Définition d'une dépense électorale

En période électorale

Toute dépense ayant trait à une élection doit être obligatoirement payée à même le fonds électoral, être autorisée par le candidat et apparaître dans le rapport de dépenses électorales.

La Loi stipule qu’une dépense électorale est le coût de tout bien ou service utilisé pendant la période électorale pour :

• favoriser ou défavoriser, directement ou indirectement, l’élection d’un candidat;
• diffuser ou combattre le programme d’un candidat;
• approuver ou désapprouver des mesures préconisées ou combattues par un candidat;
• approuver ou désapprouver des actes accomplis ou proposés par un candidat.

La période électorale débute le 44^e jour précédant celui fixé pour le scrutin et se termine le jour du scrutin à la fermeture des bureaux de vote.

Type de dépenses électorales

Différents types de dépenses électorales peuvent être faites lors de la période électorale, soit :

• publicité;
• biens et services;
• location de locaux;
• voyages et repas;
• dépenses autres qu’électorales.

Les dépenses de publicité sont généralement les plus fréquentes et aussi celles qui grèvent la plus grande partie du budget d’une campagne électorale. Elles nécessitent le plus d’attention afin que les règles prescrites à leur égard dans la Loi sur les élections scolaires soient respectées.

En effet, toute publicité ou matériel électoral doit être identifié conformément à la Loi pour être considéré, le cas échéant, dans une demande de remboursement.

Pièces justificatives

Il est important de se rappeler que toutes les dépenses doivent être accompagnées de pièces justificatives telles que :

• factures;
• échantillons de matériel publicitaire (par exemple, des macarons ou des affiches);
• page de journal dans lequel a paru un message publicitaire;
• attestation de publicité ou photographie lorsqu’il s’agit de grands panneaux publicitaires;
• cassettes audio ou vidéo lorsqu’il s’agit de publicité à la radio ou à la télévision.

Tiré de: Le Directeur Général des Élections du Québec

Lien vers le document

http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/francais/scolaire/financement-et-depenses-electorales/definition-d-une-depense-electorale.php

Comment s'assurer de l'admissibilité d'une copie

R. c. Tehrani, 2008 QCCQ 21453 (CanLII)

Lien vers la décision

[1]               If a party seeks to examine a witness with reference to a copy of a business record originally made by that witness, must the copy be produced in accordance with section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act?

[2]               A voir dire was held on this question.  I decided that copies of two relevant business records made by Mr Neil Mills are admissible at the instance of the prosecution without having to meet the conditions imposed by section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act.  These are my reasons for that decision.

[3]               At the relevant times Mr Mills was an officer of the Scotiabank.  In this capacity he executed a loan agreement with the Accused.  As the loan was made with the assistance of a programme of guarantees by the federal government, Mr Mills also executed a document for registration of the loan with the government.

[4]               When Mr Mills was called to testify M^e Lévesque sought to examine him with reference to photocopies of these two documents.  M^e Frigon objected that the copies could not be tendered unless they were produced in conformity with section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act, notably the requirement for timely notice.

[5]               On the voir dire Mr Mills testified that he recognised the documents as copies of originals that he had prepared.  He testified that the documents bore his handwriting and he recalled the transaction to which they relate.  On this basis the prosecution sought to examine Mr Mills.

[6]               Documents, like other objects, do not speak for themselves.  For this reason the common law imposed strict conditions on the admissibility of documentary evidence.  The admissibility of documents had to be proved.  On the principle that a party should produce the best evidence, the common law required production of the original and would allow a copy only exceptionally if the original were not available.  It required that the party tendering the document prove the source of the document and that it is actually what it is represented to be.  It also disallowed any evidence that purported to vary or contradict the terms of the document.  Some of these conditions applied where documents were offered as original evidence.  At common law a witness was required to identify a document tendered by the proponent party and to establish its relevance, authenticity and other indicia of reliability.  When a document was tendered as testimonial evidence by way of exception to the hearsay rule, further conditions had to be met before it could be admitted for the truth of its contents.  Only then could a document be admitted to "speak," subject to considerations of weight.

[7]               Some of the conditions relating to the admissibility were gradually relaxed at common law but, for the most part, the courts enforced the conditions of admissibility rigorously.  The Supreme Court of Canada eventually accepted that the rigour of the common law regarding documentary evidence should be relaxed and that documents produced in the ordinary course of business should be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, subject to conditions. This development was justified in part by an acceptance that such records inherently bear a heightened degree of reliability.  A parallel development concerning documents was acceptance that copies need not be regarded with the same measure of suspicion as the common law had traditionally expressed and enforced.  The so-called Best Evidence Rule lost much of its force, though the law never abandoned its abiding concern for the reliability in relaxing the admissibility of secondary evidence.

[8]               Parliament and provincial legislatures have occasionally enacted measures to facilitate the admission of documentary evidence.  What are now sections 29 and 30 of the Canada Evidence Act are among some of the more recent amendments of this nature.  Section 29 is a substantial amendment of a previous provision dealing with copies of entries in bank books or records.  At the same time as this amendment was enactedsection 30 was also enacted.  As a result, the various provisions of the Canada Evidence Act concerned with documentary evidence are complex.  There are conflicts and contradictions among them and a notable degree of overlap.

