Comment une infraction peut elle être incluse à une autre & l'amendement d'un acte d'accusation en appel

R. v. Pelletier, 2012 ONCA 566

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[105]   One offence may be included in another in any of three ways:

i.            by description in the enactment creating the offence[1];

ii.            by description in the indictment or count in which the accused is charged[2]; or

iii.           by specific statutory provision[3].

See, R. v. Simpson (No. 2), (1981), 1981 CanLII 3284 (ON CA), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 122 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 133; Luckett v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 185 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1140, at p. 1141.

[106]   An “included offence” is part of the main (principal) offence. The offence charged as described in the enactment that creates it, or in the count that charges it, must contain the essential elements of the included offence: Simpson, at p. 133; R. v. Fergusson, 1961 CanLII 97 (SCC), [1962] S.C.R. 229, at p. 233.

[107]   Section 239(1) of the Criminal Code creates the offence of attempted murder: Simpson, at p. 134. However, the subsection, in particular its phrase “by any means”, does not “describe” the ways in which the offence of attempted murder may be committed: Simpson, at p. 140. The offence of attempted murder may be committed without committing an assault or causing any bodily harm whatsoever: Simpson, at p. 142. It follows that, “as described in the enactment creating it”, attempted murder does not include any crime of assault or unlawfully causing bodily harm: Simpson, at pp. 142-143.

[108]   Sections 662(2)-(6) permit conviction of certain offences on indictments for other crimes.[4] The effect of these provisions is to declare certain offences to be included in other offences. Nothing in these provisions permits a court to convict an accused of aggravated assault on an unparticularized count of attempted murder.

[109]   One offence may be included in another where the commission of the offence charged, as described in the count, includes the commission of another offence: Criminal Code, section 662(1). In other words, apt words of description in the charging count may import as included offences crimes that fall outside those included in the enactment creating the offence or the specific provisions of sections 662(2)-(6).  

[110]   Attempted murder is one of several offences in the Criminal Code that attracts a minimum punishment when firearms are used in its commission. The inclusion of the words “while using a firearm” in a count that charges attempted murder puts an accused on notice that, if a conviction of attempted murder is entered, he or she will be subject to a minimum punishment in accordance with the scheme put in place by sections 239(1)-(3): R. v. Manley, 2011 ONCA 128, (2011), 269 C.C.C. (3d) 40, at paras. 54-61; R. v. D.(A.) (2003), 2003 BCCA 106 (CanLII), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 177 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 29-31. The addition of the phrase “while using a firearm”, does not amount to a particularization of the means by which the offence was committed, thus cannot serve to expand the offences included in the description of the enactment creating the principal offence.

[111]   Counts of attempted murder that do not specify the means used to commit the offence and do not contain other apt words of description include the offence of unlawfully attempting to cause bodily harm: Simpson, at p. 143; R. v. Colburne (1991), 1991 CanLII 3701 (QC CA), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 235 (Que. C.A.), at p. 247.   

[112]   Section 683(1)(g) of the Criminal Code permits a court of appeal, where it considers it in the interests of justice, to amend an indictment, unless the court concludes that the accused has been misled or prejudiced in his or her defence or appeal. The scope of the amendment authority matches that of a trial judge under section 601 and reaches variations between the evidence and the charge: R. v. Irwin (1998), 1998 CanLII 2957 (ON CA), 123 C.C.C. (3d) 316 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 8 and 31.

[113]   In R. v. St. Clair (1994), 1994 CanLII 8719 (ON CA), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 402 (Ont. C.A.), a jury convicted the appellant of an offence that had been erroneously left to them as an included offence on a count that did not specify the means by which the offence charged had been committed. This court amended the indictment on appeal by adding to the count words that described the means by which the principal offence was committed and upheld the conviction of the included offence: St. Clair, at p. 410. In determining whether to make the amendment, the court considered several factors including:

i.            the original indictment;

ii.            the evidence adduced at trial;

iii.         the positions of the parties at trial; and

iv.         the real issues on appeal.

St. Clair, at p. 408.

