lundi 24 novembre 2014

CARACTÈRE VAGUE ET IMPRÉCIS DES TERMES DU MANDAT

R. c. Bâtiments Fafard inc., 1991 CanLII 3174 (QC CA)


Fafard reproche aux mandats émis leur caractère vague et imprécis.  Il soutient que ces mandats ont permis la saisie d'une quantité importante de documents qui n'avaient rien à voir avec la cotisation émise et les faits allégués dans la dénonciation.

Les mandats dont il est question qui étaient adressés à Les Bâtiments Fafard Inc., dans la plupart des cas et ses compagnies affiliées, faisaient référence aux articles de la loi dont on alléguait la violation, précisaient l'adresse où la perquisition devait être effectuée; étaient jointes à ces documents, deux annexes B et C.  L'annexe B contenait la liste suivante: (m.a. p. 258)

- Factures d'achat
- Factures de vente
- Contrats de vente avec les clients
- Bons de livraison
- Livrets de dépôts bancaires

- Chèques utilisés et retournés par la banque
- Correspondance avec clients et fournisseurs
- Journaux de ventes et d'achats
- Grand livre
- États financiers
- Registres des comptes à payer
- Registre de caisse-recettes
- Registre de caisse-déboursés
- Registre des coûts de production
- Pièces (registres)
- Registre des inventaires
- Disques et/ou disquettes d'ordinateur
- Copie des déclarations mensuelles de taxe B-93
- Registre des comptes à recevoir
- Bons de commandes des clients
- Journal général

ayant trait à la fabrication et à la vente des structures d'acier pour la période du 1er juillet 1985 au 31 juillet 1987.



L'annexe C, de son côté, mentionnait la liste des compagnies affiliées et divisions de compagnies Les Bâtiments Fafard Inc.

Muni de ces mandats, les perquisitions ont été effectuées par les préposés du ministère du Revenu national et par des agents de la G.R.C.

Fafard plaide que les termes sont si vagues et généraux qu'ils auraient pu permettre la saisie de tous les documents appartenant à Fafard et, alléguant entre autres  l'arrêt Church of Scientology, de même qu'un arrêt de notre Cour, Lefebvre c. Morin([15]), il soutient que les mandats émis en pareils termes constituent des «parties de pêche» qui ne sont pas admises par la jurisprudence.

Dans l'arrêt Church of Scientology, il faut rappeler que quelque deux millions de documents avaient été saisis et que 25% d'entre eux avaient subséquemment été retournés par le ministère du Revenu qui n'en avait pas ou plus besoin.  Comme  dans les autres éléments discutés préalablement, il y a de nombreuses similitudes entre cette décision et le cas qui nous occupe.

La cour d'appel de l'Ontario s'exprime de la façon suivante: (p. 513)


It is understandable that where tax evasion involving disposition of hidden profits is involved or where an accounting of funds which involves the tracing of funds through many hands and organizations is required in order to prove an offence, such as fraud, it will be difficult to describe with precision the things sought.  In the present case the informant described in general terms the nature of the documents for which a search warrant was sought and in para. 16 of the information recognized that a limitation must be put on the classes of documents for which a search was to be made.  Paragraph 16 states:

   «The above described documents to be search for are to relate the time period January 1, 1976, to February 15, 1983, with the exception of the documents described in paragraphs 7 and 8 which are to relate to the time period January 1, 1972, to February 15, 1983 --all the above described things to be searched for to relate directly to the below described offences.»

Attached as App. «B» to the information (and subsequently to the warrant) was a description of the offences alleged to have been committed.  The informant stated therein that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the above described things to be searched for would afford evidence of the commission of these offences.



Puis, concluant sur l'aspect de la particularité du mandat de perquisition, elle conclut: (pp. 513-514)

In addition to Print Three Inc., Burnett and Lubell, which were referred to above, there are numerous cases in Ontario courts and the courts of other provinces that have approved descriptions in general terms of things to be searched for under search warrants.  Listed below are some examples:

  Re Worrall1964 CanLII 161 (ON CA), [1965] 2 C.C.C. 1 at p. 16, 48 D.L.R. (2d) 673, [1965] 1 O.R. 527:

«...oil paintings, records and documents of all descriptions, art books, artists' supplies, paints and restoration materials, and correspondence...»

  R. v. Pink Triangle Press [summarized at 2 W.C.B. 228]:

«...corporate records, invoices and documents pertaining to the business operations of a publication known as Body Policies...»

