La communication de la preuve non entièrement complétée n'implique pas automatiquement de retarder la fixation de l'enquête préliminaire ou du procès

R v JEK, 2016 ABCA 171

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[66]           A final point must be made. While it is true that the Crown has an ongoing obligation to disclose relevant information that comes to light, that obligation is linked to the right to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence. Where an accused asserts a disclosure delay, the fact of that delay must be shown to have had some real effect on the right to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence in order to be itself a Charter breach. In other words, delay in Crown disclosure may not require delay of the trial, much less delay in setting either the date for a preliminary inquiry or a trial date. The judge in this case seemed to think that any sort of disclosure had to be rectified before a trial date, indeed before a preliminary inquiry date, could even be set. In the context here, that was unrealistic and presumed some sort of anticipatory Charter breach. It amounted to a notion that outstanding disclosure, no matter how trivial or technical, and no matter that disclosure review (especially with respect to third party records) is restricted to the trial judge hearing the trial itself, somehow puts the case into stasis with the clock ticking against the Crown. This is simply not so.