Les principes élémentaires en matière d'identification selon la Cour d'Appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Pelletier, 2012 ONCA 566

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[89]      Several basic principles inform our decision on this ground of appeal. None require extended examination. 

[90]      First, countless authorities acknowledge the inherent frailties of eyewitness identification evidence, especially in cases that involve fleeting glimpses of unfamiliar persons in stressful circumstances: R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 1996 CanLII 1268 (ON CA), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 445 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 450-451.

[91]      Second, the weight to be assigned to evidence of eyewitnesses is a variable, not a constant. The weight of such evidence is for the trier of fact to determine and will vary according to the circumstances of individual cases: Miaponoose, at p. 452.

[92]      Third, the reliability of eyewitness testimony is not determined by or coextensive with the actual or apparent honesty of, or the confidence in correctness expressed by, the identification witness: R. v. Izzard (1990), 1990 CanLII 11055 (ON CA), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 252 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 255.

[93]      Fourth, as a general rule, in-dock identifications are entitled to little weight in the assessment of the adequacy of the prosecution’s proof on the issue of identity: Izzard, at p. 256; R. v. Williams (1982), 1982 CanLII 3729 (ON CA), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 234 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 235; R. v. A.(F.) (2004), 2004 CanLII 10491 (ON CA), 183 C.C.C. (3d) 518 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 47; and R. v. Nguyen (2000), 2000 CanLII 5742 (ON CA), 132 O.A.C. 354, at para. 41.   

[94]        Fifth, the recommendations of the Sophonow Inquiry about the manner in which photo line-ups should be conducted are persuasive tools to avoid wrongful convictions arising from faulty eyewitness identification, but they are neither conditions precedent to the admissibility of eyewitness testimony nor binding legal dictates for the assignment of weight: R. v. Goulart-Nelson, [2004] O.J. 4010 (C.A.), at para. 11; R. v. Grant, 2005 ABCA 222, (2005), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 376, at para. 6; and R. v. Doyle, 2007 BCCA 548, at paras. 12-13.

[95]      Finally, each case that includes eyewitness testimony as part of the prosecution’s case requires the trier of fact, mindful of its frailties both inherent and patent, to consider it in its entirety, along with and in the context of the balance of the evidence, in deciding whether an accused’s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Goulart-Nelson, at para. 11; Grant, at para. 6; Doyle, at para. 13.

Un enquêteur doit divulguer toute information pertinente, incluant l'existence d'une controverse jurisprudentielle au sujet de la question juridique en litige s'il aborde cela dans son affidavit & cette autorisation sollicitée doit alléguer la commission d'une infraction connue en droit

R. v. Branton, 2001 CanLII 8535 (ON CA)

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The affiant of the Information to obtain the search warrants started out with 11 paragraphs copied from an Information prepared by another officer. Those paragraphs had nothing to do with the police investigation relating to the respondents. The affiant cited two cases favourable to his interpretation of the law and omitted a case against his interest which was contained in the precedent which he copied. The Information contained misstatements of fact and ill-founded conclusions. The affiant did not make full, fair and frank disclosure to the issuing justice. This failure deprived the justice of his right to assess all of the circumstances in deciding whether it was appropriate to issue the warrant. The usable contents of the search warrant failed to satisfy the statutory grounds for issuing the warrant

[16] One of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant is that the search will provide evidence with respect to an offence known to law.

[30] Language in a search warrant that is so careless, filled with inaccuracies, or [reliant] on ritualistic phrases that it masks the true state of affairs and deprives a judicial officer of the opportunity to fairly assess whether the requirements for the issuance of a warrant have been met strikes at the core of the administration of justice: R. v. Hosie (1996), 1996 CanLII 450 (ON CA), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at pp. 398-400, 37 C.R.R. (2d) 97 (Ont. C.A.). If, after cross-examination of the affiant in support of the application for the warrant, there remains no basis upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the warrant, this will amount to a defect in jurisdiction and certiorari to quash the warrant will issue: R. v. Hosie, supra, and Re Church of Scientology and R. (No. 4) (1985), 1985 CanLII 3615 (ON SC), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 499 at p. 500 ff. (Ont. H.C.J.).