[9]               Section 30 was a direct response to Myers v. The Director of Public Prosecutions.  A majority of the House of Lords refused to relax the common-law restrictions concerning the admissibility of business records and decided that an initiative of this nature should be undertaken, if at all, by Parliament.  The British Parliament did just that and the Canadian Parliament did the same.  It did so before the Supreme Court, in Aresv. Venner, followed the minority in Myers and decided to relax the common-law restrictions on the admission of business documents.

[10]            Section 30 is not without difficulty but it is unnecessary here to explore this provision at length.  It creates an exception to the requirement for the best evidence by allowing a copy of a document to be admitted in evidence.

[11]            There is no doubt that the documents produced by the prosecution are copies of a business record within the meaning of section 30(12).  But this characterisation does not necessarily mean that such copies are admissible only under the terms of that section.  If they are admissible at common law or under any other statutory provision, section 30 need not apply.

[12]            Section 30 plainly would not apply if the prosecution presented Mr Mills with the original documents.  If he were able to authenticate them, that would be an end of the matter.  He would be able to identify the documents and explain what they purport to be.  He would be able to identify and attest at least to his own signature and handwriting upon the documents.  He might also be able to identify the writing of any other person upon the documents.  He would be able to testify whether the copies are correct and complete copies of the original documents.

[13]            The narrow question is whether the issue is any different if the witness is presented with a copy of a document that he originally made.  Framed in this way, the question is whether a copy is admissible in lieu of the original.  It is a question about the best-evidence principle and not about more intricate questions concerning business records.

[14]            It was once held that a copy could be admitted only if the trial judge was satisfied that the original existed and that it was lost, destroyed or otherwise unavailable to the party seeking to tender the copy.  This rule has long since passed.  A trial judge may admit a copy of a document if he or she is satisfied that the copy is as good as the original or if otherwise it is sufficiently reliable.  The criteria applicable to determine whether a copy is sufficiently reliable will vary according to the nature and quality of the copy, the purpose for which it is tendered, and any extrinsic evidence adduced to support its reliability.  In this case I am satisfied by Mr Mill's testimony that the two copies tendered by the prosecution are reliable to assist his testimony concerning the transactions to which they relate.  I am also satisfied that section 30 of the Canada Evidence Actdoes not apply in this case and thus the prosecution was not required to give notice. 

[15]            Section 30 does not apply whenever a party seeks to tender a business record.  It applies when a party seeks to take advantage of the expeditious and less cumbersome procedure for the production of such evidence that Parliament has provided in that section.  Nothing in that provision supplants the common law or the application of any other statutory provision relating to the production of business records.  This is expressly declared in section 30(11) of the Act.

[16]            I would add two comments that are not strictly necessary to dispose of the question on this voir dire.

[17]            The objection before the Court was based upon section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act, which is concerned broadly with business records.  The scope of its application is confirmed by the definitions of "business" and "record" in section 30(12).  Section 29 of the Act is concerned more specifically with copies of banking records.  It is arguable that the two copies at issue here would be admissible under that provision if it is properly construed to include not only entries in ledgers but other documents prepared and recorded in the ordinary course of banking transactions.  If the two copies produced by the prosecution in this case are properly within the scope of banking records contemplated by section 29, they would be admissible according to the terms of section 29(2) and without notice by the prosecution.

[18]            Finally, as this voir dire has taken place within a preliminary inquiry, it is also arguable that the copies tendered by the prosecution may be admitted under section 540(7) of the Code.  This is a new provision and its scope has yet to be mapped by judicial interpretation.  Supposing that the two copies in question were not otherwise admissible at common law or under another statutory provision, the prosecution could seek to tender them with the aid of extrinsic evidence to establish their credibility or trustworthiness – their reliability.  In a case such as this Mr Mills's testimony would serve adequately for this purpose.

[19]            I repeat that the two copies produced in this case are admissible at common law in lieu of the originals because they have been satisfactorily proved and authenticated by the testimony of a witness who participated in writing and signing the originals.

La notion de vie privée & la distinction entre ses différents aspects

R. c. Tessling, 2004 CSC 67 (CanLII), [2004] 3 RCS 432

Lien vers la décision

24                              La distinction entre les aspects du droit à la vie privée selon qu’ils ont trait à la personne, aux lieux ou à l’information nous fournit des outils d’analyse utiles, mais dans une affaire donnée, bien sûr, divers aspects peuvent se recouper.  En l’espèce, par exemple, c’est l’aspect qui a trait à l’information qui domine (les renseignements concernant les activités du défendeur), mais l’aspect qui a trait au lieu intervient aussi parce que, même si la police n’est pas effectivement entrée chez l’accusé, c’est dans sa maison que se déroulaient les activités qui intéressaient les forces de l’ordre.

