R. c. Mballa-Paulotte, 2024 QCCS 2840
[584] Earlier, I referred to the authors regarding this issue. I said that general information concerning the functioning of cellphone networks could be presented to the jury by lay witnesses, but more sophisticated explanations would require an expert.
[585] In terms of admissibility, it appears that the issue rests on the degree of generality or, said conversely, the degree of specificity.
[586] Here is how the authors addressed the question:
It is now accepted in many jurisdictions that it is not necessary to call an expert to testify about how cellular communication networks generally work. Instead, a representative from a cellular network service provider who is otherwise not an expert in the area of the design and operation of such networks is allowed to testify about the general operation of these networks without being qualified as an expert. This is because the witness is attesting to a “fact” rather than offering an opinion. The witness can, by reason of their knowledge, observation, and experience in dealing with cellular technology, testify as to what are now considered “uncontroversial” facts about the operation of cellular communication networks.[124]
[587] These uncontroversial facts speak to such things as the registration of a mobile device at the site with the strongest signal or the closest tower, or to capacity of cell sites, obstruction or clearance, presence of water, etc.[125]
[588] Judicial notice could be taken of these facts, including “directional movement”. Directional movement was described as “the movement of a cellphone over a particular time period by reference to the location of the different cell sites it connected to (the approximate generalized location of the phone at particular points in time)”.[126] The authors added: “However, it would not be appropriate to take judicial notice of precise location”.[127]
[589] Contra, an expert could be needed in order to go beyond these generalities. It is worth citing the authors on this point given the differences between the proposed evidence of Mr. Sadoun and that of Mr. Poirier/Ms. Létourneau.
[590] Describing the “precise configuration of a cellular site or the engineering associated with a cellular network” are matters that go beyond the general facts of which judicial notice could be taken. The area of expertise would then be radio frequency engineering. The authors noted the following:
[…] Beyond describing the general rule, the expert can discuss the physics of wave propagation (the way in which a radio signal can be reflected, refracted, or obstructed) and also how things such as terrain, land use clutter, type of setting, and parameters and engineering of a particular cellular tower must be taken into account when seeking to establish the location of a particular device at a particular time. This type of evidence clearly goes beyond what a trier of fact could conclude as a matter of common sense and goes beyond the “general” rule as to the operation of cellular phone towers. […]
Ultimately, because the court is relying on the expertise of the witness they may be asked to opine on the “likely” location of a mobile phone at a particular time considering the various parameters that need to be considered. This was the nature of the evidence offered by the expert in R v Oland, where a radio engineer provided an opinion about the “most likely” location of a mobile phone at a particular point in time.[128]
[591] At some point during case management, it appeared that Décarie J. raised the issue of specialized witnesses with the parties. To recall, defence counsel referred to the Araghoune and Al Sherifi decisions in an email that was filed in voir dire 17.
[592] In Araghoune,[129] the Superior Court acknowledged that Ms. Létourneau could testify as a lay witness given the widespread knowledge of the basic technology relating to cellphones. In that context, Longpré J. noted the following: “Bien que la preuve de géolocalisation à l’aide des sites cellulaires ne soit pas très précise quant au lieu où se trouve l’utilisateur d’un téléphone, elle est néanmoins utile et pertinente, car elle est susceptible d’aider le jury à déterminer si une personne associée à un cellulaire se trouve dans un certain périmètre ou accomplit un trajet vers un lieu pertinent ou à un moment cadrant avec les faits reprochés aux accusés”.[130]
[593] The same conclusion was reached in Al Sherifi.[131] Mandeville J. added that any inferences to be drawn from the facts adduced by the specialized witness is to be left to the jury. What a specialized witness could say about geolocation is of a general nature. This is how she described the proper level of generality: “Tel qu’elle l’a mentionné dans son témoignage lors du voir-dire, elle est en mesure de décrire au Tribunal les différents facteurs qui peuvent affecter la captation d’un signal par un site cellulaire plutôt que par un autre (par exemple la présence d’un plan d’eau qui peut faciliter la transmission du signal). Cependant, elle n’entend pas donner d’opinion sur une communication précise, ni conclure que si une communication a été captée via le site cellulaire X plutôt que Y, c’est donc que le téléphone était localisé à un endroit précis. […] Par ailleurs, cette preuve est pertinente car bien que la preuve de géolocalisation ne soit pas précise, elle est néanmoins utile car susceptible d’aider le juge des faits à déterminer si un individu associé à un cellulaire se trouve dans un certain périmètre ou accomplit un trajet vers un lieu pertinent au dossier à un moment cadrant avec les faits reprochés”.[132]
[594] Both of Longpré J. and Mandeville J. referred to the well-known decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Hamilton, then Cyr,[133] to which one can add the Ranger decision rendered a year prior.[134] These decisions stand for the proposition that specialized witnesses are limited to generalities, i.e., approximation, concerning geolocation. More specific, exact, or detailed geolocation requires expert evidence.
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