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[122] La question de l'utilisation d'une entrée dynamique est délicate en raison de la force exceptionnelle utilisée:
The realities of the investigation of crime mean that there will be cases in which the police will be justified in using extraordinary methods in entering a place to be searched. Normally a warrant is to be executed, especially at a dwelling house, by the police attending at the normal entrance to the place, knocking on the door and announcing to those at the place their purpose and authority (i.e., that they are there to execute a search warrant). It is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, this normal process that will govern.
In some cases, however, the police will be able to show reasonable grounds to believe that the execution of the warrant will be frustrated, or that officer safety may be compromised, if this normal process of execution is used. In such a case the police can seek, and the judicial officer may grant, an endorsement permitting the warrant to be executed in a manner that departs from the presumed process of announcement and entry.
The language of s. 529.4 of the Criminal Code provides an helpful benchmark for when such an endorsement may be made as part of a discretionary order associated with any other warrant. It provides:
529.4 (1) Omitting announcement before entry – A judge or justice who authorizes a peace officer to enter a dwelling-house under section 529 or 529.1 [i.e., issues a "Feeney" warrant or enter order], or any judge or justice, may authorize the peace officer to enter the dwelling-house without prior announcement if the judge or justice is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that prior announcement of the entry would
(a) expose the peace officer or any other person to imminent bodily harm or death; or
(b) result in the imminent loss or imminent destruction of evidence relating to the commission of an indictable offence.
Before an order can properly issue for such an entry the belief in the danger to officers must be shown to be based on reasonable grounds. This standard should be assessed with a measure of deference to legitimate police safety concerns and experience.
Where a "no knock" warrant as issued without a proper basis, the quality of intrusion is significantly more serious than would otherwise have taken place. Exclusion of any evidence obtained may be the proper remedy.
[123] Le droit applicable en cette matière est décrit en ces termes par la juge Wein dans R. v. Newell :
The sanctity of a dwelling house was enshrined in the common law as a fundamental, almost sacred principle, as far back as Semayne's Case [(1604), 77 E.R. 194 (Eng. K.B.)] in 1604. In the ordinary course police, officers executing a warrant to search are required to knock and demand entry on the authority of the warrant.
The police are permitted to enter a dwelling-house without notice, with or without the use of force, if necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. In the case of warrants issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the use of "as much force as is necessary in the circumstances" is authorized by s.12 (b).
In general, the police need not knock or announce their presence in drug cases, because of the generally expected presence of firearms or likely destruction of evidence, as long as a reasoned decision has been made concerning the likely risks. In R. v. Gimson (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 232 (Ont. C.A.), at 243, aff'd on a different basis (S.C.C.), the Ontario Court of Appeal declined to address the issue of whether there is "a blanket authorization" to enter without a prior demand in drug searches. See also R. v. Mac, [2005] O.J. No. 858 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 19, 25-6). Other cases suggest the police must undertake a case by case analysis, showing a particular basis justifying departure from the common law rule. In R. v. Lau (2003), 2003 BCCA 337 (CanLII), 175 C.C.C. (3d) 273 (B.C. C.A.) at p. 276, it was held that it is "not enough to rely on general experience alone". U.S. authorities set the test for deciding not to knock in an individual case at a very low threshold. For example in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (U.S. S.C. 2006) , 2162-3 the court held "We require only that police "have a reasonable suspicion...under the particular circumstances" that one of the grounds for failing to knock and announce exists, and we have acknowledged that "[t]his showing is not high."
In this case, more than one of the police witnesses distinguished between "grow op" situations where the police usually knock first, knowing that the evidence is less susceptible to destruction, and cases of drug distribution, where the evidence would be easier to destroy, in which case the frequent practice was to make a "hard entry", that is by force, with no prior notice or warning through.
The approach taken by the police, of assessing the situation at a briefing before the search, and determining if a hard entry was appropriate, despite the lack of any known expectation that they would be met with weapons, was acceptable. While in general this may verge on an informal policy of doing a straight hard entry in similar cases, the decision was appropriate in the searches conducted in this case, and the decisions were reached in an acceptably individualized manner.
(Nous soulignons)
[124] Malgré la conclusion à l'égard de l'insuffisance de la dénonciation, il est toutefois nécessaire de mentionner que même si le Tribunal avait considéré que la dénonciation était suffisante, l’utilisation de la force n’était pas justifiée par les circonstances en ce que le dossier ne révèle pas de fait qui établisse qu’une annonce régulière entraînerait la perte ou la destruction imminente d’éléments de preuve.
[125] L'agent Leblanc a omis de décrire au juge autorisateur la faiblesse de sa croyance quant à la probabilité raisonnable de découvrir des stupéfiants au domicile de M. Parasiris. Sa croyance de même que celle de M. Courtemanche, son supérieur hiérarchique, ne révèlent pas une croyance subjective que M. Parasiris est en possession de stupéfiants qui pourraient être détruits si une annonce régulière était faite. De plus, les motifs raisonnables justifiant l'entrée dynamique n'étaient pas établis objectivement.
[126] Initialement, les policiers préparent l’exécution d’une perquisition ordinaire au domicile de M. Parasiris. Ce fait supporte la conclusion que les policiers n'avaient pas la croyance subjective qu’ils possédaient les motifs justifiant une entrée dynamique. C'est la seule inférence raisonnable dans les circonstances malgré les affirmations des policiers à l'effet contraire.
[127] À cet égard, le témoignage de M. Courtemance selon lequel la préparation d'une perquisition ordinaire se faisait dans l'attente d'un mandat pour la drogue est incompréhensible. S'il avait sincèrement la croyance subjective que les faits justifiaient l'émission d'un mandat de perquisition en vertu de la LDAS et qu'une entrée dynamique était requise, il devait en faire la préparation lors du «briefing» de la veille de l'exécution du mandat de perquisition. Il ne pouvait pas préparer l'opération policière en tenant pour acquis que le mandat ne serait pas autorisé à moins, bien sûr, qu'il ne se soit aveuglé volontairement sur le fait que les motifs étaient insuffisants, ce qui est la conclusion la plus raisonnable dans les circonstances.
[128] L'emploi de la force lors de l'exécution de la perquisition le 2 mars n'était pas conforme aux exigences de l'article 12 de la LDAS.
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