Le privilège relatif aux techniques d'enquête

R. c. Mirarchi, 2015 QCCS 6629 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

[14]        Investigative techniques privilege may be invoked pursuant to common law or under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, which mainly codifies the common law (sections 38 and 39 go further). Thus justification for non-disclosure may be based on grounds of privilege at common law or under the Canada Evidence Act in order to protect the confidentiality of the information or evidence; Pierre Béliveau and Martin Vauclair, Traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales, 20^e éd., Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2013, p. 332. Section 37 does not eliminate the common law privilege. If the common law privilege invoked previously by the Crown were upheld,   there would be no need for a s. 37 application. Since the privilege claim was denied, in part,  the Crown  invokes s. 37 and seeks a ruling from this Court under s. 37(2); R. v. Chan, 2002 ABQB 287 (CanLII), par. 103, 120; R. v. Trang, 2002 ABQB 19 (CanLII), par. 48-51; R. v. Lam, 2000 BCCA 545 (CanLII), par. 3; R. v. Pilotte, (2002), 2002 CanLII 34599 (ON CA), 156 O.A.C. 1, par. 44.

[15]        Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act refers to sensitive information (renseignements sensibles) and potentially injurious information (renseignements potentiellement préjudiciables). Section 37 uses different language. The Crown burden is more onerous. Section 37(5)refers to information which would encroach upon a specified public interest (est préjudiciable au regard des raisons d’intérêt public déterminées).   Thus it is easier to have access to information if s. 37 (public interest) is invoked, as opposed to s. 38 (international relations, national defence, national security) or s. 39 (confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada); R. v. Minisini, 2008 QCCA 2188 (CanLII), par. 53; Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 57 (CanLII), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, par. 17-19.

[16]        However, the Crown does not have to show, under s. 37, that the disclosure of the information would necessarily encroach upon a specified public interest; R. v. Minisini, supra, par. 54; R. v. Allie, 2014 QCCS 2381 (CanLII), par. 10, 19.

[17]        The mere assertion by the police or the Crown is insufficient to warrant a finding of privilege. Proof of the allegation is required.

[18]        In deciding whether to disclose information under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, s. 37(5) requires the Court to balance whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance the specified public interest that would be encroached upon.

[19]        In circumstances where a court concludes that disclosure would encroach upon a specified public interest, s. 37(5) provides that if the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance the specified public interest, the court may order disclosure with appropriate conditions.

[20]        Therefore, a court’s upholding of a public interest privilege under s. 37 may exempt the Crown from disclosing the privileged information and shield the information affected from being admitted in open court; either it is excluded from the trial or notwithstanding the privilege, the balance may favour disclosure and the information may be subject to protections, such as non-publication orders and/or in camera hearings.

[21]        Upon review of the applicable jurisprudential and doctrinal principles referred to in the November 18, 2015 judgment, as regards the common law investigative techniques privilege claim, the Court balanced the following factors:

1.            the sensitivity of the investigative technique and the impact disclosure would have on the present case and on future investigations;

2.            the length of time that has passed since the investigative technique was utilized;

3.            the circumstances in which, and the extent to which the investigative technique has been made public; whether the technique is truly public or whether the accused learned of it through improper means;

4.            the good faith or bad faith of law enforcement and/or the Crown in invoking the privilege; whether the privilege claim is motivated by something other than a genuine concern for the secrecy of the information;

5.            the nature of the criminal charge weighing against the accused;

6.            the effect of disclosure or non-disclosure on the public perception of the administration of justice;

7.            whether the information sought is relevant to an issue in the proceedings to the extent that it may possibly affect the outcome of the trial;

8.            if relevant, whether the public interest in effective police investigation and the protection of those involved in such investigations, outweigh the interests (public and individual) in protecting the legitimate right of the accused to receive disclosure of information with respect to the investigative police techniques, in the exercise of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence;

9.            in considering relevancy,

(i)   the proximity and connection of the information to triable issues;

(ii)  whether there is other evidence of guilt unrelated to the information;

(iii)  whether the information is the source of the sole evidence incriminating the accused