Les règles applicables à la communication de la preuve au stade de l'appel

R. v. Schirmer, 2022 BCCA 214

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[54]      Based on the principles developed and applied in those cases, modified where necessary to fit the appeal context, I consider the following framework to govern the application before us:

•         After conviction and during the appeal process, the Crown is duty-bound to disclose to an appellant any records in its possession or control where there is a reasonable possibility the information may assist the appellant in the prosecution of their appeal.

R. v. Trotta (2004), 2004 CanLII 60014 (ON CA), 23 C.R. (6th) 261 at para. 25 (Ont. C.A.); McNeil at para. 17; R. v. Johnston, 2019 BCCA 107 at paras. 47, 59–60, 66 [Johnston (2019)]; R. v. Moazami, 2020 BCCA 3 at paras. 37, 48; R. v. Orr, 2020 BCCA 319 at para. 23.

•         This is a first party disclosure obligation. It subsists throughout the appeal proceedings. New information that falls in its scope must be disclosed when received. The Crown’s duty to disclose first party records is triggered upon request and there is no requirement that the appellant apply to the appeal court for disclosure.

Gubbins at para. 19.

•         For the purpose of first party disclosure, the Crown is the prosecuting Crown. All other federal and provincial Crown entities, including police agencies, are third parties.

R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46 at para. 11.

•         However, police agencies have a corollary disclosure obligation to provide the Crown with the “fruits of the investigation” that led to the convictions at issue in the appeal, as well as any additional information that is “obviously relevant” to the appeal.

McNeil at paras. 14, 23–24; Gubbins at para. 23; R. v. Pascal, 2020 ONCA 287 at para. 106.

•         Consequently, when the Crown becomes aware of information in the possession of a police agency or other public entity that is potentially relevant to the appeal, it has a duty to make reasonable inquiries of that agency or entity and to obtain the information, where reasonably feasible, for the purpose of assessing whether it constitutes first party disclosure and must be provided to the appellant.

McNeil at paras. 49–50; Quesnelle at paras. 12, 18; R. v. McKay, 2016 BCCA 391 at para. 50, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37315 (20 April 2017); Gubbins at para. 21; Moazami at para. 50.

•         First party disclosure includes the “fruits of the investigation”, as well as any records beyond the original investigative file that are “obviously relevant” to the appeal. Operational records or background information generally do not fall in scope.

McNeil at paras. 53–54; Gubbins at paras. 22–23; Johnston (2019) at para. 36(e)(ii).

•         The Crown is entitled to withhold first party records if the records are clearly irrelevant, privileged or their disclosure is otherwise governed by law. When first party records are withheld, the appellant can apply for production under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The Crown bears the onus of justifying the non-disclosure.

McNeil at para. 18; World Bank Group v. Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 at paras. 114–115; Gubbins at para. 19.

•         First party records sought in support of a fresh evidence application that are neither subject to a statutory prohibition on disclosure nor privileged can only be justifiably withheld on the basis of irrelevance. The Crown must show there is no reasonable possibility the records could assist on the application to introduce fresh evidence, and no reasonable possibility the records may be received as fresh evidence in the appeal.

Trotta at paras. 25–28; Johnston (2019) at para. 80.

•         Assessing whether records constitute first party records is context-sensitive. In the appeal context, this assessment must be informed by the possible uses of the records in support of an appellant’s grounds of appeal.

McKay at para. 103; Johnston (2019) at paras. 43, 61–65, 80; Moazami at para. 50; Orr at paras. 3, 23–24; R. v. Johnston, 2021 BCCA 34 at para. 340 [Johnston (2021)], leave to appeal to SCC granted, 39635 (2 December 2021).

•         If the material requested by an appellant consists of third party records, the onus is reversed. The Crown has no obligation to produce this material and the appellant can only establish an entitlement to production if they show that the records are “likely relevant” to the appeal.

O’Connor; McNeil at para. 28; Johnston (2019) at paras. 42, 132.

•         The assessment of “likely relevance” in the appeal context must be informed by the possible uses of the records in support of an appellant’s grounds of appeal.

Johnston (2019) at para. 80; Orr at paras. 3, 23–24; Johnston (2021) at para. 340.

•         To meet this test in support of a fresh evidence application, the appellant must show there is a reasonable possibility the records could assist on the application to introduce fresh evidence, and a reasonable possibility the records may be received as fresh evidence in the appeal.

Trotta at paras. 25–28.

•         In assessing “likely relevance”, the Court does not determine whether the records would be admissible as fresh evidence; rather, at the production stage, the assessment is focused on the reasonable possibility of admissibility. The latter threshold is necessary to prevent fishing expeditions.

Gubbins at para. 28.

•         In recognition of the fact that the appellant will not have seen the records, the burden to show “likely relevance” is not onerous. However, the mere assertion that a third party record is relevant to the credibility or reliability of a witness at the trial will not suffice, even where that witness was not peripheral. Instead, the appellant must point to some case-specific evidence or information that objectively justifies the assertion of “likely relevance”. They must show that the sought-after records realistically carry the potential to assist on the application to introduce fresh evidence, and realistically carry the potential to be received as fresh evidence.

