R. c. Robert, 2023 QCCA 379
[62] Lorsqu’un accusé choisit de témoigner, il s’expose, cela va de soi, au contre-interrogatoire de la poursuite.
[63] Dans l’arrêt R.(A.J.), le juge Doherty décrit le caractère essentiel de ce contre-interrogatoire et les délicates limites qui l’encadrent[26] :
Crown counsel is entitled, indeed in some cases expected, to conduct a vigorous cross-examination of an accused. Effective cross-examination of an accused serves the truth-finding function as much as does effective cross-examination of a complainant.
There are, however, well-established limits on cross-examination. Some apply to all witnesses, others only to the accused. Isolated transgressions of those limits may be of little consequence on appeal. Repeated improprieties during the cross-examination of an accused are, however, a very different matter. As the improprieties mount, the cross-examination may cross over the line from the aggressive to the abusive. When that line is crossed, the danger of a miscarriage of justice is very real. If improper cross-examination of an accused prejudices that accused in his defence or is so improper as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, an appellate court must intervene […][27].
[Le soulignement est ajouté]
[64] Le pourvoi porte donc sur la délimitation du contre-interrogatoire d’un accusé concernant ses déclarations antérieures incompatibles et les règles entourant la preuve de celles-ci lorsque cela s’avère nécessaire.
[65] En dépit de l’utilisation restreinte envisagée par la poursuite, c’est-à-dire pour tester la crédibilité de l’intimé, je décris tout d’abord les règles générales.
[66] La déclaration antérieure incompatible d’un accusé peut être admissible à deux fins : 1) présentée à titre d’aveux de l’accusé[28] ou 2) pour évaluer la crédibilité de l’accusé comme témoin.
[67] Dans l’arrêt J.B., le juge Watt formule la règle applicable à l’admissibilité d’une déclaration antérieure incompatible de l’accusé de la manière suivante :
[30] As is the case with an ordinary witness, an accused who testifies may be cross-examined on prior out-of-court statements alleged to be inconsistent with his or her in-court testimony about the same subject-matter. But where the out of-court statement on which the accused is cross-examined is one made to a person in authority, the Crown must ensure that any applicable admissibility rules have been satisfied, including the common law requirement of voluntariness: R. v. Fischer, 2005 BCCA 265, 197 C.C.C. (3d) 136, at para. 41, leave to appeal refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 308; R. v. Groves, 2013 BCCA 446, 301 C.C.C. (3d) 430, at paras. 33, 42.
[31] On the other hand, unlike an ordinary witness, whose prior inconsistent statement only becomes substantive evidence if the witness adopts it as true by words, action, conduct or demeanour while testifying, an accused witness’ prior inconsistent statement may be used as substantive evidence by the trier of fact for two purposes. First, as with an ordinary witness, the prior inconsistent statement is relevant to the credibility of the accused as a witness. Second, and unlike an ordinary witness, the prior inconsistent statement of an accused who testifies is admissible as substantive evidence as an admission even without adoption: Groves, at paras. 42-44; R. v. Mannion, 1986 CanLII 31 (CSC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272, at pp. 277-78[29].
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[68] L’analyse de la jurisprudence par les auteurs de l’ouvrage McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence confirme cette approche :
There is a substantial amount of authority to the effect that a prior inconsistent statement used to cross-examine an accused is admissible not only to assess credibility but also for the truth of its contents. This position makes sense given that a party’s statements are admissible for their truth under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. On the other hand, several cases suggest, often without considered discussion, and sometimes only implicitly, that a prior inconsistent statement used for the first time at trial to cross-examine the accused is only admissible for the purpose of assessing credibility. In support of this view, it can be said that the Crown did not lead the statement as part of its case, at which point it would have been admissible for its truth, and so should not be permitted to use the statement for a substantive purpose during the defence case or in reply. Yet any unfairness to the accused in this regard will be prevented by the rule against improper splitting. Provided that this rule is not breached, there is arguably no good reason to limit use of the accused’s prior statement to the issue of credibility[30].
