R. c. Robert, 2013 QCCQ 2396 (CanLII)
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[69] Dans l'affaire Legault c. R., notre Cour d'appel commente ainsi (références omises) :
7 L’ordonnance de dédommagement fait partie du processus de détermination de la peine. Elle émane d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire qui doit être exercé avec circonspection.
10 Les principes qui prévalent en matière de dédommagement sont exposés par l'auteur François Dadour :
1. L’ordonnance de dédommagement doit être rendue avec circonspection ;
2. Cette ordonnance fait partie intégrante de la détermination de la peine en ce qu’elle participe à la sanction du contrevenant, lie ce dernier au dédommagement de la victime, le prive du fruit de l’infraction qu’il a commise et facilite la remise en état de la victime ;
3. Le juge d’instance doit considérer l’objectif visé par le créancier du dédommagement, de même que l’existence de procédures civiles ;
4. L’ordonnance de restitution n’est pas un substitut à ces procédures civiles ;
[...]
9. Le dédommagement en double peut être évité par le recours aux juridictions civiles ;
10. L’ordonnance de dédommagement peut être indiquée lorsqu’un jugement civil est inexécutoire suite à la faillite du débiteur.
11 L’auteur ajoute :
Il est à noter que le juge d’instance a le pouvoir de rendre une ordonnance de dédommagement pour un montant inférieur aux dommages causés. En effet et en lien avec un commentaire similaire quant au quantum des amendes, il n’est ni souhaitable ni approprié qu’une ordonnance de dédommagement mette en péril les chances de réhabilitation du contrevenant par la destruction de son patrimoine.
12 L’auteur Ruby partage le même avis :
A compensation order which would ruin the offender financially, thus impairing chances of rehabilitation, should not be imposed; neither should one be made where compliance would be particularly onerous or impossible, nor where enforcement would be difficult or impossible. The totality principle applies to the whole of the sentence, including the order of restitution.
13 La jurisprudence a également établi que le juge qui rend l’ordonnance de dédommagement doit tenir compte des ressources financières de l’accusé, même si la capacité ne doit pas toujours être le facteur déterminant. Comme l'explique le juge Doherty, s'exprimant pour la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, dans Taylor :
(5) It has been stated many times that restitution is a discretionary order. It should only be made with restraint and caution and not only in order to avoid putting the victim through the extra legal expense of going to the civil courts or as a substitute for civil procedure.
(6) As stated by Martin J.A., speaking for this court, in R. v. Scherer, reflex, (1984), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 30 at 38:
It may be that in some cases it would be inappropriate to make a compensation order in an amount that is unrealistic to think that the accused could ever discharge.
(7) In his reasons, the trial judge said:
The only possible way to complete that part of his rehabilitation is through penal consequences. Because of the magnitude of the crime, the duration of the crime, there is no other way to compensate the victims other than his family, then by a penitentiary term [emphasis added].
(8) He then ordered restitution. The restitution order appears to have been added as an afterthought to permit the victim to avoid the costs of a civil action. The Crown had not asked for a restitution order.
(9) The relevant factors and objectives to the imposition of a restitution order have been discussed by this court in R. v. Devgan, and R. v. Biegus. An order for restitution must also bear some reality to the circumstances of the appellant and must be directly associated with the sentence imposed as the public reprobation of the offence. In the circumstances of this case, the overriding factor is the means of the appellant. There is no ability, as noted by the trial judge, to pay even the most minute part of this staggering amount, with no expiry date. It would kill all hope for the appellant for the future and it would likely impair his chances of rehabilitation. The order is clearly excessive and futile and the trial judge erred in that regard.
(10) It remains open to the victim to take proceedings in the civil court, if so advised.
(14) En conclusion, une ordonnance de dédommagement doit être rendue avec pondération et circonspection afin de remplir les objectifs et principes de la détermination de la peine soit, plus particulièrement, la réparation des torts, la conscience de la responsabilité, la dénonciation et la dissuasion. Cette ordonnance ne constitue pas le substitut à un recours civil. Lorsque la capacité de payer est absente, comme en l’espèce, il est déraisonnable de rendre une ordonnance de dédommagement de plus d’un million de dollars. Il importe de souligner que l’ordonnance de dédommagement survie (sic) à la libération d’un failli. En l'espèce, le montant du dédommagement est si excessif que le délinquant ne pourra jamais l'acquitter, ce qui met en péril le principe de réinsertion sociale.
