On peut se rabattre sur le témoignage d'un témoin compétent ou sur une preuve circonstancielle pour attester de la nature d'une drogue

Young c. R., 2018 QCCS 4277

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[58]        A number of courts have held that the trier of fact is entitled to rely upon circumstantial evidence when determining whether the Crown’s evidence has identified a substance[9].

[59]        In R. v. O’Brien[10], the Court of Appeal of Quebec stated:

Clearly, the certificate of analysis referred to in section 9 of the Narcotic Control Act is not the only possible evidence of the nature of a substance.  The testimony of an arresting officer or other eye-witness may also, at least if he has some familiarity with narcotics, constitute such evidence: […] The weight of all such other evidence is, of course, a matter for determination by the trial judge: […]

[60]        In Leboeuf v. R.[11], it was argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, because there was a total absence of evidence on the nature of the substance contained in a parcel found where an alleged drug traffic had taken place.

The Court of Appeal of Quebec concluded as follows:

[10]   Les policiers décrivent ainsi les caractéristiques des divers colis qu’ils ont examinés et manipulés et qui leur permettent d’affirmer qu’ils sont similaires : ils pèsent tous environ une livre, mesurent approximativement huit pouces de longueur par huit pouces de largeur et deux pouces d’épaisseur, sont recouverts de ruban gommé gris, les quatre coins du paquet sont ramenés en pointes, la texture et la densité sont les mêmes (une substance granuleuse qui résiste d’abord et cède ensuite sous la pression du doigt) et le même bruit est perçu lorsque le paquet est ainsi manipulé. [11]   De plus, le policier Côté, qui a examiné et palpé le colis du 18 janvier, est impliqué dans des enquêtes reliées aux stupéfiants depuis 1994.  Il a vu et manipulé de la cocaïne à plusieurs reprises et il a affirmé que, selon lui, vu les circonstances, le colis contenait une telle substance. [12]   En résumé, la preuve circonstancielle autorisait le jury à conclure que le colis du 18 janvier 2002 contenait de la cocaïne.  En effet, ce colis, similaire sinon identique à tous les autres, fut livré et récupéré dans des circonstances analogues aux autres colis, particulièrement à celui du 22 novembre, et dans le cadre d’une transaction impliquant Sylvain Lamontagne qui lui-même était relié aux divers événements relatés précédemment.  Le juge de première instance était donc fondé de rejeter la requête pour verdict dirigé d’acquittement.

[61]        In Marin v. R.[12], the Court of Appeal of Quebec also stated :

[39]   Le ministère public reconnaît qu’aucun certificat d’analyse n’a été produit pour prouver que les substances saisies étaient du cannabis. Toutefois, il plaide que le témoignage d’un policier d’expérience peut servir à établir la nature des substances. [40]   Le sergent-détective Pinel pouvait témoigner sur cette question. En effet, il ne s’agit pas ici de drogue chimique, mais bien de plants de cannabis. Or, le sergent-détective travaillait depuis six ans pour le Service de police de Québec au moment des événements et il était enquêteur pour la section des stupéfiants depuis trois ans et demi environ. Ses connaissances et son expérience en cette matière étaient suffisantes pour lui permettre d’établir la nature des substances, comme l’a mentionné la Cour dans O’Brien c. R. : Clearly, the certificate of analysis referred to in section 9 of the Narcotic Control Act is not the only possible evidence of the nature of a substance.  The testimony of an arresting officer or other eye-witness may also, at least if he has some familiarity with narcotics, constitute such evidence: […] The weight of all such other evidence is, of course, a matter for determination by the trial judge: […]

[62]        More recently, in R. v. Douglas[13], the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated the following:

[7]   The main issue on the conviction appeal is whether the trial judge erred in relying on lay opinion evidence from a police officer to establish that the balance of the substances in the room were cocaine when those substances had not been analyzed. In the alternative, if the trial judge was entitled to make that finding, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant was in possession of the balance of the substances in the room and proceeds of crime.   [8]   The appellant contends that while it may be possible in some cases to prove a substance is a narcotic without a certificate of analysis, this is not one of those cases. In this case, there were differences in the colour, texture and packaging of the balance of the substances in the room as compared to the substances found on the two other occupants of the room that were subjected to analysis. The police officer who testified he believed the balance of the substances were cocaine is not a chemist was not in a position to positively confirm their character.   […]

[11]   Although we think it should be the rare case in which a trial judge makes a finding that a substance is a particular narcotic in the absence of a certificate of analysis, we are satisfied, based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence in this case, that it was open to the trial judge to do so.   [12]   As we have said, samples of the substances found on the two other occupants of the motel room were confirmed to be cocaine by certificates of analysis. A police officer who had participated in more than 100 undercover cocaine purchases testified that the non-tested substances smelled like cocaine and had the appearance, texture(s) and colours for cocaine and were packaged as cocaine often is, in ziplock bags. Based on the whole of the evidence, including the surveillance evidence that placed the appellant in the motel room for more than a fleeting period; the evidence of the comings and goings to the room; the presence of what appeared to be drugs and drug-related paraphernalia throughout the room; the experienced police officer's lay opinion concerning the nature of the balance of the substances in the room; and the cash in each of the occupant’s pockets; it was open to the trial judge to conclude, as he did, that the occupants of the room, including the appellant, were part of a drug-dealing enterprise and that the substance they were dealing was cocaine. This same evidence and this finding supported the trial judge's further finding that the appellant was in possession of the balance of the substances in the room.   [13]   Viewed as a whole, the record provided a sufficient basis for the trial judge to make the findings of guilt.

[63]        Finally, the Court notes that in R. v. Grant[14], relied upon in part by the Applicant, the Court of Appeal of Alberta stated:

3     In allowing this appeal, which we do, we are not to be taken as foreclosing proof by other means in every possible case. This case could not serve as such an exception. We allow the appeal, set aside the conviction, and direct the entry of an acquittal. [Our emphasis]

[64]        The Court is of the view that, if circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to determine the nature of substances such as cannabis or cocaine, it can certainly be relied upon for tobacco, since this product is much more common.

[65]        As stated in R. v. O’Brien[15], the weight of such evidence is a matter for determination by the trial judge.