R. V. Thames Valley et al., an Ontario High Court judgment delivered May 8, 1980, not reported:

   «Books of account, financial statements, tax files, bank statements, cancelled cheques, deposit slips, pay-roll records, telephone and utility bills, purchase and sales records, vehicle maintenance and expense records, expense vouchers and receipts and correspondence relating to Thames Valley Ambulance Limited and Thames Valley Medic-Aid Limited between January 1, 1978, and December 31, 1979.»

See also R. v. 237345 Products Ltd., an Ontario High court judgment delivered January 5, 1979, not reported; Re PSI Mind Development Institute Ltd et al and The Queen (1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 263Re Dare to be Great of Canada (1971) Ltd., and A.-G. Alta (1972), 1972 CanLII 205 (AB QB), 6 C.C.C. (2d) 408 at pp. 410 and 413, [1972] 3 W.W.R. 307.



Finalement, concluant sur toute la question, la cour s'exprimait de la façon suivante: (pp. 515-516-517)


Osler J. also considered the appellants' submission that the terms of the warrant were so broad that the executing officers were not in a position to know what they were looking for and to recognize it when they found it.  Associated with that complaint is the criticism that, if the warrant is issued with a very broad description of the things to be searched for, it requires an exercice of discretion on the part of the executing officers as to what to seize.  The appellants submit that the justice cannot delegate such discretion.

The appellants rely on the large number of documents that were returned to them by the executing officers as proof of the lack of sufficient particularity of description in the information and resulting warrant.  As previously stated, 25% of the documents seized were returned.  That percentage may not in itself be too startling.  If, for example, a warrant authorized the seizure of four specific documents and it later appeared that one such document contained no evidence with respect to the commission of an alleged offence, it would be most unlikely that the warrant would be quashed on that basis, even though it constituted a return of 25% of the documents seized.
In the present case, however, the 25% consisted of hundreds of thousands of documents.  In our opinion, the absolute number of documents returned is more significant than the percentage of documents returned although the large number returned does not necessarily mean that the warrant should be quashed.

There was also evidence produced on the application before Osler J. which indicated that a substantial number of documents and things that did not fall within the classification of things to be searched for described in the warrant and a number of copies of documents in duplicate where single copies only were authorized to be seized, were seized by the executing officers.

As we have stated previously it is most difficult to describe business records, books of account and financial statements generally with the same degree of particularity as one can describe things such as a motor vehicle, a book, a specific business agreement or a particular letter.  The latter items can be identified by a model number, a licence number or by reference to a specific title or date of and parties to an agreement or letter.  In such cases it is a simple mater to give exact descriptions and there is no reason for an officer executing a warrant to be given or to exercise any discretion.  Where, however, by the very nature of the things to be searched for it is not possible to describe them with precision or great particularity, it is inevitable that the executing officers will have to exercise some discretion in determining whether things found on the premises fall within the description of the things or classes of things described in the warrant. It seems clear that a number of the documents or classes of documents described in the informations and warrants in the present case fell within the latter category.  In our opinion, the amount of discretion required to be exercised by the executing officers in the circumstances was not such as to constitute jurisdictional error.  In determining the reasonableness of the warrant itself, as distinct from the method in which it was executed, it is appropriate to consider the difficulties already mentioned.  These difficulties were  disclosed in the information which described the sophisticated and complicated nature of the organization of Scientology, the continuing nature of the three alleged offences and the difficulty of knowing precisely where each item believed to afford evidence might be found.



The motions court judge recognized that in considering the nature and number of the things that were seized it was necessary to keep in mind the distinction between the importance of such considerations for the purpose of deciding, on the one hand, whether it showed that the manner of carrying out the search and the extent of the seizure exceeded the authority of the warrant as opposed to, on the other hand, deciding whether the seizure of things which did not provide evidence of an offence demonstrated that the information and the resulting authorization in the warrant were unclear and excessive.  The former consideration was not relevant to the application to quash the warrant. If the warrant is valid but has been executed in an improper manner so that the search and ensuing seizure became unreasonable within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter the remedy under s. 24 of the Charter for an alleged infringement of s. 8 must be sought in another forum.  The appellant Scientology submits that the vast seizure of documents, followed by the subsequent return of 25% thereof, indicated that the executing officers first seized and then searched through the material seized.  The appellants claim that the result was that a seizure and search took place rather than the search and seizure authorized by the warrant. There may be merit in that argument but it relates to the reasonableness of the search conducted by the executing officers and not to the validity of the warrant itself.  As pointed out by Osler J., an «oversearch» on the part of such officers which exceeded the authority given to them by the warrant «cannot retroactively affect the jurisdiction of Chief Judge Hayes to issue the warrant, and hence cannot in this proceeding justify me in quashing»: see also Re Newfoundland & Labrador Corp. Ltd (1974), 6 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 274 at p. 279.

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