[35] An additional ground for quashing the warrants that was argued before the motions judge was whether the search warrants were invalid on their face for failure to comply with s. 487 of the Criminal Code. The search warrants purport to authorize the search and seizure of "things . . . that are being sought as evidence in respect of the commission, suspected commission or intended commission of an offence against the Radiocommunication Act. . . ." [Emphasis added]. The warrant was issued pursuant to s. 487(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. That section limits a search to "evidence with respect to the commission of an offence". In authorizing a search for evidence of the "suspected or intended commission" of an offence, the warrants exceeded the authority prescribed in s. 487.

[36] While the motions judge did not comment on this submission, it appears that the warrant was also invalid on its face.

[37] The motions judge properly quashed the warrants on review. Inasmuch as I would decide this appeal in the respondents' favour, I do not consider it necessary to address the Charter issue that was raised with respect to freedom of expression in s. 2(b).

[41] The real misconduct here was the overseizure of the respondent's goods, not the conduct of the litigation by the Crown. The motion and the appeal raise important legal issues and the Crown was entitled to pursue these issues. The remedy for the overseizure of the respondent's goods is a civil action for damages. Accordingly, while I would dismiss the appeal, I would not award costs against the Crown.

Analyse des principales différences séparant le mandat général du mandat de perquisition traditionnel

Lepage c. R., 2013 QCCA 122 

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[32]        La lutte contre le crime n’est pas forcément chose simple, surtout lorsqu'il s’agit de concilier efficacité du travail policier et droits fondamentaux des individus. Le cas à l’étude en est un exemple frappant.

[33]        En 1993, conscient des limites inhérentes au mandat de perquisition traditionnel prévu à l’article 487 C.cr., le législateur fédéral a décidé de doter les forces policières de pouvoirs d’enquête plus étendus. Il a alors promulgué l’article 487.01 donnant ainsi naissance au mandat dit général.

[34]        Sous la plume du juge MacPherson, la Cour d’appel d’Ontario[4] s’est livrée à une analyse des principales différences séparant le mandat général du mandat de perquisition traditionnel. Je n’entends pas reprendre un exercice avec lequel je suis en parfait accord et me contenterai donc d'un simple rappel en citant quelques passages que j'estime particulièrement éclairants:

[24] There are significant differences between the investigative powers described in s. 487 and those set out in s. 487.01. Unlike s. 487, s. 487.01 is not limited to searches of "a building, receptacle or place". There are no spatial limitations on s. 487.01. Nor is it limited to any particular investigative technique or procedure. Apart from a prohibition against interference with the bodily integrity of a person (s. 487.01(2)), there are no express limits on the investigative methods that may be authorized.

[25] Section 487.01 fundamentally alters the traditional search warrant paradigm. Instead of legislation permitting judicial authorization of a specific investigative method (search and seizure) where certain statutory conditions are met, s. 487.01 speaks to any situation in which the police seek judicial authority to do something that, absent that authority, would constitute a breach of s. 8 of the Charter. Section 487.01 ensures that the determination of whether the police will be allowed to use a specific investigative means (not involving interference with bodily integrity) in any given case will be decided by balancing the state interest in law enforcement and the individual interest in privacy. The state will not be denied access to investigative methods that are constitutionally justified because the relevant statute does not contemplate the specific investigative means that the police seek to use.

[26] Section 487.01 recognizes that Parliament cannot anticipate or imagine all investigative means or techniques that are or will become available to the police. Section 487.01 focuses not on authorizing specific techniques, at least where there is no interference with bodily integrity, but rather on whether the public interest in authorizing the specific investigative technique in issue is sufficiently strong in the circumstances to [page761] overcome an individual's constitutional right not to be subject to an unreasonable search or seizure.

