Ce qui pouvait être initialement considéré comme un recours raisonnable et légal à la force de la part de l'accusé peut devenir déraisonnable et illégal une fois que la menace a été éliminée ou réduite

R v Bilodeau, 2024 ABCA 149

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[54]           After deliberating for a few hours, the jury returned with the following question:

In relation to the shots against Maurice, if hypothetically the first shot from Anthony was deemed to be self-defence, would the additional shots also be considered self-defence or is each shot evaluated individually against the criteria to determine self-defence.

[55]           The trial judge responded to this question by instructing the jury:

Members of the jury, it is for you to decide after consideration of the totality of the circumstances and the evidence at different points in time whether Anthony Bilodeau was acting in self-defence when he shot Maurice Cardinal. And of course I will reiterate that you are to consider all of the jury charge in relation to the issue of self-defence.

[56]           During discussions between the trial judge and counsel prior to answering the jury’s question, defence counsel objected to the use of the words “different points in time” and indicated that the defence position was that there was one continuous act in relation to Mr. Cardinal and the jury should be instructed that it has to consider all points in time.

[57]           In Khill, the Supreme Court explained that an accused’s actions must be assessed holistically and without artificial compartmentalization, so that the actions of all parties can be appropriately contextualized, stating at paragraph 83:

This broad temporal frame allows the trier of fact to consider the full context of the accused’s actions in a holistic manner. Parliament made a choice not to repeat the freeze-frame analysis encouraged by such concepts as provocation and unlawful assault. Rather than a forensic apportionment of blows, words or gestures delivered immediately preceding the violent confrontation, the “incident” extends to an ongoing event that takes place over minutes, hours or days. Consistent with the new approach to self-defence under s. 34, judges and juries are no longer expected to engage in a step by step analysis of events, artificially compartmentalizing the actions and intentions of each party at discrete stages, in order to apply the appropriate framework to the facts (see, e.g., R v Paice, 2005 SCC 22, [2005] 1 SCR 339, at paras 17-20). For example, where both parties are engaged in aggressive and confrontational behaviour, s. 34(2)(c) does not demand a zero-sum finding of instigation, provocation, cause or consent (paras 21-22). Parliament has now selected a single overarching standard to weigh the moral blameworthiness of the accused’s act in context: reasonableness. This reflects the complexity of human interaction and allows triers of fact to appropriately contextualize the actions of all parties involved, rather than artificially fragmenting the facts.

[58]           In Khill, the Court also stated at paragraph 61, when dealing with the second element of self-defence, under the heading “Did the Accused Do Something for the Purpose of Defending or Protecting Themselves or Another Person from that Use or Threat of Force”, that the analysis must take into account the threat of force as it existed at a particular point in time, not to put an accused’s conduct into a silo, but to assess a confrontation in its full context, in how it evolved and with respect to the accused’s role in its evolution. The Court cautioned decision makers that:

great care is needed to properly articulate the threat or use of force that existed at a particular point in time so that the assessment of the accused’s action can be properly aligned to their stated purpose. Clarity of purpose is not meant to categorize the accused’s conduct in discrete silos, but instead appreciate the full context of a confrontation, how it evolved and the accused’s role, if any, in bringing that evolution about.

[59]           A number of cases recognized that an accused may initially act in self-defence but that continued use of force may result in self-defence no longer being applicable. In R v Whiteley, 2017 ONCA 804, the accused was struck by an individual. The accused then picked up a metal object and struck the individual several times while he was on his knees. The court held at paragraph 8 that it was open to a trial judge to assess the blows with a metal object differently:

We agree with the Crown that the trial judge concluded that some of the blows landed with the metal object could not be justified in self-defence. That conclusion does not turn on an assessment of the appellant’s credibility, but rather on the totality of the evidence, which included the appellant’s testimony and his description of the relevant events in his statement. On that evidence, the trial judge concluded that the appellant continued to use deadly force after, on a reasonable assessment of the circumstances as perceived by the appellant, the use of that degree of force was no longer necessary as the appellant was not in any imminent danger. On that analysis, which was open to the trial judge on the evidence, the self-defence claim failed.