[70] Dans l'affaire Bendwell c. R., notre Cour d'appel commente ainsi (références omises) :
(14) L’ordonnance de remboursement est plus problématique compte tenu du peu de preuve sur la capacité de payer de l’appelant.
(16) Si l’objectif visé par le juge – d’assurer la réparation des torts causés aux victimes – est pertinent (C.cr., art. 718, alinéa e)), il ne saurait justifier à lui seul l’ordonnance. Il faut aussi tenir compte des ressources financières du contrevenant comme le rappelle la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt R. c. Fitzgibbon :
D’abord, l’arrêt Zelensky reconnaît que le tribunal doit tenir compte des ressources financières de l’accusé quand [il] envisage de rendre une ordonnance de dédommagement.
Ce que le juge a omis de faire.
(17) Ce facteur est lié à l’objectif de la réhabilitation du délinquant et à sa réinsertion sociale. Obliger un délinquant qui en a les moyens à indemniser sa victime est de nature à le responsabiliser. Par contre, une ordonnance susceptible de le maintenir démuni constitue un sérieux obstacle à toute reprise en main de sa part. Comme l’exprimait la Cour d’appel du Manitoba :
(8) From the wording of s. 738(1)(a) and its predecessor, the old s. 725(1), it is obvious that it is discretionary as to whether the court orders restitution or not. There is case law concerning both the old s. 725(1) and the present s. 738(1)(a) which forms a useful guide as to how that discretion should be exercised.
(1) […]
(2) The means of the offender are to be considered as an important factor in determining whether restitution should be ordered. That factor was specifically mentioned by Laskin C.J.C., who wrote for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Zelensky,. At p. 961, Lasking (sic) C.J.C. stated that the various factors, including the means of the offender, come down to this:
…[A]n order for compensation should only be made with restraint and with caution.
In the subsequent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Scherer, Martin J.A., speaking for the appeal panel, agreed that the means of the offender is a factor to be considered, but that is not a controlling factor in every case. Martin J.A. went on to note at pp. 37-38:
It may be that in some cases it would be inappropriate and undesirable to make a compensation order in an amount that it is unrealistic to think the accused could ever discharge.
(3) The impact of a restitution order upon the chances of rehabilitation of the accused, either pro or con, is a factor to be considered. In R. v. Spellacy (R.A.), the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland approbated a passage from Sentencing in Canada (1982), by R. Paul Nadin-Davis, which contained the following passage at p. 497:
A compensation order which would ruin the accused financially, thus impairing his chances of rehabilitation, should not be imposed;
(4) […]
(18) Compte tenu des faits qui révèlent une déchéance sociale et financière, il est irréaliste de prévoir que l’appelant puisse un jour satisfaire l’ordonnance de remboursement, même pour une partie quelque peu substantielle.
(20) La Cour est d’avis que les circonstances de l’affaire rendent contre-indiquée l’ordonnance de remboursement.
[71] Par ailleurs, dans l'affaire Morin c. R., notre Cour d'appel est intervenue pour annuler l'ordonnance et ce pour les raisons suivantes :
(5) Premièrement, l’ordonnance a été rendue sans véritable débat sur la situation financière de l’appelant et, en conséquence, sans que le juge tienne véritablement compte de ses ressources pécuniaires.
(6) Deuxièmement, il ne s’agit pas ici d’un cas où « la valeur de remplacement des biens [pouvait] être facilement déterminée », pour reprendre les mots de l’article 738 du Code criminel.
(7) Ainsi, l’avocate de l’appelant faisait part au juge de première instance que son client, à qui le propriétaire avait offert de vendre sa maison, « avait l’impression que le montant qui avait été donné au propriétaire [par l’assureur] dépassait déjà la valeur de la résidence ».
(8) Finalement, la Cour note que le juge envisage l’ordonnance de dédommagement afin d’éviter aux victimes de « prendre des recours civils », alors qu’au moment du prononcé de la sentence, il s’était écoulé plus de cinq ans depuis les événements sans que quelque action civile ait été intentée contre l’appelant.
[72] Finalement, dans l'affaire R. c. Castro, la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario commente ainsi (références omises) :
(21) Section 738(1)(a) governs the making of restitution orders when money has been taken. It gives the court discretion to order the offender to make restitution by paying the victim “an amount not exceeding the replacement value of the property as of the date the order is imposed, less the value of any part of the property that is returned … where the amount is readily ascertainable”.