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[69] Dans l’arrêt P.G., le juge Rosenberg opine dans le même sens quant à l’admissibilité de la déclaration antérieure incompatible de l’accusé en tant qu’aveu :
The consideration that does not have any application where the witness is the accused is that the trier or fact will improperly make substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement. Being an admission by a party, the accused's prior inconsistent statement is available for substantive use: see R. v. Mannion, 1986 CanLII 31 (CSC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272 at pp. 277-78, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 544 at p. 549. There is, nevertheless, the danger that the trier of fact will give the statement undue weight when it is first disclosed in the testimony of a reply witness. This is a concern with any reply evidence, but a prior inconsistent statement is a particularly potent form of impeachment. The prosecution's interest in having the trier of fact make substantive use of the statement will often be of secondary importance[31].
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[70] Bien qu’une déclaration antérieure incompatible d’un accusé soit admissible pour établir la véracité de son contenu, la poursuite souhaitait faire la preuve de la déclaration incompatible de l’intimé uniquement afin qu’elle soit considérée par la juge du procès dans l’évaluation de sa crédibilité.
[71] Cette concession est importante.
[72] Les auteurs de l’ouvrage The Law of Evidence conviennent que le principe interdisant à la poursuite de scinder sa preuve soulève une question plus délicate lorsque la poursuite recherche l’admissibilité de la déclaration incompatible en tant qu’aveu opposé à l’accusé lors de son contre-interrogatoire. Selon eux, normalement, la déclaration antérieure de l’accusé introduite lors du contre-interrogatoire de celui-ci ne vise que la crédibilité de celui-ci :
Given that the Crown cannot split its case, it should not be tendering inculpatory prior statements for the first time during cross-examination. Therefore, statements produced at this stage by the Crown usually go only to the accused’s credibility (should the accused’s testimony be inconsistent with the prior statements)[32].
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[73] Vu la fin limitée poursuivie par la poursuite en contre-interrogeant l’intimé au sujet de sa déclaration antérieure incompatible et sa volonté de faire la preuve de celle-ci, je n’ai pas à décider si la poursuite aurait eu l’obligation de présenter cette déclaration en preuve principale pour valoir comme preuve au fond.
[74] Le pourvoi peut être tranché sur le fondement de l’admissibilité de la preuve de la déclaration incompatible uniquement pour évaluer la crédibilité de l’intimé.
[75] À cet égard, dans l’arrêt A.M., la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario cerne parfaitement l’importance d’un contre-interrogatoire au sujet d’une déclaration antérieure incompatible d’un témoin :
[12] Fourth, one of the most valuable means of assessing witness credibility is to examine the consistency between what the witness said in the witness box and what she has said on other occasions, whether or not under oath: R. v. G. (M.), 1994 CanLII 8733 (ON CA), [1994] O.J. No. 2086, 93 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (C.A.), at p. 354 C.C.C., leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 390. Inconsistencies may emerge in a witness' testimony at trial, or between their trial testimony and statements previously given. Inconsistencies may also emerge from things said differently at different times, or from omitting to refer to certain events at one time while referring to them on other occasions.
[13] Inconsistencies vary in their nature and importance. Some are minor, others are not. Some concern material issues, others peripheral subjects. Where an inconsistency involves something material about which an honest witness is unlikely to be mistaken, the inconsistency may demonstrate a carelessness with the truth about which the trier of fact should be concerned: G. (M.), at p. 354 C.C.C.[33]
[76] Ainsi, les variations dans le récit d’un témoin (y compris celles de l’accusé) peuvent affecter inéluctablement l’appréciation de la crédibilité ou de la fiabilité de celui-ci :
If it can be shown that the witness is saying one thing now and something different on a previous occasion, then, in the absence of a credible explanation for the discrepancy, that witness must be lying or at least mistaken, either now, or on the prior occasion. In any event, it is not difficult for the trier of fact in such a situation to draw the inference that the witness is not reliable and is therefore less credible.
Prior inconsistent statements can be incredibly useful tools of impeachment, and are part of every litigator's toolkit. As the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in R. v. Calder, the use of this evidence is valuable to the trial process, because “[s]elf-contradiction through proof of a prior inconsistent statement can have a powerful impact on credibility both as it relates to the specific inconsistency and the overall veracity and reliability of a witness” [34].