Gubbins at paras. 27–28; R. v. Dunbar, Pollard, Leiding and Kravit, 2003 BCCA 667 at para. 69, citing R. v. Batte (2000), 2000 CanLII 5751 (ON CA), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at para. 75 (Ont. C.A.).

•         In an application for the production of third party records, an appellant must serve notice on the record holders, along with a subpoena (unless waived), requiring that the records be brought to court for possible production after a hearing.

O’Connor; McNeil at para. 27; Gubbins at para. 25; Johnston (2019) at para. 149; York (Regional Municipality) v. McGuigan, 2018 ONCA 1062 at para. 73.

•         If an appellant meets the test for “likely relevance”, the appeal court will proceed to review the records, assess their actual relevance and weigh relevant competing interests as engaged by the particular circumstances of the case, including assertions of legislated confidentiality or privilege.

Dunbar at paras. 48–70; McNeil at para. 35; World Bank at para. 113.

L'obligation de communication de la preuve vue par la Cour d'appel de Colombie-Britannique

R. v. S.F., 2024 BCCA 413

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[55]      There is a well‑known distinction between “first party” disclosure of all relevant material in the possession of the prosecuting Crown agency as described in the seminal case of R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, and court‑ordered production of likely relevant “third party” material as originally articulated in O’Connor. The distinction between these two categories of materials, and the circumstances in which the prosecuting Crown agency may have a duty to assist in “bridging the gap” between the two, was addressed at length in R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, and once again in R. v. Gubbins, 2018 SCC 44.

[56]      The present case involves an application for both first party disclosure and third party production in connection with an appeal from conviction. The legal principles that operate in this particular context have been fully canvassed in a series of recent decisions from this Court, namely R. v. Johnston, 2019 BCCA 107, R. v. Schirmer, 2022 BCCA 214, and R. v. Lowry, 2023 BCCA 399. Without retreading all of the legal ground covered in those decisions, we would identify seven key legal principles emerging from the jurisprudence.

[57]      First, the prosecuting Crown agency has a continuing duty to meet its disclosure obligations while a matter is under appeal: Schirmer at para. 54, bullets 1–2. This includes an ongoing duty to “bridge the gap” between first party disclosure and third party production by considering whether material in the possession of third party Crown agencies is “obviously relevant” to the appeal proceedings: Schirmer at para. 54, bullets 5–6. Investigative agencies have an ongoing corollary obligation to provide the Crown with the “fruits of the investigation” that led to the convictions at issue in the appeal, as well as any additional information that is “obviously relevant” to the appeal: Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 4.

[58]      Second, to determine the applicable relevance threshold, it is necessary to ascertain whether the materials which are the subject of the application are first party records as contemplated in Stinchcombe, or third party records as contemplated in O’Connor and McNeil. As a general rule, first party records are (i) those in the possession or control of the prosecuting Crown agency, and (ii) those held by the police or any other Crown entities that “ought to have been supplied” to the prosecution because they were “fruits of the investigation”, or otherwise “obviously relevant”. Materials that do not fit within either of these categories are properly characterized as “third party” records: Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 6, applying Gubbins at paras. 22–24; McNeil at paras. 53–54; Johnston at para. 36, bullet 5.

[59]      Third, where the materials sought by the appellant are properly characterized as first party records, then unless the records are privileged or subject to statutory restrictions on their release, the burden will be on the Crown to show that there is no reasonable possibility that the requested records could assist the appellant in prosecuting the appeal: Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 8.

[60]      Fourth, where the materials sought are classified as third party records, the burden is “reversed” such that it falls on the appellant to show a reasonable possibility that the records are likely relevant in that they could assist in the prosecution of the appeal: Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 10; Lowry at paras. 15–16.

[61]      Fifth, the concept of relevance is context‑specific. In the appellate context, “the relevance test for disclosure or production of records is generally whether there is a reasonable possibility the records might assist the appellant in prosecuting an appeal”: Johnston at para. 80. In other words, the assessment of relevance in the appellate context “must be informed by the possible uses of the records in support of the appellant’s grounds of appeal”: Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 11 citing Johnston at para. 80. The questions to ask are (i) whether the records that are the subject of the application realistically carry the potential to assist in an application to introduce fresh evidence, and (ii) whether the fresh evidence application stands some realistic chance of success: Lowry at para. 16; Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 12. This relevance threshold, though significant enough to weed out applications that are speculative and unmeritorious, is not an onerous one: Lowry at para. 18; Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 14. The appeal court’s role on such an application is not to determine whether the records would be admissible as fresh evidence, but rather to determine whether the records could realistically assist in a potentially successful fresh evidence application: Lowry at para. 18; Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 13.