(26) … Thus, the omission of a sentencing judge to give any consideration to the relevant factor of the offender’s ability to repay the amount of money taken is an error. A restitution order is not intended to undermine the prospects for rehabilitation of the offender...
(27) Reviewing courts have, however, consistently held that no single factor is itself determinative of whether a compensation order should be granted and that the weight to be given to individual considerations will depend on the circumstances of each case. Those circumstances include two considerations I wish to emphasize: the nature of the offence and, when money has been taken, what has happened to the money.
(30) In imposing a sentence where the offender has used his or her position to commit a breach of trust, the primary considerations are the protection of the public, general deterrence and the repudiation of the conduct of which the offender was found guilty. Relevant factors include the length of time over which the conduct took place, whether the offence was a sophisticated and well planned scheme, the amount involved, and, most importantly, the impact of the offender’s conduct on the victims. The secondary considerations are specific deterrence, rehabilitation and any mitigating circumstances such as a plea of guilty or co-operation with the authorities (in tracing the funds): Scherer, per Martin J.A. at para. 34.
(32) Whether or not a breach of trust has occurred, the impact of the crime on the victim is an important factor. In Biegus, the appellant was one of several co-accused convicted of bank theft. The ringleader, Hornett, worked for Intercon Security and as a result had access to the combinations of ATM machines in various Royal Bank branches. Biegus was brought in by Hornett and participated with him in seven thefts. After Biegus pleaded guilty, he co-operated fully with the police and returned $14,000 of the cash. He received a sentence of two years less a day in jail and was ordered to make restitution of the remaining amount stolen in the seven thefts with Hornett, namely $638,534. The sentencing judge recognized that Biegus did not have the ability to pay this amount but did not say why this fact was irrelevant in imposing the order for restitution. On appeal, the court held that the sentencing judge erred in not addressing this factor and also erred by failing to take into account the potentially unfair effect to Biegus of the restitution orders already made against two other co-accused. The court did not say that Biegus engaged in any breach of trust. The restitution order was excessive and prevented Biegus’s rehabilitation. The court noted that the bank’s insurer had already repaid the bank $453,387.70. Furthermore, the bank could be in a position to recover a portion of its losses from Hornett. Therefore, the court reduced the amount of restitution to $264,000, the amount Biegus acknowledged he received from the robbery. Where the victim is a large institution, or is likely to have insurance for the amount of the loss, the impact on the victim will obviously be much less than in situations where disabled or elderly persons have lost their ability to earn income and to replace the money taken.
(33) This brings me to a discussion of the second consideration I wish to emphasize, namely evidence as to what has happened to the money that was taken illegally, and how this evidence factors into a determination of the ability to pay.
(34) Ability to pay must take into consideration what disclosure has been made respecting where the money is or has gone. Depriving the offender of the fruits of his crime is one of the overarching goals of making a restitution order: see Working Paper 5 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, October 1974, cited with approval by Laskin C.J. in Zelensky at pp. 592-593. In cases of theft, robbery, fraud, breach of trust or the like, I see no reason why the court should accept an offender’s bald assertion that he or she has no ability to make restitution because the money “is gone” when no evidence is proffered in support of this assertion. When the victims can clearly establish that “the replacement value of the property” under s. 738(1)(a) is the amount of money taken, surely it is the offender asserting that he or she has no ability to make restitution who is in the best position to provide transparency concerning what has happened to that money. A bald assertion that the money is gone should be given no weight. Similarly, when the location of the money illegally obtained by the offender is unknown, the sentencing judge is entitled to take that fact into account with respect to ability to pay in making a restitution order.
(35) To summarize, a restitution order is simply part of the determination of an overall fit sentence, and general sentencing principles apply. While consideration of the offender’s ability to pay and the impact of a restitution order on an offender’s rehabilitation are factors to be considered, the weight to be given to these factors will vary depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. When the offence involves a breach of trust, a primary consideration is the effect on the victim; rehabilitation is a secondary consideration. Furthermore, consideration of the ability to pay includes the ability to make payment from the money taken as a source of restitution.
(43) … The fact that a restitution order provides a convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery for the victim, especially a vulnerable victim, is one of the considerations in favour of the making of such an order.
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