[60]           In R v AA, 2019 BCCA 389, the complainant was insulted by four youths which resulted in a physical fight. The accused, one of the youths, was involved with the other youths in pushing, shoving and hitting the complainant, who was knocked to the ground. Once the complainant was knocked to the ground, there was no concern that he would get up to confront the youths. Nonetheless the accused grabbed a tennis racket and while the complainant was on the ground, struck him a number of times with the racket causing the complainant to lose consciousness. The Court of Appeal at paragraph 38 upheld the conviction and referenced the trial judge’s assessment of the changing legal character of the application of force by the accused:

While the initial application of force by [A.A.] was lawful, that changed during the course of the altercation. Once [B.B.] was down on the ground for the second time, it was no longer necessary or lawful to continue to apply force to [B.B.] with the tennis racket. There was no necessity to beat [B.B.] with his own tennis racket.

The use of such force at that point was no longer proportional. There were two teens on one adult male. The teens had the upper hand. They easily subdued [B.B.] to the ground. [A.A.] did not need to keep striking [B.B.] with the tennis racket to extract himself from the fight or to protect himself or others. The use of the tennis racket at that point was used in retaliation and as a means to injure [B.B.].

[61]           We agree with the Crown that Khill does not stand for the proposition that an accused who initially acts in self-defence can continue his assault long after the threat has ended and past the point of proportionality. The jury in this case was told to assess the appellant’s actions considering all the circumstances as they developed throughout the altercation. That was an appropriate answer to the question.

[62]           The trial judge’s instruction that the jury should consider all the evidence but that they could consider the individual shots in the context of all the evidence to determine whether they amounted to self-defence was correct. It was proper to inform them to consider all of the evidence and to also consider particular points in time. We see no error in the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question.

Principes généraux relatifs aux déclarations spontanées (res gestae)

R v Badger, 2021 SKCA 118 

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[27]           Out-of-court statements are presumptively inadmissible for the truth of their contents: R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 at para 162, [2000] 2 SCR 144; R v Durocher, 2019 SKCA 97 at paras 56–57, 380 CCC (3d) 511; and R v Bear, 2020 SKCA 86 at para 51, 389 CCC (3d) 437. One of the exceptions to this rule is res gestae, with its most common category more modernly and usefully referred to as spontaneous utterance: R v Nurse, 2019 ONCA 260 at paras 58–59 and 78, 145 OR (3d) 241; R v Hall, 2018 MBCA 122 at para 41, [2019] 1 WWR 612 [Hall]; R v Head, 2014 MBCA 59 at para 25, 310 CCC (3d) 474; and R v Khan, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 531 at 540.

[28]           The general nature and test for admissibility of a spontaneous utterance was described in Hall as follows:

[41] A spontaneous (or excited) utterance is one of the categories of res gestae recognised to be a traditional exception to the hearsay rule … . A spontaneous utterance resulting from a startling event is admissible if the circumstances in which it was made exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion and there are no special features of the case that give rise to a real possibility of error … . The circumstances of the making of the statement provide the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness to alleviate any hearsay danger … .

[42] Consideration of this traditional exception is not a mechanical process. Rather, a functional analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the statement should be undertaken … .

…

[58] While hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, if the evidence meets the criteria of a traditional exception to the hearsay rule, it is presumptively admissible because the traditional exceptions “incorporate an inherent reliability component”… .

…

[63] Under the principled approach, questions of admissibility focus on threshold reliability as opposed to the ultimate reliability of the statement which is for the trier of fact to decide. The requirement of reliability is about ensuring the integrity of the trial process. The trial judge must decide whether the given circumstances “sufficiently overcome” the inability to test the hearsay evidence in the regular way … .

[29]           A further description of the exception for spontaneous utterances, with an expansion of the analysis to be applied regarding the necessary contemporaneity, is set out in R v Mullin, 2019 ONCA 890, 383 CCC (3d) 16:

[41] The law permits the introduction of excited or spontaneous utterances as an exception to the rule against hearsay: a “statement relating to a startling event or condition … may be admitted to prove the truth of its contents if it is made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement cause by the event or condition”: David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), at p. 191. In order for a statement to be admissible, “[t]he stress or pressure of the act or event must be such that the possibility of concoction or deception can be safely discounted. The statement need not be made strictly contemporaneous to the occurrence so long as the stress or pressure created by it is ongoing and the statement is made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent”: R v. Khan (1988), 1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 197 (Ont. C.A.), at 207 … .

