Un accusé n'a pas de droit constitutionnel autonome d'avoir une enquête policière adéquate relativement aux accusations portées contre lui

R. c. Durand, 2011 QCCS 6762 (CanLII)

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[31] D'abord, le Tribunal ne peut conclure que l'enquête policière a été bâclée du fait que certaines vérifications n'ont pas été faites auprès de certains témoins.

[32] L'enquête policière n'a pas à être parfaite. La défense a reçu la divulgation de la preuve et pourra, si elle le juge à propos, faire le nécessaire pour contester cette preuve.

[33] À ce sujet, le Tribunal réfère à une décision rendue par la juge Sophie Bourque, le 27 septembre 2011, dans la cause Sa Majesté la Reine c. Frank Antoine Joseph qui renvoie à l'arrêt R. v. Darwish :

[29] An accused does not have a freestanding constitutional right to an adequate investigation of the charges against him or her: R. v. Barnes, 2009 ONCA 432 (CanLII), 2009 ONCA 432, at para. 1. Inadequacies in an investigation may lead to the ultimate failure of the prosecution, to a specific breach of a Charter right or to a civil remedy. Those inadequacies do not, however, in-and-of-themselves constitute a denial of the right to make full answer and defence.

[30] An accused also does not have a constitutional right to direct the conduct of the criminal investigation of which he or she is the target. As Hill J. put it in R. v. West, [2001] O.J. No. 3406 (S.C.), at para. 75, the defence cannot, through a disguised-disclosure demand, “conscript the police to undertake investigatory work for the accused”. See also: R. v. Schmidt 2001 BCCA 3 (CanLII), (2001), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 74 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 19. That is not to say that the police and the Crown should not give serious consideration to investigative requests made on behalf of an accused. Clearly, they must. However, it is the prosecutorial authorities that carry the ultimate responsibility for determining the course of the investigation. Criminal investigations involve the use of public resources and the exercise of intrusive powers in the public interest. Responsibility for the proper use of those resources and powers rests with those in the service of the prosecution, and not with the defence.

[31] Nor does the disclosure right, as broad as that right is, extend so far as to require the police to investigate potential defences. The Crown’s disclosure obligation was recently described in R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 (CanLII), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66 . The court, at para. 22, reiterated the Crown’s obligation, subject to very limited exceptions, to make timely disclosure to an accused of all relevant material “in the possession or control of the Crown”. The Crown’s disclosure obligation will also require the Crown, in response to defence requests, to take reasonable steps to inquire about and obtain relevant information in the possession of some third parties. Charron J. described this aspect of the disclosure obligation at para. 49:

The Crown is not an ordinary litigant. As a minister of justice, the Crown’s undivided loyalty is to the proper administration of justice. As such, Crown counsel who is put on notice of the existence of relevant information cannot simply disregard the matter. Unless the notice appears unfounded, Crown counsel will not be able to fully assess the merits of the case and fulfil its duty as an officer of the court without inquiring further and obtaining the information if it is reasonably feasible to do so.

[32] I see a vast difference between requiring the Crown to take reasonable steps to assist an accused in obtaining disclosure of relevant material in the possession of a third party, and requiring the Crown to conduct investigations that may assist the defence. The former recognizes an accused’s right to relevant information and the practical advantage that the Crown may have over the defence when it comes to obtaining that information from some third parties. The latter would require the prosecution to effectively surrender control of the investigation to the defence, or ultimately face a stay of the criminal charges.

[33] The disclosure obligation rests on the premise that material in possession of the prosecutorial authorities that is relevant to a criminal prosecution is not the “property” of the Crown, but is rather “the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is done”: R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 , at p. 333 . This rationale fully justifies the broad disclosure obligations imposed on the prosecution with respect to material that is in existence. It does not justify an approach that would permit the defence to dictate the course of the investigation to prosecutorial authorities.

[…]

[39] An interpretation of the right to make full answer and defence that imposes a duty on the prosecution to investigate possible defences is also irreconcilable with the basic features of the criminal justice system. No doubt, the Crown has obligations to an accused and to the administration of justice that go beyond those normally imposed on opposing counsel in litigation. However, the criminal justice system remains essentially an accusatorial and adversarial one. The prosecution, which includes the Crown and the police, is charged with the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting crime in the public interest. To do so the prosecution must investigate allegations, lay charges and prove those charges in a criminal proceeding. To properly perform these functions the prosecution must decide on the nature and scope of an investigation. The accused is entitled to the product of that investigation, but is not entitled to dictate the nature or scope of that investigation.

[34] Un accusé n'a pas de droit constitutionnel autonome d'avoir une enquête policière adéquate relativement aux accusations portées contre lui.