Comment apprécier l'aveuglement volontaire en lien avec la portée d'un permis de produire du cannabis à des fins médicales personnelles

R v Stewart, 2020 ABCA 252

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[52]           A mistaken belief that one is transporting marijuana rather than cocaine, though irrelevant to conviction, can be highly relevant to the sentence imposed: R v H(CN), 2002 CanLII 7751 at para 46 (Ont CA) [H(CN)]. That is because “[t]here is a considerable difference in the moral blameworthiness of a person who believes he is importing marihuana... and one who knows he is importing cocaine”: ibid at para 47. The same may be said of possession for purposes of trafficking. 

[53]           The lack of actual knowledge is often found to be irrelevant in sentencing because it is not mitigating where the offender is nevertheless wilfully blind to the nature of the substance: R v Sidhu, 2009 ONCA 81 at paras 17, 19 [Sidhu]; Mohamed c R, 2017 QCCA 1643 at paras 14-17. However, there will be rare instances where the offender is not wilfully blind, having held an honest belief as to the substance possessed but duped into transporting a more harmful one. In those cases, a mistaken belief or lack of knowledge has been said to be a significant mitigating or extenuating factor in sentencing: H(CN) at paras 46-51; R v Hamilton, 2004 CanLII 5549 at para 111 (Ont CA); Sidhu at para 18; R v Norman, 2018 ONSC 2872 at para 44(3); R v Mesfin, 2020 ONCJ 93 at paras 6, 13(3).

[54]           Given the apparent significance of wilful blindness to the question of whether an offender’s mistaken belief is mitigating in sentencing, we think it important to address the Crown’s argument that the trial judge in this case erred with respect to wilful blindness. Our intention is not to wade into the sentencing process – it is simply to settle an issue raised on this appeal which may prove relevant and otherwise contentious in the extant sentence proceedings.   

[55]           An accused will be found wilfully blind – and thereby imputed with knowledge – where their suspicion is aroused to the point of seeing the need for further inquiries but deliberately choosing not to make those inquiries: R v Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at para 21, [2010] 1 SCR 411 [Briscoe]. In this case, the trial judge concluded that Ms Stewart was not wilfully blind to the presence of the cocaine even though she made no inquiries into the content of the feedbags. In our view, there is no reviewable error in such a finding.  

[56]           The mere failure to make inquiries is not itself sufficient to find wilful blindness: Briscoe at para 24; R v Brown, 2018 ONCA 481 at para 56; Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 7th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018) at 214-215 [Roach]. Moreover, as the trial judge recognized, the question of whether an accused felt the need to make inquiries is a subjective one. The issue is not whether the accused should have been suspicious but whether she in fact was suspicious: R v Laronde, 2010 BCCA 430 at paras 31-32; R v Smith, 2008 ONCA 101 at para 5; R v Pilgrim, 2017 ONCA 309 at para 66; R v Malfara, 2006 CanLII 17318 at para 2 (Ont CA); McClelland c R, 2020 QCCA 324 at paras 89-90; Roach at 213; MacFarlane at 4:80.100.60.40.