[77] Dans l’arrêt Hill, le juge Doherty aborde la question de l’admissibilité d’un contre-interrogatoire au sujet des différences entre la version donnée par l’accusé lors du procès et celle fournie antérieurement aux policiers.
[78] Bien que le contexte soit différent du présent dossier, une question additionnelle relative à l’exercice du droit au silence par l’accusé se greffait au pourvoi; le juge Doherty confirme le caractère approprié d’un tel contre-interrogatoire en autant qu’il n’existe pas une autre règle d’admissibilité qui l’empêche :
[43] With few exceptions, an accused’s exercise of his right to silence when questioned by the police cannot be used as circumstantial evidence of guilt or to impeach the credibility of the accused’s trial testimony: R. v. Turcotte (2005), 2005 SCC 50, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at paras. 46-58 (SCC); R. v. Palmer, 2008 ONCA 797, [2008] O.J. No. 4753, at para. 9. An accused who testifies can, however, be cross-examined on prior inconsistent statements, assuming those statements are admissible: R. v. Paris, 2000 CanLII 17031 (ON CA), [2000] O.J. No. 4687, at para. 41. Cross-examination on a prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach the credibility of the accused, or in an attempt to have the accused adopt the prior statement as true.
[44] Counsel for the appellant submits that cross-examination on inconsistencies between a prior statement and trial testimony cannot extend to cross-examination on omissions from the prior statement. On this approach, Crown counsel’s cross-examination of the appellant about his failure to mention Ms. General’s verbal abuse and assault would infringe the appellant’s right to silence, but Crown counsel’s cross-examination on the inconsistency between the appellant’s recollection of the act of strangling Ms. General in his statement and his inability to recall any of those details at trial would be appropriate.
[45] With respect, the distinction counsel attempts to draw is not tenable. Omissions can be integral to the existence of material inconsistencies between two versions of events. An account of an event which leaves out important details may be viewed as inconsistent with a subsequent account that includes those details.
[46] The propriety of cross-examination on a prior statement made by an accused to the police turns on the purpose of the cross-examination. If the cross-examination is designed to challenge the credibility of an accused’s testimony based on inconsistencies between that testimony and a previous version of events provided by the accused, the cross-examination is appropriate. If, however, the cross-examination invites the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference from the accused’s silence when questioned by the police, the cross-examination is inappropriate. Sometimes, both purposes may be in play. A trial judge can refuse or limit cross-examination on the prior statement when there is a legitimate concern that the cross-examination may trespass improperly on the accused’s right to silence. The trial judge may also give a limiting instruction cautioning against misuse of the right to silence if the cross-examination merits that instruction[35].
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[79] Ainsi, la poursuite peut autant contre-interroger un accusé sur « les différences matérielles entre les versions racontées »[36], que celles-ci soient contenues dans une déclaration aux policiers ou à une autre personne. La principale différence réside dans la nécessité d’établir le caractère libre et volontaire de la déclaration à une personne en autorité[37].
[80] L’arrêt Alix de notre Cour va dans le même sens. Il reconnaît qu’il « est possible pour la poursuite de tenter de miner la crédibilité d'un accusé au moyen de déclarations antérieures contradictoires »[38].
[81] Nul ne saurait nier l’efficacité d’une déclaration antérieure incompatible pour attaquer la crédibilité d’un témoin, y compris l’accusé, tel que l’explique le juge Rosenberg dans l’arrêt P.G. : « a prior inconsistent statement is a particularly potent form of impeachment »[39].
[82] À la lumière de l’analyse qui précède, le contre-interrogatoire engagé par la poursuite était légitime et tout à fait approprié.
[83] Il convient à présent d’examiner l’équité du processus, de même que de déterminer si la règle interdisant la division de la preuve de la poursuite, celle relative à la contre-preuve, de même que celle concernant les faits incidents, empêchait la poursuite de présenter en preuve la déclaration antérieure incompatible de l’intimé après que celui-ci l’eut nié.
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