[62]      Sixth, in an application for first party disclosure, where the records in issue are not privileged or subject to any statutory disclosure restrictions, and the Crown is unable meet the burden of showing that there is no reasonable possibility they could assist the appellant in the prosecution of the appeal, then the analysis comes to an end. The appellant’s application must be granted, and the appeal court will issue an order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code: Schirmer at para. 54, bullets 7–9.

[63]      Seventh, in an application for third party production, even where the appellant meets the burden of showing a reasonable possibility that the records could assist in the successful prosecution of the appeal, the analysis is not over. The appeal court must go on to consider assertions of privilege, legislated confidentiality, third party privacy interests, and other third party rights that could weigh against the issuance of a production order: Lowry at para. 19; Schirmer at para. 54, bullet 16. The court must consider all of these things before determining whether an order under s. 683(1)(a) should issue for production of third party records.

Le simple fait d’être en colère ou de proférer des insultes ne constitue pas en soi une menace au sens du Code criminel, pas plus que le fait d’exprimer l’intention de « détruire légalement » une personne

Schiro c. R., 2025 QCCS 3516

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[31]        Citant les arrêts R. c. McRae[10] et R. c. McCraw[11] de la Cour suprême du Canada, ainsi que l’arrêt Patoine c. R.[12] de la Cour d’appel du Québec, la juge résume le droit applicable de la manière suivante :

[32] La question de savoir si des mots constituent une menace doit être tranchée selon une norme objective. L’élément de faute est prouvé s’il est démontré que les mots proférés visent à intimider ou être pris au sérieux et l’absence d’intention de mettre à exécution n’est pas un élément essentiel. Par ailleurs, l’expression « lésions corporelles » comprend la blessure psychologique grave ou importante.[13] (Références omises)

[32]        À la lumière de la preuve retenue, la juge était bien fondée de conclure que les paroles de l’appelant, lorsque considérées - comme il se doit - dans le contexte de l’ensemble de la conversation, constituaient une menace au sens de l’alinéa 264.1(1)a) du Code criminel.

[33]        Il est exact, comme le reconnaissent les parties, que le simple fait d’être en colère ou de proférer des insultes ne constitue pas en soi une menace au sens du Code criminel, pas plus que le fait d’exprimer l’intention de « détruire légalement » une personne.  Toutefois, il est manifeste que la présente affaire comportait des éléments additionnels permettant à la juge de conclure à l’existence d’une menace au sens juridique du terme.

[34]        En plus d’avoir exprimé sa colère, d’avoir injurié les agents de Passeport Canada et d’avoir menacé de les poursuivre, l’appelant a mentionné à plus d’une reprise qu’il est mieux pour eux que son passeport soit prêt avant 13h00, sans quoi il se rendra au bureau de Montréal; qu’ils feraient mieux d’appeler la police et les militaires; qu’ils auront besoin d’assistance physique et psychologique après ce qui va se passer; et que ce sera un « bloody hell » ou un « bloody mess ».

[35]        Conformément à la jurisprudence, la juge devait analyser la conversation dans son ensemble et non en vase clos, et ce, en fonction du « sens qu’une personne raisonnable donnerait aux mots, eu égard aux circonstances dans lesquelles ils ont été proférés ou transmis »[14].  Dans le contexte de la présente affaire, la juge a eu raison de conclure que les paroles prononcées par l’appelant constituaient une menace au sens du Code criminel.

[36]        En ce qui concerne l’élément de faute (mens rea), l’argument de l’appelant selon lequel la juge aurait omis de l’examiner ne saurait être retenu.  La juge rappelle d’abord qu’il appartient à la Couronne de prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable « les éléments essentiels de l’infraction dont le défendeur fait l’objet »[15].

[37]        Elle aborde ensuite expressément la question de la mens rea, en affirmant que « l’élément de faute est prouvé s’il est démontré que les mots proférés visent à intimider ou être pris au sérieux (...) »[16].  Elle se réfère aux arrêts R. c. McRae, R. c. McRaw et Patoine c. R., précités, qui traitent de cette question, et souligne que l’intention de mettre à exécution la menace n’est pas un élément essentiel de l’infraction.

[38]        La juge procède, comme déjà mentionné, à une appréciation détaillée des témoignages et de l’ensemble de la preuve.  Elle rejette le témoignage de l’accusé - une conclusion factuelle exempte d’erreur susceptible de révision - et retient celui de l’employée du bureau des passeports, une conclusion également exempte d’erreur.

[39]        La juge conclut son jugement en ces termes :

[44] Le but d’une menace au sens du Code criminel est de faire craindre une personne pour sa sécurité ou celle d’autrui.  C’est exactement ce que le défendeur crée par ses propos lors de cet appel et le Tribunal estime que la preuve démontre hors de tout doute raisonnable qu’il a menacé de causer des lésions corporelles ou la mort à des employés de Passeport Canada.

POUR CES MOTIFS, LE TRIBUNAL :

[45] DÉCLARE le défendeur coupable.[17]