[30]           The authors of McWilliams’ list two key criteria for admission: “(1) that the statement be made contemporaneous to an unusual, overwhelming event that (2) left the declarant (at the time of the declaration) under pressure or emotional intensity which would give the guarantee of reliability” (footnotes omitted, at para 7:120.20).

[31]           For a spontaneous utterance to be admissible, the circumstances in which the statement was made must be carefully examined in order to determine if the statement in question meets the test of threshold reliability. Trial judges should ask themselves whether the event was so unusual or startling that it would dominate the thoughts and expressions of the person making the utterance. Exact contemporaneity of the startling event or condition is not required, as spontaneity resides on a spectrum and is dependent on the circumstances, but it must be reasonably contemporaneous and the nature of the event must be such that it would still be dominating the mind of the declarant when the statement is made. Some of the cases also require that there be an absence of special features that could likely result in an error by the declarant. For these principles, I rely on the above noted authorities, plus R v Khan, 2017 ONCA 114 at para 15, 45 CCC (3d) 419, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2017 CanLII 49991; R v Liard, 2015 ONCA 414 at paras 63–64, 327 CCC (3d) 126, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2016 CanLII 13758; and R v Andrews, [1987] 2 WLR 413 (HL) at 424 [Andrews].

L'état du droit relatif aux déclarations spontanées (res gestae)

R. v. Head, 2014 MBCA 59

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[25]                    The res gestae categories of spontaneous (or excited) utterances and statements explaining acts are both traditionally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule (see Hodge M. Malek et al., eds., Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed. (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at paras. 31-01–31-04; and Hon. Mr. Justice S. Casey Hill, David M. Tanovich & Louis P. Strezos, eds. McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., looseleaf (Toronto:  Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2012) vol. 1, at para. 7:120:10).  In my view, the established hearsay exception best suited to the admissibility of the “gat” conversation is that of spontaneous (or excited) utterances.

[29]                    The traditional common-law test for the admission of a spontaneous (or excited) utterance as an exception to the hearsay rule was stated as follows by Lord Wilberforce in Ratten v. The Queen, [1972] A.C. 378 (P.C.) (at p. 391):

 

… [H]earsay evidence may be admitted if the statement providing it is made in such conditions (always being those of approximate but not exact contemporaneity) of involvement or pressure as to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion to the advantage of the maker or the disadvantage of the accused.

 

(See R. v. Khan, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 at 540.)

[30]                    In my view, the judge erred in principle by focussing on the fact that the “gat” conversation was not exactly contemporaneous to the shooting.  While the location and timing of the declarant’s statement are relevant factors, they are not determinative (Ratten at p. 389).  A statement can be sufficiently contemporaneous even if made shortly after a declarant flees the scene of a crime (R. v. Grand-Pierre (1998), 1998 CanLII 13202 (QC CA), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 236 at 242-43 (Que. C.A.)).

[31]                    The analysis as to whether a declarant’s statement is sufficiently contemporaneous is functional. A circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness comes from the declarant being under such stress or pressure from the triggering event that the possibility of concoction or distortion when making the statement can safely be disregarded (R. v. Clark (1983), 1983 CanLII 1805 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (2d) 609 at 622 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, [1983] S.C.C.A. No. 253 (QL)).

[32]                    The judge should have weighed all of the surrounding circumstances of the “gat” conversation before deciding whether the possibility of concoction or distortion could be disregarded.  As a result of his error in principle, no deference is owed to his decision on this issue.

[33]                    I am satisfied, based on the record that was before the judge at the time of his decision, that the “gat” conversation was made sufficiently contemporaneous to a shocking and dramatic event: the unanticipated shooting of a rival gang member.  The possibility of concoction or distortion can safely be excluded in such a short period of time where the intervening events do not undermine the statement’s circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.  In my view, the “gat” conversation was admissible under the recognized hearsay exception of spontaneous (or excited) utterances.

[34]                    When hearsay evidence satisfies a traditional recognized exception to the hearsay rule, it is admissible unless it is a rare case where it does not satisfy the indicia of necessity and reliability required by the principled approach to the hearsay rule (Mapara at para. 15).  I do not see this as a rare case where there would be reason to not admit potentially exculpatory evidence that satisfied a traditional exception to the hearsay rule. 

