

In Knutson v. Saskatchewan Registered Nurses' Assn. (1990), 1990 CanLII 2650 (SK CA), 90 Sask. R. 120 at 124 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal stated that "one can only incriminate oneself as defined by s.13 in respect of matters which may be described as criminal, quasi-criminal, or proceedings with penal consequences". "Other proceedings" has therefore been judicially interpreted to include a new trial on the same charge (R. v. Kuldip et al. (1990), 1990 CanLII 64 (SCC), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.)), quasi-criminal proceedings under provincial legislation (Donald v. Law Society of British Columbia, 1983 CanLII 550 (BC CA), [1984] 2 W.W.R. 46 (B.C.C.A.), a voir dire (R. v. Tarafa et al. (1989), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 472 (Que. S.C.)), and the preliminary inquiry of the accused (R.
v. Lucas and Lucas (1995), 1995 CanLII 6025 (SK QB), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 89 (Sask. Q.B.)).

What these various inclusions into the s. 13 definition of "other proceedings" have in common is that they all pertain to a point in time, post-charge, when the accused is in jeopardy of penal consequences.  In my opinion, an application for a search warrant is not analogous to the situations which have been held to be "other proceedings". Though the search warrant may lead to evidence which could form the basis for reasonable grounds to arrest, at the point in time at which a search warrant is being sought, the applicant was not facing penal consequences.
I am supported in this conclusion by the decision of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench in R. v. Vo, (January 23, 1997) at 8, wherein MacInnes J. stated that:

The investigation of potential crimes based on compelled testimony, and the determination that there are reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges do not themselves constitute proceedings so as to engage Charter section 13.  Nor does the obtaining of a warrant as part of the investigative process.

The application for a search warrant is not an "other proceeding" within the meaning of s. 13.  Therefore, the applicant did not fall within the scope of the section's protection at the time of the application for the search warrant.

Although in certain circumstances s. 7 may provide a broader protection against self-incrimination than s. 13, the applicant did not strenuously pursue this Charter argument. Even if this argument was successful there is only one paragraph in the Informations which would be affected.  Its removal would not affect the sufficiency of the Informations. I therefore cannot conclude that s. 7 provides any assistance to the applicant.

Accordingly, the reference to the applicant's testimony at the Scraba preliminary inquiry violates neither s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act nor ss. 7 and 13 of the
Charter and need not be excised from the February 15, 1995 warrant.