25                              La vie privée étant une notion protéiforme, il est difficile de fixer la limite du « caractère raisonnable ».  Dans l’arrêt Plant, précité, p. 293, le juge Sopinka a proposé la solution suivante relativement à l’aspect informationnel du droit à la vie privée :

Étant donné les valeurs sous‑jacentes de dignité, d’intégrité et d’autonomie qu’il consacre, il est normal que l’art. 8 de la Charte protège un ensemble de renseignements biographiques d’ordre personnel que les particuliers pourraient, dans une société libre et démocratique, vouloir constituer et soustraire à la connaissance de l’État.  Il pourrait notamment s’agir de renseignements tendant à révéler des détails intimes sur le mode de vie et les choix personnels de l’individu.  —Je souligne.—

26                              Je souligne le mot « notamment » parce que le juge Sopinka a clairement indiqué que son exemple (« des détails intimes sur le mode de vie et les choix personnels ») ne se voulait pas exhaustif et ne devait pas être considéré comme tel.  Cependant, l’arrêt Plant établit clairement que les renseignements dont une personne peut vouloir préserver la confidentialité ne bénéficient pas tous de la protection de l’art. 8.

Liste de ressources utiles à la pratique du droit criminel

THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION par FRANCIS WELLMAN
Lien vers le document
www.ca-nvlaw.com/Art%20of%20X-Exam%20by%20Wellman.pdf‎


THE ART AND PLAN OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
Lien vers le document
http://www.ducharmefox.com/Areas/Custom/ContentFiles/Documents/Art-of-Cross-Examination.pdf


The Art of Cross-examination par Alexander W Street SC
Lien vers le document
http://www.sevenwentworth.com.au/ws-content/uploads/The_art_of_cross-examination.pdf

Le consentement à la fouille

R. v. Atkinson, 2012 ONCA 380 (CanLII)

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[55]         A consent search is lawful, thus reasonable.  A valid consent requires that the consenting party have the required informational foundation for a true relinquishment of the right: R. v. Borden, 1994 CanLII 63 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, at p. 162.

[56]         The consent must be voluntary and informed. To be voluntary, the consent, which may be express or implied, must not be the product of police oppression, coercion or other conduct that negates the consenting party’s freedom to choose whether to allow police to pursue the course of conduct requested or to deny them that right: Wills, at p. 354. To be informed, the consenting party must be aware of

i.                    the nature of the police conduct to which the consent relates;

ii.                  the right to refuse to permit the police to pursue the conduct; and

iii.               the potential consequences of giving consent.

Wills, at pp. 354-355.

La théorie du “Plain View”

R. v. Atkinson, 2012 ONCA 380 (CanLII)

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[57]         The “plain view” doctrine is a common law doctrine that permits the warrantless seizure of things in plain view. To engage this doctrine requires the satisfaction of three conditions:

i.                    the seizing officer must be lawfully in the place of seizure;

ii.                  the evidentiary nature of the item must be immediately apparent to the officer through the unaided use of his or her senses; and

iii.               the evidence must be discovered inadvertently.

L'autorisation implicite d'approcher la porte d'une résidence

R. v. Atkinson, 2012 ONCA 380 (CanLII)

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[45]         The common law recognizes an implied licence for all members of the public, including police officers, to approach the door of a residence and to knock: R. v. Evans, 1996 CanLII 248 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 13. Thus, an occupier is deemed to grant the public, including the police, permission to approach the door and to knock.  Police who act in accordance with this implied invitation do not intrude on the occupant’s privacy: Evans, at para. 13. Unless rebutted by some clear expression of intent, the implied invitation effectively waives the privacy interest that an individual might otherwise have in the approach to the door of his or her dwelling: Evans, at para. 13.

[46]         This implied invitation to knock extends no further than is required to permit convenient communication with the occupant of the dwelling. It follows that only those activities reasonably associated with the purpose of communicating with the occupant are authorized by the “implied licence” to knock: Evans, at para. 15.

[47]         Where state agents approach a dwelling with the intention of gathering evidence against an occupant, they have exceeded any authority implied by the invitation to knock and become engaged in a search of the occupant’s home: Evans, at paras. 16, 18, and 21. Likewise, where police specifically advert to the possibility of securing evidence against an accused by “knocking on the door”, they have exceeded the authority conferred on them by the implied licence to knock: Evans, at para. 20.

[48]         In some circumstances, police officers lawfully present at the door of a residence may lawfully enter the premises. An invitation to enter may be implied from the circumstances, for example from the words and conduct of a person in charge of the place. An implied invitation to enter furnishes lawful authority for the police to be in the residence or other place: R. v. Clarke2005 CanLII 15452 (ON CA), (2005), 196 C.C.C. (3d) 426 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 28.

[49]         When determining whether to imply an invitation to enter a residence from the words and conduct of a homeowner in a brief interaction with a police officer, we should not lose sight of the dynamics of the police-citizen relationship. The essence of the policing function puts citizens on an uneven footing with police. We should not too readily imply an invitation to enter from the absence of objection or mere compliance, any more than we would equate consent with acquiescence or compliance in equivalent circumstances: R. v. Wills 1992 CanLII 2780 (ON CA), (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 348