Les critères d'admission des déclarations spontanées (res gestae) résumés par la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Nicholas, 2004 CanLII 13008 (ON CA)

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[88] In R. v. Dakin (1995), 1995 CanLII 1106 (ON CA), 80 O.A.C. 253, [1995] O.J. No. 944 (QL) (C.A.), the accused was charged with the murder of two women who died as a result of burns. The Crown sought to introduce statements made by one of the women an hour after the fire. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the statement under the spontaneous statements exception referred to in R. v. Clark (1983), 1983 CanLII 1805 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (2d) 609, 7 C.C.C. (3d) 46 (C.A.), citing R. v. Khan (1988), 1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 197, 27 O.A.C. 142 (C.A.) at p. 207 C.C.C.:

[A] spontaneous statement made under the stress or pressure of a dramatic or startling act or event and relating to such an occasion may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The stress or pressure of the act or event must be such that the possibility of concoction or deception can be safely discounted. The statement need not be made strictly contemporaneous to the occurrence so long as the stress or pressure created by it is ongoing and the statement is made before there has been time to contrive or misrepresent. The admissibility of such statements is dependent on the possibility of concoction or fabrication. Where the spontaneity of the statement is clear and the danger of fabrication is remote, the evidence should be received. [page23 ]

[89] In my view, the trial judge did not err in classifying the 911 call as falling within the res gestae exception. The call was made within ten minutes of the attack and there has been no suggestion that G.W. had any motive for misrepresenting what happened that night.

[90] Nor do I see any error in the trial judge's finding that the statements she made in the 911 call or in her videotaped statement were necessary and reliable.

[91] With respect to reliability, the 911 call was made approximately ten minutes after the attack, indicating that there was little time to fabricate. It was audiotaped and the police statement was videotaped. The police statement, although not under oath, was not elicited by leading questions. The location of the statement, taken at the police station and made to a person in authority is also indicative of reliability (see R. v. Fleet (2001), 2001 NSCA 158 (CanLII), 48 C.R. (5th) 28, 198 N.S.R. (2d) 228 (C.A.)). The trial judge found that G.W.'s demeanour was credible. Perhaps most significantly, he found an absence of any motive to fabricate and that G.W.'s statement was not consistent with other hypotheses. (See Justice David Watt, Watt's Manual of Criminal Evidence (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at pp. 368-72).

Résumé du droit applicable sur le privilège de l'informateur, incluant lorsque l'informateur se propose de devenir un agent civil

R. c. Giroux, 2021 QCCS 527

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[32]         Il est bien établi qu'un informateur peut devenir un agent de l'État. Ce changement de statut entraîne de sérieuses conséquences juridiques. D'une manière générale, la jurisprudence qualifie ce changement d'étape importante pour l'informateur[2]. Naturellement, un aspect crucial du nouveau statut est la perte du privilège quasi-absolu dont bénéficiait l'informateur.

 

[33]         Ainsi, une fois devenu un agent de l'État[3], l'informateur ne voit plus son identité protégée. Il est à noter que le privilège de l'informateur continue toutefois de s'appliquer relativement à d'autres affaires non reliées, bien que la dualité de statuts soit quelque peu périlleuse.

 

[34]         Déterminer si un acteur est un informateur ou un agent de l'État n'est pas toujours aisé. Voici comment les auteurs de The Law of Privilege in Canada posent la question:

 

Whether, in particular circumstances, a person is an agent or an informant is sometimes difficult to decide. Agents and informants may both be material witnesses to crime. The identity of agents must be disclosed in order that they can be called as witnesses to testify, yet informer's identity is protected in order that they cannot be called to testify. One of the factors determining whether a person is an agent is whether he or she is working at the behest and on behalf of the police in the field. If someone is working on behalf of the police in the field, he or she is likely a police agent who is not covered by privilege. In contrast, if persons are not acting on behalf of the police yet provide information to the police, they are likely to be treated as informants who are afforded privilege protection[4].

 

[35]         La question de savoir si un acteur est sujet au privilège ou s'il est un agent de l'État se soulève généralement en lien avec une problématique de divulgation, notamment mais non exclusivement lorsque, par exemple, l'informateur commet des crimes[5]. En l'espèce cependant, c'est un autre aspect qui est en jeu.