[27] Despite the many differences between the traditional search warrant power in s. 487 and the general warrant power in s. 487.01, their essential structures are the same. Both require that the police obtain judicial authorization based on sworn evidence before engaging in investigative procedures that interfere with an individual's s. 8 rights. Both sections set out statutory prerequisites that must be satisfied before the authorization can be is-sued. Broadly speaking, those prerequisites are used to determine when the public interest in the investigation of crime is sufficiently strong to supersede an individual's s. 8 rights. While the criteria are not identical, they serve the same purpose.

[35]        Le paragraphe 487.01 (1) prévoit trois exigences fondamentales qui conditionnent le pouvoir d’un juge de décerner un mandat général :

487.01 (1) […]

a) si le juge est convaincu, à la suite d’une dénonciation par écrit faite sous serment, qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une infraction à la présente loi ou à toute autre loi fédérale a été ou sera commise et que des renseignements relatifs à l’infraction seront obtenus grâce à une telle utilisation ou à l’accomplissement d’un tel acte;

b) s’il est convaincu que la délivrance du mandat servirait au mieux l’administration de la justice;

c) s’il n’y a aucune disposition dans la présente loi ou toute autre loi fédérale qui prévoie un mandat, une autorisation ou une ordonnance permettant une telle utilisation ou l’accomplissement d’un tel acte.

[36]        Dans le cas à l’étude, la première de ces exigences pose à elle seule problème dans la mesure où, comme le soulignent les auteurs Fontana et Keeshan, les motifs raisonnables doivent nécessairement surpasser le niveau du simple soupçon[5] :

The requirement for consideration by a provincial or superior court judge reflects the expanded intrustive powers given police with the granting of general warrant. However, to authorize a general warrant, the granting judge must find that the standard of proof is one of reasonable probability, a standard more than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the civil test of balance of probabilities and much lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The granting judge must be satisfied that there are reasonnable grounds to believe that information will, could or may be obtained. Absolute certainty is not necessary: R. v. Brand.

[47]        Je rappelle ici que le juge chargé de la révision ne doit pas seulement considérer l’information portée à la connaissance du juge qui décerne le mandat; il doit aussi tenir compte des précisions que la preuve révèle.

[48]        Dans la Reine c. Ha[7], précité, la Cour d’appel d’Ontario constatait la concordance entre les paramètres de révision des mandats de perquisition et ceux concernant la révision des mandats généraux :

[29] Nor does the appellant contest that the trial judge applied the proper test for reviewing the general search warrant issued by Fraser J., namely, whether there was some evidence, as amplified on the review, that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have been granted: see R. v. Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (CSC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, at p. 1452 S.C.R.; R. v. Araujo, 2000 CSC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, [2000] S.C.J. No. 65, at p. 1017 S.C.R.; R. v. Grant, 1999 CanLII 3694 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 327, 132 C.C.C. (3d) 531 (C.A.), at para. 17.

[49]        Un peu plus tard, sous la plume du juge Fish[8], la majorité de la Cour suprême précisait le rôle d’un juge chargé de la révision d’un mandat. Il s’agissait dans cette affaire de la révision d’un mandat de perquisition traditionnel, mais comme je viens de le mentionner, les règles applicables sont les mêmes dans les deux cas :

39. Under the Charter, before a search can be conducted, the police must provide "reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search" (Hunter v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (CSC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 168). These distinct and cumulative requirements together form part of the "minimum standard consistent with s. 8 of the Charter for authorizing search and seizure" (p. 168.)

40. In reviewing the sufficiency of a warrant application, however, "the test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued" (R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 54 (emphasis in original)). The question is not whether the reviewing court would itself have issued the warrant, but whether there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place.

41. The reviewing court does not undertake its review solely on the basis of the ITO as it was presented to the justice of the peace. Rather, "the reviewing court must exclude erroneous information" included in the original ITO (Araujo, at para. 58). Furthermore, the re-viewing court may have reference to "amplification" evidence — that is, additional evidence presented at the voir dire to correct minor errors in the ITO — so long as this additional evidence corrects good faith errors of the police in preparing the ITO, rather than deliberate attempts to mislead the authorizing justice.