R v Araya, 2025 ABCA 61
Detention
[35] In oral argument, the appellant emphasized that the police planned to “detain” both individuals knowing that one of them was not Mr. Lugela. Although Constable Chan used the word “detain”, he was not necessarily describing detention as used in section 9 of the Charter. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Mann, being stopped by the police is not always subject to Charter protection:
“Detention” has been held to cover, in Canada, a broad range of encounters between police officers and members of the public. Even so, the police cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, or even interview. The person who is stopped will in all cases be “detained” in the sense of “delayed”, or “kept waiting”. But the constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological restraint.
[36] More significantly, the police did not initially detain the appellant. Detention does not occur, and a person’s section 9 rights are not triggered, until an individual is physically or psychologically detained: Grant at para 44. A person who flees police without submission or acquiescence to police direction is not detained: R v Nesbeth, 2008 ONCA 579 at paras 14-16 and R v Ratt, 2020 SKCA 19 at para 37. In this case, there was no detention before the appellant chose to run. If the appellant had not run and provided identification, he may not have been detained.
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