 

[36]         En effet et selon les prétentions de la défense, l'État ne peut se retrancher derrière le privilège mais, simultanément, téléguider un agent au sein d'une enquête criminelle. C'est que dans le cas de l'agent, le rôle de l'État – et de son agent – doivent être adéquatement encadrés afin de préserver l'intégrité de l'enquête mais surtout celle de l'administration de la justice. Dans ce contexte, une entente entre l'État et l'agent sera signée et, le cas échéant, une autorisation de commettre certaines infractions pourra être mise en œuvre dans le cadre du régime prévu par le Parlement aux articles 25.1 et s.

 

[37]         En résumé, l'État ne peut implicitement faire endosser à l'informateur le rôle d'agent pour faire l'économie des obligations et limites inhérentes à ce dernier statut.

 

[38]         C'est cette question qui était, entre autres, devant la Cour d'appel du Québec dans l'arrêt Brind'Amour et al[6].

 

[39]         Cette affaire réunissait nombre de dossiers et autant de jugements d'instance. La question centrale était l'appel d'ordonnances d'arrêt des procédures pour abus de procédure en lien avec la conduite de l'État lors des diverses enquêtes correspondantes. Un aspect important de l'arrêt porte sur la manière dont la police a manipulé la Commission nationale des libérations conditionnelles et les conditions que celle-ci avait imposées à un certain Pierre Tremblay, recruté à des fins d'infiltration.

 

[40]         Cependant, l'aspect pertinent à la présente rubrique porte sur le véritable statut de Pierre Tremblay. Le ministère public considérait qu'il n'était qu'un informateur avant la signature d'une entente avec les policiers. À ce sujet, la juge de première instance avait noté que Tremblay avait reçu des informations stratégiques de la part des policiers et qu'il trafiquait séparément pour son compte, au su et au vu de la police. Elle avait souligné que les policiers l'avaient erronément qualifié d'informateur alors que, dans les faits, il était bel et bien un agent de l'État actif sur le terrain. Elle avait aussi observé que Tremblay avait reçu une mise en garde à l'effet qu'il n'était protégé par aucune immunité relativement aux crimes qu'il commettait.

 

[41]         Discutant de cet aspect, le juge Doyon écrit ce qui suit:

 

La distinction a de l’importance, puisque, souligne la juge Morin, selon la documentation de la GRC, le policier qui agit comme agent couvreur ou agent contrôleur de l’agent civil d’infiltration doit faire en sorte que ce dernier ne commette pas d’actes criminels et ne rencontre pas les personnes visées par l’enquête en dehors du cadre de l’opération. Bref, si Pierre Tremblay est un informateur qui œuvre dans le milieu criminel, on peut comprendre que la GRC ne veuille pas divulguer ses activités criminelles pour ne pas mettre sa vie en danger ni mettre fin à sa collaboration, d’autant qu’il jouit du privilège de l’informateur. Par contre, s’il est agent civil d’infiltration, il est mandaté par la GRC et est sous son contrôle; il doit limiter sa participation à ce qui est nécessaire aux fins de l’enquête, généralement à la suite de scénarios établis par les policiers. On voit bien la conséquence : la GRC ne pourrait sciemment laisser un agent civil d’infiltration commettre des crimes, comme le trafic de drogues, à ses propres fins et en dehors de l’enquête policière, comme elle l’a fait en l’espèce[7] [Les soulignés sont ajoutés].

 

[42]         La Cour d'appel rappelle également la distinction entre un informateur et un agent de l'État. Il importe de reproduire ici encore l'extrait cité par le juge Doyon:

 

In general terms, the distinction between an informer and an agent is that an informer merely furnishes information to the police and an agent acts on the direction of the police and goes "into the field" to participate in the illegal transaction in some way. [...][8].

 

[43]         Appliquant ce qui précède au cas de Pierre Tremblay, la Cour d'appel fait les observations suivantes:

 

•           La police voulait savoir si Tremblay était en mesure d'aider la police à s'attaquer à des projets d'importation;

 

•           La police était au courant des activités criminelles de Pierre Tremblay puisqu'il était, notamment, impliqué dans un trafic de cocaïne déjà visé par une enquête;

 

•           Il avait avisé les policiers de rencontres avec des personnes criminalisées et était sous filature lors de ces rencontres;

 

•           Tremblay avait plusieurs contrôleurs;

 

•           Lors d'une rencontre, l'enquêteur avait demandé à Tremblay de reporter un rendez-vous pour mettre en place une équipe de filature;

 

•           À une autre occasion, Tremblay a rencontré une personne à la demande de l'enquêteur;

 

•           Tremblay a reçu comme instruction de cacher certains faits à son agente de libération conditionnelle.

 

[44]         Confirmant la conclusion de première instance, le juge Doyon écrit:

 

Devant un tel constat, on ne peut aucunement remettre en question la détermination factuelle selon laquelle Pierre Tremblay était un agent civil d'infiltration bien avant la signature de l'entente le 2 septembre 2005. Peut-être ne l'a-t-il pas été dès le 31 décembre 2004, mais cela n'a pas d'importance. En effet, au-delà des mots, ce qui importe c'est que, durant une bonne partie de l'année 2005, la GRC exerçait un contrôle sur les activités de M. Tremblay, tout en sachant qu'il commettait des actes criminels et des bris de conditions en dehors de l'enquête et tout en le laissant néanmoins agir de la sorte. [...][9] [Les soulignés sont ajoutés].

 

[45]         Les auteurs de The Law of Privilege in Canada donnent divers exemples de cette situation.

 

[46]         Un exemple classique est celui de l'informateur qui approche l'accusé et s'enquiert d'une source d'approvisionnement en cocaïne. L'informateur présente ensuite l'accusé à un agent de la police[10]. On a conclu que le privilège était inapplicable parce que l'informateur était plutôt un agent.

 

[47]         Un autre exemple est celui d'un enquêteur privé engagé par la défense et ayant assisté la police dans l'obtention d'une déclaration d'un témoin. Ce qui était déterminant était le fait qu'il avait ainsi assisté la police dans son enquête et avait donc endossé le rôle d'un participant actif à l'enquête policière[11]. Dans cette affaire, la Cour avait écrit:        « Webb was not merely a citizen who quietly provided the police with information about criminal activity with the expectation of confidentiality. Instead he became an active participant in the criminal investigation and as such is not a source or a confidential informant[12] ».

 

[48]         La situation devient cependant moins claire lorsque l'informateur se propose de devenir un agent. À nouveau, voici ce que les auteurs précédents notent à ce sujet:

 

Informers may be more than passive observers of information who pass on information to the police. Informers sometimes volunteer to actively pursue police objectives by following leads or goals discussed with their police handlers. When this occurs, it is more problematic whether the informer has abandoned the role of informer for the role of agent. Whether an informant has become an agent frequently turns on the question of whether the informant has acted at the “direction" of the police"[13] [Les soulignés sont ajoutés].

 

[49]         Enfin, dans une autre décision répertoriée par ces auteurs, un juge d'instance a proposé certains facteurs permettant de distinguer l'informateur de l'agent:

 

Subsequently, the parties have adduced no further evidence that would suggest that the source was anything other than a confidential informant. For example: (1) there is no evidence that the source went "into the field" and conducted any investigative activities at the direction of the police, or participated in the alleged illegal activities of the accused at the suggestion of the police; (2) there is no evidence that the source was directed by the police to attend any particular location, speak to any specific individual, or conduct himself in any particular fashion; (3) there is no evidence that the source expected that, if charges were commenced against the accused, his identity might be disclosed and he might be expected to testify; and (4) there is no evidence of any type of agreement between the police and the source that would support the notion that the source took the "big step" of becoming a police agent in this case. In other words, none of the recognized indicia of police agency are evident in the record of these proceedings. In short, there is simply no evidence that the source was acting as an agent of the police, rather than as a confidential informant[14].

 

[50]         En conséquence et au vu de ce résumé des principes juridiques, la défense doit donc démontrer que l'informateur en l'espèce était, d'une manière ou d'une autre, sous le contrôle de la police avant qu'il ne devienne officiellement un agent civil. L'abus pourrait alors résider dans le fait pour la police de se soustraire aux contraintes se rapportant au statut d'agent civil au profit du simple statut d'informateur, dans le contexte où, bien entendu, cet informateur commettrait par ailleurs des infractions criminelles à la connaissance de la police.